

Shared Pasts in Central and Southeast Europe,
17th–21st Centuries:
Hungarian and Bulgarian Approaches

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**Shared Pasts in Central and Southeast Europe,
17th–21st Centuries:
Hungarian and Bulgarian Approaches**

Editors

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“Shared Pasts in Central and Southeast Europe: New Sources,
New Approaches”



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Abbreviations

a.e.	архивна единица [archival unit]
АМВнР	Архив на Министерството на външните работи – София [The Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs – Sofia]
АВП РФ	Архив внешней политики Российской Федерации
БЕ	Български език
в.	век
Год. СУ	Годишник на Софийския университет
ЕЛ	Език и литература
РР	Родна реч
ОДА-Враца	Отдел „Държавен архив” – Враца при Дирекция „Регионален държавен архив” – Монтана [Section of the “State Archives” – Vratsa at the Department of “Regional State Archives” – Montana]
ИБИД	Известия на Българското историческото дружество
ИДА	Известия на държавните архиви
ИПр	Исторически преглед
М.	Москва
МПр	Македонски преглед
НА-БАН	Научен архив на БАН [The Scientific Archives of the BAS]
оп.	опис [inventory]
Пер. сп. на БКД в София	Периодическо списание на Българското книжовно дружество в София
РГАНИ	Российский государственный архив новейшей истории
С.	София
См.	Смотрите [See]
СПб.	Санкт-Петербург
ф.	фонд [fond]
ЦДА	Централен държавен архив – София [The Central State Archives – Sofia]
BAS	Bulgarian Academy of Sciences
BayHStA	Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv

BHR	Bulgarian Historical Review – Sofia
Bp.	Budapest
cs.	csomó
ADBFP	Documents on British Foreign Policy
EtB	Etudes balkaniques – Sofia
Ethn.	Ethnographia – Budapest
FO	Foreign Office
Ford.	Fordítás
füz.	fűzet
HAS	Hungarian Academy of Sciences
Ism.	Ismertetés
Ld.	Lásd [see]
ÖHHStA	Österreichische Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv
ÖHHStA PA	Österreichische Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv, Politische Archiv
MmL	Moson Megyei Levéltár [The Moson County Archives]
MNL (OL)	Magyar Nemzeti Levéltár (Országos Levéltár) [The Hungarian National Archives]
MREZsL	Magyarországi Református Egyház Zsinati Levéltára – Budapest [The Archives of the Council of the Hungarian Reformed Church – Budapest]
MNy	Magyar Nyelv
RAS	Russian Academy of Sciences
SML	Sopron Megye Levéltára [The Sopron County Archives]
StB	Studia balkanica – Sofia
sz.	század [century]
t.	tétel
Tört. Szle	Történelmi Szemle – Budapest
űő.	úgyanő [the same author]
Vol.	Volume

Papers included in the current volume were prepared in the framework of the HAS and BAS joint international research project entitled “Shared Pasts in Central and Southeast Europe: New Sources, New Approaches”. They present research results and understandings of scholars from Hungary and Bulgaria (and Russia as an invited guest) of a shared past in contexts of contacts and conflicts, from the standpoint of the historical events behind the curtains, parallelisms and difference concerning social, economic, religious and cultural aspects, mentality. Some of them participated in the *Hungarian-Bulgarian history conference* carried out within the abovementioned project on the topic of “*Contacts and Conflicts in Central and Southeast Europe: Hungarian and Bulgarian Approaches*”, held in *Budapest* on *May 13-14, 2014*.

**Congratulatory Address by H. E. Mrs. Biserka Benisheva,
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Bulgaria
to Hungary to the Participants in the Conference**

Dear Director General of the Reserch Center for the Humanities
at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences,

Dear Chairs of the Hungarian and Bulgarian Parts of the Joint
Academic Commission of Historians,

Dear members and researchers of the National Academies
and Universities in Hungary and Bulgaria,

I am honoured to be here today for the opening of the International Conference “Contacts and Conflicts in Central and Southeast Europe: Hungarian and Bulgarian Approaches”. Indeed the conference is a timely opportunity to again and again exchange scientific research and findings regarding the historical past of our neighbouring regions – Southeast and Central Europe. Both regions, being part of the pan-European cultural heritage, poses specific identity, based on the lessons learnt during historical periods of glory and unfortunately of troubles. The archives, researched by historians, reveal that shared understanding of the past, define the development of a common future of two brave

nations, willing to guarantee the prosperity of their people. In regional context the archives reveal that the two neighbouring regions have influenced each other, have developed an extensive network of contacts economically, culturally and people-to-people, have tried to assist each other at difficult historical times.

And I wish to extend acknowledgments to the researchers of both Academies of Science for their dedicated work in the frame of the joint academic project “Shared Pasts in Central and Southeast Europe: New Sources, New Approaches” and in particular to the members of Hungarian – Bulgarian Joint Academic Commission of Historians. The track record of the Joint Commission over the years has been impressive and have testified to the need of such type of studies for the benefit of the next generations.

At present Bulgaria and Hungary share common values and are two champions of peace and stability in their respective regions. Both states share the view that unification of Europe will only be completed once all the countries in the Western Balkans join the European Union.

I avail of this opportunity to congratulate the organizers of the conference and to wish all of you every success in your scientific endeavours. I will be delighted to host you at the Bulgarian Embassy in Budapest for a closing reception at the end of the conference and to get informed of your future plans for cooperation.

**Congratulatory Address by Prof. DSc. Pál Fodor, Director
General of the Research Centre for the Humanities at the
HAS to the Participants of the Conference**

Her Excellency, Dear Colleagues, dear guests!

I am delighted and very proud to greet you all in the international scientific conference entitled “Contacts and Conflicts in Central and Southeast Europe: Hungarian and Bulgarian Approaches”, which is realized within the frame of the joint academic project “Shared pasts in Central and Southeast Europe.

New Sources, New Approaches". The event is organised by the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Research Centre for the Humanities, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, Institute for Historical Studies and the Bulgarian-Hungarian Joint Academic Commission of Historians, and kindly supported by the Bulgarian Cultural Institute in Budapest and the Embassy of the Republic of Bulgaria in Hungary for which I would like to express my gratitude to Her Excellency Biserka Benisheva, ambassador of the Republic of Bulgaria.

The communication between the historical institutes of the two academies is mainly realized through the activity of the Bulgarian-Hungarian Joint Academic Commission of Historians which was (re)established in 2006, and has an unquestionable role in coordinating the scientific activities and tasks. In the recent years the cooperation of the two institutions resulted in the publication of three books (two of them were published last year containing the collected studies of the last joint conference held in Sofia in 2012, entitled 'Regions, Borders, Societies, Identities...') a separate volume of studies in the peer-reviewed Bulgarian Historical Review and several online publications. Beyond this, the bilateral agreement promoted the realization of two Bolyai Scholarships in Hungary by providing accommodation and research possibilities in the Bulgarian archives, which resulted in two volumes on the society and economy of the Balkan peninsula. The cooperation also enhances the opportunity for Hungarian doctoral students to finish their dissertation.

Being so fruitful, the bilateral agreement for the cooperation has been renewed several times. The recent project lasts till the end of 2015. The Hungarian partner in its project plan – beyond the research on social and diplomatic history of the peninsula – outlined a methodological workshop for academic researchers for the last project year and lectures on history in Hungarian language for the students of the Sofia University.

The significance of this event and this cooperation can be underlined by the fact that this is the only operating academic-level cooperation of the HAS RCH Institute of History with any of the Balkan countries. This is true even if last year our institute

established very good direct relations with both Croatian Institutes of History and in February this year we organised a big joint conference on the historical contacts of the two nations during the 800 years of common statehood. To this I can now add another promising development: in March this year we got in touch with the Institute for Balkan Studies of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts and agreed to publish a volume in English on the Serbian-Hungarian relations and mutual perceptions in the 19th and 20th centuries.

Devoted the improvement of the international relations a new department has just been founded at our institute to undertake scientific research related to Balkan affairs and to coordinate other public activities including the promotion of the implementation of Balkan studies in higher education.

Our future goal is to move on creating either bilateral or even multilateral agreements with the academies of the peninsula, as well as to elaborate a joint strategy of historical research enabling us to create a network of cooperation with western research centers and that way promoting the accessibility to financial sources (through international applications and scholarships). In this regard our institution tries to function as a link between the peninsula and Western Europe.

And finally, let me recall a personal memory. It was maybe at the end of 2011 that Penka Peykovska came to see me and asked me to do my best in order to keep the joint academic commission of our historians alive. She visited me because by that time it had already become public that I would be appointed the new director of the institute. She deemed it necessary to draw my attention to the work of the commission and asked for my support because she was worrying about the future of the common projects already under way. During our talk I promised her to do my best and I emphasised my commitment to the Bulgarian-Hungarian cooperation. I hope that since then I have been able to live up to her expectations. As I mentioned we published two volumes recently. We spared no efforts and means that this conference has really come true. And I hope that due to our joint efforts we will be able to continue our common projects in the future, too.

I would like to conclude by thanking all of you for having accepted our invitation and contributed to the realization of this meeting either by giving a lecture or by doing hard organization work. My special thanks go to my colleague Gábor Demeter for the excellent scientific and organisational work he has done. I wish You, I wish us a very good and fruitful conference. Welcome to our Institute, welcome to Hungary.

**Congratulatory Address by Prof. DSc. Valery Stoyanov,
Chairman of the Bulgarian Part of the Joint Academic
Commission of Historians**

Your Excellency Benisheva, Ambassador of the Republic of Bulgaria to Hungary,

Dear Professor Pál Fodor, Director General of the Research Centre for Humanities at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences,

My dear Professor Imre Rész, Chairman of the Hungarian Part of the Joint Academic Commission of Historians,

Dear Colleagues,

Ladies and Gentlemen!

First of all let me say that I am very glad to be here with you.

There are almost ten years since we renewed our scientific cooperation. The first joint project between both Institutes of History started in the year of 2004 – the one at the HAS and the one at the BAS, at the end of which we agreed with the need of re-creating the Joint Hungarian-Bulgarian Commission of Historians.

In the year of 2006 the Commission was born – we have already had three joint projects behind us, which unified the efforts of many colleagues of both sides – specialists in the history of the Ottoman and the Hapsburg empires, as well as in contemporary history of Central and Southeastern Europe, including the ones of Hungary and Bulgaria. We have already investigated some aspects of the Ottoman Balkan past, the peculiarities of the National revival and the National state building, some problems of war and peace, of the demographic development,

the minority issue, of some auxiliary sciences of history, and so on.

In this sense, the work of the Joint Commission is very useful. And perhaps the greatest contribution to that came from the secretaries of the Commission – now Dr. Gábor Demeter from Hungarian side and Assoc. Prof. Dr. Penka Peykovska from the Bulgarian side. They are the living flame of our Commission. Let us thank them cordially for their dedicated work.

Their latest success is the preparation of the two books that will be presented today at the Bulgarian Cultural Institute in Budapest. These beautiful editions could not have been realized without the kind support of the Director General of the Research Centre for Humanities, Prof. DSc. Pál Fodor. Thank you very much indeed for these two splendid works and for all that you have done for us.

Finally, let me express my very hope, that despite of all difficulties of the time in what we live and work, the Hungarian-Bulgarian Joint Commission of Historians will further continue doing its useful work in clearing different aspects of the joint historical processes in Central and Southeastern Europe, bringing together the efforts of the Hungarian and Bulgarian historical humanitarians.

Thank you!

**Begrüßungsworte des Vorsitzenden der Ungarn-Sektion in
der Bulgarisch-Ungarischen Historikerkommission
Hon. Dozent Dr. Imre Ress**

Ihre Exzellenz Frau Botschafterin Benisheva, verehrter Herr Generaldirektor Fodor, lieber Freund Stoyanow, werte Kolleginnen und Kollegen!

Die beiden Vorredner/in würdigten schon ausführlich die neuartigen regionalen Problemstellungen und die methodischen Erneuerungen der Tagungen der Bulgarisch-Ungarischen Historikerkommission und hoben besonders hervor, dass die wissenschaftlichen Erträge der Aufsätze unserer Konferenzbände

sich vor allem auch durch die Erschließung und Einbindung neuer Quellen auszeichneten. Um ihre Gedankengänge weiterzuführen, erlauben Sie mir auf die unerläßliche Edition einer bedeutenden Quellengruppe aufmerksam zu machen, die eine fachliche Herausforderung und moralische Pflicht für die ungarische Geschichtswissenschaft darstellt und an der sich auch wichtige Intressen der bulgarischen Kollegen/innen knüpfen. Es handelt sich um die allgemeine Zugänglichmachung der Schriftennachlässe von drei ungarischen historischen Persönlichkeiten, István Burián, Lajos Thallóczy und Mihály Jungeth-Arnóthy, die sich im Prozess der nationalstaatlichen Umgestaltung und der mehrmaligen machtpolitischen Neuordnungen Südosteuropas im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert in Bulgarien, Bosnien-Herzegowina und Serbien als Zeitzeugen und aktive Mitgestalter beteiligten. Als Diplomaten und beamtete Wissenschaftler verbrachten sie eine lange Zeit in den Balkanländern und ihre Erfahrungen und Erlebnisse wurden von ihnen in Jahrzehnte überwölbenden Tagebüchern verewigt, die für die regionale Erforschung der Politik-, Mentalität- und Kulturgeschichte von eminenter Bedeutung sind. Die Tagebücher sind für die Forschung zwar nicht unbekannt, doch in ihrer wissenschaftlichen Wertung überwiegen die sporadischen und zufälligen Momente. Obwohl ausgewählte Kapitel der Tagebücher schon in deutscher, bulgarischer und ungarischer Sprache veröffentlicht wurden, entsprechen diese Teileditionen wegen ihrer einseitigen Auswahlkriterien und oft mangelnder Texterläuterungen nur in beschränktem Maße den Ansprüchen der komplexen regionalen Forschung. Die neuen medialen technischen Errungenschaften unserer Epoche, die Digitalisierung und die elektronische Erreichbarkeit im Internet erleichtern zwar ohne Zweifel den physischen Zugang zu einem kompletten handschriftlichen Quellenkorpus, doch die Erschließung der speziellen Inhalte und die Klärung der regional-nationalen Zusammenhänge erfordern unverändert, dass die Tagebücher mit erläuterndem Anmerkungsapparat versehen werden. Auch in der internationalen Praxis wird dem Grundsatz immer mehr Geltung verschafft, dass die historischen Grundforschungen der Quelleneditionen nicht durch die medialen Erneuerungen ersetzt

und erspart werden können.

In diesem Zeichen wurden die Editionsarbeiten der Kriegstagebücher des Balkanexperten und der grauen Eminenz der ungarischen Politik in Wien, Lajos Thallóczy, aus den Jahren 1912–1916 in unserem Institut nach gründlicher technischer Vorbereitung in Angriff genommen. Das Schicksal der Veröffentlichung der Tagebücher von István Burián aus den Jahren 1886–1922 ist ein aufschlußreicher Abdruck der ungarischen Geschichtspolitik des vergangenen halben Jahrhunderts. Die vollständige Textrekonstruktion der in mehreren Anstalten verstreuten Tagebüchern wurde von dem Mitglied der Vorgängerorganisation unserer Historikerkommission, dem emeritierten Universitätsprofessor István Diószegi fertiggestellt, doch die Veröffentlichung wurde damals verhindert, weil die Eintragungen in Sofia, die im Zeitraum des ausgehenden 19. Jahrhunderts verfasst wurden, als nicht zeitgemäß betrachtet wurden, weil sie russenfeindliche Bemerkungen beinhalteten. Im Jahr der osteuropäischen Wende 1989 berichtete das ungarischsprachige Nachrichtenmagazin „Bulgária“ darüber, dass die politischen Hindernisse der Publikation nicht mehr bestehen und es wurde eine baldige Veröffentlichung angekündigt. Zehn Jahre später erschien wirklich eine Teilpublikation der Burián-Tagebücher, doch die gründlichen Vorarbeiten und die fertiggestellte Textrekonstruktion wurden überhaupt nicht in Betracht gezogen. Die ganze Edition beschränkte sich bloß auf die Quellen eines einzigen Archivs, so kamen die wichtigsten bulgarischen Bezüge der Burián-Tagebücher nicht zur Veröffentlichung. Die erlangte Forschungs- und Publikationsfreiheit ist also ebenso wenig ein Garant für die fachlich relevante Editionsarbeit, wie die technischen Neuigkeiten. Sei es mir erlaubt die bulgarischen Teilnehmer unserer Tagung in der Hoffnung herzlich begrüßen zu dürfen, dass wir bestimmt noch erleben werden, dass die vollständige Edition dieses einmaligen Quellengutes an einer zukünftigen gemeinsamen Konferenz unserer Historikerkommission präsentiert wird.

Държавата и хората в процеса на съхраняване на паметта за военни конфликти: гражданите на Силистра в края на XVI –XVII век

Стефка Тървева

Институт за исторически изследвания – БАН

През 1593 г. започнала поредната война между Хабсбургската монархия и Османската империя, която продължила до 1606 г. На страната на Австрийската империя застанали като съюзници князете на васалните на султана княжества Трансилвания, Влашко и Молдова. Войната се водела предимно на територията на Унгария с променлив за воюващите армии успех. През 1594 г. активни военни действия започнали и долнодунавските княжества, чиито войски били водени от войводите Михай Витязул, Арон Вода и техни военни командири. В периода от края на 1594 г. до 1599 г. многократно били нападани градовете и крепостите по крайбрежието на Долния Дунав, както и селищата на юг от реката до Стара планина и София. Според някои източници войските на Михай Витязул достигнали дори районите в близост до Пловдив и Одрин. Бойните действия на военните отряди, в които участвали освен власи също и сърби, българи, маджари, албанци и др., били следвани от многократни разрушения, ограбване и опожаряване на селищата, избиване, заробване, отвлечане или принудително преселване на населението. Същото поведение имала и османската войска заедно със съюзните ѝ татари на влашка земя.¹

¹ Велики, К. Походите на Михай Витязул на юг от Дунав. – ИПр, 1973, №3, 63-72; Димитров, Стр., Н. Жечев, В. Тонев. История на Добруджа.

Войната, която достигнала селищата и домовете на хората, оставила дълбоки следи в колективната памет на поданиците на султана. Това изследване си поставя за цел да обърне внимание на някои аспекти на проблема за пътищата и механизмите за съхраняване на паметта за травматичните събития в хода на военни конфликти сред поданиците на султана. Тези аспекти са свързани с функционирането на османските бюрократични, съдебни и военни институции на местно и централно ниво и осъществяваните контакти с местното население. За тази цел ще бъде анализиран казусът с гражданите на Силистра и тяхното поведение, както и това на османската власт по време и след войната със Свещената лига от 1593–1606 г. и края на XVII в.

ХРОНОЛОГИЯ НА СЪБИТИЯТА

Опирайки се на разказите на свидетели и участници в събитията или на техните хроникьори, ще се опита да проследим някои акценти от военните действия между християнската и османската войски. Те представляват красноречиви свидетелства за създалата се военновременна обстановка, в която били принудени да живеят хората от крайдунавските селища и тези в равнината чак до Стара планина и София.

Началото на военните действия на васалните на Османската империя княжества, било сложено след вероломните действия на Михай Витязул спрямо неговите османски кредитори, извикани в Букурещ, за да бъдат изплатени дълговете на войводата. На 13 ноември 1594 г. той наредил сградата на държавната хазна, в която се намирали въпросните османци, да бъде запалена. В тази

Т. 3. С., 1988, 82–84; История на България. Т. 4. С., 1983, 126–127, 196–197; De Hammer, J. Histoire de l'Empire Ottoman Depuis Son Origine Jusqu'à Nos Jours. Vol. 7 (Première édition, Paris, 1836), Istanbul, 1999, 146, 157–158, 162, 180–181; Olteanu, Șt. Les Pays Roumains à l'Époque de Michel le Brave (l'Union de 1600). București, 1975, 91–105.

акция бил нападат и унищожен и еничарският отряд, разположен в града. След това на 15 ноември отрядите на Михай се насочили към Гюргево, нападнали града, без да успеят да превземат крепостта.² Османският хронист Мустафа Наима³ решил да опише това събитие чрез съчинената или преразказаната лична история на някой си Алиджан, помощник (наиб) на кадията в Гюргево. Алиджан бил изпратен в Букурещ с цел да регулира проблема между Михай и неговите османски кредитори по съдебен път. Когато си тръгнал от съда и напускайки града, очевидно преди трагичните за османците събития, той срещнал негов стар познат немюсюлманин. Той го посъветвал да не замръква там, нито да отсяда в Гюргево, а колкото се може по-бързо да се отправи към Русчук. Забелязвайки странна суматоха и движение на войски в посока към Гюргево, наибът Алиджан се качил на своята каруца и се отправил към дома. Оттам преплувайки Дунав срещу Русе, едва успял да се спаси от нападателите. По думите му, той и още един човек, който плувал редом с него, били единствените жители на Гюргево, които успели да избягат. Останалите 4000 мъже, жени и деца били убити или пленени. След това войниците на Михай Витязул изгорили града. Виждайки това, което се случва на отсрещния бряг, русенци се разпръснали, търсейки убежище в Балкана.⁴

След Гюргево били нападнати и други селища и крепости: на 10 декември – крепостта Флоч, на 30 декември бил нападат и изгорен Свищов; следвали Оряхово и Никопол; на 1 януари 1595 г. – Хърсово, на 8

² De Hammer, J. цит. съч., 146; Olteanu, Șt., Op. cit., 92–93; Димитров, Стр., Н. Жечев, В. Тонев, цит. съч., 82; Велики, К., цит. съч., 64.

³ Повече за Мустафа Наима вж. в: Woodhead, Ch. Naima – In: *Encyclopaedia of Islam* (EI2), CD-ROM Edition, Brill NV, Leiden, Vol. 1, 2001, 917–918.

⁴ *Annals of the Turkish Empire from 1591 to 1659 of the Christian Era by Naima*. Translated from the Turkish by Charles Fraser. Vol. 1, London: Printed for the Oriental Translation Fund of Great Britain and Ireland, 1832, 37–39.

януари – Силистра, на 25 януари – Русчук, след това отново Силистра, Никопол, Тутракан, Браила и др.⁵ Многобройните османски войски и гарнизони, както и стратегическите планове на влашкия войвода го принудили да раздели войската си на няколко походни единици, командвани от него или негови капитани. През пролетта на 1595 г. около 2000 хайдутути, които представлявали обособени части от влашката войска, нападнали и ограбили София.⁶ След нападенията над дунавските градове и крепости отрядите на Михай Витязул достигнали Разград, Варна, чак до полите на Стара планина. Влашките летописи отбелязват, че *„колкото турски села и градове срецали по пътя, изгорили, ограбили и взели в робство турци, туркини и деца и ги откарали във Влашко.“*⁷

Молдовският войвода Арон също пристъпил към военни действия паралелно с нападенията на войските на Михай Витязул над дунавските градове. В съюз с казашките водачи Лобода и Наливайко, те разорили османските владения в Буджака, а след това нападнали и опостошили Исакача и района около града. Войските им успели да отведат като плячка 100.000 глави говеда и 400.000 овце.⁸

Жителите от селищата в земите между Дунав и Стара планина страдали и от действията на кримските татари, които били съюзни на османските войски. Придвижването на техните отряди през 1596 г. носело същите опустошения за населението, както и действията на влашката войска. Свидетелства от това време разказват, че: *„Тази народност [българите] е силно развълнувана, понеже татарите преди да се съберат на бойното поле в Сърбия с турците, минавайки през България, оплячкосали почти цялата тази*

⁵ De Hammer, J. Op. cit., 157–158; Велики, К., цит. съч., 64–65; Olteanu, Șt., Op. cit., 93.

⁶ Велики, К., цит. съч., 65; История на България, 186.

⁷ Велики, К., цит. съч., 65; De Hammer, J. Op. cit., 162.

⁸ Димитров, Стр., Н. Жечев, В. Тонев, цит. съч., 82.

страна... И нанесли огромни щети на цялото ѝ население, макар че българите са поданици на Турската империя."⁹

Боевете между османската и влашката войска продължили и през 1596 г. На страната на Михай Витязул се сражавал и Баба Новак, който стоял начело на хайдушки отряди. Самият влашки владетел разказал, че когато изпратил Баба Новак срещу войските на Хасан паша, които се готвели да минат Балкана на път за София, той го „нападнал, разбил го, обърнал в бягство войската му, изклал мнозина от нея и им взел камилите, конете, оръжието и всичкото богатство, което притежавали.“¹⁰

Унгарската хроника на Самошкьози добавя, че Баба Новак опожарил крепостта Враца, близо до планината Новак (Стара планина), а после бродил из нея, като стигнал близо до София. Навръщане от похода той стигнал Дунав при Флорентин с многобройна плячка от роби и добитък. Навярно на път към Дунава хайдутите нападнали Плевен като пленили много негови жители. Сред тях се оказали жената и децата на местния бей Михалоглу, който заплатил 500.000 жълтици като откуп за тяхното освобождаване. Един доклад от Прага свидетелства, че сред пленниците на хайдушките дружини се оказали също 70 евреи и 400 турци, за откупа на които те получили 400.000 талера. Този доклад приписвал нападението над Плевен на Дели Марко, но изследователят на събитията Константин Велики твърди, че хайдушките отряди, трябва да са били ръководени именно от Баба Новак, тъй като по това време Дели Марко се сражавал с войските на трансилванския княз Сигизмунд Батори някъде в Банат. Навръщане Баба Новак разбил още веднъж турците при Никопол.¹¹

Този град пострадал от влашките нападения и през 1598 г., когато на 10 септември Михай Витязул минал с

⁹ История на България, 185.

¹⁰ Велики, К., цит. съч., 66–67.

¹¹ Пак там, 67.

войските си Дунав при Никопол. Влашкият войвода описал в писмо до ерцхерцога Максимилиан от 16 октомври 1598 г. бойните действия при укрепения град, както и резултатите от по-сетнешните си походи:

„[...] При Никопол се срещнахме с 13000 турци заедно с двама паши и 12 санджакбея и се сражавахме с тях; най-после с Божия помощ ги разбихме, така че много от тях останаха в рова, а пашите успяха да избягат. След това изгорихме до основи град Никопол, в който имаше около 6000 къщи, а жителите му, [колкото се намираха в града], всички убихме.

След това тръгнахме към Видин. Тъй като отново срещнахме 2 бея с 1000 турци, пак се заехме с отбрана, така че те многократно бяха бити от нас, а знамената им отнехме и взехме в плен знатни турци. Скоро след това в деня на битката, подпалихме град Видин, в който имаше 12000 къщи; от нашите паднаха малцина. Освен това такива известни градове като Плевен, Враца, Флорентин и Оряхово всички бяха изгорени, а жителите турци бяха избити. Що се отнася до областта от Трансилвания чак до София ние изгорихме над 2000 села, а жителите им, които се намираха там християни или българи, бяха доведени заедно с нас през Дунава, мало и голямо, по моя сметка над 16000 души, заедно с имуществото им, и бяха заселени там, където бяха най-бедните в моята страна, и където можеше да бъдат настанени, като им беше дадено и предоставено толкова място, че те да могат да се прехранват. И оставихме областта [на юг от Дунава] напълно обезлюдена и опустошена.”¹²

Опожарени и опустошени градове и села и цели райони, избито, заробено или принудително изселено население –

¹² Hurmuzaki, E. D. Documente privitoare la Istoria Românilor. Vol. 12. București, 1903, 411. Документът се цитира по български превод на В. Паскалева: Христоматия по история на България. Т. 1. Съст. Проф. Ал. Бурмов и доц. П. Петров, С., 1964, с. 398-399; Велики, К., цит. съч., 70–71.

това била равностойката от действията на двете враждуващи войски. Дали числата, упоменати в изложението на Михай Витязул, са близки до действителността, или са силно преувеличени, не бихме могли да знаем. Във всеки случай те са красноречиво свидетелство за разрухата в следствие на военните действия, за ужаса, загубите и повратните моменти в живота на хората от засегнатите райони.

През годините на войната българите, направили възможното да организират въстание срещу султана, което избухнало през септември 1598 г. с център Търново, но скоро било потушено от многобройна османска войска.¹³ Неговите водачи - търновският митрополит Дионисий Рали, никополският първенец Тодор Балина и дубровнишкият търговец Павел Джорджич положили много усилия, за да осигурят за българското начинание военната подкрепа на християнските войски. В същото време обаче, те дали да се разбере, че с действията си срещу селищата и тяхното население въпросните войски отблъсквали българите. По този повод Павел Джорджич в свое изложение от 5 януари 1595 г. си позволил да посъветва трансилванския княз следното:

„... Нека В.В. да даде заповед и разпореждане на своите офицери и войници да поласкаят българите с всякакъв вид любезности и да не позволяват в никакъв случай те да бъдат ограбвани [...]. А за да си спечелите сърцата на българите и с по-малко трудност да ги докарате до преданост към Вас, ще бъде целесъобразно плячката, която те ще съберат, да остане за тях и по такъв начин те ще посрещнат опасности и по-големи дела. В това отношение не бива Вашите офицери да проявяват алчност, тъй като много често тя причинява големи пакости: ако християните останат възмутени, те биха могли да се оттеглят в планините и там да пазят проходите в полза на турците, които ще дойдат през лятото, за да могат те да навлязат

¹³ Повече за въстанието вж.: История на България, 189–196.

в България без други затруднения.”¹⁴

Думите на Павел Джорджич показват колко пагубни можело да бъдат действията на християнските войски срещу домовете, селищата и поминъка на единоверните им поданици на султана. За прозорливостта на организаторите на въстанието, които предвидили възможните опасни последствия от нападенията на християнската войска, свидетелства поведението на немюсюлманите – жители на Силистра, които се съюзили с османските защитници на града по време на трикратните нападения на влашката войска, проблем на който ще се спем по-късно.

Походите на Михай Витязул продължили и през 1599 г. Тогава военни отряди, командвани от влашкия войвода или от негови капитани, водили боеве с османски военни части при Силистра, Русе, Видин и други места. Но принуден от създалата се конюнктура и отношения с неговите съюзници, той сключил мир с османците на 6 октомври 1599 г.¹⁵

СИЛИСТРА, НЕЙНИТЕ ГРАЖДАНИ И ВОЙНАТА

Първоначално град Силистра бил център на санджак. След средата на XVI в. Силистренският санджак започнал да се превръща в еялет. Преходът продължил вероятно до времето на Мехмед III (1595–1603), когато трансформацията завършила окончателно и за негови управители били назначавани лица с ранга на паша.¹⁶ През 1651 г. в града пребивавал за известно време османският пътешественик Евлия Челеби. Той оставил едно от най-подробните описания на крепостта, жилищните зони, джамиите и други обществени постройки, дунавските рибници, водениците над Дунав, разкази за някои от известните

¹⁴ Гюзелев, В. Българската държавност в актове и документи. С., 1981, 118–119.

¹⁵ Велики, К., цит. съч., 71.

¹⁶ Димитров, Стр., Н. Жечев, В. Тонев, цит. съч., 12–15.

силистренски граждани, техните делници и празници. Първият обект на неговия интерес била крепостта на Силистра. За нея той разказва, че е една здрава крепост на брега на реката, изградена от изсечени камъни във формата на лък. Откъм сушата крепостта била опасана от голям, широк и дълбок вал, през който тече водата на Дунав. Над вала имало дървен мост. Всяка вечер войници от гарнизона вдигали моста и затваряли вратата на крепостта. Тогава тя се превръщала в един вид дунавски остров. Вътре в крепостта се намирали джебехането, хамбар за храни и 20 помещения за редници. Артилерията се състояла от 40 големи и малки оръдия. Повечето от тях били обърнати към Дунава. Само няколко топа били поставени откъм сушата и гледали към сарая на пашата край вала, защото той се намирал на дунавския бряг пред крепостта. Всяка нощ стражата бдяла по ред, тъй като отвъд била страната на „влашките неверници” и когато през зимата Дунавът замръзнул, опасността ставала голяма.¹⁷

Производствено-търговската част на града – чаршията включвала множество дюкяни, част от които покрити с керемиди, един безистен, едно сарачхане и два хана. Отделно от тях е спомената и рибарската чаршия. Достойни за отбелязване, според османския пътешественик, били ахтарските дюкяни, кожухарските и златарските работилници. Лете и зиме, по думите на Челебията, ставали такива големи пазари, че там се събирало море от хора.¹⁸

Десет от махалите в жилищната зона на града били християнски, една еврейска и останалите мюсюлмански. Част от къщите в мюсюлманските махали били покрити с керемиди, докато тези в християнските махали били покрити

¹⁷ Пътуване на Евлия Челеби из българските земи през средата на XVII в. Превод Д. Г. Гаджанов. – Пер. Сп. на БКД в София (Пловдив), 1909, LXX, 661–662; Български средновековни градове и крепости. Т. 1. Градове и крепости по Дунав и Черно море. Варна, 1981, 177–195.

¹⁸ Пътуване на Евлия Челеби, 665–668.

с тънки дъски. През 1621 г., по сведения на Евлия Челеби, около Вароша бил прокопан ров, запълнен с вода от Дунав. Там имало и поизоставена по негово време крепост, вътрешността на която била запълнена с камъни и пръст. Извън валовете се намирали обширни площи с ливади и зелени равнини.¹⁹ Данъчните регистрации на града добавят, че там били овощните и зеленчуковите градини, лозята и нивите на силистренските граждани.²⁰

МЮСЮЛМАНИТЕ – ЖИТЕЛИ НА СИЛИСТРА

Серия от регистри (*дефтери*) от 70-те година на XVI и от края на XVII век дават богати сведения за жителите на Силистра. През 1573/74 г.,²¹ две десетилетия преди войната мюсюлманите в Силистра обитавали 20 махали²² и наброявали общо 1071 мъже глави на домакинства, неженени мъже и такива, на които не бил отбелязан семейния статус - всички те принадлежали към групата на раята или аскерите (военни, административни служители и улема).²³ Освен тях в регистъра били записани и 32 мъже цигани мюсюлмани.²⁴ Силис-

¹⁹ Пак там, 663–664.

²⁰ Първева, Ст. Земята и хората през XVII – първите десетилетия на XVIII в. Овладяване и организация на аграрното и социалното пространство на Централните и Южните Балкани под османска власт. С., 2011, 416–439.

²¹ Последният дефтер от типа тапу тахрир, който съдържа информация за населението на Силистра, е съставен през първата десетдневка на джемази юл евелл 1022 г. / 19-28.06.1613 г. Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi [по-нататък: BOA], Istanbul, TT 688. Той обаче е препис (suret) на дефтер, съставен през 981 / 3.05.1573 – 22.04.1574 г. BOA, TT 701. Затова тук ще цитираме данните от оригиналния документ от 1573/74 г.

²² По принцип махалите в данъчните дефтери представляват укроннени структури, които обединяват по-големи и по-малки махали, разположени в близост една до друга. Имената на последните понякога се откриват в документи, записани в кадийските сиджли или подробни джизие регистри.

²³ BOA, TT 701, р. 230–239. В сурет дефтера от 1613 г. (TT 688) са записани 19 мъже мюсюлмани по-малко, от тези в оригиналния дефтер.

²⁴ BOA, TT 701, р. 245.

треньските мюсюлмани със статут на рая имали задължението да обслужват крепостта, в замяна на което били освободени от извънредни данъци и държавни повинности (*авариз-и дивание и текялиф-и йорфие*).²⁵

През последното десетилетие на XVII в. за силистренските граждани са съставени два подробни авариз дефтера, първият от които носи дата 1107 г./12.04.1695 г. – 27.04.1696 г., а вторият – 1109 г./20.07.1697 г. – 8.07.1698 г.²⁶ На основание на записани уточняващи дати в маргиналните бележки на втория дефтер, приемаме, че те са били съставени през 1696 г. и 1697 г.²⁷

Според информацията на въпросните дефтери, в града били обособени 17 мюсюлмански махали. В тях и в крепостта живеели 719-947 мъже (нефери) от категорията на раята и на аскерите.²⁸ Късните описи на града допълват някои шрихи към картината, отнасяща се до специалните ангажименти на силистренските мюсюлмани. Те били задължени да обслужват крепостта като извършват джера-хорлук, т. е. поправка, когато това било необходимо. В

²⁴ BOA, TT 701, p. 230.

²⁵ Пак там, 701, 230.

²⁶ BOA, K. Kepeci, Mevkufat Kalemi, N. 2770; N. 2785.

²⁷ И трите бележки, които съдържат дати, се намират върху маргиналните полета на дефтера от 1107 от Егира. Датите са споменати във връзка с цитираните доклади (*arz*), направени от кадията. С тях той потвърждавал необходимостта мюсюлманите и немюсюлманите в града да бъдат освободени от определени групи данъци, тъй като изпълняваните от тях задължения били необходими. Тези кадийски доклади носят дати: 24 и 28 рамазан 1107 г./27.04. и 1.05.1696 г. и очевидно са подготвени по време на първата регистрация, която се състояла именно през 1696 г. Същата роля изиграли те и при следващата регистрация от 1109 г. от Егира. Обяснителните маргинални бележки за освобождаването на мюсюлмани и немюсюлмани от съответните групи данъци в тази по-късна регистрация са вписани в дефтера на първия ден от месец сафер 1109 г./19.08.1697 г. На основата на последната цитирана дата приемаме, че вторият дефтерът е съставен през 1697 г. BOA, K. Kepeci, Mevkufat Kalemi, N. 2785, p. 1, 6.

²⁸ BOA, K. Kepeci, Mevkufat Kalemi, N. 2770, p. 2–11; N. 2785, p. 1–5.

замяна били освободени от държавни аварии и ангарии и местни данъци и такси (*авариз-и дивание, текялиф-и йорфие и шакка*). Същевременно обаче силистренските жители мюсюлмани били задължени да изпълняват и мензилска служба (*мензил хизмет*). В потвърждение на своите специфични ангажименти и съответно на освобождаването им от определени групи данъци те притежавали височайши заповеди със султанско послание (*хатт-ъ хюмаюн*). По повод на ангажиментите на силистренските мюсюлмани и на извършваната нова регистрация на населението кадията направил проверка и докладвал на столичните власти в специално донесение (*арз*) от 24 рамазан 1107 / 27.04.1696 г., че службата им била необходима. При тези обстоятелства техните задължения, които съществували от „стари времена“, били потвърдени и записани в регистрацията от 1696 г. Същите кадийски проверка и донесение, направени през 1696 г., били използвани и по време на регистрацията от 1697 г.²⁹

НЕМЮСЮЛМАНИТЕ – ЖИТЕЛИ НА СИЛИСТРА

През 1573/74 г. домовете на българите били разположени в осем християнски и една мюсюлманска махали. Те наброявали общо 646 глави на домакинства и неженени мъже.³⁰ Седем души от тях формирали общност (*джемаат*) на дърводелци, железари и ковачи към крепостта на Силистра. На основание на свещени заповеди (*хюкм-и шерифлери*) в отплата за службата им споменатите занаятчии били освободени от десятък (*юшюр*), поземлен данък (*испенче*), държавни аварии и ангарии (*авариз-и дивание и текялиф-и йорфие*), но плащали поголовен данък (*джизие*).³¹

Освен българите в града била регистрирана общност (*джемаат*) на евреи, които наброявали общо 20 глави на домакинства и неженени мъже. В Силистра живеели и

²⁹ Пак там, N. 2770, 2; N. 2785, р. 6.

³⁰ Пак там, ТТ 701, р. 239–245.

³¹ ВОА, ТТ 701, р. 245.

дубровничани, чиято колония (*джемаат*) включвала 12 мъже. И най-сетне в града били регистрирани 8 мъже глави на домакинства и неженени цигани (*къптиян*) – християни.³²

В края на XVII в. българите, жители на Силистра намалили чувствително своя брой. Според двете авариз регистрации от 1696 и 1697 г. във Вароша имало пет махали, в които живеели 181–214 мъже (*нефери*) вероятно глави на домакинства. Част от тях били ангажирани в корпуса на войнуците – през 1696 г. те били 30 души, а през 1697 г. броят им достигнал 37 души.³³ Според един по-ранен джизие регистър от 1102 г. от Егира / 5.10.1690 г. – 23.09.1691 г. немюсюлмани живеели не само в петте махали на Вароша, но и в много от мюсюлманските махали.³⁴

Сред градските жители – немюсюлмани са регистрирани и евреи, чиято колония през 1696 г. се състояла от 9 мъже, вероятно също глави на домакинства.³⁵ В края на века основен източник за демографски растеж на евреите в града била миграцията на хора от Белград и Видин заради превземането на двата града от австрийска войска по време на войната със Свещената лига (1683–1699). Евреи, дошли от Видинска каза, са вписани още в джизие регистъра от 1690/91 г. Според тази регистрация в града са установени 14 местни и други 13 мъже, които се преселили в града навярно със своите семейства.³⁶ Няколко години по-късно, на страниците на авариз дефтера от 1697 г. регистра-торът е записал за заварените в Силистра 18 мъже евреи следното: „*Даде се разяснение, че [членовете на] споменатата еврейска общност (яхуди тайфеси) повечето са ябанджии. След нашествието над Белград и Видин са дошли в споменатата касаба. Тъй като [скоро] са се*

³² Пак там.

³³ BOA, K. Kepeci, Mevkufat Kalemi, N. 2770, p. 12–14; N. 2785, p. 5–6.

³⁴ BOA, MAD (Malliyeden Müdevver) 4023, p. 131–133.

³⁵ BOA, K. Kepeci, Mevkufat Kalemi, N. 2770, p. 12.

³⁶ BOA, MAD (Mal. Müd.) 4023, p. 121.

установили, нямат свои собствени имоти, всички са бедни и наематели.”³⁷

От авариз регистрациите на населението от периода 1696–1697 г. разбираме, че в града съществувала и трайно установена арменска колония. Тогава тя се състояла от общо 24–31 мъже. Става ясно също, че арменците в Силистра били разделени на две групи – едните живеели във Вароша – в махалата “Поп Васил”, а другите в две мюсюлмански махали.³⁸ Освен това в джизие регистър от 1690/91 г. са регистрирани и други 18 души арменци търговци (аджемлер базаргян), които се настанили по хановете и които пребивавали в града по причина на търговските си ангажименти.³⁹

През XVII в. и най-вероятно още от самото му начало настъпила съществена промяна в данъчното облагане на жителите на Вароша на Силистра. Първоначално тази промяна била свързана с тяхното поведение по време на нападенията на влашките войски над града. За да се опитаме да създадем известна представа за обстановката, в която живеели силистренци в тези времена, ще приведем няколко кратки описания на събитията, свързани конкретно с град Силистра. Тези описания са излезли изпод перото на представители от враждуващите лагери или представляват откъси от по-късни османски хроники и документи, които удивително съвпадат по отношение на разказа за действията на воюващите сили и последствията от военния конфликт.

На страниците на своето „Кратко и истинно описание на делата, извършени от Йоан Михай, владетел на Влахия”,

³⁷ BOA, K. Kepeci, Mevkufat Kalemi, N 2785, 6; Gradeva, R. Jews and Ottoman Authority in the Balkans: the Case of Sofia, Vidin and Rusçuk, 15th-17th Centuries. – In: Gradeva, R. Rumeli under the Ottomans, 15th-18th Centuries: Institutions and Communities. Istanbul, 2004, p. 245–246.

³⁸ BOA, K. Kepeci, Mevkufat Kalemi, N. 2770, p. 12–13; N. 2785, p. 1, 5, 6.

³⁹ BOA, MAD (Mal. Müd.) 4023, p. 121.

полският пратеник в княжеския двор Балтазар Валтер отбелязал, че: „След като си възстановиха малко силите, отслабнали от студа и трудностите, на 8 януари,⁴⁰ минавайки отново реката, [войската на Михай Витязул] нападна град Дръстър [...], наричан и Силистра, където е седалището на санджака [...] голям град, прочут с търговията си и много красив. След като спечелиха важната битка, с ярост го подпалиха и съсипаха с топовете, избивайки по-голяма част от жителите му.”⁴¹

В Хрониката на Бузешите (влиятелен болярски род) е добавено следното: „И след тази битка⁴² Михай вода изпрати един от своите боляри, и по-точно Михалча бана, при други боляри, а именно Преда спатар и Раду комис, които с войските си бяха срецу Силистра. И тези боляри подпалиха града и го изгориха.”⁴³

За едно от нападенията над Силистра османският хронист Мустафа Наима написал: „Проклетият Михал [...] ходел навсякъде, подбуждал непокорство и бунт и грабел, и убивал, където можел. С 4000 [войници] от своята парцалива войска той проникнал в Силистра, но управителят Мустафа бей му се противопоставил толкова твърдо и ефективно, че само около 100 от неговите 4000 скитници се изплъзнали от острието на меча.”⁴⁴

А ето каква е информацията, оставена от османската данъчна администрация за действията на християнската войска. Много красноречив в това отношение е текстът, предхождащ регистрацията на жителите на Вароша на гр.

⁴⁰ 1595 г.

⁴¹ Бешевлиев, Б., П. Бойчева. Историкогеографски сведения в три документа, посветени на Михай Храбри (края на XVI – началото на XVII в.). – В: Общото и специфичното в балканските култури до края на XIX в. Сборник в чест на проф. В. Тълкова-Заимова. С., 1997, 260.

⁴² 25.02.1595 г., когато войводата Михай Витязул напада и опожарява Русе.

⁴³ Бешевлиев, Б., П. Бойчева, цит. съч., 262.

⁴⁴ Annals of the Turkish Empire, 50; De Hammer, J. Op. cit., 157.

Силистра в авариз дефтера от 1696 г. Той разказва, че:

*„Преди, през 1003 година (16.09.1594 – 5.09.1595), поради бунтовни действия влашкият войвода Михал, заедно с неверниците (kefereler) трансилванци, власи, немци и маджари дойде в касаба Силистра. Когато три пъти палиха, опустошаваха и грабиха споменатата касаба, неверническата рая (kefere raya), която живее в града, воюва и се сражава заедно с мюсюлманското население (ehl-i islam). По-голямата част от хората бяха поробени и избити. Освобождаването на силистренската крепост и Вароша станаха причина за проявената милост към тяхното положение. [Неверниците] бяха освободени и опростени от авариз-и дивание и останалите тежялиф-и йорфие, и шакка. [Така е било] от старо време до този момент. При все това, според височайши ферман, [тъй като се намира на брега] на Дунав раята от самата Силистра със собствени средства издържаше и екипираше 2 шайки с кюрекчиите, [които] да са налице всяка година за служба в султанския поход (sefer-i hıtaуın). В замяна на сборните им задължения, с изключение на джизието бяха освободени и опростени от авариз-и дивание и другите тежялиф-и йорфие и шакка, заради което притежаваха многобройни свещени заповеди (evamir-i şerifeleri). Изясни се, че старото им освобождаване беше отново регистрирано.“*⁴⁵

Почти същият текст е записан и по време на регистрацията на града, направена година по-късно, през 1697 г.⁴⁶ В него се допълва, че християните освен от авариз-и дивание и други тежялиф-и йорфие и шакка не издължават също нюзюл (?),⁴⁷ джелепкешан,⁴⁸ джамус (биволи), мубая⁴⁹ и други (sair)

⁴⁵ ВOA, К. Kereci, Mevkufat Kalemi, N. 2770, p. 12.

⁴⁶ Първи ден на месец сафер 1109 г.

⁴⁷ Nüzül – натурални вземания.

⁴⁸ Джелепкешан-и агнам – данък върху овцете, който от началото на XVII в. станал паричен данък.

данъци (*текялифи*). Като аргумент за запазване на старото положение се изтъква и донесението (*арз*) на кадията от 1.05.1696 г., в което се твърдяло, че службата им е необходима и че за нея са им дадени свещени заповеди.⁵⁰

Текстовете от двата османски данъчни регистъра потвърждават съобщените факти и допълват с нови детайли информацията от цитираните хроники. От тях разбираме за времето и причината за нападенията над Силистра, за коалиционните партньори на разбунтувалия се войвода и състава на неговите войски, за злощастната участ на града – трикратно пален, разрушаван и опустошаван и за съдбата на неговото население – избивано или заробвано. Текстът информира и за поведението на немюсюлманите – българите заедно навярно с хората от еврейската общност по време на защитата на Силистра. Със сигурност действията на християнската войска били основната причина те да се съюзят с мюсюлманите и с общи усилия да защитят живота, домовете и поминъка си. Това не останало незабелязано от османската власт. В отговор на помощта, оказана на защитниците на града, немюсюлманите били освободени от извънредни данъци и държавни повинности. За да разберем степента на данъчното облекчение, което получили силистренските немюсюлмани, трябва да отбележим, че най-вероятно именно по време на войната от 1593–1606 г. данъците от групата на държавните аваризи (авариз-и дивание) станали регулярни парични данъчни сборове.⁵¹ С въвеждането през XVII в. на задължението местното население да покрива вилаетските разходи (*текялиф*-и *шакка*),⁵² силистренските немюсюлмани били освободени и от това данъчно перо.

⁴⁹ Закупуване на продукти от страна на държавата на специално определени цени.

⁵⁰ BOA, K. Kepeci, Mevkufat Kalemi, N. 2785, p. 6.

⁵¹ Inalcik, H. Military and Fiscal Transformation in the Ottoman Empire, 1600–1700. – Arhivum Ottomanicum, 1980, № 6, 314–315.

⁵² За тях вж. Inalcik, H., Op. cit., 317–322.

Тази информация, както споменахме, е записана в началото на два поименни авариз дефтера на мъжете, жители на Силистра. Но те били съставени сто години след описаните в тях събития – през 1696 г. и 1697 г., навярно заради възшествието на новия султан Мустафа II, Гази (1695–1703) на престола. Това означава, че един век по-късно османската администрация чрез своите бюрократични практики все още съхранявала и предавала информацията за военновременните събития, от които силистренските граждани били пряко засегнати. Изпълнявайки своите функции, административните служби направили възможно чрез съставяните от тях документи, което ще рече чрез писменото слово, да бъде съхранена паметта за травматичните събития сред една общност, по-голямата част от членовете на която били неук и неграмотни хора. Споменаваме по-голямата част, тъй като изворите са запазили сведения за съществуването в Силистра в края на XVII и началото на XVIII в. на учители и съответно за функционирането на едно или повече училища вероятно към митрополията или самостоятелно от нея. Те давали на своите ученици първоначална грамотност и познания за основните богослужебни книги на “гръцки диалект”.⁵³

Нека сега се опитаме да възстановим реда на предприетите действия, които довели до въпросните данъчни отстъпки след войната, както и до съхраняването и пренасянето във времето на информацията за тях чрез османската документация. Тази реконструкция е възможна благодарение на натрупаното знание за функционирането

⁵³ Един от техните възпитаници бил роденият в Силистра Партений Павлович (ок. 1695-1760 г.). За обучението си там той е записал в своята Автобиография, че: „*На граматика се научих още в моето отечество Доростол на Дунава или Дристра, или Силистра от дидаската Палеолог Константинополитанеца, а първото си учение до октоиха и псалтира, и апостола започнах на гръцки диалект в споменатия град при поклонника при светия Христов гроб на име Тетради.*” Димитров, Стр., Н. Жечев, В. Тонев, цит. съч., 107–108; Ангелов, Б. Съвременници на Паисий. С., 1964, 11.

на османските институции – бюрократични, съдебни и военни – на централно и провинциално ниво.

И така, войната приключила през 1606 г., когато бил подписан договорът от Ситварок.⁵⁴ Както показва установената практика, след края на войната султанът изпращал до провинциите ферман, с който уведомявал своите поданици за нейния успешен край, като нареждал да се провеждат тържества в чест на победата.⁵⁵ Възможно е именно тогава силистренските граждани да са повдигнали въпроса за освобождаването им от споменатите данъци и ангарии, заради положението, в което били изпаднали след разрухата на града. Институцията, с която те най-бързо и лесно могли да влязат в контакт, и пред която да обявят проблема и претенциите си, се явявал кадийският съд. Кадията не бил упълномощен да променя статуквото, но в неговите пълномощия влизали представителство на султана и контрола по провинциите.⁵⁶

⁵⁴ История на България, 127.

⁵⁵ За изпращаните по провинциите фермани по повод на военните победи на османската армия, успешния край на войните и празниците, устройвани в селищата по тяхна поръка вж. Турски документи за историјата на македонскиот народ. Серија прва, том 3, Скопје, 1969, 145–146, док. 196; Димитров, Стр. (Съставил, превел и редактирал), Османски извори за историята на Добруджа и Североизточна България. София, Издателство на Българската академия на науките, 1981, 67 (док. 92), 257 (док. 488); Иванова, Св. Предаване на вести в Османската империя и управлението на поданиците. – В: Иванова, Св. (Съст.). Етнически и културни пространства на Балканите. Ч. 1. Миналото – исторически ракурси. Сборник в чест на проф. Цветана Георгиева. С., 2008, 444–450; Odorico, P. Conseils et mémoires de Synadinos, prêtre de Serrès en Macédoine (XVII siècle). Avec la collaboration de S. Asdrachas, T. Karanastassis, K. Kostis, S. Petmézas. Paris, 1996, 117, 119.

⁵⁶ Градева, Р. Налагането на кадийската институция на Балканите и мястото ѝ в провинциалната администрация (XIV – нач. на XVI в.). – Балканистика, 1989, № 3, 33–53; Gradeva, R. The Activities of a Kadi Court in Eighteenth-Century Rumeli: the case of Hacıoğlu Pazarcık. – In: Gradeva, R. Rumeli under the Ottomans, 53–66; Jennings, R. C. *Kadi*, Court and Legal Procedure in 17th C. Ottoman Kayseri. – In: *Studia Islamica*, 50, 1978, 151–184; Faroqhi, S. Land

Ето защо данъкоплатците очаквали и изисквали от него да информира столичните власти за техните проблеми и прошения.⁵⁷

Освен за контактите на просителите на местно ниво с кадията, изворите свидетелстват и за предприеманите от тях действия на централно ниво – имперската столица.⁵⁸ Възможно е, силистренските немюсюлмани да са отправили своята молба за данъчни облекчения директно до султана и до подчинените му от Дивана. И както изисквало правилото, силистренският кадия е трябвало да изпрати свое становище (*arz*) по случая,⁵⁹ потвърждавайки истинността на информацията за поведението на християните по време на трикратното нападение на града от войските на Михал Витязул. Възможно е също, молбата на силистренските данъкоплатци да е била подкрепена от градските първенци и най-вероятно от страна на санджакбея на Силистра и останалите военни командири на крепостта и гарнизона.⁶⁰

Transfer, Land Disputes and *Askeri* Holdings in Ankara (1592–1600). – In: *Mémorial Ömer L. Barkan*. Paris, 1980, 88 и цит. там лит.; Singer, E. *Palestinian Peasants and Ottoman Officials. Rural Administration Around Sixteenth-Century Jerusalem*. Cambridge University Press, 1994, 24–131; Ergene, B. *Local Court, Provincial Society and Justice in the Ottoman Empire. Legal Practice and Dispute Resolution in Çankırı and Kastamonu (1652–1744)*. Leiden–Boston, 2003, 33–56; Demirci, S. *Complaints About Avariz Assessment and Payment in the Avariz-Tax System: an Aspect of the Relationship Between Centre and Periphery. A Case Study of Kayseri, 1618–1700*. – *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient*, 2003, №4, 437–474.

⁵⁷ Darling, L. *Revenue – Raising and Legitimacy. Tax Collection and Finance Administration in the Ottoman Empire 1550–1650*. Leiden–N.Y.–Köln, 1996, 254, 258, 260; Ergene, B., *Op. cit.*, 45–56; Димитров, Стр. Ямбол в епохата на феодализма. – В: *История на град Ямбол*. С., 1976, 102.

⁵⁸ Darling, L., *Op. cit.*, 253–254, 258; Първева, Ст., *цит. съч.*, 2011, 200–202, и цит. там лит.

⁵⁹ Ergene, B., *Op. cit.*, 45.

⁶⁰ Исканията за промяна в размера на данъчно облагане могли да бъдат инициирани и от местния военно-административен управител – санджакбея, от самите събирачи на данъци и др. в случаите, в които те били затруднени

Можем да предположим, че още тогава висшите военни на града и провинцията са предложили и новите ангажименти на въпросните немюсюлмани по екипирането и издръжката на два военни кораба и техните гребци.

Наред с това изворите свидетелстват за случаи, в които данъкоплатците изпращали и свои представители в столицата. Те лично предавали молбите и оплакванията на султана и членовете на Дивана. В този случай пътуването на представителите на раята до Истанбул изисквало сериозна организация и финансова подкрепа от страна на цялата заинтересована от решаването на проблема общност.⁶¹ Можем само да гадаем кой модел на поведение са следвали силистренци, за да запознаят властта със своите проблеми. За нас е важно да отбележим, че очертаните пътища за реализиране на техните цели са исторически възможни и многократно засвидетелствани в изворите от епохата.⁶²

Веднъж предадени лично от данъкоплатците или чрез нарочен куриер, изпратен от провинциалните власти, документите били насочвани за разглеждане към отговорните служби. Както се посочва в изследванията по въпроса, поне от средата на XVI в. насетне с оплакванията и молбите, свързани с данъчното облагане, се занимавал башдефтердарят и неговите подчинени служители. Стъпките, които били предприемани, имали следната последователност. Първо била правена проверка в регистрите на

да съберат данъците или конкретната ситуация изисквала бързи мерки от страна на централната власт. Darling, L., Op. cit., 97–98, 260–262.

⁶¹ Faroqi, S. Political Initiatives “From the Bottom Up” in the 16th- and 17th-Century Ottoman Empire: Some Evidence for Their Existence. – In: Osmastische Studien zur Wirtschafts und Sozialgeschichte in Memoriam Vanko Boskov. Wiesbaden, 1986, 24–33.

⁶² Калицин, М., Кр. Мутафова. Подбрани османски документи за Търново и Търновска каза. В. Търново, 2003, 275–276, 278–283; Димитров, Стр., 1976, цит. съч., 100–111. Faroqi, S., 1986, Op. cit., 24–33; Demirci, S., Op. cit., 437–474; Darling, L., Op. cit., 246–280; Singer, E., Op. cit., 24–131.

Мевкуфата,⁶³ като били консултирани направените в тях допълнителни вписвания, ако съществували такива. Следващият етап от процедурата включвал вземане на решение по случая и записването му върху маргиналните полета на молбата. Съставян бил и документ – тезкере, на основата на който е трябвало да бъде издадена заповед. Тя представляла казуса, предприетите стъпки от страна на молителите и на властите, и най-сетне взетите по този повод решения. Заповедта била адресирана до провинциалните служебни лица, които били отговорни за прилагане и контролиране на всичко онова, което било предписано в нея. Тези лица най-често били кадиите, но също и санджакбеят, бейлербеят, командирите на военните подразделения, местните първенци (аяни) и др. Наред с това чиновниците във финансовото ведомство трябвало да актуализират дефтера, така че той да отразява последните промени, в случай че взетото от властите решение не представлявало отказ на молбата на данъкоплатците, а удовлетворявало изцяло или частично техните искания.⁶⁴

След време в Силистра трябва да е пристигнала султанската заповед – ферман в отговор на кореспонденцията от провинцията. Ферманът бивал прочитан на глас в кадийския съд в присъствието на всички заинтересовани лица, а в случая и в присъствието на представителите на силистренските немюсюлмани. След това се налагало високият стил на документа, както и сложната бюрократична терминология да бъдат разяснявани на данъкоплатците.⁶⁵ Обсъждани били навярно и обстоятелствата

⁶³ Отдел във финансовото ведомство (дефтерхането), отговорен за събиране на държавните приходи и за регистрациите на населението, свързани с тях.

⁶⁴ Подробно по въпроса за процедурите виж.: Darling, L., *Op. cit.*, 246–276; Велков, А. Допълнителни вписвания върху османските финансови документи от XVI–XVIII в. (Дипломатико-палеографско проучване). – В: Народна библиотека “Кирил и Методий”, (20), 1976, №14, 83–140.

⁶⁵ Иванова, Св., *цит. съч.*, 457–491.

около тяхното освобождаване от споменатите данъци, а също така и новите им задължения.

Тук възниква въпросът за езика на комуникация между представителите на немюсюлманската общност и тези на местните власти по време на заседанието. Някои изследвания показват, че в големите административни центрове на империята в контактите между властта и местното население се случвало да бъдат използвани преводачи (*tercüman*). Те били в услуга на дейността на Дивана на санджакбея или на кадийския съд.⁶⁶ Освен това като преводачи в местните институции можело да бъдат използвани и мюсюлмани конвертити или членовете на семейства от смесени бракове, които не били единици в османското общество.⁶⁷ И най-сетне, на много от европейските пътешественици правел впечатление билингвизма на балканските християни или поне на техните представители пред институциите. Владението на османски/турски език трябва да е било на едно простонародно ниво – познание, натрупано в хода на ежедневните професионални и съседски контакти между членовете на двете етноконфесионални общности.⁶⁸

⁶⁶ Пак там, 488; Gradeva, R. On the Judicial Functions of Kadı Courts: Glimpses from Sofia in the 17th Century. – In: Gradeva, R. War and Peace in Rumeli – 15th to Beginning of 19th Century. Istanbul, 2008, 145; Veinstein, G. L'administration ottomane et le problème des interprètes. – In: Etudes sur les villes du Proche-Orient, XVIe-XIXe siècles. Hommage à André Raymond, coord. Par B. Marino, Damas, 2001, 65–79; Çiçek, K. Interpreters of the Court in the Ottoman Empire as Seen from the Sharia Court Records of Cyprus. – Islamic Law and Society, 2002, № 9/1, 1–15.

⁶⁷ Георгиева, Цв. Трансформациите на един сблъсък на цивилизации – християнството и исляма на Балканите. – В: Балкански идентичности. Ч. III. С., 2003, 69.

⁶⁸ Пътешественикът Карстен Нибур написал през 1767 г., че: „От Кючук Дервент до Дунава се минава през много села, населени само с християни. В селата никой не разбира турски освен ония, които имат работа в града или които трябва да се грижат за даване на подслон и храна на пътуващите турци. Останалите селяни говорят само български.” Цит. по Румелийски делници и празници от XVIII в. С.,

След направените пояснения и разисквания пред заинтересованите данъкоплатци в съда, документът обикновено бил записван в кадийския регистър.⁶⁹ По този начин се създавал един официален провинциален архив, който осигурявал постоянен достъп до информация, когато се налагали справки или били търсени сигурни аргументи за решаване на съдебни спорове. Към този архив можем да прибавим и копията на данъчните регистрации, чиито оригинали се съхранявали в централните данъчни служби. Някои от тях също били записвани на страниците на кадийските сиджили.⁷⁰ В продължение на десетилетия, дори на столетия в тези данъчни регистри била акумулирана синтезирана информация за причините и обстоятелствата, при които данъкоплатците били натоварени с определени ангажменти и съответно освободени от някои данъчни задължения.⁷¹ Такъв бил случаят и с двата авариз дефтера от 1696-1697 г., които сто години след събитията все още съхранявали и препредавали информацията за участието на силистренските немюсюлмани във войната.⁷²

1978, 44; Георгиева, Цв., цит. съч., 69–71; Китромилидис, П. „Балкански манталитет“ история, мит, представа. – В: пак той, От кръста към флага. Аспекти на християнството и национализма на Балканите. С., 1999, 94-95; Китромилидис, П., цит. съч., 95; Иванова, Св., цит. съч., 488–489; Шушарова, М. Софроний Врачански (поп Стойко) като представител на раята в Османската държава. – В: Софроний Врачански книжовник и политик от Новото време. Сб. с материали от Международна научна конференция София, 24 ноември 2011 г. С., 2013, 104;

⁶⁹ Gradeva, R., 1978, Op. cit., 53–66; Ergene, B., Op. cit., 33–39.

⁷⁰ Вж. напр.: Национална библиотека „Св. Св. Кирил и Методий“, Ориенталски отдел, Софийски сиджили S85, р. 142, 150–152, 162–163, 182–183; S309, р. 47, 62–65; S312(1), р. 20а, 23а-25а, 266-28а; Русенски сиджили, R1, р. 156, 24а-б; R7, р. 476-48а, 63а-б и др.

⁷¹ Vatin, N. Remarques sur l’oral et écrit dans l’administration ottomane au XVI^e siècle. – In: Oral et écrit dans le monde turco-ottoman. Etudes sous la responsabilité de N. Vatin. – Revue du monde musulman et de Méditerranée, 1995, № 75–76, 144; Иванова, Св., цит. съч., 428–494.

⁷² Историята за войната не е записана в други подробни или кратки

Но паралелно с този официален архив се създавал и друг неформален архив. Както беше посочено в цитирания османски текст от двата авариз дефтера, данъкоплатците получили заповеди, регламентиращи техните професионални задължения към флота, както и данъчните отстъпки на властта. Тези заповеди са съхранявани навярно в църквата или в домовете на първенците на общността, хората, които представлявали своите съграждани пред органите на властта. Този своеобразен архив бил попълван с нов ферман, който потвърждавал или променял установеното статукво и който бил издаван при възшествието на всеки нов султан.⁷³ Тази неформална архивна сбирка била източник за аргументи и доказателства срещу злоупотреби при данъчно облагане, при съдебни спорове в кадийския съд, при молби и оплаквания, изпращани до столичните власти и до султана.

Посоченото дотук показва част от пътищата и механизмите за запазване на паметта за важни за битието на християнската общност събития. В процеса на съхраняване и прерпедаване на информацията участвали институции и функционери от всички нива на османската йерархия, прилагани били бюрократични практики, свързани с регистрацията на населението и неговото данъчно облагане, със създаването на формални и неформални архивни сбирки. Съхраняването и предаването на спомена се осъществявало както чрез писмена комуникация между институциите чрез потока от документи в посока към центъра и към провинцията,

авариз дефтери, които са ми известни и които са съставяни преди или след датите на изследваните авариз дефтери. Вж. BOA, Istanbul, TD 771, p. 320; K. Kereci, Kevkufat kalemi 2849, p. 47; K. Kereci, 12912, p. 18.

⁷³ За султанските документи муаф-наме, с които данъкоплатците били освобождавани от определени групи данъци и специално за муаф-намето на никополските граждани–мюсюлмани вж. Inalcık, Op. cit., 321; Първева, Ст. Българин на служба в османската армия: военни и военнопомощни задължения на градското население в Никопол и Силистра през XVII век. – В: Контрасти и конфликти „зад кадър“ в българското общество през XV-XVIII в. С., 2003, 230–231.

така и чрез устна комуникация в рамките на обсъжданията между представителите на властта и данъкоплатците в кадийския съд, а също така и между членовете на общността и техните първенци, присъствали на съдебното заседание.

Italian Contacts in the Ottoman–Habsburg Conflict in the Hungarian Theatre of War

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ITALIANS IN THE VIENNESE COURT

The present study is part of a future monograph on the Italian soldiers, generals in the Court of Vienna, since the Italian commandants played an important role in the Ottoman–Habsburg conflict in the late 16th and during the whole 17th century as military generals (*'condottieri'*) and strategists. I shall mainly concentrate on the age of Leopold I. King of Hungary, Bohemia, Croatia, Archduke of Austria, and finally King of Germany and Holy Roman Emperor from 1658 up to his death in 1705.¹

In the capital of the Habsburg Empire, Vienna, Italian was almost an official language. Emperor Leopold I spoke perfect Italian, and he was said to be happy when he could use Italian language, since this reminded him to be the head of the Holy Roman Empire.² In the Habsburg ideology the multiethnic empire was a reputed successor of the Holy Roman Empire and the notion

¹ Bérenger, J. Léopold I (1640-1705) fondateur de la puissance autrichienne. Paris, 2004; idem, La Cour impériale de Léopold I^{er}: partis, clans et clientèles. Marburg, 2001; Hamann, B. (Hrsg.). Die Habsburger. Ein biographisches Lexikon, Wien, 1988; Lorenzi, E. Kaiser Leopold I. Wien, 1986; Evans, R. J. W. Das Werden der Habsburgermonarchie 1550–1700. Gesellschaft, Kultur, Institutionen. Wien-Köln, 1989; Winkelbauer, Th. Ständefreiheit und Fürstenmacht. Länder und Untertanen des Hauses Habsburg im konfessionellen Zeitalter Teil 1. – In: Herwig, W. (Hrsg.). Österreichische Geschichte 1522–1699. Wien, 2003.

² De Bin, U. Leopoldo I. Imperatore e la sua Corte nella letteratura italiana. – Bollettino del Circolo Accademico Italiano a Vienna, Trieste, 1910.

of “imperial nobility”, among the Austrian and German aristocrats could be extended also to the Italians. We find several Italians among Leopold’s counselors: as the historiographer of Habsburg Empire, Galeazzo Gualdo Priorato³ or Giovanni Battista Comazzi⁴ who continued his work. Furthermore many Italian priest, monks and clerks worked in the Habsburg Empire, there were numerous Italian musicians in Vienna, some of them were noted also as historians, like Angelini-Bontempi.⁵

The Italian generals also formed a determining component of the Viennese court of Leopold I. Already in the 16th century Italian military leaders had arrived to the Hungarian front-line, and with them also military engineers came from Italy, since in this field they were the most innovative experts, able to find always the cheapest, easiest and most efficient solution to any technical problem. In the Hungarian inventories in the 16th century we find the names of roughly 60 Italian constructors of castles who spent shorter or longer periods in the territory of the Hungarian Kingdom (for example Pietro Ferabosco, Giulio and Ottavio Baldigara, Felice da Pisa, Giovanni Maria da Speziacasa, Carlo Teti and so on).⁶ Furthermore we have to

³ *Historia di Leopoldo cesare continente le cose più memorabili successe in Europa dal 1656 fino al 1670 descritta dal co.[nte] Galeazzo Gualdo Priorato; postovi li ritratti de Principi, de generali e de ministri principali, gli assedii di piazze e battaglie. appresso Gio. Battista Hacque, 1674; Bene S. „Ő császári felségének kedve telik benne...” Egy birodalmi história és társszerzői. – Filológiai Közlöny, 1993, 49–50.*

⁴ *Istoria Di Leopoldo Primo Imperadore De Romani CXXII. Descritta dal cavaliere Gio. Battista Comazzi. Vienna-Milano, 1691.*

⁵ *Historia della ribellione d'Ungheria di Gio. Andrea Angelini Bontempi perugino. Dresda, 1772.*

⁶ *Maggiorotti, L. A. Gli architetti militari. L'opera del genio italiano all'estero. Published by Libreria dello Stato, 1932-1939, Roma, Vol. I–III. Vol. II. Gli Italiani nell'Architettura Militare dell'Epoca Moderna e Contemporanea; Jászay M. Párhuzamok és kereszteződések. A magyar-olasz kapcsolatok történetéből. Bp., 2000, 267–269; Domokos Gy. Ottavio Baldigara. Egy itáliai várfundáló mester Magyarországon. Bp., 2000.*

mention that Italians were the best experts also in the field of the artillery.

Even if there was a considerable number of Italians in the court of Vienna, in this early period they did not form a considerable element of any group of the courtly life, they rather joined individually to one or another minister. The Italian presence became important only before the Thirty Years' War (1618–1648) thanks to the activity of well-known generals such as Giorgio Basta, Aldobrandini, Bentivoglio, Strozzi, Gonzaga, Spinola and others.⁷ Furthermore there were many Italian agents sent to the East, also in the Ottoman Empire, since in that time competent diplomatic corps in the Habsburg Empire did not exist. In the Viennese court the number and influence of the Italians increased clearly during the above mentioned Thirty Years War.⁸

Around some of the most important Italian personalities and families – such Galasso, Piccolomini and others – real centers of clients were formed composed of friends and members of the wider family. These commandants supported the arrival of many other Italian to the court of Vienna. The almost continuous war (since 1618) meant a good opportunity for the Italian military experts, supported by the increasing number of fellow countrymen and by the familiar network between them. For example, before the activity of the most famous strategist, Raimondo Montecuccoli (1609, Modena – 1680, Linz), at least 18 members of his family held a position in the imperial court, accomplishing mostly

⁷ Brnardic, Vl. *Imperial Armies of the Thirty Years' War*. Vol. 2. Cavalry. Osprey Publ., 2010, 16; Hanlon, G. *The twilight of a military tradition: Italian aristocrats and European conflicts, 1560–1800*. New York, 1998, 2014.

⁸ Thiriet, J. M. *Les italiens au service de Léopold I^{er}*. – In: Stolwitzer, Gertrude (Ed.). *Le baroque autrichien au XVIII^e siècle*. I. Rouen, 1989; Martelli, F. *Generali italiani a Vienna tra scienza nuova, empirismo e ideali assolutistici*. – In: *La politica, la scienza, le armi*. Luigi Ferdinando Marsili e la costruzione della frontiera dell'Impero e dell'Europa. A cura di Raffaella Gherardi. Bologna, CLUEB, 2010, 45–100.

shorter or longer military services.⁹ His father, Galeotto Montecuccoli fought also in Hungary in 1593 and the family wanted that Raimondo became a priest, but he choosed “*il mestiere delle armi*.”¹⁰

THE POLITICS OF LEOPOLD I

If we would like to investigate the considerable role that the Italian generals played in the Viennese court, we need first to illustrate briefly the problems Leopold I had to face during his reign, and to what extent the Italians could support him in these efforts.

Leopold had to face basically five different serious problems during his reign: in the field of foreign politics there was a constant conflict on the one hand with the great European power, that is the ‘Sun King’ Louis XIV of France, for the European supremacy, and on the other with the eastern enemy, the Ottomans. A further foreign political problem was the weakening of the Kingdom of Spain. In the inner politics, he had to fight against the separatism of the Hungarians and the attempts of the German princes for autonomy. In spite of these inner and foreign difficulties by the end of his rule Leopold’s realm became from a middle power to a strong great power and he devised some type of *pax asburgica*. However, the fact that there was no venality, meant a serious control of the government and a spoil system existed instead. Leopold did not have a Prime minister, but a Privy Council had served as the Monarchy’s highest deliberative body, a selected group of only 12 state ministers. In 1669 he had formed a new, smaller policy-making body, the *Geheim Konferenz*.¹¹ With these

⁹ Sandonnini, T. Il generale Raimondo Montecuccoli e la sua famiglia. Modena, 1913; Gimorri, Adriano. Raimondo Montecuccoli e le sue opere. Modena, 1924; Rossi, B. Raimondo Montecuccoli: un cittadino d’Europa del Seicento. Bologna, 2002.

¹⁰ Brunelli, G. Montecuccoli, Raimondo. – In: Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani, Vol. LXXVI, Roma, 2012, 22–30.

¹¹ Gherardi, R., F. Martelli. La pace degli eserciti e dell’economia. Montecuccoli

institutions the authority of the *Kaiser* in the Viennese Court was in many sense more firm than the Court of his cousin, Louis XIV's court.¹²

The second Turkish siege of Vienna in 1683 and the formation of the Holy League in 1684 – promoted in a considerable manner by the activity of cardinal Francesco Bonvisi, the papal nuncio of Vienna – meant the Habsburgs' turn to take the offensive. This last stage of the conflict against the Ottoman Empire (called 'Great Turkish War /German: Der Große Türkenkrieg/ or the War of the Holy League') ended with the Treaty of Karlowitz in 1699.¹³ Since the Habsburg army rapidly conquered the Turkish-controlled parts of Hungary, the Ottoman plans for expansion had been stopped. In addition Leopold was able to secure dominion over Slavonia and Transylvania, and the Habsburg Monarchy had significantly extended its territory towards the South-East that was undisputedly accepted by the Ottomans in the treaty of Karlowitz.

Since in the meanwhile the Habsburgs stipulated a peace treaty with France in 1697 in Rijswijk, these foreign political successes brought the victory of Leopold's political strategy. A significant factor of these successes was the military power created by the Emperor that meant a permanent army of 100 thousand of soldiers in the given period.¹⁴ The leaders of this army were important generals such as, Charles V, Duke of Lorraine or the Italian Raimondo Montecuccoli or Prince

e Marsili alla Corte di Vienna. Bologna, 2009, 13–15.

¹² Duindam, J. Vienna and Versailles. The Courts of Europe's Dynastic Rivals, 1550–1780. Cambridge, 2003.

¹³ F. Molnár M. Der Friede von Karlowitz und das Osmanische Reich. – In: Strohmeier, A., N. Spannberger (Hrsg.). Frieden und Konfliktmanagement in interkulturellen Räumen. Das Osmanische Reich und die Habsburgmonarchie in der Frühen Neuzeit. Stuttgart, 2013, 197–220.

¹⁴ They were able to mobilize troops numbering between 64.000–86.000 in the 1680-90s and 110.000 in 1705. Ágoston, G. The Ottoman Wars and the Changing Balance of Power. – In: Ingraio, Ch., N. Samardžić, J. Pešalj (Eds.). The Peace of Passarowitz, 1718. Purdue University, 2011, 95.

Eugene of Savoy, their leadership was very important in reforming and modernizing the Habsburg armed forces.

The Habsburg monarchy was similar to the Ottoman Empire in the sense of being a heavily multinational, multi-cultural and multiconfessional empire, and as such, despite the centralization attempts, its ruler still depended very much on the local aristocracies. In this society the army meant a separate universe, since it obeyed directly to the ruler, and consequently the army became the ruler's most faithful ally not only in the foreign policy, but also in the centralization attempts of the emperor. Moreover in the Habsburg army there were many foreigners at high positions who considered only the Emperor as their exclusive lord and patron (*Herr und Meister*).¹⁵ This was the period when the number and influence of the Italians reached the limit to be able to support one of the fractions (parties) of the court, and consequently to be involved in the political decisions. The Italians joined a multiethnic alliance of interests that was forming in that period, the so called 'Military Party'. This meant also to support and interpret the interests of this party also in cultural and literary sense, and the Italians were the most efficient in this field. This literary and cultural propaganda was an extremely important activity, since the military results alone were not enough to convince the society, and obviously the Emperor himself about their point. The supranational military party and the national military elites often collaborated against the Ottomans, but sometimes there were open conflicts among them. An interesting manifestation of these conflicts was the so called Zrínyi-Montecuccoli debate. This debate – which is widely studied by Hungarian historiography – between the Italian general, Raimondo Montecuccoli and his Hungarian fellow, Miklós Zrínyi (famous general and poet) in the 1660s was discussed in the form of letters, pamphlets and projects between the two military leaders of the Habsburg army on political and military issues, including both

¹⁵ Gherardi, R., F. Martelli, *Op. cit.*, 16.

theoretical and practical considerations.¹⁶

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The military party was also called the “Spanish party” since their main political goal was to protect the Spanish territories of the Habsburgs from the attacks of Louis XIV and to maintain the European geopolitical balance. The main strategist of the Habsburg Empire, Montecuccoli underlined that both the Ottoman and the Spanish army were retarded. For example speaking about the Turkish army Montecuccoli stressed the increasing corruption in the Ottoman bureaucracy, the bad quality of the troops, the inadequacy of the military training, and, most of all, the more and more irreversible technologic backwardness. According to the view of Montecuccoli and the military party a modern, developed European army with the help of military science could defeat easily the Ottomans, even if they were more numerous. They worried much more about France, because of its well-trained, disciplined army, based on strong economic background under the leadership of the best commandants and military engineers.

The modification of the war-tactics, the birth of the more numerous armies contributed to the success at the end of the 17th century against the Ottoman Empire that was left out from the “military revolution.”¹⁷ The Italian soldiers were the promoters of a certain military revolution in the Viennese court, they aimed to introduce a modern, scientifically based

¹⁶ For a synthesis in Italian see: Hausner, G. Il dibattito tra Raimondo Montecuccoli e Miklòs Zrinyi. – In: *Annuario. Accademia d’Ungheria a Roma*. Roma, 2010, 450–458.

¹⁷ Ágoston, G. *Empires and Warfare in East-Central Europe, 1550–1750s: The Ottoman-Habsburg Rivalry and Military Transformation*. – In: Tallet, F., D. Trim (Eds.). *European Warfare, 1350–1750*. Cambridge, 2010, 110–134; Kelenik, J. *The Military Revolution in Hungary*. – In: Dávid, G., P. Fodor (Eds.). *Ottomans, Hungarians, and Habsburgs in Central Europe: The Military Confines in the Era of Ottoman Conquest*. Leiden, 2000, 117–159.

military art, using the so-called „*geometria militare*.” They worked on the practical elaboration of this, following the theoretical basis laid down by Galileo Galilei (1564–1642). The most important representatives of this group were from Bologna, such as Cesare Marsili (1592–1633),¹⁸ the Bentivoglios, the Marescottis, and first of all, the above mentioned Raimondo Montecuccoli and his family. They were aware of the utility of both the Galilei-method and the cartography and they diffused this knowledge of Galilei into a little élite, furthermore they were influenced by the writings of Justus Lipsius (1547–1606) about discipline and training necessary to the formation of a modern army. They argued for the centralization of the Kaiser’s power against the local nobilities, in order to reinforce the Habsburg Empire. For the same reason, all the important Italian commandants stressed the need to form a *miles perpetuus*, a permanent army.¹⁹

The Italians earned their practical experience in the service of the Habsburgs, mostly in the Hungarian theater of war: according to Fabio Martelli’s opinion the Hungarian wars were “*oggettivamente una vera e propria immensa ‘macelleria’ di turchi e di imperiali.*”²⁰ They had to face many difficulties in logistics (the Ottomans had permanent logistic department!) and economy (the imperials could not pay the stipend of the soldiers in the castles and in the field-armies), the absence of experienced military leaders, and that of a well-trained professional army. They had to adapt the theory (technics and geometrical skills) in the everyday military practice in Hungary. One of the most eloquent examples for this phenomenon was the case of the above mentioned Raimondo Montecuccoli, military

¹⁸ Cavazza, M. Marsili, Cesare. – In: Dizionario biografico degli italiani. Trecciani, Roma, 2008. 755–758; Baffetti, G. Cesare Marsili: un cauto galileiano nell’aristotelismo barocco bolognese. – In: Il Carrobbio, 17. 1992, 5–16.

¹⁹ Martelli, F., Op. cit., 78–90.

²⁰ Martelli, F., Op. cit., 80.

writer,²¹ commandant and president of the Court War Council (1668–1681). Montecuccoli arrived to the Hungarian theater of war against his will. In the Hungarian front, the Italian strategist had to face serious alimentation and financial problems. Because of his dilatory strategy he had a conflict with the Hungarians.²² Even if Montecuccoli won the battle of Szentgotthárd, the disadvantageous treaty of Vasvár (10 August 1664)²³ increased the Hungarian's resentment against him, and these tensions exploited in the revolt by Imre Thököly.²⁴ At the end, thanks to the ambitions of the gran vezir, Kara Mustafa, the siege of Vienna (1683) gave an impulse to the elimination of the Ottoman domination of Hungary. During and after the War of the Holy League, the central government gradually assumed stronger control over recruitment, financing, and supply and Habsburg commanders were better able to control their armies, which were organized into smaller and more agile units than their Ottoman counterparts.²⁵

As we have seen above, the Italian military experts and commandants from every part of the the Peninsula (Bologna, Modena, Roma, Napoli and various regions as Tuscany, Lombardy etc.²⁶) were welcome, due to their qualification and

²¹ For the more complete and most recent publication of the works of Montecuccoli see: *Le opere di Raimondo Montecuccoli*. A cura di Raimondo Luraghi. Vol. 1–2. Roma, 1988. and *Le opere di Raimondo Montecuccoli*. A cura di Andrea Testa. 3. vol. Roma, 2000.

²² Nagy L., Hausner G. Raimondo Montecuccoli és a magyarok. – *Hadtörténelmi Közlemények*, 124/3, 2011, 679–740.

²³ Tóth, F. Saint-Gotthard 1664. Une bataille européenne. Paris, 2007; Tóth, F., Zágorhidi Czigány, B. Szentgotthárd–Vasvár 1664: háború és béke a XVII. század második felében. Szentgotthárd, 2004.

²⁴ Varga J. Válaszúton. Thököly Imre és Magyarország 1682–84-ben. Bp., 2007.

²⁵ Ágoston, G., *Op. cit.*, 95–96.

²⁶ Mugnai, Br., L. Cristini (Eds.). *L'esercito imperiale al tempo del Principe Eugenio di Savoia 1690–1720*. La Fanteria (1): The Imperial Army in the Age of Prince Eugene of Savoy 1690–1720 the Infantry (1). Soldiershop Publishing, 2014, 46–47.

military talent, and also because of the fact that they did not aimed to form an “Italian party”, but they tended to get involved in the groups of the German aristocracy and bureaucracy, and made efforts to be accepted by the court. They had to legitimize themselves according to the norms of the given period, and consequently those Italians who started a carrier in Vienna – such as the above mentioned Raimondo Montecuccoli or we can mention the names of Collalto, Colloredo, Caprara, Torquato de’ Conti, Galasso, Gambacorta, Isolani, Odeschalchi, Piccolomini and Veterani – tried to “find” (or rather invent) some historical connection (alliance or kinship) with the Habsburg dynasty in the late-antique period for themselves, or some of them choose a more direct way, and declared himself a descendent of a German tribe.²⁷

Since many of these persons coming from Italy showed special talent in both military and individual-cultural field, they could often earn special commissions from the Viennese court: as an example we can mention the activity of Giorgio Basta (1550–1607)²⁸ from an earlier period, or later that of Antonio Caraffa (1646, Naples – 1693, Vienna)²⁹ or the carrier of Luigi Ferdinando Marsigli (1658-1730).³⁰ For the Italians the military carrier meant an opportunity to reach the highest dignified ranks in the Viennese Court. The main reason of this was the fact that the Austrian rulers intended to avoid the highest state functions’ becoming inheritable, and they wanted to keep these positions under control. The meritocratic approach of emperors in tended to put Italians to the main positions of the military leadership, since they were easily controlled and influenced, because of the lack of roots and

²⁷ Martelli, F., *Op. cit.*, 64–68.

²⁸ Veress, E. (Ed.). *Basta György hadvezér levelezése és iratai (1597–1606)*. Vol. 1–2. Bp., 1909–1913.

²⁹ Vico, G. *La gesta di Antonio Carafa*. A cura di Manuela Sanua. Napoli, 1997.

³⁰ Stoye, J. *Marsigli’s Europe: 1680–1730. The life and times of Luigi Ferdinando Marsigli, Soldier and Virtuoso*. New Haven–London, 1994.

political relations with the local nobility. The fact that they were linked uniquely to the Emperor was even more important than their objective merits, and it seems that this unconditional loyalty was the basic criteria in the formation of the new élite. It is true that Montecuccoli based his decisions on the *Ragion di Stato* (*raison d'état*), but for him this concept was not an abstract philosophical notion, but it meant the Emperor's will, in the very pragmatic and effective sense. And for example Marsigli states that for him the *amor principis* was clearly identical with the *amor Dei*.³¹ So it was an absolutely logical choice to give the leadership of the imperial army to the Italian mercenaries in such a difficult period as the Thirty Years War, since they were independent economically and socially from the nobility of the Austrian-German regions. In other words we can say that there was a strong and reciprocal community of interests.

In conclusion we can point out that in Habsburg military service a large number of Italian commandants of voluntaries fought for the liberation of the Hungarian Kingdom and Transylvania from the Ottoman occupation. These Italians contributed with their practical activity and with their theoretical writings to the success of Emperor Leopold resulting in the consolidation of his power over the whole region, and in the creation of an important European Empire. The expansion of the Monarchy following the military successes against the Ottomans is regarded as the key event of his reign, which was solemnly stylized in the patriotic historiography of the 19th century as Austria's 'heroic age'.

³¹ Nagy, L. La frontiera, il buon governo e l'armonia mondiale. L. F. Marsili sulla frontiera della Transilvania. – In: La politica, la scienza, le armi. Luigi Ferdinando Marsili e la costruzione della frontiera dell'Impero e dell'Europa. A cura di Raffaella Gherardi. Bologna, CLUEB, 2010, 192; Martelli, F. Le Leggi, le Armi e il Principe. Studio sul pensiero politico di Raimondo Montecuccoli. Bologna, 1990; Gherardi, R., F. Martelli. La pace degli eserciti e dell'economia. Montecuccoli e Marsili alla Corte di Vienna. Bologna, 2009, 13–15.

Effects of Russia's Balkan Aspirations on the British Diplomacy in St Petersburg.

The Treaty of Adrianople and Its Consequences (1829–1832)

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Russia's growing great power status and strengthening influence in the Balkans at the end of the 1820s were partially the consequence of the role Russia had played during the Greek Cause, as well as of its foreign policy towards the Ottoman Empire. As regards the latter, the issue of an upcoming war launched against the Porte had the greatest significance, the probability of which could increasingly be perceived since the autumn of 1827. Despite the fact that the alternative of a Russo–Turkish war had been an integral part of the rhetoric of Russia's foreign policy, it had not been realized in practice. Since the main diplomatic tool in Russia's foreign policy was to sustain the theoretical possibility of an upcoming war, which was not only regarded as a means for crisis management and a temporary solution in solving the Eastern Crisis, but also as a means in shaping international relations, in particular the Anglo–Russian diplomatic relations.

Year 1828 brought sharp changes in this respect. In consequence of an actual armed conflict developing between Russia and the Ottoman Empire, Russia had managed to achieve substantial war successes, while the results ratified by the Treaty of Adrianople resulted in an unequivocal growth of the great power prestige of the Russian Cabinet. It was in this context that the allied cooperation between Russia and Great Britain, based on the treaties of April 4, 1826 and July 6,

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1827 was broken, the precursors of which had started to reveal themselves since 1828, but it was not until the beginning of 1830s that its actual consequences became apparent for both the London and the St Petersburg Governments.

The main objective of my paper is to give an overview of the most important stages of this process, and to demonstrate Great Britain's foreign policy toward Russia following the Treaty of Adrianople, and also to present the major factors influencing this policy. For the interpretation of the British position I used foreign affairs sources from the British National Archives/Public Record Office, from the collections of which I used in particular volumes recording Britain's direct communication with Russia (General Correspondence – Russia). I also used several publications mostly issued in the 19th century, comprising both private correspondence and collections of official government material, such as correspondence, dispatches of Arthur Wellesley the Duke of Wellington.

The major policy guideline defining the British foreign policy of the era is marked with names of Duke of Wellington and Lord Aberdeen, and its basic principle was the reconsideration of the relationship with Russia, namely keeping under control St Petersburg's position and ambitions represented in the Eastern Question. Endeavors to create a counterbalance had appeared as a main objective of the Foreign Office as early as during the months prior to the outbreak of the Russo–Turkish war. The turning point however, was undoubtedly the outbreak of the Russo–Turkish war, which for the Cabinet of St James resulted in understanding that London is not able to substantially influence the course of the Russian policy. The real or perceived possibility of launching an armed conflict turned out to be even more dominant, since during the Goderich Government, as a result of the Anglo–Russian negotiations, Britain still had a slight chance that St Petersburg would give up his plan of a war against the Ottoman Empire. Consequently, this failure of the British policy resulted in the gradual break-up of the Anglo–Russian alliance, concluded in

the spring of 1826, and issued in the continuous weakening of the Anglo–Russian diplomatic relations. London’s concerns or hypotheses, according to which Russia was a potential threat to the English geostrategic, political and economic interests, as well as to the sovereignty and integrity of the Ottoman Empire, had a top influence in this process. As a result, the need to protect the Balkan and Middle Eastern status quo gained more significance than ever.

One of the most prominent moments of the British–Russian disintegration process was the Russo–Turkish peace treaty, signed on September 14, 1829, in Adrianople. The foreign policy determined and applied relating to the Ottoman Empire offered an alternative for the two leading Great Powers of Europe for a long term preservation of their cooperation, based on coordination of interests and exercising mutual control, which thus became the guarantee for either the stability or the instability of the formed coalition. In this context, the moment any difference in the attitude of the two Cabinets occurred, the conditions of the partnership based on mutual temperance would change at their core. And the Russo–Turkish war and the Treaty of Adrianople created a situation exactly of this nature, in which due to the changing international circumstances Great Britain was forced to redefine its relationship with Russia. Consequently, in the first part of this paper I attempt to find the motives of the Government of London in changing their foreign policy toward St Petersburg, while the second part will be a presentation of the actual political steps induced by the changes in the tone of the Foreign Office.

The successful peace talks in Adrianople resulted in the implementation of several beneficial decrees for the Russian Empire, perhaps one of the most important of which was the reinforcement of the rights of the Danubian Principalities, which was a constant and dominant element of the foreign policy of the Russian Court “(...) *the Danubian Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia pursuant to their specific capitulation had subordinated themselves to the power of the Sublime Porte, and since Russia had*

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accepted to guarantee their well-being, at present they are granted all rights, advantages and privileges, which were assured for them by their capitulations, also by the agreements concluded between the Courts of the two Empires, and finally as a result of the Hatti Sherifs issued in different periods."¹

The status of Moldavia and Wallachia and the reformation of their internal political structure also determined the degree of the Russian influence in the given region. The points of origin for the privileges of the Principalities went back to the Peace Treaty of Kuchuk Kainarji of 1774,² to the Treaty of Jassy of 1792³ and to the Treaty of Bucharest in 1812,⁴ as well as to the Sultan's Hatti-Sherif of 1802⁵ and the Convention of Akkerman concluded in 1826.⁶ Based on these treaties, Russia gained more and more influence in the internal policy of the Danubian Principalities,⁷ a prominent example of which was the issue of representation of Moldavia and Wallachia,

¹ Внешняя политика России 19 и начало 20 века. [Henceforward: ВПР] Документы Российского Министерства Иностранных дел. Сер. II. т. 8 (16). М., 1995. Док. 103. Мирный договор между Россией и Османской Империей, Адрианополь, 2 (14) сентября 1829 г., 267.

² Кючук-Кайнарджийский мирный договор между Россией и Турцией, 10 июля 1774 г. Под стягом России: Сазонов, А. А., Г. Н. Герасимова, О. А. Глушкова, С. Н. Кистерев. (Сост.). Сборник архивных документов. М., 1992, 78–92.

³ Extracted text In: The National Archives / Public Record Office / FO [Henceforward: TNA] 352/61/5. Abstract of Articles of Treaties between Russian and Turkey, – 1774–1849 –, subsisting April 4, 1854.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ The Hatti-Serif ratified the election of Hospodars every seven years, as well as the manner and possibility of their removal, which in case of a justified failure should be carried out with the consensus between the Porte and the Russian Court, with their full agreement. – In: Ibid., 15.

⁶ Extracted text In: Ibid.

⁷ Taki, V. Russian Protectorate in the Danubian Principality: Legacies of the Eastern Question in Contemporary Russo-Romanian Relations. – In: Frary, L. J., M. Kozelsky. (Eds.). The Russian-Ottoman Borderlands. The Eastern Question Reconsidered. Madison, 2014, 42.

which could legitimately be fulfilled by the current Russian ambassador to Constantinople. Although the Russo–Turkish Treaty of 1774 assured for both provinces the orthodox representation through a chargé d'affaires at the Porte, the same Treaty granted the Tsar's ambassador delegated to the Turkish capital a similar power.⁸

Thus the gradual expansion of rights of the Danubian Principalities by means of the above mentioned Treaties, proved to be part of a well-constructed guideline of the Russian foreign policy. Since the results achieved in this region – besides being the means of a possible reinforcement of the Empire's position in the Balkans as well as of the control over the internal affairs of Moldavia and Wallachia – would also offer international legislative points of reference for St Petersburg in his policy toward the Ottoman Empire. Later, St Petersburg's freedom to act in this area was further enhanced by the Organic Statutes issued in 1831–1832.⁹

The issue of Russia's influence exercised in the region of East-Balkans became even more pronounced as the economic aspect was brought into the fore. In the strengthening of the economic and strategic role of the Danubian Principalities a substantial role was played by their unlimited freedom of shipping and commerce along the Danube,¹⁰ which resulted in

⁸ TNA/FO/352/61/5.14.

⁹ Florescu, R. R. Stratford Canning, Palmerston and the Wallachian Revolution of 1848. – In: *The Journal of Modern History*, 35, 1963, N 3, 229; Арш, Г. Л., В. Н. Виноградов, Э. А. Джападзе, И. С. Достян. (Ред.). *Международные отношения на Балканах 1815–1830*. М., 1983, 270; Régnauld E. *Histoire politique et sociale des principautés danubiennes*. Paris, 1855, 166–186. Concerning the autonomy and aspirations for independence of the peoples of Balkans also see: Достян, И. С., А. В. Карасев, И. В. Чуркина. *Национально-освободительная борьба балканских народов как проявление кризиса Османской империи в 19 в. Революции и реформы на Балканах. Балканские исследования*, 12. М., 1994, 5–20.

¹⁰ For Moldavia and Wallachia this right was guaranteed by article V of the Russo-Turkish peace treaty of 1829. – In: *ВПП. Сер. II. т. 8* (16). М., 1995.

Moldavia and Wallachia soon becoming significant stations of an important southeastern European grain transport route, especially in the period after the flourishing of the two port towns and commercial depots, Brăila and Galați.¹¹ Even though the region gained relevance in European commercial life only starting from the 1840s, the supervision of the Danube Delta and the privilege of control over its most important sections had been one of the most fundamental great power policy issues since the 1830s.¹² It was particularly true related to Great-Britain and Austria, who had kept the issue on the political agenda since 1829, and with Russia's acquisition of the Sulina Channel the topic attracted further attention during this period.

Russia's leading position and control over the Danube Delta was closely linked to the policy of territorial acquisitions. The problem related to that and emerging on the part of the allies, in particular on the part of Great Britain, was connected with the evaluation of the Russian Empire's true intentions. London's concerns due to the Russian borders expanding to the south and southwest, based on the tendencies of the former Russo-Turkish war, could be regarded as a natural reaction. In this case, however, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs distanced itself from the view of regarding the territorial expansion as warfare moves, or later, after the armed struggles ended, as war achievements. This view was justified by the provisions of the peace treaty, as according to article III *"The border between the two Empires will be river Prut, starting*

Док. 103..., 267.

¹¹ Ardeleanu, C. Russian-British Rivalry Regarding Danube Navigation and the Origins of the Crimean War (1846-1853). – Journal of Mediterranean Studies, 29, 2010, N 2, 165; Ardeleanu, C. The Navigation of the Lower Danube (1829-1853). – Transylvanian Review, 22, 2013, Supplement. No. 2. 230-241; Demeter G. A Balkán és az Oszmán Birodalom. Társadalmi és gazdasági átalakulások a 18. század végétől a 20. század közepéig. I. Kötet. Általános rész és Bulgária. Bp., 2014, 150.

¹² Hajnal, H. The Danube. Its Historical, Political and Economic Importance. The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1920, 53-63.

*from the point it enters Moldavia, as far as the confluence with Danube. From that point the borderline shall follow the flow of the Danube, as far as the arm of St. George meets the sea, in a way that all island, formed by various branches of this river, will belong to Russia, while its right bank will remain the property of the Sublime Porte.”*¹³

The Russian diplomacy both theoretically and in practice stuck to the principles pursued during the Eastern (Greek) crisis of the Ottoman Empire, namely, despite of taking part in its settlement, they refused to take advantage of the international situation by territorial acquisitions.¹⁴ Parties signing the Protocol of St Petersburg “(...) will not seek in this arrangement any increase of territory, nor any exclusive influence, nor advantage in commerce, for their subjects which shall not be equally attainable by all other nations.”¹⁵ A very similar formulation can be seen in the agreement concluded between the great powers and signed in July 1827, where the content is supplemented with the fact that the liabilities of the Treaty shall be undertaken by Governments of three states – Great Britain, Russia and France – instead of two.¹⁶

Despite of Russia’s manifested statements and restrained policy bearing in mind the support of the Ottoman Empire’s integrity, St Petersburg’s political attitude was still not in accordance with its former promises. As even though the completed war was not an expansive one and did not result in large scale territorial acquisitions, Russia’s economic and political influence relocated to new territories of interest, one of which was the above mentioned Danube Delta, while the

¹³ БИП. Сер. II. т. 8 (16). М., 1995. Док. 103..., 267.

¹⁴ Jelavich, B. Russia and the Formation of the Romanian National State, 1821–1878. Cambridge, 2004, 29–30.

¹⁵ Protocol of St. Petersburg, 23rd March (4th April), 1826. – In: The Duke of Wellington (Ed.). Dispatches, Correspondence and Memoranda of Field Marshal Arthur Duke of Wellington. Vol. 4. London, 1871, 60–61.

¹⁶ Treaty of the Settlement of Greece, 6th July, 1827. – In: Ibid., 60.

other was the northeastern and eastern region of the Black Sea, the Coast of Western Caucasus.¹⁷ From this aspect, the Russian party did not fully comply with the intentions agreed in the provisions of the Protocol.

The same conclusions can be made related to Russia's countenance in gaining economic advantage. During the peace talks it was an important endeavour to preserve a favourable balance between the Ottoman and Russian commercial conditions along the Danube, which was a crucial issue for both Empires. This was one of the reasons why the Government of St Petersburg stuck to the goal of acquiring control over the Danube Delta, and through that, over the Sulina Channel for his fleet *"Merchant ships of both empires were granted free navigation along the full length of the Danube, considering that these ships under Ottoman flags may enter the Chilia and Sulina arms unhindered, while navigation in the St. George arm will remain free both for military and merchant fleet of both empires."*¹⁸ However, based on the above section, an expansion of larger latitude for the Russian fleet could be predicted, while from safety aspects Russia's opportunities were restricted by the fact that: *"At the same time, Russian military vessels shall not navigate the Danube upstream further the point it meets river Prut."*¹⁹

In order to present the English position formulated concerning territorial issues and navigation on the Danube, it is important to take a look at the characteristics and political aspects of the Foreign Office's reflections on the Treaty of Adrianople. One of the most insightful sources concerning the topic was Wellington's, the Prime Minister's (1828–1830) detailed assay addressed to Lord Aberdeen, the Minister of Foreign Affairs (1828–1830), in which besides describing the

¹⁷ The section between the river St. Nicholas and Kuban. See: БИП. Cep. II. т. 8 (16). М., 1995. Док. 103..., 267.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Ibid.

articles of the Russo–Turkish peace agreement, he also put forth the short-term and long-term consequences of the newly formed situation in the Balkan and Middle Eastern area, in a close context with the valid international legislative treaties of the period.²⁰ One of the most meaningful topics described by the British Prime Minister was the range of changes concerning the Danubian Principalities, and parallel to that, the question of navigation, as well as the changes concerning the Russian commercial activities within the Ottoman Empire.

The content of article VII of the Treaty provoked particularly vehement responses, according to which besides the unlimited freedom of movement and trade, ships with the Russian flag as well as merchandise transported by Russian merchants on Turkish territories, were granted exemption from the liability of inspection.²¹ As another neuralgic point, in his essay the Duke of Wellington also pointed out the provisions of the same article relating to the Black Sea, stating that “(...) *the Sublime Porte commits itself to assure (...)*”²² the free access to the Black Sea, as well as free passage through the straits of Bosphorus and Dardanelles, and also to establish Russia’s free connection to the Mediterranean Sea.²³

The official criticism of the given section from the British side was formulated in the Memorandum of October 29, 1829,²⁴ in which the British Prime Minister did not primarily see the root of the problem in the advantages obtained by the Cabinet of St Petersburg, but in the content of the given statement relating to the merchant fleets of the other states,

²⁰ Memorandum. – Observation on the Treaty of Adrianople. London, 10th October, 1829. – In: *Dispatches...*, Op. cit., Vol. 6. [July, 1829, to April, 1830], 1877, 212–219.

²¹ ВПР, Сер. II. т. 8 (16). М., 1995. Док. 103. Мирный договор между Россией и Османской Империей, Адрианополь, 2 (14) сентября 1829 г., 268.

²² Ibid.

²³ Exclusively for merchant vessels.

²⁴ Memorandum Upon the 7th Article of the Treaty of Adrianople, 29th October, 1829. – In: *Dispatches...*, Op. cit., Vol. 6. 1877, 268–271.

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namely: “(...) *Based on the same principles and in compliance with conditions identical with those for vessels under Russian flag, the passage through the straits of Bosphorus and Dardanelles is announced to be free for merchant ships of all states friendly to the Sublime Porte, regardless they are travelling to Russian ports, towards ports of the Black sea or returning back with cargo or ballast. (...)*.”²⁵ The complexity of the problem and the cause for the concerns of the Cabinet of London could be basically explained by the fact that the treaty did not lay down clear and transparent rules concerning vessels flying flags of other states. That is to say, the treaty did not discuss and did not even mention, whether other states could expect the Russian Empire's action in case their above described rights are violated, since on the event of the infringement of the scope of authorities included in article VII of the Treaty of Adrianople, the Tsar's Court had the right to respond with retaliations, declaring those events as hostile acts.²⁶ It is not clear however, whether St Petersburg could also use these measures in case of violations suffered by ships of other foreign powers,²⁷ so Duke Wellington saw in this context the real danger of the Russo-Turkish Treaty, which could restrict the Ottoman Empire in his freedom to act.

Lord Aberdeen goes even further with his arguments, and according to the Head of the Foreign Office Russia has “*Prominently advanced into the centre of Armenia, in the midst of a Christian population, Russia holds the keys both of the Persian and Turkish provinces; and whether she may be disposed to extend her conquest to the East or to the West, to Teheran or to Constantinople, no serious obstacle arrest her progress*”,²⁸ while its forging ahead „(...) *is not hindered by*

²⁵ БИП. Сер. II. Т. 8 (16). М., 1995. Док. 103..., 268.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Memorandum Upon the Seventh..., 270.

²⁸ Lord Aberdeen to Haytesbury, 31 October, 1829. Quotation. In: Ingram, Edward, In Defence of British India. Great Britain in the Middle East,

any restrictions.”²⁹ With reference to the same point the British Ambassador to Constantinople, Lord Ponsonby, in one of his subsequent letters wrote the following: “*Lord Aberdeen observes that the Treaty of Adrianople is not in conformity with Russian promises but appears to affect vitally the interests (and) the strength the dignity, the present safety and the future independence of the Ottoman Empire.*”³⁰

In fact, the most conspicuous and alarming sign for the British diplomacy was the message right at the core of the Treaty of Adrianople: Russia had become independent from their allies in the formation of the Eastern Question,³¹ by which the British foreign policy had to face a new challenge. From that moment on, subsequent to, or rather parallel to the great power reconciliations closing the Greek Cause, Great Britain had to focus on taking a more active role, a more dominant and unequivocal one both in their rhetoric and acts. This was all the more important for Britain, since none of the other participants of the European Concert of Great Powers gave him any support in counterbalancing Russia’s policy. The British Prime Minister wrote: “*France will not move with England and Austria without Prussia, and Prussia will not move without being certain that the movement will be agreeable to the Emperor of Russia.*”³²

Based on those ideas and on the knowledge of the international relations, it soon became clear that London did not have a strong basis of allies during that period. However, this change of course did not bring an immediate success, moreover, the primary task of the Cabinet of St James was now to face all

1775–1842. New York, 2013 (first published in 1984), 173.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Quotation. – In: Wiebe, M. G., M. S. Millar, A. P. Robson (Eds.). Benjamin Disraeli. Letters, 1852–1856. Vol. 6. Toronto, 1997, 247.

³¹ Temperley, H. The Foreign Policy of Canning, 1820–1827. – In: Ward, A. W., G. P. Gooch (Eds.). The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy. Vol. 2. Cambridge, 1923, 101.

³² Memorandum. – Observation on the Treaty of Adrianople. London, 10th October, 1829. – In: Dispatches..., Op. cit., Vol. 6. 1877, 218.

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the negative consequences of the last two years, as well as the apparent lowering of their political prestige. The most representative standpoint for the failure of the British foreign policy was formulated in the following: *“Go to the North, and hear the terms of bitterness and contempt in which England is assailed by the Russian Government for our vacillation, by the Russian people for our illiberality... Turkey complains of being betrayed. Greece considers us her enemy.”*³³

By studying the two diplomatic acts of the period following the Treaty of Adrianople, we may get a representative picture of the main features of the British Government's attitude toward Russia, characteristic of the whole 1830s. The first example to that was the signing of the act of navigation and commerce with Austria. As to its essential point, Great Britain and Austria agreed in a joint Treaty about the commercial benefits used toward each other, defining first of all trade concessions in the field of export and import. A special gesture from the side of the British Government concerned the overseas colonies, with an exceptional attitude toward the province of India: the Cabinet of London held out prospects of future advantages – similar to those of Britain's – for the Government of Vienna during their local trade activities in the overseas provinces.³⁴ From one hand, the agreement tightened the Anglo–Austrian connections, and from the other hand, it was also a clear response to the dynamic changes of the Russian foreign policy tangible in 1828–1829. The agreement – concluded in two months after the Russo–Turkish Peace Treaty – was ratified on December 31, 1829,³⁵ while the Russian diplomacy's reaction followed only a year later, in September of 1830.

St Petersburg standpoint was mediated to Aberdeen by Andrzej Josef Matuszewicz. The Polish-born diplomat had

³³ Quotes Lady Canning's opinion, Temperley, Op. cit., 104.

³⁴ TNA/PRO/FO/94/35 – FO and Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Ratification of Treaties. Austria Convention on Navigation and Commerce. Place and Date of Signature – 31.12.1829.

³⁵ Ibid.

represented the Russian interests as authorized ambassador extraordinary on the Conference of London discussing the question of the Greek State since 1830.³⁶ The cause of the Anglo–Austrian agreement was not a negligible factor for the Cabinet of St Petersburg. Evidence to that was Matuszewicz's ultimatum of September 26, 1830, in which he requested information from the Foreign Office's regarding the provisions of the contract between London and Vienna, valid since February 1 of the same year. Lord Aberdeen answered in an official letter, with full details of the treaty and with its regulations concerning the Ionian Islands. Since as it was revealed by the British Prime Minister's response to Matuszewicz, the Russian ambassador primarily wanted to obtain intelligence concerning the Greek territories in question, which was not surprising at all during the period of consultations on the circumstances and conditions of establishing an independent Greek State.³⁷ Based on the statement of the Foreign Office and the provisions of the official agreement the contracting parties confirmed for the Austrian Government all the formerly offered benefits as regards the commercial activities with the Ionian Islands,³⁸ which were included in the contract about placing the given territories under a British protectorate, signed in the Four Power Agreement of November 5, 1815.³⁹ Beyond those, Austria did not have any further benefits.

³⁶ Satow, E. *A Guide to Diplomatic Practice*. Vol. II. Cambridge, 2011, 101; *The Cabinet Annual Register and Historical, Political, Biographical and Miscellaneous Chronicle for the Year 1831*. Vol. 1. London, 1832, 426.

³⁷ Draft, Count Matuszewicz, FO, September 29, 1830. – In: TNA/PRO/FO/65/189 – Foreign Office and Predecessors. Political and other Departments. General Correspondence before 1906, Russian Empire. Domestic, Prince Lieven, Matuszewicz, Prince Troubetskoy, and various.

³⁸ TNA/PRO/FO/94/35.

³⁹ No. 426. Трактат, заключенный в Париже между Россией и Англией относительно Ионических островов Собрание Трактатов и Конвенций, заключенных Россией с иностранными державами. По поручению Министерство Иностранных Дел составил Мартенс, Ф. Ф. СПб, 1895, 250–255.

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The curiosity of the situation was that according to the ultimatum received from the Russian ambassador, the Russian Government must have wished to expand the given regulations to Russian merchant ships, too. But the head of the Foreign Office in his answer to Matuszewic brought forth detailed arguments claiming that the benefit granted to Austria was not a new improvement in the British–Russian relations, as it was a confirmation of the related section of the former Treaty, signed one and half decade ago. And since in 1815 Russia fully supported the contents of article VII of the Treaty of Paris without insisting on its expansion, in view of all that, the British Government saw no reason for the Russian demands.⁴⁰

Another intriguing diplomatic affair of the time was the case of the British ambassador to St Petersburg designated to replace Lord Heytesbury (1828–1832). The Government led by Charles Grey, in agreement with the new Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, for the position of the outgoing diplomat appointed Stratford Canning.⁴¹ The candidate in theory could be a perfect choice for the position, as Stratford Canning had previously completed two periods of diplomatic missions in the capital of the Ottoman Empire, from 1809 to 1812 and from 1825 to 1827. Despite his profound experience and background knowledge related to the Eastern Question, to the Russo–Turkish, as well as the British–Turkish relations, his person caused a huge dilemma for the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.⁴² Stratford Canning's great disadvantage derived from his very advantages, mentioned before. Karl Nesselrode, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs and the official diplomatic body, as well as the Tsar, were very well aware of the British ambassador's capabilities,

⁴⁰ Draft, Count Matuszewic, FO, September 29, 1830 (TNA/PRO/FO/65/189).

⁴¹ Jones, R. *The British Diplomatic Service, 1815–1914*. Waterloo, 1983, 39.

⁴² Потемкин, В. П. (Отв. ред.). *История дипломатии*. Т. 1. Библиотека внешней политики. М., Государственное социально-экономическое издательство, 1941, 418; Lane-Poole, St. *The Life of The Right Honourable Stratford Canning Viscount Startford de Redcliffe*. Vol. 2. London, 1888, 20.

owing to his anti-Russian performance during the mid-1820s. So when the Russian Court had to respond to the Foreign Office's request, because of the raised concerns in connection with the candidate, Nicholas I. refused to receive him.⁴³

The categorical attitude from the side of the English diplomacy manifested in Palmerston's refusal to change his decision, by rejecting all the compromise proposals from the other party.⁴⁴ The delays in the agreement led to a situation in which Great Britain was left without a representative of ambassadorial rank in St Petersburg, which did not change until 1835. Thus, the Russian connection, which was of great importance for the British political and economic interests, seemed to loosen. The more so, since by 1834 based on the Russian Government's decision, Prince K. A. Lieven – after more than two decades of ambassadorship to London – was recalled to Russia.⁴⁵ The inefficiency of the consultations that lasted over two years, in the end forced the Court of St Petersburg – remaining temporarily without a representative in London – to make a decision. Several months later it was the Russian Government who solved the stalemate situation by appointing Pozzo di Borgo ambassador to London.⁴⁶

In the transformation of the Anglo-Russian relations in the beginning of the 1830s, the Eastern Question and the range of problems connected to the Balkans played a crucial role, all of which by 1828–1829 generated a favourable situation for Russia. The peculiar ambition of the St Petersburg diplomacy, the aim of which was to achieve independence in the forming of the Eastern Question, and parallel to that all endeavours to maintain the Anglo-Russian alliance, seemed to fail. To keep balance between

⁴³ Потемкин, В. П., *Op. cit.*, 418–419.

⁴⁴ Hyde, H. Montgomery, *Princess Lieven*, London, George G. Harp and Co. Ltd., 1938, 208–210; Потемкин, В. П., *Op. cit.*, 418.

⁴⁵ Hyde, H., *Op. cit.*, 210.

⁴⁶ *The Annual Register or a View of the History and Politics of the Year 1842*. London, 1843, 252.

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the two sides turned out to be an impossible task. At the same time, it became evident for London that the Anglo–Russian partnership could be maintained as long as the British Government was able to sustain the parity between the two leading Great Powers, along with the balance and integrity of their primary economic and political interests. A sharp change in that process was brought by the period following the Treaty of Adrianople, during which Great Britain lost its leading position within the Anglo–Russian coalition, thus becoming an external observer in the course of the Balkan events. The long-term consequence of the temporary failure of the British policy on the Great Power level was Britain's distancing itself from Russia, and parallel to that, the increasing Russophobia, which by the 1830s will become one of the main features in the Anglo–Russian relations.

Regional and Ethnic Differences in the Welfare of Urban Societies during the Tanzimat Period (1844–1870).

A Comparative Analysis of Priština, Vučitrn and Some Rumelian and Anatolian Settlements¹

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Ottoman sources provide facilities to measure and compare the welfare of the local societies through *temettuat defters* (which contain the yearly income for each person in the urban communities), or through the analysis of probates (in *sicils* and *terekes*),² or based on documents containing the amount of taxes to be paid. Of course, researchers have to face with the methodological challenge, that these are not comparable to each other – the first source-type refers to yearly income and tells nothing about the profits or the wealth itself, thus narrowing the possibilities of a comparative analysis. Tax-registers cannot refer to welfare or income accurately, because only tithe-types taxes (*ondalik*) are levied proportionally on income, *vergi*-type taxes or head taxes were not always handled in the same manner. Furthermore, types of taxes and methods of taxation were changing, rendering temporal comparisons more difficult. The existence of tax-farming further aggravated the quantification of *income*, as the profit of tax-farmers often remains unknown beyond the collected 10–12%. Although *cizye* (as head-tax) was

¹ The study has been supported by the Bolyai János Research Scholarship of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences.

² Атанасов, Хр. В османската периферия: общество и икономика във Видин и околността през XVIII в. С., 2008.

collected based on *wealth* the proportion of the different categories of welfare were changing quickly even within 10–20 years,³ such as the amount of *cizye* per capita, not to mention its real value in silver, or value given in PPP. Furthermore, Draganova proved on the example of Pleven, that the extent of land is not in strong correlation with these *cizye* categories, which means that many villagers and urban dwellers had other sources of revenue beyond agriculture.⁴ And as Bilgi proved in the case of Salihli settlement, the proportion (%) of tax measured to revenues can vary between broad values within a community, depending on the origins of income (agriculture, industry, tertiary).⁵ These all create limits to comparison. In order to avoid the traps discussed above we decided to focus on the first type of documents, which rely on yearly income.

Another problem is the selection of an appropriate welfare index. Regional studies now tend to focus on measuring inequalities instead of direct wealth in their calculations, as the formers may destabilize a society.⁶ Growing inequalities are

³ For example, in 1841 the number of persons grouped into the *ala* (richest) category was 234 in Berkovitsa, 5978 were *evsat* and 1124 *edna*. In 1831 it was 227, 6247 and 2978 respectively. Demeter G. A Balkán és az Oszmán Birodalom. Vol I. Bp., 2014, 354–355. (PPP = purchase power parity)

⁴ Draganova, Sl. Documents of the 1840's on the Economic Position of the Villages in Central North Bulgaria. – BHR, 1988, N 2, 87–100.

⁵ Bilgi, N. A Developing Village in the Middle of the 19th Century: Salihli. – In: Imber, C., K. Kiyotaki, (Eds.). Frontiers of the Ottoman Studies: State, Province, and the West. Vol. 1. London – New York, 2005, 149–167. The average tax was about 16–17% of the income in Salihli, but in the case of richest it varied between 25–50% depending on the main occupation or sources of income.

⁶ See: Coşgel, M., B. Ergene. Inequality of Wealth in the Ottoman Empire: War, Weather, and Long-term Trends in Eighteenth Century. Kastamonu Working Paper, <http://web2.uconn.edu/economics/working/2011-29.pdf>; also Canbakal, H., A. Filiztekin. Wealth and Inequality in Ottoman Lands in the Early Modern Period. AALIMS – Rice University Conference on the Political Economy of the Muslim World, 4–5 April 2013 (working paper) http://aalims.org/uploads/Rice_v1.pdf; further: Coşgel, M. Estimating Rural Incomes and Inequality in the Ottoman Empire. – International Journal of

more dangerous – even within a society getting richer and richer averagely – from the aspect of social stability, than increasing poverty with decreasing inequalities between different layers of society. Contrary to this approach we chose the income as welfare index, partly because these above mentioned investigations are usually based on wealth (not on income). While probates can supply the researcher with continuous sampling for temporal comparisons, *temettuat* defters cannot provide us the same possibility, as these are static data and make possible rather spatial comparisons than temporal ones. Second, income data are also apt for investigating inequalities, thus Gini-coefficient can be calculated from them. Third, we were also curious about the internal stratification, the differences between occupations, *mahalle*-quarters, etc. and it is easier to count group average, standard deviation or mode, than the Gini-coefficient, which is based on the previously mentioned variables representing the dataset.

The following comparative investigation is based on the yearly income differences of taxable urban population and aims to trace:

- 1, the income differences between *occupation-groups*;
- 2, income differences depending on *size and functional types of towns* (did smaller towns have poorer society, is there any difference between their social stratification compared to larger town at different hierarchical level?)
- 3, differences in welfare of *different religious communities* (were Muslims richer in Ottoman Empire, what temporal and spatial patterns can be traced?);
- 4, *local spatial differences (segregation)* of urban dwellers based on their religion or wealth (differences between quarters, *mahalles*);
- 5, *regional spatial differences* regarding the welfare of

Middle East Studies, 40, 2008, N 3, 374–375; and Milanovic, B. P. H. Lindert, J. G. Williamson. Measuring Ancient Inequality. NBER Working Paper 13550, revised (2007), <http://www.nber.org/papers/w13550>.

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urban population (is there any difference between the welfare and social stratification of towns in Serbia, Kosovo, Bulgaria under Ottoman rule?);

6, *the changes over time* (how did the process of *Tanzimat* influence the livelihood of urban dwellers, did they become wealthy, more stratified or not?);

7, *the role of migrant society*: their wealth compared to autochthonous populations and identification of main source areas.

In the following pages I aim to analyze the validity of the statement whether the wheat producer Anatolian society was poorer compared to the Rumelian as for the 17th century Inalcik and Parveva pointed out, and to examine whether Tanzimat contributed to the enrichment of Christians or to the differentiation of Christian society, and whether these processes eliminated or enhanced material differences between Muslims and Christians in Rumelia. The investigations of Draganova and Berov put this debated question into another context, claiming that broad layers of Christian society were lucky enough to become rich compared to their previous status or compared with other regions. Whether it is the result of the activity of Midhat Pasha or not, or it is rather the consequence of favourable external circumstances (West Europe became the main consumer of Balkan wheat owing to the European division of labour, which implied manufactures for wheat, prior to the dumping of Russian and American crops) was not investigated.⁷

The investigation includes the following localities in Anatolia:

Salihli urbanized village, 278 conscripted in 1845	Anatolia
Silifke kaza (Konya), 567 conscripted in 1844	Anatolia
Kastamonu, Diyarbakir, Manisa , 1800–1820	Anatolia

and the following in Rumelia:

⁷ For this see Demeter G. A. Balkán és az Oszmán Birodalom. Vol. II. Bp., 2015. Sources used for this investigation: Osmanli Arsiv Belgelerinde. Kosova vilayeti. Istanbul, 2007, 363–413.

Priština: 1140 persons under taxation, 24% Christians, 1844	Kosova
Vučitrn: 282 persons under taxation, 40% Christians, 1844	Kosova
Provadija: 309 persons under taxation, Christians under 50%, 1870	Bulgaria
Anhialo-Pomorie: 200 persons fell under taxation in 1870, Christian predominance	Bulgaria
Majdanpek: 382 persons under taxation, 1862	Serbia
Veliko Gradište: 721 persons under taxation in 1862	Serbia
Kjotesh village: 81 taxable inhabitants, 33% Bulgarians, 1866	Bulgaria

*INCOME DIFFENCES BETWEEN SOCIAL STRATA AND
DIFFERENCES ORIGINATING FROM DIFFERENT
HIERARCHICAL LEVEL OF SETTLEMENTS*

Based on the summary of data illustrated in *Table 1–2*, and *Figure 1–2*, the following statements can be pointed out. Taxpayers at all categories of occupation were richer in Priština, than in Vučitrn with the exception of craftsmen, who were characterized by nearly the same per capita revenues (400–440 kurush) in the 2 towns. The income of administrative elite, soldiers and tradesmen was double in Priština compared to Vučitrn.

Craftsmen were underrepresented in Vučitrn with their 15% compared to the more urbanized Priština (40%). It is not surprising therefore, that land revenues were the major source of income in Vučitrn constituting 46+12% (while in Priština it was 14+8%), and peasants and landowners paid more tax compared to their proportion. Land revenues were of secondary importance in Priština: here only 10% of the taxpayers were free peasants or landowners, while in Vučitrn it exceeded 30%. Agricultural wage-labourers were also overrepresented in Vučitrn with their proportion of 26% compared to the 16% in Priština, but they were cheaper as well. The difference between the average income of the two settlements was more than 40%, people working in transportation earned 35% less in Vučitrn, teachers 50% less.


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Tabs. 1–2. Distribution of income under taxation based on occupations in Priština és Vučitrn in 1844.

Priština, 1844	temetuat (kurush)	income in %	persons	persons in %	income for one tax payer	welfare index: *income in % / nütüs in %
local administration and soldiers	226 669	28.06	102	8.9	2222	3.2
craftsmen	200 596	24.83	455	39.7	441	0.6
peasants, landowners	113 076	14.00	118	10.3	958	1.4
merchants	81 846	10.13	71	6.2	1153	1.6
agricultural wage-labourers	64 517	8.00	184	16.06	351	0.5
transportation	37 736	4.67	92	8.03	410	0.6
teachers, priests	18 091	2.24	26	2.27	696	1.0
other	65 262	8.08	98	8.55	666	0.9
altogether	807 793	100	1146	100	705	1.0
Vučitrn, 1844						
local administration and soldiers	19 091	14	21	7	909	2,0
craftsmen	17 065	13	42	15	406	0,9
peasants, landowners	60 063	46	97	33	619	1,4
merchants	11 055	8	16	6	691	1,3
agricultural wage-labourers	15 426	12	74	26	208	0,5
transportation	2 658	2	11	4	242	0,5
teachers, priests	1 846	1	7	2	264	0,5
other	4 713	4	20	7	236	0,6
altogether	131 934	100	288	100	458	1,0

The role of administrative personnel was greater in Priština than in Vučitrn regarding both the percentage values (9 vs. 7%) and their proportion from the income as well (28% vs. 14%). The welfare index, which was calculated by using the proportion of income measured to the total, divided by the proportion of population group was extremely high in the case of administrative personnel in Priština, even higher than in Vučitrn, which means that inequalities based on social strata/ occupation were greater in the vilayet center. This is not surprising. Canbakal and Filiztekin proved the same: after the turn of the 18th–19th centuries, the inequality grew between civil society and the administrative elite. The latter was three times richer than the group average, as in Priština (*Fig. 3*).⁸

Fig. 1. Differences in wealth of strata (average revenues in Priština and Vučitrn).



⁸ Canbakal, H., A. Filiztekin, Op. cit.

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Fig. 2. Differences in social stratification and welfare of strata in the two Kossowar towns.





Fig. 3. The changes in wealth of different social layers in Manisa, Bursa and Diyarbakir measured to the average (=1).



Source: Canbakal, H., A. Filiztekin. Wealth and Inequality in Ottoman Lands...

INCOME DISTRIBUTION BETWEEN OCCUPATION GROUPS

The prestige of different occupations can be estimated based on the yearly revenues, which enables us to group them: the coloured background in *Table 3* represents the different social strata and occupations assigned to these categories. Barbers, carpenters, tailors and abadzhis were characterised of low income, while shopkeepers, peasants, bakers, bakals were among the richer. The difference between the two towns was significant: certain occupations (like Muslim priests) belonged to different social classes based on their yearly income. However it is true that we do not know anything about the costs of living and the differences in costs of living for the 2 towns, therefore we cannot analyze differences of purchasing power and the index of livelihood.

According to the internal stratification (based on the distribution of income) Priština was definitely richer than Vučitrn (*Fig. 4*).

RELIGIOUS DIFFERENCES


The internal stratification of the population can be examined further by defining religious sub-groups. It is evident that the Moslem population was the wealthiest religious community in Kosovo according to the temetuat defters in 1844. In Vučitrn among the 20 wealthiest tax payers (7%), one can find only 2 Christians (10%, compared to their 40% in the whole sample). The wealthiest Moslems were landowners, timar rentiers or tenants (14), the *mukhtar* himself and only 2 merchants (compared to Bulgarian lands their proportion was very low). 10 of the richest were living in Gazi Ali bey mahalla, but the generally poorer Hürrem mahalla also gave 7 persons. Richest Christian merchants were living in the Kasaba ranked 21-25th place. Among the poorest 25 (10%) only 8 Christians were enumerated, a little bit underrepresented (33%) compared to their proportion from the whole society.

In Priština among the wealthiest 50 persons (4,5%) with

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income above 2000 grosh were 20 timarli rentiers, 2 *çiflik* owners, 5 ‘peasants’ and only 7 merchants besides the *naib* and the leaders of *zaptie*. Only 3 Christians and 1 Jew was enumerated in this group (2 of them are merchants). They were not concentrated in one district but rather dispersed: 13 were living around the Great Cami and 9 in Aliüaddin mahalla, 4 in Hasan Emin. Among the poorest 100 (under 160 grosh) one can find 33 Christians, a bit overrepresented compared to their 25% in the whole society. 36 were living in the outskirts, 13 in Ramazanije mahalle, 16 in Jusuf Celebi quarter.

Fig. 4. Internal stratification of Priština and Vučitrn based on taxable income in 1844 (% and grosh-kurush). Data are given in current prices.



A two sample t-test proves statistically, that inhabitants of Priština were significantly richer than their compatriots in Vučitrn. The statement is true for religious groups as well: Christians and Moslems in Priština were richer, than in Vučitrn considering the average income (*Tab. 4*). Regarding the median value, differences *between* religious groups were also diminishing compared to average values. Canbakal and Filiztekin also pointed out that among the richest differences in wealth originating from

religious differences were eliminated between 1720–1820 people, meaning that the elite became religiously heterogeneous.⁹ Differences *within* the identical religious group in different localities were also smaller if median is used as index. Standard deviation was great, meaning that *both Christian and Muslim society was very differentiated in 1844. Differences within religious groups were even greater than differences between different denominations.*

When investigating the differences between the social stratification of local Muslims and Christians in Kosovo it became evident, that Christians with their 33% proportion among the poorest were overrepresented in Priština (their proportion from the total population was about 25%), while they constituted only 8–15% of the richer (*Tab. 5*). In the case of middle classes the proportion of Christians was similar to their proportion from the total population. While 33% of the Muslim community earned more than 666 groshes at corrected prices, it was only 15% in the Christian society. 60% of the Christians were classified into the poorest categories, while among the Muslims this was only 38%.

In Vučitrn the 2 *millets* showed relatively balanced structure, although the proportion of Muslims among the poorest was 13% greater than in Priština (the proportion of Christians was even higher in the category under 333 grosh). Among richer (1000–1333 piastres yearly income) the Christians were overrepresented. So, *while the Bulgarian and Muslim society was very similar at the end of the Tanzimat regarding their social differentiation (Tab. 4, Kjötesh), in the beginning of the reform process significant differences were observable in the western part of the peninsula between the two millets.*

Tab. 3. Social position (based on yearly income) of different occupations in Priština and Vučitrn, 1844.

⁹ Religion explained only 10% of the differences in 1820 and dropped back from 22%. Canbakal, H., A. Filiztekin, Op. cit.

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Vučitrn, 1844	persons	taxable income (kuruş)	for one person
taylor of textiles	4	1225	305
arabadji	6	1897	316
shopkeeper	2	1300	650
barber	3	945	315
barber assistant	3	987	329
chapaldji	2	305	153
peasant	93	51 636	555
landowner	4	8426	2107
carpenter	2	400	200
baker	3	1440	480
moslem priest	4	1113	278
taylor of clothes	4	1551	388
taylor assistant	5	2050	410
spahi	1	500	500
timarli rentier	7	7962	1137
gendarmerie	6	1763	294
trader	15	10 855	724

Priština, 1844	persons	taxable income (kuruş)	for one person
pasha	1	78 000	78000
taylor of textiles	4	1640	410
arabadji	63	24 092	382
shopkeeper	44	31 469	715
barber	21	9010	429
<i>bojadji</i>	6	2990	498
<i>choban</i>	4	1170	293
peasant	54	65 312	1209
landowner	15	29 019	1935
carpenter	8	2246	281
baker	16	7701	481
moslem priest	16	11 954	747
taylor of clothes	76	34 004	447
<i>dervish</i>	3	300	100
<i>hamam keeper</i>	2	555	278
<i>coffee maker</i>	11	4235	385
timarli rentier	76	130 000	1711
gendarmerie	12	6582	549
trader	61	65 497	1074
<i>muezzin</i>	3	1116	372
<i>mukhtar</i>	8	7278	910

Tab. 4. Income inequalities of religious groups in Priština and Vučitrn towns (1844) and in Kjøtesh village (Bulgaria) (1866) in current prices (piastres).

riština (1078)	Average income (kuruş)	Standard deviation	Median	Vučitrn (287) Average income	Standard deviation	Median	Kjøtesh village (83)	Average income	Sta. deviation	Median
Christian	427	414	300	367	259	291	Bulgarian (27)	402	184	300
Moslem	707	828	420	518	641	315	Ottoman (8)	456	280	300
Jewish	811	1021	395				Tatar (46)	348	186	300
Total	630	748	375	459	530	300	Total	392	216	300

Source: Osmanli Arsiv Belgelerinde. Kosova vilayeti. Istanbul, 2007, 363–413, and Драганова, Сл. Материали за Дунавския вилает. С., 1980, 242–245. (Tab. 163.) The pasha is omitted from the investigation.

LOCAL PATTERN OF DIFFERENCES (SEGREGATION)

Local income differences within settlements can also be traced. Richest quarters (based on mean income), mahalles were all Muslims in Priština (Cami, Jararçeri) and also characterised by mediocre homogeneity, referring to a differentiated local society (*Tab. 7*). The Muslim and Christian suburbs and the Muslim Yusuf Celebi district were poor and relatively homogenous. Districts of middle classes were not homogenous, while the districts of lower classes showed no real stratification. It seems that the greater the income, the smaller the homogeneity was. The average income in the wealthiest mahalle in Vučitrn did not exceed the welfare of mahalles of mediocre wealth in Priština, Christian mahalles were even poorer (*Tab. 6*).

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Tab. 5. Social stratification of Christian and Muslim societies based on differences of income in Kosovo.

Priština	Muslim	Christian	Muslim %	Christian %	Muslim society %	Christian society, %
above 1333 grosh	105	9	92,11	7,89	13,3	3,0
1000–1333	51	9	85,00	15,00	6,5	3,0
666–1000	83	25	76,85	23,15	10,5	8,3
333–666	247	79	75,77	24,23	31,4	26,4
under 333	299	177	62,82	37,18	38,1	59,2
Vučitrn	Muslim	Christian	Muslim %	Christian %	Muslim society %	Christian society, %
above 1333 grosh	14	0	100,00	0,00	8,1	0,0
1000–1333	5	7	41,67	58,33	2,8	6,1
666–1000	13	9	59,09	40,91	7,5	7,8
333–666	48	24	66,67	33,33	27,6	20,9
under 333	90	75	54,55	45,45	51,7	65,2

Source: Osmanli Arşiv Belgelerinde. Kosova vilayeti, 363–413.

Tab. 6. Income differences of mahalles in Vuçitrn according to religion and social homogeneity in 1844.

mahalle	Average (kuruş)	Standard deviation	Median	Relative wealth	Homogeneity of mahalle (St. dev. / Average)
Gazi Ali bej (M)	665	822	373	++++	*, 1.23
Hürrem (M)	486	404	337	+++	***, 0.82
Kasaba (Ch)	368	238	300	++	****, 0.62
Kibtiyani ¹⁰ (Ch)	138	69	125	+	****, 0.49
Mahalle (Ch)	427	293	303	++	****, 0.68
Average	459	530	300	+++	*, 1.15

¹⁰ Christian gypsies.

Tab. 7. Income differences of mahalles in Priština: wealth and social homogeneity.

mahalle	Average (kurush)	Standard deviation	Median	Relative wealth	Homogeneity of mahalle (St. dev. / Average)
Alaüddin (M)	786	711	525	+++	**, 0.9
Cami kebir (M)	1195	1164	770	++++	**, 0.97
Hasanbey (Ch)	535	464	355	++	***, 0.86
Hasan emin (M)	827	1383	405	+++	*, 1.67
Hatuniye (M)	581	498	400	++	***, 0.85
Yarar (Ch)	413	280	280	++	***, 0.67
Yararçeri (M)	1109	991	821	++++	**, 0.89
Yunus (M)	755	714	500	+++	**, 0.94
Yusuf Celebi (M)	337	275	250	+	***, 0.81
Kasaba (Ch)	459	477	325	++	**, 1.03
Kücükcami (M)	1151	942	900	++++	***, 0.81
Suburb (Ch)	207	58	200	+	****, 0.28
Suburb (M)	240	88	225	+	****, 0.36
Mehmed bey (M)	470	355	360	++	***, 0.75
Pirnazir (M)	698	1085	504	+++	*, 1.5
Ramazanije (M)	544	567	400	++	**, 1.04
Average	630	748	375	+++	*, 1.18

Source: Osmanlı Arsiv Belgelerrinde. Kosova vilayeti. İstanbul, 2007, 363–413. Richest mahalles are indicated by gray background, Christian mahalles are indicated by bold letters. * = least homogeneous, **** = homogeneous.

REGIONAL SPATIAL DIFFERENCES

The regional differences regarding the welfare of towns can also be measured by applying the same income classification, however it raises (1) the question of rescaling the data published by Nikolay Todorov, who used a different grouping, (2) the problems concerning the real prices of *Thalers* given for Serbia (B. Katić), and (3) the changes in silver content and in the prices of goods within the investigated 25 years. Thus a regrouping and correction of original data was required (*Tab. 8*).

Since both the prices and the silver content of kurush changed during the investigated time interval, this required the introduction of purchasing power substituting the different currencies. Within 20 years the prices grew by 50%, while the piaster's silver content was slowly increasing. This means, that 2000 grosh in 1866 equalled with 1333 grosh in 1844. In this way the data on Vučitrn and Priština were rescaled in order to make them comparable with Bulgarian and Serbian towns from the later periods.

Among the compared towns the small Pomorie was the richest followed by Priština – regarding the proportion of wealthy layers. The latter was very similar to the stratification of the small Provadija. These were followed by Vučitrn which had a more differentiated society with larger proportion of rich and poor and with a thinner middle-class compared to the 2 Serbian towns.

The proportion of persons earning more than 1000 grosh a year was 20% in Provadija, 50% in Pomorje, only 26% in Priština and 17% in Vučitrn using the corrected values (but only 16% and 10% without the usage of PPP). The Anatolian Silifke kaza around Konya in 1845 was as rich as Pomorie in the 1870s. Urban Bulgaria was wealthier during the last decade of the Ottoman rule, than urban Kosovo in 1844 or Serbia in the 1860s. The fact that in Vučitrn only 1 merchant, but 3 farmers-landowners had more than 2000 grosh yearly revenue, while in Pomorje–Anhialo 25 persons or 95% of this stratum was

composed of merchants, clearly enlightens the changes over time and the differences in the way of living and in these two regions of Ottoman Empire. During these 25 years a new, wealthy stratum emerged in Bulgaria. In Priština this latter category of wealthiest people comprised 50 men including 23 farmers, çiftlik owners and timariots (46%) and only 6 merchants (12%). Especially middle class was weak in Kosovo (32 and 25% between 333–666 grosh), while in Bulgaria this layer was strengthening its position (42%, 500–1000 grosh).

Tab. 8. Social stratification of Bulgarian, Serbian, Kossovar and Anatolian towns in %.

Yearly income in kuruš	Pomorje (200: 1870 k)	Provadija, with agricultural wage-labourers (309: 1870 k)	Majdanpek, (382: 1862)	Veliko Gradište (721: 1862)	Priština, 1844 uncorrected (1077)	Vučitrn, 1844 uncorrected (287)	Silifke kaza (Konya), uncorrected (567)	Rescaled based on purchase parity %	Priština, 1844 corrected (1077)	Vučitrn, 1844 corrected (287)	Silifke kaza in Anatolia (Konya), corrected (567)
above 2000	13	20	1	3	4.6	2	2	above 1333	10.5	5	11.5
1500–2000	10		1	5	4.2	2	9	1000–1333	6	4	33
1000–1500	28		6	16	7.6	5.2	33	666–1000	10	8.5	17
500–1000	48,5	42	72	39	22.6	16.4	55	333–666	32	25	25
under 500		38	19	36	61	74.2		under 333	42	57	13

Taxpayers and year in brackets. Serbian Thaler is counted at 6 kurush. Katić, B. *Struktura stanovništva Velikog Gradišta i Majdanpeka*. – *Istorijski časopis*, 35, 1988, 119–131; Тодоров, Н. Из демографията на гр. Анхиало (Поморие). – ИБИД, 1967, 159–181; the same, *Социално-икономически облик на Провадия*. – ИГр, 1963, № 2, 68–85.

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Tab. 9. Income of different settlements in Silifke kaza (case number in brackets).

Settlement types	Silifke muslims (84)	Silifke non-muslims (15)	villagers in plains (191)	villagers in mountains (132)	nomads (149)	altogether (567)
Average income in kuruş in 1845 (per tax-payers)	808	434	1110	1009	610	900

Based on Yalçın, A. Temettuat defterlerine...

Was the Rumelian town/village richer, than the Anatolian town or village? Establet and Pascual in Damascus pointed out, that 75% of the population accumulated less than 500 grosh wealth (in 1720 it equals with 8000 gramms of silver, in 1780–1800 with 4000 gramms), which is similar to the values in Vidin calculated after Atanasov.¹¹

In Kastamonu town, the average heritage was 1800 kurush in 1820 and has doubled since 1720. Unfortunately our data refer to yearly income, therefore not comparable. But in western Anatolia in the urbanized Salihli village the average income per household was 830 grosh (although agricultural income constituted only 55% of the total income, and agricultural taxes constituted 15% of the total taxes levied); in Marmara it was 1935 piastres (here 77% of revenues came from agriculture), and in Saruhan it was 1780 piastres in 1844. The latter two settlements were definitely richer than Priština and Vučitrn in the same era, while Salihli was similar to the Kosovar towns. Average income was around 1200 piastres¹²

¹¹ Establet, C., J. P. Pascual. Damascene Probate Inventories of the 17th and 18th Centuries. Some Preliminary Approaches and Results. *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, 24, 1992, 375–376.

¹² Counted after the yields and animal population given by Draganova before the increase of wheat prices.

in Bulgaria in the vicinity of Pleven (for estates between 2–5 hectares, for larger estates it was even higher) in the 1840s (higher than in Priština), but it was around 2000 groshes in Kjustendil and above 3000 in rural Berkovica in the 1870s.¹³ Neither the silver content of the piaster, nor costs of living did change significantly over that time,¹⁴ which means that *rural Bulgaria became richer by the end of the Tanzimat* (Tab. 10). The Anatolian kaza of Silifke (Konya), where agriculture produced 75% of the income (in Priština it was 26 %, in Vučitrn it was 60%) was also poorer in 1845, than Pleven, where 20% of tax-payers had more than 2000 groshes yearly income, while in Silifke kaza it was only 2% (see also Tab. 11).¹⁵ (Pleven lived from animal-husbandry prior to the great upswing of wheat export). Of course, Silifke was poorer than the Bulgarian towns in the 1870s, but not poorer than Priština or Vučitrn in 1844, or Kjotesh in the 1860s (see Tab. 9). The average income in the kaza was around 900 piastres, and Christians were the poorer (450 piastres). Even local leaders (*mukhtars*) had the same income (900–1400 kurush) as the administrative elite in Priština.

Rural Anatolia was not significantly poorer than Bulgarian towns with the exception of the proportion of the richest layers. The middle class showed similar frequency values (in percentage) both in Bulgarian towns in the 1870s and in rural Anatolia in the 1840s. *So, from economic aspects the Tanzimat strengthened*

¹³ See the works of Sl. Draganova: Драганова, Сл. Берковското село в навечерието на Освобождението: статистическо изследване според османските данъчни регистри. С., 1985; the same, Кюстендилски регион, 1864–1919: Етнографско и социално-икономическо изследване. С., 1996.

¹⁴ The costs of living were decreasing while earnings were increasing between 1840–1870 in Constantinople. See: Özmucur, S., S. Pamuk. Real Wages and Standards of Living in the Ottoman Empire, 1489–1914. – The Journal of Economic History, 62, 2002, N 2, 301.

¹⁵ Yalçın, A. Temettuat defterlerine göre 19. Yüzl Ortalarında Silifke kazasının sosyal ve ekonomik yapısı. – OTAM. 15. 2004, 13–87.
<http://dergiler.ankara.edu.tr/dergiler/19/1272/14643.pdf>

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mainly the class over 2000 piasters yearly income in the towns of the Danubian provinces. It is also evident that incomes in rural Bulgaria were increasing, exceeding the values characteristic for Priština and often Anatolia.

Tab. 10. Average income of different settlements in Rumelia and Anatolia in the 1840s and 1870s during the Tanzimat era.

Settlement types	Berkovica (1870s)	Kjustendil (1870s)	Pleven (1840s)	Salihli (1840s)	Marmara (1840s)	Saruhan (1840s)	Priština (1840s)
Average income in kuruş (per households)	3000–3500	2000	1200	850	1900	1700	750

Tab. 11. The differences in stratification of social layers in urban Bulgaria (1870s, in %) and rural Anatolia (1840s).

Yearly income in piastres	Pomorie (200: 1870s)	Silifke kaza, 1845
above 2000	13	2.1
1500–2000	10	9
1000–1500	28	33
under 1000	48,5	55

Based on the raw data of Todorov and Yalçın.

MIGRATION PROCESSES

Based on their names more than 80 Muslim and 10 Christian newcomers were identified in Priština, which is only 9% of the population. Of course the proportion of not indigenous population might be greater, but could not be identified as many of the names did not refer to the place of origin, but to occupation. Based on these available data, Christian society tended to be less mobile towards the *vilaet* seat, as the number of Muslim immigrants exceeded that of the Christians by 8 times, while

among the total population the ratio between the two *millet*s was 3:1. This might be explained by the fact, that among Christians peasants settled on land were overrepresented and for them migration was forbidden. Furthermore, the ethnic proportions also show that the town was not among the most favoured destinations of Christians as ethnic replacement has already taken place by that time not only in Priština, but in Kosovo as well (this process accelerated in 1878, when 25% of the inhabitants were conscripted as Muslim *muhadjir* refugees from Bosnia). Those who were conscripted with the name Yanovali (8 persons) were all Muslims, although formerly Yanova was the centre of Catholic Slavs in Kosovo with strong trading relationship with Ragusa in the earlier centuries. More interestingly, among the source areas of Muslims immigrating to Priština one can find Novobrdó (15 persons), the last capital city of medieval Serbia. This place is followed by Vučitrn (5), Prizren (4), Ipek (3), Lipjan (3), Zaskok (2), so most of the immigrants arrived from the nearest neighborhood. Djakova and Gilan gave 1-2 immigrants. Outside the borders of Kosovo the main source areas were Dupnica (2), Shkodra (2), the Serbian Retkošer (3) and Trstenik (2). Beyond these Mitrovica (2) Skopje, Niš, Belgrade (1-1-1) can be mentioned. The main source of Christian immigrants was Vučitrn (3) followed by Prizren, Štip, Mitrovica, Ipek (1). It is surprising that the yearly income of immigrating Christians did not lag behind that of the immigrant Muslims (540 piastres), who were poorer than local Muslims (700 piastres). The latter fact is even more surprising if we analyse the occupational structure of Muslim newcomers: among the one can enumerate 8 timar and 2 çiftlik owners or rentiers/tenants/leaseholders and several richer peasants (only 3 of them had lower income than 1000 piastres). But the reason of the relative poverty of Muslim immigrants is that most of them were agricultural wage-labourers, chapaldjis, bostandjis (8), or sekbans (5), wagoners (6), whose yearly taxable income was between 300–400 piastres (the 2 merchants had 750 piastres each, which is lower

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than the local average). The reason for the relative wealth of immigrant Christians is the high income of merchants that modified the average, which would have been around 400 kurush anyway.

The USA and the Peace with Bulgaria after World War One

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Although geographically far from Europe, the US were (and still are) bound up with the European continent through the Atlantic Ocean and are inseparable part of the North-Atlantic community. It was exactly because of the Atlantic that the US got involved in the Napoleon wars and once again one century later they unwillingly joined the Great, by that time, European war. Their economic power and after 1917 their real and at moments decisive participation in battles gave them good reasons to pretend for a key role in establishing the post-war order in Europe. The Paris Peace Conference (January 18, 1919 – January 21, 1920) was the forum at which the US presented their intentions to take part in the recovery of the old continent. According to the American experts House and Seymour, one of the most dramatic questions to be settled by the conference was the Balkan one.¹ On its side, Bulgaria, situated in the heart of the peninsula, laying territorial claims to all its belligerent neighbors, and historically taken, even to its Balkan ally in the war – Turkey – was most directly interested in how the future state and territorial map of the Balkans would look like. All this justifies the interest to the position of Washington for settling the Balkan territorial issue after WWI.

The American delegation entered the negotiation process

¹ House, E., Ch. Seymour. What really happened at Paris. The story of the Peace Conference, 1918–1919. New York, 1921, 158; Пантев, А., П. Петков. САЩ и България по време на Първата световна война. С., 1983, 104.

following the principles expressed by President Woodrow Wilson in his famous “Fourteen Points” statement on January 8, 1919. It was provoked by the Soviets proposal for just and democratic peace with no territorial annexations. The first five points of Wilson’s statement which had been consulted neither with Great Britain nor with France concerned the basic principles of the new world order: open agreements gained through negotiations “in the public view” instead of secret diplomacy; freedom of navigation upon the seas, outside territorial waters, alike in peace and in war; removal of economic barriers and the establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all the nations; reduce of national armaments consistent with domestic safety; a free and impartial adjustment of all colonial claims. The next eight points referred to the territorial arrangements. For the Balkans they provided for (in point 11):

Evacuation of Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro and restoration of all occupied territories restored; free and secure access to the sea for Serbia; relations of the several Balkan states to one another should be determined by friendly counsel along historically established lines of allegiance and nationality; and international guarantees of the political and economic independence and territorial integrity of the several Balkan states. Point 12 asserted that the Turkish portion of the then Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which were under Turkish rule should be assured a security of life and an opportunity of autonomous development; the Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to the ships and commerce of all nations under international guarantees.

The last, 14th point, stated that a general association of nations had to be established for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike.²

Wilson was not a foreign policy expert and shortly before

² Papers Related to the Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1918, Supplement I, Part I, p. 15.

his first inauguration in 1913 he confessed that it would be ironically if his administration should have to deal mainly with diplomacy. When events forced him to enter the war, in September 1917 he established a special study group named the 'Inquiry to investigate the contested issues and the terms of peace'. It was composed of about 150 academics, headed by the presidential advisor Colonel Edward House and supervised by Dr Sidney Mezes.³

By the end of 1917 the Inquiry submitted its first report to the Department of State. The official Memorandum of December 22, 1917 treated in eight points the borders of the European states from historical, ethnographic and economic point of view. For the Balkans, the suggested statement of peace terms said that:

"...No just or lasting settlement of the tangled problems confronting the deeply wronged peoples of the Balkans can be based upon the arbitrary treaty of Bucharest. That treaty was a product of the evil diplomacy which the peoples of the world are now determined to end. That treaty wronged every nation in the Balkans, even those which it appeared to favor, by imposing upon them all the permanent menace of war. It unquestionably tore men and women of Bulgarian loyalty from their natural allegiance. It denied to Serbia that access to the sea which she must have in order to complete her independence. Any just settlement must of course begin with the evacuation of Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro by the armies of the Central Powers, and the restoration of Serbia and Montenegro. The ultimate relationship of the different Balkan nations must be based upon a fair balance of nationalistic and economic considerations, applied in a generous and inves[t]ive spirit after impartial and scientific inquiry. The meddling and intriguing of great powers must be stopped, and the efforts to attain national unity by massacre must be abandoned.

It would obviously be unwise to attempt at this time to draw frontiers for the Balkan states. Certain broad considerations, however, may tentatively be kept in mind. They are in brief these:

³ Джонсън, П. История на американския народ. С., 2010, 714.

1) that the area annexed by Rumania in the Dobrudja⁴ is almost surely Bulgarian in character and should lie returned; 2) that the boundary between Bulgaria and Turkey should be restored to the Enos-Midia line, as agreed upon at the conference of London.⁵ 3) that the south boundary of Bulgaria should be the Aegean Sea coast from Enos to the gulf of Orfano, and should leave the mouth of the Struma river in Bulgarian territory; 4) that the best access to the sea for Serbia is through Saloniki; 5) that the final disposition of Macedonia cannot be determined without further inquiry; G) that an independent Albania is almost certainly an undesirable political entity.

We are strongly of the opinion that in the last analysis economic considerations will outweigh nationalistic affiliations in the Balkans, and that a settlement which insures economic prosperity is most likely to be a lasting one”⁶.

The recommendations of the Inquiry combined two approaches – the ethnic and the economic one, the latter prevailing over nation concerns when conflict problems occurred as in the case of Dobrudja and Thrace in favor of Bulgaria. As for Macedonia, the experts were obviously aware of the complex character of the Macedonian issue which needed additional studying.⁷

During the next 1918 year teams of experts were sent all over Europe to study the local peculiarities and gather information from different sources and researches. In October 1918 a Balkan Section was formed presided by Clive Day, doctor of economic history at Yale University which had to examine the grounds for the Balkan states territorial aspirations (with the exception of Turkey) and recommend what position the US should take. One of the main tasks of the Balkan section was to draw up drafts for a Balkan national, state and political map which had to be

⁴ In the Treaty of Bucharest [Footnote in the original].

⁵ And in the treaty of San Stefano [Footnote in the original].

⁶ FRUS, 1919, Vol. I, 50–51.

⁷ Пантев, А., П. Петков, Op. cit., 75.

accepted by the Paris Peace Conference. Its experts had to find ethnographic, language, historical, cultural, economic and strategic arguments in connection with the boundaries of the Balkan states. In this respect, the records of the proceedings did not mention any division between victors and vanquished but recommended that the majority of population in each state should consist of representatives of one and the same nationality.⁸

As a result, the Inquiry furnished the US delegation for the pending peace negotiations with an impressive set of documents, full of reliable text information and maps. According to the British specialist on diplomatic history Harold Nicolson, who attended the conference, if the Versailles Treaty were drawn up by American experts only, this would have been one of the wisest and scientifically grounded peace treaties ever written.⁹

The benevolent attitude to Bulgaria demonstrated in the Memorandum cited above rested not only on the good expert knowledge of the origin of the Balkan conflicts and Bulgarian problems, but also on the information and the influence of the American missionaries who had entered the European provinces of the Ottoman Empire as early as in the beginning of the 19th century. Here they got in touch with the Bulgarians in the sphere of religious and lay education. The process of getting knowledge of each other continued in the turmoil after the April Uprising of 1876 through the American defense and sympathy to the participants in the rebellion against the Ottoman rule rendered by the American Consul General in Constantinople Eugene Schuyler as well as the support of the Act of Unification (1885) by both diplomats and missionaries who appreciated the Bulgarians as a nation who loved freedom and totally deserved it. Due to the long contacts with the Bulgarian population and impartial observations the American missionaries got to know quite well their ethnic

⁸ Ibid., 106–107.

⁹ Джонсън, П., *Op. cit.*, 714.

boundaries in the Balkan Peninsula. The “Miss Stone Affair”¹⁰ increased the interest to the Bulgarian liberation cause in Macedonia, which the American missionary herself supported when she returned to the USA. The heroism of the rebels in the Ilinden-Preobrazhenie Uprising (1903) and the atrocities during its suppression provoked reaction of sympathy among the American public (well informed about the events by the missionaries in Macedonia and the Adrianople region) and gained the support of distinguished public figures and high officials.¹¹

The end of the Balkan wars presented one more opportunity for the US diplomacy to demonstrate will and equity despite its interests in the region: the US Minister Plenipotentiary to Bucharest Charles Vopicka (covering also Bulgaria for the State Department) refused to sign the Treaty of Bucharest (1913) as a protest against its unjust clauses to Bulgaria. The situation in the Balkans and Bulgaria’s isolation precipitated the Bulgarian intentions at activating the dialog with the USA. In early 1914 Bulgarian Consulate General was opened in New York. The US businessman Clayton Rockhill was appointed Consul General. Besides, the Radoslavov Cabinet decided to open a Bulgarian legation in the US capital. Stefan Panaretov, a graduate of and a lecturer at the famous Robert College in Constantinople was chosen for the position of Bulgarian Minister Plenipotentiary to Washington. He presented his credentials to President W. Wilson on December 10, 1914.¹²

The war put to the test Bulgarian-American relations. Consul General in New York C. Rockhill left office while in October 1915

¹⁰ The kidnapping for ransom of the American Protestant missionary Ellen Maria Stone and her pregnant fellow missionary friend Katerina Stefanova-Tsilka by an Internal Macedonian-Adrianople Revolutionary Organization detachment led by the voivoda Yane Sandanski and the sub-voivodas Hr. Chernopeev and Kr. Asenov on 21 August 1901 and their subsequent release.

¹¹ Тошкова, В. САЩ и България 1919-1989. Политически отношения. С., 2007, 9–10.

¹² Ibid., 14.

the State Department released from service the consular agent in Sofia Dr. A. Kermekchiev who had been appointed two years before. The office was transformed into Consulate General and Dominic Murphy became the Consul-General in Sofia, the first American diplomat resident in Bulgaria. In October 1915 the State Department sent Lewis Einstein, a diplomat from the American Embassy in Istanbul, to Sofia. The observations of the American diplomats confirmed the conclusions already made by Vopicka that Bulgaria's ambitions in the war were deprived of megalomania and were limited to the revision of the Treaty of Bucharest.¹³

Although participating in opposite belligerent coalitions in the First World War, the US and Bulgaria did not sever diplomatic relations. On February 6, 1917 the Secretary of State Lansing informed the Bulgarian Government through the Consul General Murphy that the US Government assumed the friendly relations between Bulgaria and the United States would continue in spite of the necessity which had arisen for the United States to sever relations with Germany. He asked Murphy, in case of uncertainty, to convince Bulgarian authorities that it was for the mutual interest of Bulgaria and the United States to avoid the suspension of the friendly relations which had always existed between the two countries.¹⁴ Radoslavov's answer, delivered again through Murphy, was not delayed: *"I request you to declare to the Honorable Government of the United States on behalf of the Royal Government that Bulgaria intends also on her part to preserve the relations of perfect friendship that she has always been happy to maintain with the United States"*.¹⁵

Official contacts were preserved despite the German pressure over Bulgaria or the ambivalent assessments of Bulgaria's siding with the Central Powers among US politicians and public. This was mainly due to the strong pro-Bulgarian campaign carried out by American missionaries, scholars, journalists, diplomats, joined

¹³ Пантев, А., П. Петков, Op. cit., 60–61.

¹⁴ FRUS, 1917, (Supplement 2) Vol. I, p. 116.

¹⁵ Ibid., 138.

by Bulgarian public figures, who stood in defense of the Bulgarians and their motives for entering the war.¹⁶

Especially empathetic and helpful was the activity of the US Consul General to Sofia Murphy whose reports to the State Department bore not only the information of a professional diplomat but also the deep conviction that the Bulgarian people and government definitely did not want to fight with the US. In his telegram of May 10, 1917 he announced:

*“Audience with Minister for Foreign Affairs Wednesday. Received assurances that there would be no break in relations happily existing between the two countries. German-Austrian pressure is still very great but up to date has failed. Official circles in Bulgaria strongly in favor of friendly relations, public sentiment likewise. Newspaper reports of disturbances in Bulgaria entirely unfounded.”*¹⁷

The lost battle of Dobro Pole forced Malinov's government to seek termination of the Bulgarian participation in the bloodshed, according to the principles declared by W. Wilson and with the mediation of the United States. D. Murphy, together with the military attaché Archibald Walker accompanied the Bulgarian delegation for the signing of the armistice. After twice editing the answer, the Bulgarian proposal was accepted but the speed with which the armistice was signed (September 29, 1918) made the initiative pointless. This incurred criticism to Murphy that his hasty action could isolate the US from the settlement of peace in the Balkans.¹⁸

The armistice with Bulgaria accelerated the opening of a US diplomatic mission in Sofia. Charles Wilson was appointed Chargé d'affaires ad interim to Bulgaria. He arrived in Sofia on December 8, 1918 from Madrid to directly monitor the events in the country after the armistice. On October 24 he was

¹⁶ Петков П. (Ed.). С. Панаретов. Дневник 1917-1920. – ИДА, Т. 48 (1984), 259, 265–266, 273, et al.

¹⁷ FRUS, 1919, The Paris Peace Conference, Vol. 1, 67.

¹⁸ Пантев, А., П. Петков, Op. cit., 95.

specifically instructed not only to explain to the Bulgarians the US position in the war, but also to supply the State Department with more information about Bulgaria. Secretary of State Lansing explicitly indicated that he should completely avoid engaging the US government or himself with the ambitions for territorial expansion of Bulgaria, thus determining Wilson's position of a distant observer and mediator.¹⁹

Getting to know the country and the people, the US diplomat noted that all the American missionaries here were "*strongly pro-Bulgarian and strong partisans of Bulgarian territorial ambitions*".²⁰ He found out that during the war they had carried on a considerable propaganda work in the United States, especially with a view to preventing a declaration of war against Bulgaria, and that they were continuing this propaganda in a more intensely in the hope that Bulgarian aspirations for increasing their territory would be considered favorably at the Peace Conference, and especially receive the support of the American delegation.²¹

Although instructed to keep distance, Wilson transmitted thorough diplomatic channels the communications of the missionaries of the American Board, residing in Bulgaria who advocated for Bulgaria's right to present its stand before the Peace Conference. He also informed of the request of the Bulgarian Prime Minister, and the Ministers of War and Finance to secure permission from the US Government "*for some of the American missionaries in Bulgaria to go to Paris, officially or un-officially, to place before American and other allied public men Bulgaria's position and aspirations for increased territory*."²²

Wilson also reported about the friendly feelings the Bulgarians cherished for the United States and their expectations to obtain

¹⁹ Тошкова, Б., *Op. cit.*, 20; NA USA 123 W 69/106.

²⁰ FRUS, 1919, The Paris Peace Conference, Vol. II, 248.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 249.

²² *Ibid.*

from them protection of their national interests in Paris. This hope was equally shared by both politicians and people. On December 16, 1918 in a telegram to the Ambassador in France Sharp Wilson informed him about the Prime Minister's request to convey to the President of the United States, in the name of the Government of Bulgaria, and its people, congratulations upon his arrival in Europe. For the Bulgarians, the Prime minister continued, this was an event of great importance "as Bulgaria looked to the President of the United States to save Bulgaria from annihilation".²³ Ten days after his arrival in Sofia, having had numerous meetings and talks, Wilson concluded: *"Every Bulgarian with whom I have spoken looks to the United States to espouse the Bulgarian cause at the Peace Conference, and states that they have the most absolute confidence in President Wilson and his theory of nationalities, which they expect will fulfill all their aspirations for territorial expansion. I have not spoken to a single Bulgarian who has not told me that no pressure could have induced Bulgaria to side with Germany if she had believed that the United States would enter the war. It is also a fact that Germany used every argument and threat to induce Bulgaria to declare war on the United States and that the latter refused even at the risk of a break with her allies."*²⁴

The Paris Conference was the tribune where the US presented their ambitions to play a major role in the recovery of the Old continent. However a difference existed between the Entente and the American concerning the arrangement of the European matters. As early as on October 2, 1918 the US mission in London informed the representatives of the Entente that the US regarded the treaties about the Balkans as a part of the general issue of the future world order. The declaration also warned that they would not approve agreements which would allow the Balkan allies of Great Britain to solely and without control arrange the territorial problems in this region. In addition, Wilson pointed out that one of the main elements of the European "new order" should

²³ FRUS, 1919, The Paris Peace Conference, Vol. II, 250.

²⁴ Ibid., 255.

be the withdrawal of the Great Powers from the Balkans.²⁵

Just after the Peace Conference was open, on January 21, 1919 the Inquiry presented “Outline of Tentative Report and Recommendation, prepared by the Intelligence Section with instructions for the President and the Plenipotentiaries”. The document, which became famous at the conference as “The Black Book”, would serve as the principle policy document for the American delegation during the negotiations. The greater part of it (79 out of 98 pages in total) was devoted to territorial issues which, together with the large collection of maps, was intended to give background and starting position for the negotiators and influence the final policy decisions in Paris.²⁶

The document proposed considerable changes of the borders in the Balkans. According to it, the Bulgarian-Romanian border had to be restored as it had been before the Second Balkan War of 1913 i.e. before the Treaty of Bucharest; Macedonia should gain autonomy or retain its pre-war status quo; Bulgaria should take the territory in Eastern Thrace to the Midia-Enos line (as recognized by the London Peace Treaty of May 1913). At the same time the report maintained the territorial claims of Romania and the still unrecognized Yugoslav state towards Austria-Hungary; of the Yugoslavs – towards Italy and of Greece – towards Turkey. However, the implementation in practice of the scientific and historical conclusions of the experts in the Balkan problems proved to be quite different.²⁷

In Paris, in the name of the right of nations to self-determination, proclaimed by W. Wilson, for “their” national territories fought both victors and vanquished (assuming the latter were given an opportunity to present their stand in one way or another). In fact, the defense of the peacemakers as well as the

²⁵ Тошкова, Б., *Op. cit.*, 21; Saunders, R. *In Search of Woodrow Wilson. Beliefs and Behavior*. Praeger, 1998, 181–182.

²⁶ Reisser, W. J. *The Black Book: Woodrow Wilson’s Secret Plan for Peace*. Lexington Books, 2012, 33.

²⁷ Пантев, А., П. Петков, *Op. cit.*, 110.

national propaganda of the countries contending for the same area covered the entire range of arguments by which a nation state claimed their rights over certain – from the romantic view of language and religion, uniting people in a “national territory”, through the Enlightenment idea referring the integrity of the national territory rather to its security and economic viability; from the geographic determinism and the search of “natural boundaries to geopolitical concerns and the emerging fear of the spread of Bolshevism. Above them all, however, applied selectively, stood the principle of punishing the “guilty”, i.e. the vanquished, and encouraging friends – former allies and future partners. Bulgaria was among the punished.²⁸

The conclusions and recommendations of the US experts concerning Bulgaria were not taken into consideration by the 52 sub-commissions of the Peace Conference and subsequently were abandoned by the American delegation. Headed by President Wilson himself, in the course of negotiations the US diplomacy changed its stands and priorities. The pragmatic political approach, the shrewd diplomatic combinations and the pressure from the position of power prevailed over the declared intentions for just, backed up by scientific arguments.

The US activity towards the Balkans was motivated by their apparent disagreement (before and after they entered the war) with the economic and territorial aims of the Entente and by Wilson’s ambitions to displace the old Great Powers from their positions in Europe. Partially, this idea was accomplished with the establishment of a big state of the southern Slavs as a barrier to a possible German expansion. The project for a multinational state created from the territories of Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia and

²⁸ For the principles of drawing nation-state borders in Paris, see White, G. *Nation, State and Territory. Origin, Evolutions, and Relationships*. Vol. 1. Inc., 2004, 204–228; Генов, Г. П. *Ньойският договор и България*. С., 1935, 5–58. For the Bulgarian propaganda in defense of Bulgarian territorial aspirations, see Христов, Х. *България, Балканите и мирът*. С., 1984, 53–75; Илчев, И. *Родината ми – права или не!* С., 1995, 181–187.

Herzegovina, Slovenia and Macedonia was approved by the US as early as in the beginning of February 1919. Washington was the first to recognize the new Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. With their position on the Italian-Yugoslav controversy the US intended to outplay Great Britain and France in shaping post-war Europe and replace the old protection over the small European states and nations. Wilson's pro-Yugoslav attitude to the Adriatic issue had also the aim to neutralize the pro-Bulgarian conclusions of the Balkan section of the Inquiry which faced Belgrade's discontent. Meanwhile, the Yugoslav delegation was inclined to show certain consideration with the US on the issue of the western Bulgarian border in return for support of the Yugoslav interests in Dalmatia and especially if the US dropped the idea of autonomy for Macedonia under the mandate of a neutral state as well as the demand for a plebiscite there carried out under the control of the Great Powers.²⁹

Discussions on the borders with Bulgaria began on 21 July

²⁹ The Memorandum of the Balkan section of the Inquiry of March 1919 concerning the borders in the Balkans stated that Macedonia which had been a bloody battlefield for 25 years had to be given special attention if in the Balkans should be established healthy relationship. It recommended that the territory from the Shar Mountains to the present Serbian-Greek border together with Eastern Macedonia with the valley of Struma, Serres and Kavalla should be given to Bulgaria. Serbia might keep the territory north of the Shar Mountains; Greece – Thessaloniki and neighboring areas, which were Slavic before 1913, but due to an exchange of population gained Greek appearance. This, according to US experts, would be the most durable and just division. Another solution, recommended by the Memorandum, was the establishment of "autonomous" part of Macedonia under the control of a no-interested elected government uninterested mandate power. The document also stated that Bulgaria should keep or recover all its territories given to it in 1878. It specifically noted that the changes of the western and northern borders were of strategic character but the change affected seriously the principle of self-determination, and re-enforced permanent enmity. As for the Thrace, analyzing different options the experts stated that in any case it would be better if Western Thrace remained in Bulgaria while there were good reasons for Eastern Thrace with the Midia-Enos line to be given to Bulgaria. – See Пaнpeв, A., П. Пeткoв, Op. cit., 115–117.

1919 and the difference in the positions of the negotiators became clear already in the Report presented to the Supreme Council by the Central Territorial Committee. On the boundary of Dobrudja, the American delegation proposed that Roumania should return to Bulgaria the territories which she had annexed by force in 1913 since she received now much more extensive territories from Austria; the Committee except for the US delegation insisted on the maintenance of the 1914 boundary.

Unanimity could not be obtained about the Southern boundary as well. Contrary to the British, French and Japanese delegations, the American and Italian delegations proposed the frontier of 1913, amended to the profit of Bulgaria by Turko-Bulgarian Treaty of 1915. The American delegation whose observations were supported by the Italian delegation, noted that Bulgaria had not acquired Western Thrace by conquest but with the voluntary consent of Greece and her allies who had the wisdom to recognize her this natural outlet to the sea. The American delegation disputed the Report of the Commission on Greek Affairs stating that the non-Mohammedan population of Bulgarian Thrace was more Greek than Bulgarian and questioned the alleged preference of the Mohammedan population the majority of which spoke Bulgarian, to be under Greek rather than under Bulgarian authority. The US delegation pointed out that the lack of direct access by land to the Mediterranean would seriously compromise the economic development of Bulgaria. Even if these economic inconveniences could be overcome bitterness and resentment for the injustice committed would still remain among the Bulgarian people which would be an inevitable menace to the future peace of the world.

“Ethnographical, economic, and political arguments, as well as possession certainly supported by valid claims, all favor the maintenance of the Bulgarian boundaries as they are at the present time.

Consequently, the American delegation makes the following proposal:

“The Southern boundary of Bulgaria will be that which existed after the cession by Turkey in 1915 of territory adjoining Adrianople, under the reservation of the right of the principal Allied Associated Powers to attach to the International State such part of the said territory as seems desirable.”

The Italian delegation associated itself with the conclusions of the American delegation.³⁰

Although W. Wilson refrained from denouncing directly the Bucharest Treaty, the initial statements and acts of the American delegation ignored it. Consequently, the US gradually changed their position.

For regions like Banat, Croatia, Istria, Bukovina and Dalmatia which are associated rather with Eastern and Central Europe than with the Balkans, the US diplomats managed to impose their views which only partially coincided with those of the Entente. As far as “the true” Balkans were concerned, the victory states neglected Wilson’s principle for self-determination which remained a priority only to scholars – ethnologists, geographers, historians, and linguists. The fate of Eastern and Western Thrace, Dobrudja, Macedonia and some sectors of the Serbian-Bulgarian border was decided in this manner. The unwillingness of the US diplomats to listen to the recommendations of the Inquiry coincided with the decreasing chances for the establishment of a Constantinople State with an American mandate over it.

In the final decisions of the Conference the American support for Bulgaria was of importance only in rejecting the Serbian aspirations for North-Western Bulgaria and in the region of Slivnitsa and Dragoman.³¹

The other decisions on the Balkan problems were taken in the same pattern of strong pressure from the Balkan victory states and their European patrons followed by partial concessions. In the end, the Paris Conference confirmed the decisions of the Bucharest Treaty of 1913.

³⁰ FRUS. 1919, The Paris Peace Conference, Vol. VII, 242–248.

³¹ Тошкова, В., *Op. cit.*, 22.

The Thracian question from February to September 1919 was among the most controversial topics in the commissions and committees of the Conference dealing with the future Bulgarian-Greek border. According to the American experts, who obviously assumed the economic factor as dominant in settling territorial problems, the principal focus of territorial difficulty in the Balkans was Thrace, whose Eastern and Western sections affected the commercial outlets of Bulgaria in a critical way.³² Greek claims to Thrace received solid support from her former and future allies France and Britain, assisted by Japan; reserved to them was Italy as far as she has plans of her own in the Eastern Mediterranean.³³ The US position evaluated: – from accepting of the Bulgarian rights over Western Thrace based on ethnic and economic arguments and expansion of its eastern border in the Adrianople region, depending on the range of the projected by them Constantinople state (in January – March 1919), through the defense of a Bulgarian outlet to the Aegean Sea through Western Thrace³⁴ to accepting the compromise solution that Bulgaria should renounces in favor of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers all rights and title over the territories in Thrace which belonged to her (in September 1919) and the recognition by declaration of the American Congress of January 20, 1920 of all Greek claims over Eastern and Western Thrace.³⁵

The issue of Southern Dobrudja was solved in a similar way. Despite the US initiative for Roumania to return to Bulgaria the territory which she had taken in 1913, eventually Under-Secretary of State Frank Polk withdrew the US proposal with the warning that Dobrudja could become the cause for a new war in the Balkans.³⁶

³² House, E., Ch. Seymour, Op. cit., 173.

³³ Helmreich, P. C. From Paris to Sevres. Columbus, 1974, 153–154.

³⁴ Трифонов, С. Българското национално-освободително движение в Тракия, 1919–1934. С., 1988, 14–15.

³⁵ Трифонов, С. Антантата в Тракия 1919–1920. С., 1989, 30, 40–45.

³⁶ Христов, X., Op. cit., 281.

While not at war with Bulgaria, representatives of the US at the Paris Conference Frank Polk, Under-Secretary of State, Henry White, formerly Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the United States at Rome and Paris and General Tasker Bliss, Military Representative of the United States on the Supreme War Council, by a decision of the Council of Five of November 3, 1919 signed the Treaty of Neuilly as a demonstration of consensus with the Allies.³⁷

On October 27, 1919 Panaretov sent a note to Secretary of State Lansing on the occasion of the Peace Treaty with Bulgaria, indicating the severity of its conditions and their incompatibility with the principles of Wilson. The Bulgarian Minister Plenipotentiary had no illusions that it could change anything in the treaty, but he could not help expressing at least one “moderate protest” against the false assurances that Bulgaria would receive justice. In his diary he could not hide his disappointment at Wilson’s fiasco and his promises about the settlement of the world problems.³⁸

The convincing scientific arguments, presented by scholars, remained helpless against the game of the career diplomats. Due to that reason Wilson quickly gave up the pro-Bulgarian recommendations of the Inquiry and Lansing and House changed their views about to which country certain Balkan territory should belong.

The Bulgarian case, in particular, showed that the US diplomacy yielded to the old European school. This was due not only to the fact that compared to it, the team of Wilson was less experienced and skillful or because after the idea of an American mandate in Constantinople failed the US had no direct territorial interests in the region. It was mainly because the majority of the participants in the Paris Peace Conference imposed the principle of punishing “the guilty”, i.e. the vanquished and compensating the victors. With the U.S. Senate

³⁷ Ibid., 345.

³⁸ Панаретов, С., *Op. cit.*, 284.

opposition to the Covenant of the League of Nations and the with the Congress refusal to ratify the Versailles Treaty, the US reverted to isolationism but not for long. In the big politics the end of Eurocentrism had come although in the Balkans the Old Europe had still the final word. Future would show whether the “twofold” position of the US about the Versailles Treaty (on theoretical and practical level) would foster pro-American revisionist hopes among the disappointed with the new order small states and nations or would sober down their illusions in favor of a more pragmatic and rational assessment of the reliability and prospects of one or another political alliance, and whether the US could be that possible and perspective ally.

Principles and Realities of World War One Peace Settlement (A Case Study of the Slovak–Hungarian Border)

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RELEVANCE OF THE TOPIC

The case study of the Slovak–Hungarian border-distinction after the First World War is an interesting object for study because of several reasons. First of all – this border had no precedence, i.e. it could serve as a pure illustration of the peace-making process. As known, since the dissolution of the early medieval Great Moravian State, the Slovak lands were incorporated in the medieval Hungarian state and became a possession of the crown of St. Stephen under the name of Upper Hungary. According to the new principle of the right of self-determination, legitimized at the end of WWI, the new border distinction between Hungary and Slovakia *a priori* had to be defined as a border between two nations, i.e. it had to follow the ethnic distribution and localization of the population. The newly drawn border arrangement had to demonstrate in a pure form the national distinction which brings birth to two national states, successors of the old Habsburg monarchy. A pure theoretical assumption.

Secondly, both newborn national states were accepting as general criteria for the territorial arrangement the right of a nation to self-determination. The Czechoslovaks used this right to call their independent state in October 1918. The Hungarians first called their rights over the integrity of St Stephen's crown and accepted these criteria a bit later. Anyway,

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it was the Entente to decide about the new border arrangement. The fact that the decision laid in the third power, presumably neutral and not malevolent, and the fact that both sides accepted the right of self-determination as a common ground for the new border distinction supposed an easy, mutually accepted and just decision in this issue. Again a pure intellectual speculation.

PRES. W. WILSON'S GENERAL DESIGN: THEORY AND APPLICATION IN CENTRAL EUROPE

In the first version of pres. Woodrow Wilson's program a call for more autonomy for the people of Central Europe was expressed. As vague as it was stated, it left room for future arrangements, eventually for a constitutional reform, but at that time no responsible policy-maker thought about the dissolution of Austro-Hungary, the main goal was rather to separate the Danubian Monarchy from its German ally and thus to win the war. For this purpose – winning the war – the Czechoslovak legion was formed fighting on the side of Entente and against the Central Powers. Situation changed as the emigrant Czechoslovak National Council (CSNC) was recognized as a legitimate political speaker for the new nation – first by France, then by Great Britain, USA, Italy and Japan.

The new US note of October 18, 1918, send to Habsburg's government was reflecting this new political reality. It spoke again of an enlarged autonomy for the peoples of Central Europe and built up of responsible governments. The crucial point however was: Washington did not treat Habsburg's government any more as a legitimate. The future partner to deal with was CSNC (together with the Polish, Serbian and Rumanian emigrant committees). All they were invited to take part at the peace conference in Paris.

Immediately after receiving this US answer in Vienna, on the next day – October 28, 1918 – the Czech National Committee (CNC) at home peacefully took the power from the Habsburg authorities in Prague. Thus, the political coordination between

CSNC and the politicians at home gave birth to the new Czechoslovak state. At that time the names of two Slovaks were connected with this act: Milan Rastislav Štefánik, a general of the French Army with sound connections at Quai d'Orsay, who was active in organizing the Czechoslovak troops abroad fighting on the Entente's side – he became a minister of War in the first Czechoslovak's provisional government; and the Slovak politician Vavro Šrobár. Šrobár was a keen promoter of the ideas of pres. T. G. Masaryk for building up a common Czechoslovak state. On a working class demonstration in May 1918 in Liptovský Mikuláš he spoke openly about this political project.¹ It happened only by chance that Šrobár from the Slovak National Party was in Prague on October 28, 1918, when the CNC took the power and became the sole Slovak, signing up the proclamation of the new state.² But as a matter of fact, by that time he had no authorisation from the Slovak National Council.³

Two days later – on October 30, 1918 the so called Martin Declaration was proclaimed by the Slovak National Committee. It stated close ethnic, linguistic and cultural affiliations between Slovaks and Czechs, accepted fully Wilson's points as a base for future arrangements and showed political will to build up a common state with the Czechs.⁴ The initial text under point 4 stated that *“we expect that the solution of the Slovak question would be done on the peace conference, where the destiny of our nation would be settled down. That is why we insist that also the Hungarian branch of the Czecho-Slovak nation should be represented on the coming peace congress”*.⁵ This, of course,

¹ Pekník, M. Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk a nektoré aspekty slovensko-českých vzťahov za prvej svetovej vojny. – In: První světová válka, moderní demokracie a TGM. Sborník konference, Praha, 1995, 234.

² Kvaček, R. První světová válka a česká otázka. Praha, 2013, 167.

³ Holec, R. The Slovaks in the Whirlwind of War. – In: A Concise History of Slovakia. Mantova, E. (Ed.). Bratislava, 2000, 237.

⁴ Naše dejiny v pramenoč, Sborník dokumentov. Ratkoš, R. (Ed.) Bratislava, 1971, 290.

⁵ Ibid., 290.

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meant that the Slovak political leaders wanted to have their own, separate political representation at the peace conference in Paris – a claim, which was dropped down in the final version of the document.⁶ This claim did not find place in the last version of the Declaration, which was sent to Prague. The reason was that during the debate of the declaration Milan Hodža (editor and deputy at Hungarian parliament and member of the Slovak National Party, who was based during the war in Vienna) convinced the gathered politicians that the claim for a separate Slovak presentation on the peace conference would complicate the issue, as the Slovaks had already an internationally accepted speaker, the CSNC.⁷

It is also worth pointing out that on the Martin Declaration there was also the signature of pater Andrej Hlinka, the founder of the Slovak National Party, who stood for years for more Slovak autonomy and was persecuted for his views.⁸ As early as in May 1918 on a meeting of his party, he decidedly proclaimed that the “1000 year marriage of the Slovaks with the Hungarian State was a disaster” and thus a logical separation from this state could be expected and pro Czech orientation promoted.⁹ Even when signing up the Martin declaration, however, he was not thinking of abandoning his claim for Slovak autonomy – it was just politically unwise not to use the advantage of having already an internationally accepted presentation on the peace conference.

The Martin Declaration further proclaimed the Slovak National Committee (a counterpart of the Czech one) as the new legitimate ruler of the country. However, as a matter of fact, unlike the Czech National Committee, the Slovak National Committee never got a strong hold over the country. It was in power only on the paper, it had no force to implement decisions. The local institutions: police, army, post, railway, clearks, i.e.,

⁶ Pastor, P. Hungary between Wilson and Lenin: The Hungarian Revolution of 1918–1919 and The Big Three. Boulder, USA, 1976, 49.

⁷ Kvaček, R., Op.cit., 170.

⁸ Hlinka had spent two years in prison.

⁹ Slovenské dejiny. Martinka, P. (Ed.). Bratislava, 1993, 202.

all authorities remained loyal to the Budapest government. This was not surprising, given the fact that out of 6185 clerks, governing Upper Hungary by the outbreak of the World war, there were only 154 Slovaks.¹⁰

Furthermore, unlike its Czech counterpart, which was built on the parliamentary representation of the Czech parties in the parliament in Vienna, i.e. legitimized in elections, the Slovak National Committee could not accept this key.¹¹ It came into existence by a general agreement among the political parties, resp. their most prominent leaders (Andrej Hlinka, Vavro Šrobár, Milan Hodža etc.)

The Martin Declaration and the expression of the self-determination will of the Slovaks to join the Czechs, raised for the first time the question of shaping a border between the Upper land and the post-war Hungary. The war, however, was still to be won on the battlefields, and the question of the future territorial arrangements after its end – still open. An armistice was signed on November 3 in Padua between the representatives of the Entente and of Austro-Hungary. Accordingly, the Entente was given access to strategically important points on monarchy's territory, the demarcation line however did not deviate from the pre-war border line.¹² Thus, the integrity of the pre-war Hungary was still kept untouched – the question of the future territorial arrangements left to be solved at the peace conference.¹³ By that time, the Budapest Government accepted the idea of an independent Czech state, but not yet the inclusion of the Slovaks in this state. The

¹⁰ For the rest of the country there were 2911 Slovaks out of 230 000 clerks. See Rusinow, D. *Ethnic Politics in the Habsburg Monarchy and the Successor States: Three Answers to the National Question.* – In: *Nationalism and Empire.* Rudolph, R., D. Good (Eds.), New York, 1992, 253; Kann, R., *Zd. David. The Peoples of the Eastern Habsburgs Lands, 1526-1918.* Washington, 1984, 384.

¹¹ After the elections of 1910 there were only three Slovak deputies in the Hungarian parliament – see *Slovenske dejiny*, 1993, 192.

¹² Унгер, М., О. Соболич, *История на Унгария.* С., 1968, 273.

¹³ Pastor, P., *Op. cit.*, 65.

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Declaration of Károlyi's government expressed a general acceptance of pres. Wilson's principles, but at the same time claimed the integrity of the historical lands of St. Stephen's crown, which meant with Slovaks within.¹⁴ A special ministry for minorities issues was set up to illustrate that the future of Slovaks laid further in connection with Hungarians.

The armistice agreement with Hungary stroke alarm by CSNC in Paris. Edvard Beneš took an audience by George Clemenceau and gen. Foch and convinced them to intervene in order to change the armistice terms. A message from Paris soon reached the French representatives in Central Europe – the armistice had to be considered only of pure military and temporary nature, the agreement with the Károlyi's government on the integrity of the country had to be considered only as a temporary, the issue to be settled on the peace forum.¹⁵

So far then, by the beginning of the peace conference there were two important things to be noted: on one hand there was CSNC, accepted as a legitimate speaker for the Czechoslovakian nation, but with no borders yet fully defined, i.e. first the independence, based on Wilson's principle, then shaping the territory of the state; and on the other hand there was the French–Hungarian armistice, where among the terms the integrity of the lands of St. Stephen's crown assumed, which agreement however, on the pressure from Paris had to be considered as a pure military one, without any connection with the future Czechoslovak–Hungarian border distinction. Both actions were of political and strategical nature, designed to fit to the needs of the war.

Let us mention that by the end of 1918 there was also an attempt for a border arrangement, based on national principle. Direct Hungarian–Slovak bilateral negotiations began. The Hungarian side was represented by the minister of defense Albert Bartha and the Slovak by Milan Hodža, as representative of the Slovak National Party. Hodža had some kind of legitimation. For

¹⁴ Galantai, J. Hungary in the First World War. Bp., 1989, 321.

¹⁵ Pastor, P., Op.cit., 66.

the years 1905–1910 he was the only Slovak deputy in the Budapest parliament, he was also among the signatories of the Martin Declaration.¹⁶ Further, he got in advance approval and mandate from the first Czechoslovak prime-minister Karel Kramář to start negotiations with the Hungarian government on military issues, but also over border arrangements. Let us also mention that by that time Budapest had already accepted the future separation of the Slovak lands.¹⁷ All this give a presumption that a fair ethnic distinction between the two nations could be possible. As a base for it, both sides agreed, the last census, held in 1910, had to be used. As a result a new demarcation line was agreed on, leaving Bratislava and Košice within Hungary.¹⁸

The Hodza–Bartha Agreement, signed up on December 6, 1918, in fact was following the national distinction between Slovaks and Hungarians and thus was to a great extend fulfilling the national criteria. The last decision again was left to the peace conference. However, even this temporary arrangement provoked a strong protest and reaction: the French representative in Prague sent a letter to Hodža on December 23, 1918, in which he ordered immediate interruption of the bilateral negotiations with the Hungarians. The argument was not to leave the issue for the peace conference, as could be expected. He informed the Slovak representative that the Slovak–Hungarian border had been already settled down in November 1918 by an agreement between French military leadership and Edvard Beneš on the demarcation line (the so called Pichon's line).¹⁹ Beneš succeeded in getting the French support for the “historical limits” of Slovakia. On December 19, 1919 Clemenceau sent instructions to gen. Franchet

¹⁶ Готовска-Хенце, Т. Назад към изгубения трон: последният хабсбургски император и държавите-наследници. С., 1993, 80.

¹⁷ Romsics, I. Edvard Beneš a československo-maďarska hranice. – In: Edvard Beneš a střední Evropa. Sborník přednasek a statí. Praha, 1993, 30–31.

¹⁸ Krejčí, O. Český národní zájem, Praha, 1993, 114.

¹⁹ Krejčí, O., Op. cit., 115.

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d'Esperey, in which the southern border was following the Danube up to the river of Ipel, then along this river up to Rimavska Sobota and then straight to the East up to river of Uh. This line was a part of the definitive demarcation line, approved by the Entente, which further gave the right to the Czechoslovak army to occupy Slovakia.²⁰ Nevertheless this way the entente violated the principle of self-determination.

Under the benevolence of the French government, Beneš encouraged the Military leadership in Prague to commit a “fait accompli” and take Slovakia – as silently as possible.²¹ Occupation started in the beginning of November and followed this demarcation line, which paid little attention to the ethnic Slovak–Hungarian distinction. In Paris the Czechoslovakian representatives, most active of which was Beneš, were giving new and new economical, infrastructural, transport etc. arguments for moving the border further to the South. Even future demographical prognoses were among the arguments, for example that Slovaks had a bigger birth rate than Hungarians and because of this reason they would need a fertile soil for agriculture, which could be found only in the South.²² Gen. Miklós Horthy remembered that in December 1918 the Entente Representatives in Budapest announced that the Czech aspirations over Bratislava (Presburg, Pozsony) and its surroundings were met with approval.²³ Therefore, before the peace conference the new state had preliminary borders, negotiated in Paris. London however agreed only on Czechoslovak borders in the North, without mentioning Slovakia, i.e. the Slovak–Hungarian border.²⁴ On December 31 the Czechoslovak troops took Bratislava. Vavro Šrobár, the Czechoslovak minister with full power to

²⁰ Slovensko v 20. storočí., 3 sväzok: V medzivojnovom Československu 1918-1939. Ferenčuhová, B., M. Zemko (Eds). Bratislava, 2012, 34.

²¹ Krejčí, O., Op. cit., 115.

²² Slovensko v 20 storočí..., Op. cit., 57.

²³ M. Horthy. Memoires. West Point, USA, 1978, 96.

²⁴ Slovensko v 20 storočí..., Op. cit., 54.

administer Slovakia moved from Žilina to Bratislava. By January 20, 1919 the Czechoslovak army strengthened by the French and Italian legionaries moved further to the South, beyond the demarcation line, determined in December 1918 by the Entente.²⁵

PEACE-MAKING: PRINCIPLES AND ARGUMENTS

When on January 18, 1919 the peace conference in Paris started, the hopes of the Hungarians for a fair treatment were diminishing, since their attempts to negotiate a fair peace arrangement on the pres. Wilsons 14 points were in vain. Defeated countries were not allowed to participate in the peace negotiations. On the other hand, Czechoslovaks, together with Rumanians and Yugoslavs as allies were permitted to take part in the commission with "limited issues". The most active and successful of Czechoslovak delegation in Paris was the young minister of Foreign Affairs Edvard Beneš supported in his work by the Slovak Stefan Osusky.

Osusky was an emigrant, US lawyer and represented the Slovak league in the USA. He was also a secretary of the delegation. After Beneš left Paris it was exactly Osusky, who had to take the responsibility for the peace treaty with Hungary.²⁶

The US representatives in Paris were still fairly insisting on application of self-determination principle as main criteria for border distinction, but this was a general concept – they did not know the region in detail. As early as in January 1919 pres. T. G. Masaryk warned Beneš, who was actually leading the negotiations in Paris, to choose carefully his arguments, since the US representatives had an "abstract" approach concerning the national and the territorial questions in Europe.²⁷ Indirectly, this was implying a closer cooperation with the more

²⁵ Holec, R., *Op. cit.*, 243.

²⁶ Slovensko v 20. storočí..., *Op. cit.*, 55.

²⁷ Šolle, *Zd. Masaryk a Beneš ve svých dopisech z doby pařížských mírových jednání v roku 1919*. Praha, 1994, 148.

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“concrete” working French delegation. Further, the US promise of no annexations, no reparation was forgotten, the losers had to accept and sign a “*Diktat*“. Before the end of the conference, the US president departed to his home land.

Without Germany and Russia and with the dissolution of Austria-Hungary a big power gap in Central Europe was opened, the political design of the region needed to be generally redrawn. This had to be done with fine consideration and future vision. Unfortunately, this was not the case. France was obsessed with the idea of revenge for Germany and was strongly engaged in building up a strong antibolshevik alliance of the successors states in order to circle Russia and stop revolutionary spill-over. (Cordon sanitaire). Great Britain was showing small interest (and knowledge) in Central Europe’s affairs.²⁸ This was for sure not the best precondition for drawing new borders in a region with very complex population structure. On February 5, 1919 Beneš presented his government’s view on the borders to the highest representatives of the Entente. After a 3-hour discussion with the presence of George Clemenceau, Woodrow Wilson, David Lloyd George and Vittorio Orland the inclusion of Slovakia within the Czechoslovak state was generally approved.²⁹

When on March 19, 1919 the severe peace conditions were officially presented in Budapest, Karolyi’s government gave demission. In the new government some members of the new formed Hungarian Communist Party were included. As some 500.000 war prisoners returned from Russia (many of them already convinced Bolsheviks) the communist ideas were rapidly spreading throughout the country.³⁰ A Hungarian Soviet Republic was proclaimed in Budapest, a dictatorship of proletariat established with Béla Kun ahead. His goal was to spread the world revolution in Europe and that was why he addressed the solidarity of the workers abroad.

²⁸ Готовска-Хенце, Т., *Op. cit.*, 89.

²⁹ Slovensko v 20 storočí..., *Op. cit.*, 57–58.

³⁰ Hönsch, J. *Geschichte Ungarns, 1867–1973*. Köln, 1984, 89.

The revolution was in Central Europe and this fact provoked a big alarm in Paris. Of course, like in case of Russians, there would be no negotiations with Béla Kun. Kun himself also had no intention to deal with the Entente, as, *“the imperialistic Entente clearly showed what the right of the nations to self-determination means – it occupied also territories, which even from its own point of view were unquestionable”*³¹.

At the same time, Beneš was skillfully convincing the peace-makers, that in contrast to the dangerous “Bolshevik” Hungarians, threatening to destroy the status quo in Europe, the Czechoslovaks were a state-building nation, going to create an “isle of peace” in Central Europe.³² Pres. Masaryk was interpreting the new situation also as a favorable for his country, however with other arguments. In a letter to Beneš, written on April 5, 1919 he stated that Bolshevism in Hungary “has helped us in Slovakia” since many Hungarians and magyarophiles (residing in Slovakia) put their hopes on the Czechs.³³ The Czechoslovak president (who supported the Czechoslovak presence in Slovakia) was however against further Entente intervention on Hungarian soil.³⁴

Under the silent benevolence of the Entente the situation deteriorated further as the neighbours of Hungary tried to incorporate further Hungarian territories. With the approval of the French gen. Henri Berthelot, Rumanian troops crossed the demarcation line at Békéscsaba and in April advanced deeper in the country. On April 26 the Czechoslovak corps attacked from north. By May 1 the Rumanians were at Szolnok, the Czechoslovaks at Salgotarjan. Serbs took the chance and occupied Bácska and Baranya.³⁵

The situation for the Hungarians was hard but not

³¹ Б. Кун. Избранное. Будапешт, 1980, 109.

³² Готовска-Хенце, Т., Op. cit., 91.

³³ Šolle, Zd., Op. cit., 205.

³⁴ Готовска-Хенце, Т., Op. cit., 95.

³⁵ Hönsch, J., Op.cit., 87.

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desperate. It had to be won on the battlefield. Despite of the fact, that the Hungarian army was in a unfavorable situation (the ratio to the Czechoslovaks in April was 1:3, to the Rumanians 1:2, the Hungarian army was dissolved and had to be reorganized)³⁶ a successful counterattack forced the Czechoslovak army to withdraw. The British representative in Prague stated that *“The Czech troops, sent to fight Hungarians, acted bad and irresponsible”*.³⁷ He was right. The Hungarian army proceeded further to the north and on June 6 it took Košice, 4 days later Bardejov (thus cutting communication lines between Czechoslovakian and Romanian troops). On June 16, 1919 a Slovak Soviet Republic was proclaimed in Prešov, under the “protection” of the Hungarian troops. Their communist leaders addressed immediately their Czechs “brothers” asking for proletariat solidarity. A further revolution’s spill over was to reach Czech lands, Poland and Austria.³⁸

The peace-makers in Paris were frightened, alarmed and disorientated. As Beneš informed Masaryk from Paris, *“Above all they fear a worker’s revolution at home”*³⁹ and in such an atmosphere it was hard to take a reasonable decision. General Foch proposed an immediate military intervention in Hungary, but Clemenceau, Lloyd George and Wilson preferred a political solution.⁴⁰

The atmosphere in Paris described by Beneš in a letter of June 11, 1919 to T. G. Masaryk was *“bad, dim and unpleasant”*. The Czechs were blamed of *“crossing the demarcation line, being beaten and now making too much noise”*.⁴¹ It was the military failure that brought change in the mood of the peace makers. In another letter Beneš wrote frankly: *“Would we have*

³⁶ Hajdu, T. The Hungarian Soviet Republic. Bp., 1979, 93–94.

³⁷ DBFP, I Series, Vol. VI, 1956, 71.

³⁸ Ibid., 19.

³⁹ Šolle, Zd., Op. cit., 275.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 277.

⁴¹ Ibid., 275.

*entered Muškovce (Miskolc) as winners and without asking them (Entente states) for a help, they would have had nothing (against it)."*⁴² In other words, Czechs were given "free hands" to take as much territory as they could. As a matter of fact, it was again the French military leadership which supported the take over of Petržalka on the right bank of the Danube by the Czechoslovak troops in August 1919.⁴³

On behalf of the peace conference a special note, written by Clemenceau, proposed a withdrawal of the Rumanian troops from Hungary, under condition that Béla Kun's army leaves Slovakia. The Rumanians however were reluctant to withdraw and the domestic political situation was far from being peaceful and clear. In the view of a Foreign Office's representative in Prague, the city inhabitants in Slovakia were in their majority magyarophiles, and the peasants in many cases showed desire for independence, but still in no way sympathy for the Czechs. Slovakia's future "seems very uncertain"— was the main conclusion.⁴⁴ As a matter of fact, there was a big confusion among the Slovaks with people's attitude varying from apathy through fear of the unclear future up to enthusiastic welcoming of the newly born Czechoslovak state.⁴⁵

Meanwhile, the political situation in Hungary showed sign of consolidation in August 1919, when after being 133 days in existence, Béla Kun's government fell and was replaced by a new one. The Romanian troops entered into Budapest. At the same time, Miklós Horthy, an admiral of already nonexistent Austro-Hungarian fleet, was gathering anticommunist volunteers at Szeged. Horthy remembered that it would take time for him to win the support of the French government, because Clemenceau was supporting the actions of Rumanians.⁴⁶ But the Foreign Office

⁴² Ibid., 277.

⁴³ Slovensko v 20 storočí..., Op. cit., 58.

⁴⁴ DBFP, Op. cit., 71.

⁴⁵ Holec, R., Op. cit., 239.

⁴⁶ Horthy, M., Op.cit., 99–101.

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saw in him a “*strong man, one could rely on*”.⁴⁷ Horthy’s negotiations with the Entente leaders were successful – the Rumanian troops finally left Budapest. Leading his army the admiral entered the capital of the country and helped the composition of a new coalition government.

BORDER BUILDING TECHNIQUES

As long as Hungary was in communist turmoil, there were no negotiations on the terms of the Peace Treaty with Hungary because Béla Kun’s government was not accepted as a legitimate one. On June 12, 1919 Beneš informed Masaryk about this decision, pointing out, that the final settlement on the southern border would be taken by the Entente experts’ commission without Hungarian and Czechoslovak representatives. Prague and Budapest would be only informed and they would have to obey and accept this decision.⁴⁸

Taken into consideration, that the region had a highly complex ethnic composition and the border had no precedence, the decision to eliminate the Hungarian and Czechoslovak counterparts in the border settlement and to leave the final solution in the hands of Entente’s could not be expected as a happy one.⁴⁹ Most of the western representatives (not only the US) knew few about the ethnic composition of the region. Masaryk was very disgusted from the way in which the Entente was building up the peace settlement in Central and Eastern Europe, because it showed so little knowledge of this region.⁵⁰

Was only the ignorance the main mistake?

Let us look further at the mechanism of the decision-making process. The experts’ commissions had to prepare technical reports and submit them for discussion and approval in the

⁴⁷ DBFP, Op. cit., 401.

⁴⁸ Šolle, Zd., Op. cit., 277.

⁴⁹ Slovenské dejiny. Martinka, P. (ed.), Bratislava, 1993, 222.

⁵⁰ Šolle, Zd., Op. cit., 203.

commissions on the Czechoslovak, Rumanian and South-Slav territorial issues. Among the 65 experts, advisers and journalists dealing in this commission on Czechoslovak issues there were only 6 Slovaks included.⁵¹ At the end, as already mentioned, the definitive decision over the borders had to be taken by the Entente without participation of concerned states.

Some already published sources⁵², give a good idea about the preparation of the experts reports. The British representatives felt uncertain about the issue and addressed it further specialists, more familiar with the topic. Such a specialist was prof. R. W. Seton-Watson, a person with good knowledge about the region. One of the British experts, member of the the commission on drawing the new Czechoslovak–Hungarian border, named Leeper exchanged letters with Seton-Watson. Seton-Watson knew also Nicolson and Headlam-Morley, other members of the experts' commission. Of interest is the letter written by Headlam-Morley on May 27, 1919. After expressing gratitude for Seton-Watson's previous letters, he pointed out that Leeper and Nicolson found the professor's writhing extremely "interesting and useful". Discussing the minority rights in the new states, the expert was of opinion that the professor's view "corresponds" to a great extend with the point of view Beneš was presenting on the peace conference. Not surprisingly. Seton-Watson was a keen supporter of the Czechoslovak cause during the war and a close friend of T. G. Masaryk.⁵³

From the same letter we also understand that the expert commission, which Headlam-Morley was part of, maintained as he pointed out "direct contacts" with Beneš.⁵⁴ And for sure, the young Czechoslovak foreign minister could not be blamed

⁵¹ Slovensko v 20. storočí..., Op. cit., 55.

⁵² Šolle, Zd., Op. cit.; DBFP, Op. cit.; Seton-Watson, R.W. Documents. Vol. I, 1906–1951. Prague, 1995.

⁵³ Goldstein, E. Winning the Peace: British diplomatic Strategy, Peace Planning and the Paris Peace Conference 1916–1919, Oxford, 1991, 257.

⁵⁴ J.W. Headlam-Morley to Seton-Watson. – In: Seton-Watson, Op. cit., 299.

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of ignorance of Central Europe. Given the fact that there were no negotiations with Budapest and as proved there were very close contacts with the Czechoslovak delegation in Paris, it is not surprising which point of view the commission was supporting.

The final border distinction between Slovaks and Hungarians was settled down in June 1919 with the Treaty of Trianon. No Czechs, no Slovaks, no Hungarians took part in it. As expected in Prague, it fulfilled all their territorial claims. On June 16th 1919 Beneš informed Masaryk that on the “Hungarian question” he was given everything he wanted: “*a general satisfaction and... the borders!*”⁵⁵ He was right: the new border included also Bratislava and the Grain isle. As a ground for this border distinction, a mixture of ethnic, economic, military-strategic and demographic arguments were used.⁵⁶ The new borders included 49.006 km² with population of 2.998.244, which represented 22% of the total population in Czechoslovakia and formed 35% of the territory of the new state.⁵⁷

An isolated Slovak political action is also to be mentioned, which was unsuccessful, but not insignificant – the trip of the tutor of the Slovak National Party Andrej Hlinka to Paris in August 1919. Equipped with a false Polish passport and accompanied by some supporters, he intended to submit a special memorandum, wherein more autonomy for the Slovaks was claimed. Without putting under question the future of the Czechoslovak state, the documents main idea was “Slovakia to the Slovaks”, Slovaks were neither Czechs, nor Czechoslovaks, but Slovaks. He was waiting in Paris up to October, but no hear was given to his memorandum.⁵⁸ The peacemakers had enough problems to deal with. Centralistic or federal, the constitutional design of the new Czechoslovakian state was no topic to be discussed in Paris – the peacemaker had anyway

⁵⁵ Šolle, Zd., Op. cit., 266.

⁵⁶ Holec, R., Op. cit., 243.

⁵⁷ Ibid., 244.

⁵⁸ El Mallkh, D. H. The Slovak Autonomist Movement. Boulder, 1979, 37.

enough problems to deal with. And there was an already accepted as legitimate speaker for the Slovaks. M. Štefanik meanwhile, in the function of the foreign minister in the first Czechoslovakian government. Hlinka travelled back home, where on order from Prague he was immediately arrested.⁵⁹ This was not a well calculated action – the arrest provoked demonstrations in Slovakia. But not everybody was on his side. In December 1919 Milan Hodža wrote to Seton-Watson that Hlinka had “sick ambitions”, was a “megaloman”, whose claims were damaging the image of the newly created state⁶⁰, i.e. his actions have to be ignored.

The preliminary peace conditions for Hungary were announced on January 15, 1920. To admiral Miklos Horthy – and to the majority of Hungarians – they seemed “fantastic”, not real, impossible.⁶¹ That is why the Hungarian government tried in the months to come any possible diplomatic channel to present its point of view and to pretend for border rectifications. From Budapest the British representatives were sending warning signals to Foreign Office that the border arrangement *de facto* violated pres. Wilson’s principles, which were accepted for just by majority of Hungarians. Lord Curson was warned that such an arrangement could be a “threat” for the peace in Europe.⁶²

In January and June 1920 the Hungarian government undertook different diplomatic actions in the European capitals in order to draw the attention that significant amount of Hungarians remained beyond the new borders of the country.

By that time Hungarian claims met already a joint Czechoslovak–Yugoslav–Rumanian diplomatic opposition. The formation of the Little Entente was underway.⁶³ When

⁵⁹ According to an information of the British representative in Prague. See DBFP, Op. cit., 302-303.

⁶⁰ Seton-Watson, R. W., Op. cit., 307.

⁶¹ Horthy, M., Op. cit., 109.

⁶² DBFP, Vol. XII, 1962, 107–108.

⁶³ Gotovska-Henze, T. Neue Grenzen – neue Bündnisse: Die kleine Entente

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opposed to the question of the considerable Hungarian minority, included in his state, Beneš argued that their number approximately corresponded to the number of Slovaks, remaining in Hungary and further – that Hungarians in his state were spread among the domestic population, i.e. that they did not inhabit compact regions.⁶⁴ The main reason for shifting the border was of economic character – Prague wanted access to the Danube for this continental state. Having no access to the sea, the Danube could be used as a substitution and as an important transportation channel for the Czech industry. “*Czechoslovakia has to be a Danubian state*” – proclaimed openly Beneš.⁶⁵ And of course, this could not be possible, if the national principle was consequently applied.

Hungarian borders were debated in the beginning of March 1920 on the Ambassadors’ conference in London. The issue provoked vivid and sometimes controversial discussion on the general post-war peace arrangement in Central Europe. On behalf of British Leeper underlined that any questioning of the already settled Hungarian borders could provoke loss of trust in the Entente authority and serious government’s crisis in Central Europe.⁶⁶ His stand was supported by the French. To the question on the right of self-determination – main point in the memorandums submitted by the Hungarian representatives – Leeper reminded that this right was accepted as legitimate for the fighting Czechoslovaks as early as in August 1918, i.e. before the start of the Peace conference on the ground that 50.000 Czechoslovaks were fighting on the side of Entente and against Austro-Hungary.⁶⁷ Of course, this was a crucial political

nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg. – In: Die große Politik und die kleinen Regionen 1918-1939. Prešov, 2002, 49–59.

⁶⁴ Purgat, J. Od Trianonu po Košice: k maďarské otázke v Československu, Bratislava, 1970, 133.

⁶⁵ Ibid., 133.

⁶⁶ Готовска-Хенце, Т., Op. cit., 110.

⁶⁷ DBFP, Op. cit., Vol. VII, 441–442.

argument for proclaiming an independent state, but not a convincing one for a fair border distinction based on the pres. Wilson's principles, accepted as a common guiding line for the general peace settlement in Europe. It was also not hard to notice that many of Leeper's arguments were "borrowed" from Masaryk's memorandum. The French position, expressed by Berthelot⁶⁸ was firm – no border rectifications in Central Europe, any change in this direction would provoke disorder and political chaos in the region. On behalf of the British government Lloyd George stated that it was exactly the incorrect border settlement in the region could provoke disorder or even war as the desperate Hungarians could join Russians or Germans.⁶⁹ He proposed an open debate on borders in Central Europe and more moderation toward the Hungarians. Too late. At the end however Ambassadors's conference rejected any rectification in Slovak– Hungarian border.

CONCLUSION

The general conditions on which the armistice was signed up, were based on the pres. Wilson's peace program. They introduced for the first time in the international relations the right to self-determination and as a result, the CSNC as a nucleus of a legitimate Czechoslovak national government was acknowledged. Internationally accepted as a general principle for the shaping of the new status quo in Europe, the right to national self-determination in fact was applied selectively, only for co-fighters of the Entente, i.e. for the winners. And the CSNC was able to gain far-reaching promises of the French military leadership even before the peace conference started.

In a power gap, when the traditional powers in the region Germany, Russia and Austro-Hungary, were set apart and given the small interest in the region's affairs of Great Britain,

⁶⁸ Also a good personal friend of Benes.

⁶⁹ DBFP, Op. cit., Vol. VII, 387.

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the main designer of post-war Central Europe was France. However the main decisions in Paris at that time were taken by the military leadership and some hard-line politicians and these were calling for nothing else but for a harsh revenge against the Germans and fighting the Bolsheviks. In such an outlook, the new grounded states in Central Europe were given considerable support in order to make them a strong ring isolating the Bolsheviks from the rest of Europe. This included also having “free hand” to take as much territory as they wished from the defeated Hungary. The last fact of course, radicalized the atmosphere in Budapest and brought into power the government of Béla Kun, which succeeded in pushing back the Czechoslovak army and exporting revolution to Slovakia.

The peacemakers in Paris were alarmed – the revolution stood at their front door. Under these changed circumstances the Czechoslovak representatives suddenly lost their favorable position at Paris peace conference, but in no way at the experts’ commissions and they still enjoyed good contacts at Quai d’Orsay. Not surprisingly, the post-war Hungarian–Slovak border suited all their claims. Having no precedence in the history, this new border thus apriori had a fair chance to be drawn on the newly formulated principle of national self-determination and to become an illustration of the basic principles the new born political status quo was based on. In reality however, it became what all the peace treaties were – a tool for a punishment, “ein diktat”. When in January 1920 the preliminary peace conditions with Hungary were announced, admiral Miklos Horthy was already firmly convinced that the new neighbors of Hungary would soon be very sorry for their excessive “appetite” for Hungarian territory.⁷⁰

As a conclusion of this case study however, I found it more convincing to quote the peace-makers, i.e. the words coming from the side of the very doers. In one discussion held at the Ambassador’s conference in London, Lloyd George

⁷⁰ Horthy, M., Op. cit., 109.

stated – as soon as in 1920! – that the new drawn Czechoslovak-Hungarian border could become a threat to the general peace in Central Europe. In a merely “medical” way of expression, he pointed out to the fact that the Czechoslovak state had to “swallow” such amount of Hungarian territories which could provoke an “acute appendix”. In his view then, an operation would be unavoidable and this in turn could provoke a state collapse.⁷¹

Another British point of view was expressed by Prof. Seton-Watson, as already mentioned also a supporter of the newly created status quo in Central Europe. When confronted with the question on the controversy on which the new Czechoslovak state was build up (the border to Germany claimed on historical right, which on other side it denied to Hungary) he stated a bit cynically that “*there was not a single claim of whatever nation*” which did not suffer the same shortcoming, i.e. controversy in principles.⁷²

Even Masaryk, who could hardly be blamed for being neglected or ignored by the Entente, shared with Beneš that the peace-making in Central and Eastern Europe was “fearful” and this was “clear to every child” in his country and abroad this was “even more obvious”. Because of this, he concluded, the Entente was “loosing prestige”...⁷³ He was speaking not on the concrete border settlement but about the general way the peace was made at Paris. But what was valid for the general peace making process was even more evident in the case of the new Czechoslovak border – it was grounded with many arguments, but based on no single principle.

⁷¹ DBFP, Op. cit., Vol. VII, 387.

⁷² Готовска-Хенце, Т., Op. cit., 74.

⁷³ Šolle, Zd., Op. cit., 203.

The Road of Slovak Politicians from Czechoslovakia to the Establishment of the “Slovakian Kingdom” with a Bulgarian Monarch and the Hungarian Diplomacy

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INTRODUCTION

Before the presentation of the circumstances of the proclamation of the ‘Slovakian Kingdom’, a brief introduction of the antecedents seems necessary in order to follow the ideological development of Slovak politicians in 1918–1941; how and why they arrived at the idea of founding a monarchy.

Czechoslovakia was founded on 28 October 1918, and the country showed a great diversity of ethnic groups. According to the statistics of 1910, Czechs and Slovaks together gave a mere 59.09% of the population in the territory in question. In other words, 40.91% had become citizens in a new ‘foreign’ country. Those who had German as their first language formed 27.58% of the population, Hungarians formed 7.88% while 5.45% spoke Ruthenian, Polish, Romanian, Croatian or something else as their mother tongue.¹ The Slovaks joined the new state as ‘the Hungarian branch of the Czechoslovak nation’. However, this proved to be an ‘association of two unequal sides’, which had an impact on the two-decade history of the nation.² In Slovakia, not

¹ Popély Gy. Népfogyatkozás. A csehszlovákiai magyarság a népszámlálások tükrében 1918–1945 (Population decrease. Hungarians in Czechoslovakia in census statistics). – Regio (Bp.), 1991, 104–105.

² Szarka L. A szlovákok története. Bp., 1993, 170.

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only political parties but also most politicians were discontented with the constitutional system of Czechoslovakia. There were many ideas to modify the situation from decentralisation through the strengthening of local government to the construction of a federal state. It is widely known that Eduard Beneš, later foreign minister of Czechoslovakia, did not support the separation of Slovakia; on the contrary, he did all he could to prevent it. Interestingly, Beneš only acknowledged the Slovak language as a dialect of Czech rather than a different language. In the view of Beneš the two nations were one.³ The Czechoslovak state was founded on the doctrine of Czechoslovakism,⁴ which attacked Slovak national identity, and therefore it had to be rejected by the Slovak side. After 1918, the majority of the Slovaks were convinced that the new Czechoslovak state was a temporary stage.⁵ They were glad to have been seceded from

³ The Czechoslovak state was founded on the doctrine of Czechoslovakism, which stated that Czechs and Slovaks formed one nation, or, in the more extreme version, the Slovaks were in fact Czechs. Czechoslovakism did not recognise Slovak national identity, and therefore the Slovaks rejected it. The founders of the state (Masaryk and Beneš) used the fiction of Czechoslovakism to explain the contradiction that the new country had been born as a nation state, while it was multi-national. The constitution made Czechoslovakian official language; its Czech dialect was used in Bohemia and Slovak in Slovakia. The Czech leaders were hoping that the two nations would mix in time and develop a common identity. It is obvious that this idea only wanted to ensure the Slavonic majority of the newly born state.

⁴ The Czechoslovak state was founded on the doctrine of Czechoslovakism, which stated that Czechs and Slovaks formed one nation, or, in the more extreme version, the Slovaks were in fact Czechs. Czechoslovakism did not recognise Slovak national identity, and therefore the Slovaks rejected it. The founders of the state (Masaryk and Beneš) used the fiction of Czechoslovakism to explain the contradiction that the new country had been born as a nation state, while it was multi-national.

⁵ Kníchal, O. Slovenská národná identita. – Ľudové Noviny, 28 March 2002, 4–5. The leaders of the Slovak National Party asked President T. G. Masaryk not to allow a referendum about territorial changes because the Slovaks might vote for the union with Hungary.

Hungary but they were also distrustful of their new home. They had expected to enjoy autonomy in the Czechoslovak state, which would protect them against centralising and nationalist attempts of the Czechs.

However, it proved certain, by the mid 1920s, that Czechoslovakia would not give the political, administrative and economic autonomy that had been promised to the Slovaks. The original plans for Slovakia with wide self-government did not come true. Slovakia, in effect, had become an occupied territory. The Czechoslovak constitution declared that the official language was 'Czechoslovak', whose Czech and Slovak dialects were used in the Czech and Slovak territories respectively.⁶ The Czech leaders were hoping that the two nations would merge in time and form a common identity. It goes without saying that this idea served the purpose of ensuring the Slavonic majority of the new state. Czechoslovakia could not look back at a thousand-year past but the mediaeval Kingdom of Bohemia could, so the Czech political leadership regarded the new state as the renewal and extension of historical Bohemia rather than a new construction. This idea generated continual conflict between the politicians of the two nations, for it stood in opposition with the Slovak conception of the alliance of two equal sides. The creation of Czechoslovakia was regarded as a Czech 'project' even though Slovak politicians had participated in it. For the Czechs it meant an outbreak from the surrounding German ring, a direct link with the Slavonic peoples and the possibility to become a medium-sized power in the region. For the Slovaks, the creation of Czechoslovakia meant shaking off Hungarian rule, which denied the independent Slovak national existence and it provided a road towards a free national home.⁷ The Slovaks had never been satisfied with the political possibilities provided by the Czechs. No wonder, therefore, that

⁶ Rychlík, J. *Češi a Slováci ve 20. století. Spolupráce a konflikty 1914–1992*. Praha, Vysehrad, 92.

⁷ Simon A. *Az elfeledett aktivisták. Kormánypárti magyar politika az első Csehszlovák Köztársaságban*. Somorja, Fórum 2013, 19.

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certain resentment had developed in the course of time towards the central administration in Prague. They condemned the Czechoslovak government for making important decisions that affected them above their heads without consulting them. According to the Slovak nationalists the problems of Czech and Slovak coexistence stemmed from the fact that effective Slovak representation had ceased for a while after the death of Milan Rastislav Štefánik.⁸ In fact, Czechs and Slovaks interpreted the common state in two different ways. The former interpreted it as the realisation of Czech statehood in a developed and modern form extended with Slovakia. The latter regarded Czechoslovakia as a unit created from two different parts. The Slovaks thought that the existence of Czechoslovakia was an inevitable stage of development, which was necessary for the Slovaks to get free from the past that had linked them to the Kingdom of Hungary. However, this stage was interpreted to be a temporary one. The strongest Slovak political party in Czechoslovakia was the ‘Hlinkova slovenská ľudová strana’ led by Andrej Hlinka.⁹ It was later described as “*Hlinka’s*

⁸ Milan Rastislav Štefánik (1880–1919) – Slovak politician, diplomat, astronomer and pilot. After the outbreak of the First World War, he joined the French army, where he reached the rank of general. He formed the Czechoslovak National Council with other politicians in Paris in February 1916. The president of the council was T. G. Masaryk, the vice president was Štefánik and the secretary was Eduard Beneš. Thanks to his scientific activity Štefánik had access to higher French circles, and therefore he was able to gain the political support of the main figures of the entente for the Czechoslovak independence attempts. Masaryk and Beneš wanted to push the Slovaks back from the very beginning, which led to conflicts between the latter and Štefánik. Štefánik wanted to return home from Udine, Italy, due to the weaning of his position in the Czechoslovak government but suffered a deadly accident during the landing of his aeroplane near Pozsony / Bratislava in spring 1919. The Slovaks thought that the Czechs put Slovakia under ‘colonial rule’ after the death of Štefánik on 4 May 1919. It made matters worse that the lay Czechs started attacks against Slovak Catholicism; crosses were taken off walls and other atrocities happened. Masaryk renewed Hussite religion, which condemned Catholics. Hussitism started to spread, but the campaign was not successful in Slovakia even in Lutheran territories.

⁹ Bartlová, Al. Návrhy slovenských politických strán na zmenu

Slovakian people's party is the sole heir of the history of the Slovaks, the centre of Slovak patriotism."¹⁰ Between the two world wars, the Slovaks were distrustful of the Czechoslovakian leadership. Nevertheless, no significant change took place in the form of government or the domestic policy of the country.¹¹

The Hungarian government did not consider the establishment of Czechoslovakia as the unification of the Slavonic peoples of historical Hungary with their mother country; they even denied consistently that the Slovaks and Czechs belonged to one nation. By doing so, they denied, in effect, the Czechoslovak state theory, which regarded Czechs and Slovaks as two branches of the same nation. The Hungarian government endeavoured, through two decades, to hinder the approach of the Slovak and Czech nations. For them the Slovaks were people under Czech occupation, who, together with other national minorities, were struggling to liberate themselves. In their view, the Slovaks formed a nation ethnographically, linguistically and historically separate from the Czechs. The Hungarian leaders agreed that Slovakia, or at least its territory with Hungarian majority had to return to Hungary in some way.¹² They believed that if a referendum had been held, the Slovaks and the Ruthenians would vote for reunification with Hungary. After the First World War, they expected the Slovak political elite to turn towards Hungary, which would lead to Slovakia's unification with Hungary, but this proved vain hope in the second half of the 1930s (although there were some attempts for the realisation

štátoprávneho usporiadania ČSR v rokoch 1918–1935 a zapojenie HSĽS do vládnej koalície v rokoch 1927–1929. – In: Zemko, M., V. Bystrický (Eds.). Slovensko v Československu (1918–1939). Bratislava, 2004, 138–139.

¹⁰ Tiso, J. Snemovanie slovenského národav Piešťanoch. – Slovák, 18–22 September, Vol. 217, 3.

¹¹ Letz, R. Hlinkova Slovenská ľudová strana. – In: Letz, R., P. Mulík, Al. Bartlová (Eds.). Slovenská ľudová strana v dejinách 1905–1945. Martin, 2006, 30.

¹² Zeidler M. A revíziós gondolat. Pozsony, 2009, 8; Bárdi N. Tény és való. A budapesti kormányzatok és a határon túli magyarság kapcsolattörténete. Pozsony, 2004, 49.

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of this option). Hungarian diplomacy did all it could to gain Andrej Hlinka¹³ and his party in the 1920s and 1930s. These attempts failed due to the Vojtech Tuka¹⁴ trial, through which they lost the person who could have an influence on Hlinka as well as Jozef Tiso.¹⁵ While in prison, Vojtech Tuka changed his views that Slovakia had to join Hungary, which he openly said to a Hungarian diplomat.¹⁶

¹³ Andrej Hlinka (1864–1938) - Slovak politician and Catholic priest. He started his political career in the Catholic People's Party, later became the clerical wing of the party of the Slovak People's Party. Founding president of the Slovak People's Party. Member of Parliament. In 1919, he asked the Paris Peace Conference to guarantee self government for Slovakia within the Czechoslovak state in a memorandum. Therefore the Czech authorities deprived him of his MP status and put him into prison for eight months. Later he became the leading figure of the Slovakian autonomy movement against Czech centralising attempts. His successor was Jozef Tiso.

¹⁴ Vojtech Tuka (1880–1946), lawyer, university professor, politician. He thought at the law academy in Pécs and the University of Pozsony. He participated in the secret Hungarian military movements and the organisation of Hungarian political parties in Czechoslovakia from the beginning. He joined Hlinka's Slovak People's Party; he was its vice-president and representative in parliament from 1925. He made the first autonomy programme of the party. The Czechoslovak authorities arrested him as Hungarian spy and sentenced him to 15 years imprisonment. He was released with amnesty in 1937. Deputy minister in Tiso's Slovak republic, foreign minister and prime minister. Executed for war guilt in 1946.

¹⁵ Slovak-Hungarian cooperation was hindered by the Tuka trial. It turned out, although not proven, that Tuka received money and spying commission from the Hungarian government. See: Veres T. A Tuka-per közvetlen előzményei a cseh és szlovák sajtóban. – Fórum-Társadalomtudományi Szemle 6, 2004, N 1, 149–153. Also: Lukeš, M. Cesta k amnestii Vojtecha Tuky. – Historický Časopis, 46, 1998, N 4, 663–672.

¹⁶ In the first half of 1939 Tuka declared that he could do nothing for the unification of Slovakia and Hungary. The Hungarian diplomacy did not count on him as an agent after this. Fabian, J. Svätoštevanské tiene Telekiho zahraničná politika a Slovensko 1939–41. Bratislava, 1966, 31, 91.

*THE STAGES OF THE IDEOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT OF
SLOVAK POLITICIANS FROM THE AUTONOMY OF 1938 TO
MONARCHY*

The deepening of the Czechoslovakian crisis shifted Germany and Czechoslovakia closer and closer to a military conflict by the middle of 1938. The great powers wanted to avoid a world war with the Munich talks.

After the signature of the Munich Pact in 1938, the establishment of an independent Slovak state seemed to be at hand. Germany was one of the strongest supporters of this idea. The destabilisation of the Czechoslovak domestic policy served as another pretext for Hitler, whose real objective was the complete dissolution of the country.¹⁷ In the Slovak political elite's view the Czechoslovak Republic, proclaimed on 14 November 1918, saved the Slovaks from Magyarisation and defended them from Hungarian irredentism but the Slovaks immediately faced a new threat: the Czech centralisation, and therefore they moved towards independence. The Munich decision and the territorial changes in its wake brought forth new ideas in Slovak politicians as well. It was not political parties but individuals from the lines of Hlinka's Slovak People's Party that started to deal with constitutional questions. These conceptions were responses to the momentary situation of Central Europe especially the Nazi expansion in the region. The names of Jozef Tiso, Vojtech Tuka, Alexander Mach and others could be mentioned here. The Munich Pact sealed the fate of Czechoslovakia. Beneš resigned from presidency on 5 October 1938 and flew to emigration in London. As a result of the activity of Slovak politicians the so-called 'Zsolna / Žilina Agreement' was signed, which meant, in effect, the conclusion of the twenty years' struggle for the acknowledgement of the Pittsburgh Agreement¹⁸ of 1918.¹⁹ Czechoslovakia was transformed

¹⁷ Germany had already planned its plans to get Czechoslovakia as a vassal state or as protectorate. They needed the 'Slovak card' in 1938–1939. Lukeš, F. Podivný mír. Praha, 1968, 145.

¹⁸ T. G. Masaryk and the American Slovak leaders made an agreement in

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to be a dualist state on the pattern of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy: only foreign affairs, defence and financial affairs remained common affairs with Prague. Jozef Tiso became the head of the autonomous government of Slovakia. The five-member Slovak regional government was a part of the central government. The name of the state was hyphenated to Czecho-Slovak Republic. Another document was also accepted in Zsolna / Žilina, in which the participants declared that “*the constitutional situation of Slovakia will be finally solved*”, but this close remained in effect for only five months.

Slovak politicians worked out new plans with new elements regarding the form of government in Slovakia in the second half of 1938. They were seeking some alternative solution for the case if Czechoslovakia should fall apart or be occupied. These political speculations were based on the notion that the year 1938 would be just as significant from the point of view of European international affairs as 1918. They even considered the possibility of joining a neighbouring country, in the form of autonomy, federation or union, in order to avoid the dissolution of the Slovak nation. There held negotiations with the Hungarians and the Poles on this question. The possibility of establishing monarch did not yet occur in 1938. The neighbouring states and the European great powers did not think of Slovakia as a possible sovereign state but as the part of a greater one.

Hungary had to choose between two options after the Anschluss: either to come to an agreement of some sort with the states of the Little Entente giving up her revisionist ambitions, or

Pittsburgh on 30 May 1918. The town had the largest Slovak community. They declared that free Bohemia and free Slovakia had made a common state. Political leadership, schools, law courts and other institutions would have Slovakian control and would use Slovakian language in Slovakia and Czech in Bohemia. Slovakia was even promised a parliament but it did not come true.

¹⁹ On the question of autonomy see: Gebhart, J., j. Kuklík. Česká politika a zákon o autonómii Slovenska. České země a Československo v Evropě XIX. a XX. století. – In: Dejmek, J., J. Hanzal. Sborník prací k 65. narozeninám prof. Roberta Kvača. Praha, 1997, 357–379.

to participate in the unfolding German action against Czechoslovakia during 1938. No matter how much Hungary was afraid from the strengthening of Germany, the Hungarian reluctance shown during the dissolution of Czechoslovakia was unfathomable from both international and domestic point of view. The Hungarians realised that they had to negotiate with the leadership of the Slovak People's Party: Andrej Hlinka and Jozef Tiso in order to make some achievement in terms of territorial growth.²⁰

Hungarian diplomacy was encouraged by the information that Andrej Hlinka had left for his supporters, on his death-bed in August 1938, that *"As soon as time comes and possibility for secession from the Czechs is provided, I leave it for Karol Sidor, as the most competent representative of the nation and my will, to have talks with the Hungarian government on the Slovaks' joining Hungary bearing in mind the conditions for autonomy according to the programme of our party."*²¹ No documents have remained about the talks between Hlinka and the Hungarian government, so the reality of the political testament cannot be proven with evidence.

Hungarian diplomacy realised, as early as the beginning of 1938 that the strongest man and possible successor of Hlinka was Jozef Tiso, so they tried to come to some agreement with him in the question of Slovakia. The secret talks took place at the 34th Eucharistic World Congress in Budapest in late May 1938.²² Jozef Tiso, the new president of the Slovakian People's Party, participated as a priest, which gave him an opportunity to meet Hungarian foreign minister Kálmán Kánya without being noticed. Tiso told Kánya that the Slovaks would be willing to form a union with Hungary after having seceded from the Czechs. The talks continued until the end of

²⁰ Ádám M. Diplomáciai Iratok Magyarország Külpolitikájához 1936–1945. Vol. II. (Henceforward: DIMK). Bp., 1965, 2. Doc. 187, 369–370.

²¹ Naša Zastava, 4 February. 1940, N 2.

²² MNL, K-63-1938-7/1.

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September 1938.²³ Tiso summarised his conditions in three points: *"1. A central office with executive power in Slovakia and the use of Slovakian as official language. 2. A separate parliament and legislative power in domestic, religious and economic affairs. 3. A budget quota."*²⁴ The Poles were inquiring about the Slovak–Hungarian talks as well and received this information from Hungary on 14 September: *"...there is no final agreement yet but the negotiations are going in a favourable atmosphere."*²⁵ Tiso travelled to Eduard Beneš in Prague on 23 September 1938 and he let the Hungarian government know about his trip. He wanted to prevent the split of the Slovak leadership into factions, and he also wanted to disprove the accusation that he failed to do all he could to come to an agreement. Therefore he asked the Hungarians not to regard his trip to Prague as delaying tactic, *"but they have to show a friendly face towards Prague, otherwise they are exposed to the danger of being massacred."*²⁶ He also asked the Hungarian leaders that in case of a union, Hungarian officials should not invade Slovakia as they were unfamiliar with the situation there, and therefore they could easily elicit resentment in the Slovak population. Although the Hungarian government accepted Tiso's conditions the Slovak–Hungarian talks ended without success. In the view of ambassador András Hory they were unable to come to an agreement because Kánya did not trust Tiso.²⁷ Kálmán Kánya described the attitude of the Slovak politicians with these words: *"The Slovaks seem to continue their double-sided game. While Sidor apparently makes Czech-friendly remarks, Tiso has summarised his wishes, in the*

²³The Munich Pact and Hungarian foreign policy (1936–1938). DIMK, Doc. 403, 665–666.

²⁴ Ibid. Also: Archív Ministerstva Zahraničných Vecí, Praha, ZU Budapest', 20. karton, No. 352.

²⁵ DIMK, 337, Doc. 596.

²⁶ DIMK, 388, Doc. 645–646.

²⁷ Pritz P. (Ed.). Hory A. Bukaresttől Varsóig. Bp., 1987, 252.

*past days, in case they join Hungary.*²⁸ Later Slovak foreign minister Ferdinand Ďurčanský²⁹ put the Slovak attitude towards the Hungarians in this way: “... *the Slovaks were afraid that autonomy attempts for the Hungarians would eventually mean reunification with Hungary. What has been written down and said about the cooperation with the Hungarians can only be regarded as a means to put pressure on Czechoslovakian policy.*”³⁰ In other words: it was a mere tactical step, which was, in reality, rejected. The Hungarian–Slovak talks ended without success.

When the Munich Pact was signed, the Slovak political leadership started thinking about the establishment of an independent Slovak State. This idea also received formidable support from abroad especially Germany, whose objective was the destabilisation of the domestic situation in the Czechoslovak Republic, and finally to create some pretext for the dissolution of the state. On 9 March 1939, protests broke out in Slovakia against the Prague administration. President Emil Hácha displaced the autonomous Slovak government led by Jozef Tiso. Czech army and gendarme units occupied key positions in Slovakia and arrested several politicians. On 12 March 1939, the Czecho-Slovak government had to stop making order on German pressure. On 13 March, Hitler invited Tiso to Berlin and let him know that if he failed to appear, the Hungarians would occupy not only Subcarpathia but also Slovakia. Under the impression of his Berlin talks, Tiso and the Slovak parliament proclaimed the independence

²⁸ DIMK, Vol. 2, 403, Doc. 665.

²⁹ Ferdinand Ďurčanský (1906–1974) – Slovak politician and lawyer. Representative of the Slovak People’s Party in the National Assembly from 1935. Editor of the periodical *Nástup*. Minister in the autonomous government in the Tiso era from 7 October 1938 to 9 March 1939. Foreign minister after the establishment of Slovakia until 1940. After this, he did not hold any significant offices. In 1945, he escaped to the west; sentenced to death in absence. He was a leader of Slovak emigration until his death.

³⁰ Ďurčanský, F. *Pohľad na slovenskú politickú minulosť*. Bratislava, 1943, 205.

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of Slovakia, which formally put an end to the Czecho-Slovak State Federation. Meanwhile, Hitler got the consent of President Emil Hácha to the German military occupation of Bohemia and to the establishment of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia.

Slovak independence, created by international circumstances and German pressure, did not last long as they signed the so-called ‘Schutzvertrag’, a defensive alliance with Germany on 23 March 1939. The German Reich guaranteed the sovereignty of Slovakia for 25 years and Slovakia obliged herself to cooperate with Germany in international and military affairs. What is more, they agreed to the creation of the Schutzzzone.³¹ Jozef Tiso became head of state and a single-party system of Hlinka’s Slovak People’s Party developed.

At the time of her birth, Slovakia was bordered by Germany, Poland and Hungary; by 1939 only with Germany and Hungary. Diplomatic relations between Slovakia and Hungary were organised around three main questions: 1. the territories given to Hungary in the First Vienna Award, 2. the situation of minorities in those territories, and 3. to gain German support against each other. The Hungarian government did not reject the possibility of annexing the whole Slovakia in some form or other. The Slovak state gradually became the puppet figure of German political ambitions and her sovereignty depended on the German momentary interests. The Slovak leaders, understanding the complicated situation in international and domestic questions, worked out an alternative solution by 1941.

³¹ The territory of the Schutzzzone formed a 30-40-km wide region along the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia from the Polish to the former Austrian border. Only German troops were allowed to station and only German barracks could be built here.

*THE IDEA OF THE 'KNGDOM OF SLOVAKIA' WITH A
BULGARIAN MONARCH AND THE HUNGARIAN
DIPLOMACY*

On 23 June 1941 the embassy of Slovakia in Berlin leaked information that Slovakia would become a kingdom. They would invite Cyril from the House of Saxon-Coburg-Gotha, the Prince of Preslav, younger brother of the King of Bulgaria to the throne. The Slovakian embassy conveyed the message as if it had come from the German foreign ministry. The background of the story was that President Jozef Tiso and PM and Foreign Minister Vojtech Tuka met Ferdinand I, the former King of Bulgaria as well as his son, Boris III, then King of Bulgaria in Muraň and Bratislava on the formation of the kingdom of Slovakia on 30 May and 19 June.³² Ferdinand I, who had abdicated from the throne on the pressure of the Entente in 1918, often spent shorter or longer periods on his estates in Slovakia. Boris III talked with Mussolini and Hitler on this issue in early June 1941.³³ On 19 June 1941, King Boris stopped in Bratislava on his way back from Berlin and talked with Tiso and Vojtech Tuka on the question of the Slovakian kingdom.³⁴

Hungarian ambassador in Slovakia, Lajos Kuhl, heard of these talks and turned to the Foreign Ministry of Slovakia for more information. The ministry formally denied that the question of monarchy had come up at the talks with the Bulgarian king. Slovakian propaganda minister, Alexander Mach gave his word to journalists that there had been no talks about changing the form of government in Slovakia and the election of Prince Cyril as king at the Bulgarian–Slovakian negotiations. His words were contradicted by the Hungarian ambassador, however, who confirmed the talks on the issue

³² See his articles in *Slovák* on 31 May and 21 June 1941.

³³ MNL, K-63, Fasc. 461, No. 78/pol. 1941. (23.06.1941.)

³⁴ *Ibid.*

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referring to his information from Tiso's personal secretary. The secretary also explained that the Italian diplomacy supported the idea while the Germans were against it. Kuhl also asked the German ambassador in Bratislava, Hanns Elard Ludin for information. Ludin admitted hearing about the plan and said that he had even visited Tuka, who denied the news. Ludin said to Kuhl: Germany was interested in the consolidation of the political situation in Slovakia without troubles and significant changes. Kuhl also talked with the Italian ambassador on this question, and the latter confirmed the information. Kuhl thought that the Slovak government wanted to confirm the sovereignty of the state by electing a strong-handed king from a foreign dynasty, which would also make control over the parties and administration easier. The king could have higher reputation and authority than President Jozef Tiso. The final conclusion of the Hungarian ambassador was, as his report to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry testifies, that the Slovak politicians did bring up the possibility of the rule of Prince Cyril to King Boris.³⁵

King Boris III brought up the issue in Berlin and Rome, its practicability and method of implementation. After all this, he could return to Bratislava knowing the opinion of the Axis leaders. Since the Slovak Foreign Ministry denied the talks, Kuhl concluded that Germany had rejected the idea of monarchy, which, therefore, was taken off the agenda. In his view, the purpose of the rumour was to prevent the Hungarians from making use of the pro-Hungarian atmosphere in Slovakia and confirm their position and political influence in Slovakia.

The visit of the Bulgarian king had another purpose: to settle the problem of the wealth of his family in Slovakia. The Saxon-Coburg-Gotha dynasty had extensive land and real estate property in the country, which had caused inheritance debates in the family. A great amount of land had earlier been confiscated by the Czechoslovak Land Office without compensating the family. Kuhl thought that the increased activity of

³⁵ Ibid.

the family to regain the estates could be put down to the fact that the wealth of the Coburg family in England had been distrained by the authorities. He even thought it was possible that the Bulgarian king promised political support to Slovakia against Hungary, and this gave the idea to the Slovak leaders to form a monarchy.

Hungarian Foreign Minister László Bárdossy instructed Hungarian ambassador in Sofia Mihály Arnóthy-Jungerth to find out about the reality of the news in the Bulgarian court.³⁶ The ambassador received mixed information. People close to the court simply rejected the idea and labelled it 'false information'. A secretary in the Bulgarian foreign ministry said that the government did not know about such plans. The German ambassador in Sofia, who had talked to the king, declared that the visit of Boris III to Tiso in Bratislava was an act of mutual courtesy. Formerly both Tiso and Tuka had paid a visit to the king when he was at his father Ferdinand's residence in Muraň. The Hungarian ambassador in Sofia did not exclude the possibility that the idea of creating a Slovak kingdom and the enthronement of Prince Cyril had been discussed in Muraň. He also found it possible that Ferdinand, who had been living in Slovakia, gave the idea to the Slovak politicians because he was expecting that both he and his family would benefit considerably from the monarchy. They could regain the Coburg-Koháry estates, which were in litigation. In Arnóthy-Jungerth's opinion, however, Boris III and Cyril were familiar with the German plans regarding Slovakia and they finally rejected participation in the creation of a 'puppet kingdom' in Slovakia.³⁷

Slovakia had got under overwhelming German influence (dependence) by 1939–1940, which resulted in political

³⁶ MNL, K-63, 85/pol. 1941. sz. (Reports of the Hungarian embassy in Sofia.) (17 July 1941.)

³⁷ Holec, R. Bulharský excár Ferdinand a Slovensko (1939–1944). - Historický Časopis, 56, 2008, N 4, 674. Also: Holec, R. Coburgovci a Slovensko. Bratislava, 2010.

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obligation. It is possible that the Slovak administration intended the enthronement of the royal house of Bulgaria to be the first step of opening within the Axis, and there might be attempts for gaining total independence. In retrospect, it may also be assumed that the Slovak administration regarded the kingdom of Slovakia a better-founded sovereign state between Germany and Hungary, which could have argued more effectively in a general territorial reorganisation in order to regain the lost areas. What is more, even the Saint Stephen state theory could not have been used as an argument against Slovakia, which would, then be a sovereign kingdom. The establishment of the kingdom could be a response to the Hungarian revisionary propaganda.

Germany wanted to make Slovakia a model state, which could have been used for propaganda purposes in Central and Southwestern Europe. Model state, for the Nazis, meant total subjugation to German demands; it would demonstrate that a state could only survive and complete its plans with the help of Germany. The establishment of a kingdom, therefore, did not fit in the Nazi framework and it would not serve Nazi interests. Even if founded, a sovereign kingdom could not have lasted long; it would probably have been transformed into a 'puppet kingdom' of Germany. It does not seem very likely that Slovak society, which had been living in a republic since 1918 and had predominantly democratic sentiments, would have accepted monarchy as a form of government. The Slovak kingdom did not come into existence mostly because it did not meet with German approval. Germany preferred those contemporary politicians who had been enjoying their support to remain at power. The Germans did not want to confront other allies including Hungary because of this issue.

Macedonia between the Two World Wars: Some Impacts of Integration in Yugoslavia¹

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After World War I, the great Eastern European empires collapsed, and new states were established, such as Czechoslovakia or Yugoslavia. The new countries were comprised of parts that had previously belonged to different empires. On 1 December 1918 the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was proclaimed. The new state included seven different regions, which had been either sovereign states (Serbia and Montenegro) or parts of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. 57.5% of the country's territory had previously belonged to the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy: Croatia, Dalmatia, Slovenia, Vojvodina, and Bosnia and Herzegovina (the last one had belonged there since 1878). Serbia's pre-1914 territory, expanded as a result of the Balkan Wars, accounted for 38.5% of the new state.²

Earlier there had been very few connections between the different parts of the new state, in fact, in many cases there was no connection at all. The regions of the new state had different levels of social, economic and cultural development. They had

¹ The study has been supported by project K 101 629 of the Hungarian Scientific Research Fund (OTKA).

² The state of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes had a territory of 248.987 sq km. The territory of the different areas was as follows: Serbia 95.667 sq km (pre-1912 Serbia 49.950 sq km and Southern Serbia 45.717 sq km), Montenegro 9.668 sq km, Bosnia and Herzegovina 51,199 sq km, Dalmatia 12.732 sq km, Slovenia and Prekmurje 16.197 sq km, Croatia 43.822 sq km, and Vojvodina 19,702 sq km. Đuričić, V. M., M. B. Tošić, A. Vegner, et al. *Naša narodna privreda i nacionalni prihod*. Sarajevo, 1929, 30.

different experience and traditions in political life, along with different institutions and institutional systems (for example, differing economic, political, judicial and educational systems). The new state had to face a huge challenge: integrating the different parts, regions and systems and organising them into an unified country. This work took place on several levels.

In this study we shall mention some measures through which the government intended to integrate the different regions and unify the differing political, economic and educational systems, after that, we wish to point out what impact such measures had on Macedonia as part of Yugoslavia. In the Middle Ages, the region was part of the Bulgarian Empire, and it came under Ottoman rule in the 14th century. In the period of the formation of nations, the Bulgarians, Serbs and Greeks also laid their claims to the area, wanting to define the national consciousness of the population as well. In 1913, after the Balkan Wars, the geographical territory of Macedonia was divided, and the so-called Vardar Macedonia came to form part of Serbia. It was one of the least-developed regions of Yugoslavia. In times of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, the government intended to integrate the locals into the Serbian population, while after 1945 the new socialist state supported the local population's ambitions of becoming a nation. The history of this region and nation presents an interesting case within the Yugoslav integration.

ONE COUNTRY, SEVERAL REGIONS, SEVERAL NATIONS

After World War I, several new states were established in Europe, but the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes had the largest differences of all in terms of development (or, even if there were similarly large differences, none of the states was comprised of so many different regions).³ Various comparative historians highlighted the fact that the regions that ended up

³ For detailed information on regional differences and the Yugoslav integration, see: Bíró, L. A jugoszláv állam, 1918–1939. Bp., 2010.

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constituting the southern Slavic state had previously belonged to different historical regions or to different subregions of the same region (Eastern Europe). Boundaries were basically drawn between the Slovenian, Croatian and Vojvodinan areas, on the one hand, and Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, on the other hand. Among the different areas of the new state, compared to each other, some were very poor while others somewhat more prosperous. The economic performance and economic structure of these regions and, therefore, the living conditions of their population showed significant disparities (see Tab. 1).⁴ As you can judge from the data: The territories that had previously belonged to the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy produced more income than the rest of the regions.

Table 1. Ratio (%) of per capita national income by regions compared to the Yugoslav average, 1923.

Region	Agriculture	Industry	Other	Total
Slovenia	90.8	317.3	177.1	160.5
Vojvodina	175.5	107.7	125.7	146.0
Croatia	120.2	123.0	141.5	128.3
Dalmatia	74.7	180.9	94.0	99.8
Serbia	88.1	45.6	70.4	74.5
Bosnia and Herzegovina	72.0	71.3	62.4	68.4
Southern Serbia	71.0	6.1	49.3	52.2
Montenegro	46.7	3.2	32.2	34.1
Kingdom of SCS	100	100	100	100

The population of Yugoslavia increased by 29.3% from 11.984.911 to 1.490.000 (an increase of 3.5 million persons) from 1921 to 1939 (the data for 1939 are based on official estimates). However, the population of the different regions increased in different degrees. In proportion, the Yugoslavian population increase was one of the largest in Europe, with only

⁴ Jakir, A. Dalmatien zwischen den Weltkriegen. Agrarische und urbane Lebenswelt und das Scheitern der jugoslawischen Integration. München, 1999, 141–142.

Albania and Greece registering a bigger growth.⁵ As a consequence of several factors, during the twenty years of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia the population of the different regions grew to different extent. The smallest increase was recorded in the north and northwest while in the south there was a population explosion of 150–200% of the Yugoslav average. A larger increase exceeding the national average took place in the southern areas that were less developed economically and culturally, while the largest population increase was recorded in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Kosovo. The population increase was still, first of all, a consequence of high birth rates in the southern parts of the country. In the regions with more developed industry and agriculture, as a result of demographic changes that had taken place earlier, the population increased to a significantly smaller extent (in Croatia by 17.1%, in Vojvodina by 19%, in Slovenia by 19.9%, in Serbia by 26.2%, in Montenegro by 39.6, in Macedonia by 42.9, in Bosnia and Herzegovina by 46.1%, and in Kosovo by 69.7%).⁶ The natural population increase was mainly a consequence of high birth rates. The number of births per 1000 women of childbearing age (15 to 49 years) was 170 in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 167 in Macedonia, and 162 in Kosovo. This ratio approximately equalled the national average (132) in Serbia (136) and Montenegro (131), while it was lower in Croatia (118), Slovenia (104) and Vojvodina (101).⁷

75% of the Yugoslav population lived of agriculture. During the life of the Yugoslav state, there was no significant change in the employment structure. The agriculture preserved its predominant role within the employment structure of the

⁵ Tomasevich, J. Peasant, politics and economic change in Yugoslavia. Stanford—London, 1955, 288–289.

⁶ Statistički Godišnjak, 5, 1935, 40–41; Simeunović, V. Stanovništvo Jugoslavije i socijalističkih republika 1921–1961. Beograd, 1964, 30–32, 40.

⁷ Simeunović, V., Op. cit., 44.

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country, although with some regional differences (see Tab. 2).⁸ The proportion of agricultural workers decreased very slowly (from 1921 to 1931 it fell from 80.4% to 76.3%), and little increase was recorded in the proportion of workers in the industrial (8.6% to 10.7%), trade (2% to 2.3%) and transportation sectors (1.2% to 1.5%). A relatively faster increase took place only in the economically more developed regions, such as Slovenia. In the southern regions and Serbia (except for Belgrade and some industrial areas developed partly in the 1930s), agricultural production was the only source of income for the population even if large parts of the land were not suitable for agricultural production. In these parts of the country, the proportion of industrial workers, craftsmen and employees of the transportation sector was less than half of such proportion in Croatia and Vojvodina.

Table 2. The active population by employment areas, 1931 (%).

Region	Agriculture	Industry	Trade	Public services	Other
Slovenia	60.6	21.1	5.7	4.9	7.7
Croatia	76.3	10.7	4.3	4.2	4.5
Vojvodina	69.2	15.2	5.7	5.2	4.7
Serbia	79.3	8.9	3.4	4.5	3.9
Montenegro	78.1	5.8	3.0	8.3	4.8
Bosnia and Herzegovina	84.1	6.7	3.1	3.6	2.5
Macedonia	75.1	9.4	4.1	7.0	4.4
Kosovo	85.8	4.9	2.2	3.9	3.2
Sandžak	89.3	3.9	1.9	2.5	2.4

The types and distribution of the country's settlements were determined by the fact that Yugoslavia was a predominantly agricultural country: agriculture was the principal source of

⁸ Mirković, M. *Ekonomska historija Jugoslavije*. Zagreb, 1968, 308; Iščić, M. *Socijalna i agrarna struktura Srbije u Kraljevini Jugoslaviji (Prema popisu stanovništva od 31. marta 1931. godine)*. Beograd, 1999, 11.

income of more than 75% of the population and, according to different calculations, 80–90% of the inhabitants lived in villages. Towns, constituting a more modern settlement type, deserve special attention. In the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, the number and proportion of people living in towns were constantly on the rise. From 1921 to 1941 the number of town dwellers increased from 1.84 million to 3.64 million. In that period, the proportion of the urban population to the entire population also increased: from 12.4% to 22.8%.⁹ The degree of urbanisation varied from region to region: the proportion of the urban population was highest in Vojvodina and above average in Southern Serbia as well. In the preceding centuries large agricultural towns had been established in the market centres of Vojvodina, while in Southern Serbia people had moved to larger settlements in search of more protection during the century-long Ottoman domination, and thus craftsmen were also concentrated in those towns. Nevertheless, in these regions several towns remained closely related to agriculture, and, as a result of the sector's previous development, the proportion of the agricultural population continued to be significant. Taking some of the larger towns as an example, the proportion of inhabitants making their living of agriculture was 51.6% in Subotica, 40.6% in Sombor, 23.0% in Novi Sad, 22.2% in Split (fishing), 13.6% in Skopje, and 12.9% in Bitola. In other larger towns the proportion of the agricultural population was insignificant (Belgrade 1.3%, Zagreb 2.8%, Ljubljana 2.3%, Sarajevo 1.4%, and Niš 1.5%).¹⁰ Skopje between the wars became a transport hub and later, after 1929, administrative seat of the Southern regions and a university town due to the newly built railway line. In 1941 its population reached 100.000.¹¹

Loyalty to the state would have become significantly stronger if Yugoslavia had been a real nation state, as the official ideology

⁹ Statistički godišnjak, 1, 1929, 60.; Tomasevich, J., *Op. cit.*, 301.

¹⁰ Statistički godišnjak, 9, 1938–39, 20–35.

¹¹ Rogić, V. *Regionalna geografija Jugoslavije*. Zagreb, 1990, 187–191.

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proclaimed. As a result of historical events, however, the different peoples living in the territory of the country got mixed up with each other during the centuries. It might be useful to mention the principal stages of such mixing of peoples because migration processes are at the origin of one of Yugoslavia's features and its problems: the fact that it was comprised of both regions with a homogeneous population and others with a mixed population, different nations and peoples living together and mixing with each other, often amidst conflicts.

The country's population was made up of various nations, whose national consciousness, however, was not equally strong. Some of them had developed a strong national consciousness long before (for example Serbs, Croats, Slovenes), while there were others whose national consciousness was still at a very early stage and would only become stronger after World War II (for example Macedonians). The Bosnians' sense of nationhood was also unquestionable, and they continued to maintain their distance from both the Serbs and the Croats, even if a small group of intellectuals did draw closer to the Croats. Their religion-based system of advocacy, which had been created in the preceding century principally as a means of self-defence, made its entry also in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and soon assumed an independent political form. The majority of the ethnic groups, by then regarded as national minorities, had developed a strong national consciousness, and they were often supported by a neighbouring motherland (for example Hungarians and Romanians).

According to the official position, the country's population was one nation with three names and tribes, the Serbo-Croatian-Slovenian nation. Censuses never included questions about the citizens' national identity, and the published statistics contained no such data. During the 1921 census, when asked about their mother tongue, the citizens of Slavic origin could choose between Serbo-Croatian, Slovenian or "another Slavic language" (the latter was subsequently explained in the statistical publications).

Table 3. Distribution of nationalities in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in 1921.

Nationality	Gligorijević		Banac	
	Number	Proportion (%)	Number	Proportion (%)
Serbian	4,704,876	39.0	4,665,851	38.8
Croatian	2,889,102	24.0	2,856,551	23.8
Slovenian	1,023,588	8.5	1,024,761	8.5
Bosnian	759,656	6.3.	727,650	6.0
Macedonian (Bulgarian)	630,000	5.2	585,558	4.9
German	512,207	4.2	513,472	4.3
Hungarian	472,079	3.9	472,409	3.9
Albanian	483,871	4.0	441,740	3.7
Romanian	183,563	1.6	229,398	1.9
Turkish	143,453	1.2	168,404	1.4
Other Slav	198,857	1.6	174,466	1.5
Jewish			64,159	0.5
Italian	11,630	0.1	12,825	0.1
Other	42,756	0.3	80,079	0.7
Total	12,055,715	100	12,017,323	100

Apart from the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, the Macedonian population, which spoke a Southern Slavic language and was attached to Serbia in 1912–13, was also regarded as part of the nation of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. 83% of the population belonged to the state-nation, and more than ten other national minorities made up the remaining 17%.¹² Thus the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes could be regarded as a nation state, nevertheless, the homogeneous state–nation was mere fiction. Several researchers made efforts to reconstruct the national composition of the Southern Slavic state based on the citizens’ mother tongue, religion and other factors. The most important question was to calculate the number of Serbs, Croats,

¹² Definitivni rezultati popisa stanovništva od 31 januara 1921 god. Sarajevo, 1932, 2–3. (Further DRPS 1921.), Statistički godišnjak, 1. (1929) 69.

Bosnians and Macedonians within the state–nation (we will present two versions, those of Branslav Gligorijević and Ivo Banac, see Tab. 3).¹³

In the so-called Southern Serbia, which comprised Kosovo, Macedonia and some smaller regions and had been previously considered an administrative unit (46.000 sq km, 1.474.560 inhabitants in 1921, out of which 854.000 in Macedonia and 439.000 in Kosovo, calculated on the basis of districts), there were three ethnic groups constituting more than 10% of the population on their own: Serbo-Croats (59.7%), Albanians (28.2%) and Turks (10%). Approximately 60% of the population of Macedonia was made up of Macedonians, regarded as Serbs between the two world wars, 13% by Albanians, 13% by Turks (according to the language-related data of the 1921 census, there were 105.000 Albanians and 107.000 Turks), and there was also a larger group of Serbs. The Albanians lived mainly in the West of Macedonia, neighbouring Kosovo and Albania, where their proportion was significantly higher (46% in the province of Tetovo, 74% in the province of Gostivar).¹⁴ A significant part of the approximately 107.000–strong Turkish population lived in towns: in Skopje (14.000), Tetovo (6.500), Bitola (6.000) and Prilep (3.300).¹⁵ In the 1930s, a large part of the Turkish

¹³ Gligorijević, Br. *Jugoslovenstvo između dva rata*. – *Jugoslovenski istorijski časopis*, 1986, № 1–4, 76; Banac, I. *The National Question in Yugoslavia. Origins, History, Politics*. Ithaca–London, 1984, 58.

¹⁴ Stawowy-Kawka, Ir. *Die Albaner in Makedonien – Vergangenheit und Gegenwart*. – *Österreichische Osthefte*, 40, 1998, № 1–2, 115–122. The Macedonian researcher L. Sokolov described the ethnic make-up of the region as follows: he regarded almost the entire Southern Slavic population living there (67.65%) as Macedonian, while the rest of the population was made up of Turks (14.88%), Albanians (13.86%), Roma (1.61%), Vlachs (1.14%) and Serbs (0.78%). Sokolov, L. *Promene u strukturi stanovništva na teritoriji NR Makedonije 1921–1953. godine kao odraz ekonomskog razvoja*. Skopje, 1962, 81–83.

¹⁵ Sokolov, L., *Op. cit.*, 83.

population moved somewhere else as a consequence of an interstate agreement.

Yugoslavia was a diverse country not only from the point of view of nations and nationalities but also from that of religion. There were three main religious communities: the Orthodox (44.67%), the Roman Catholics (39.29%) and the Muslims (11.22%), in different proportions depending on geographical areas and ethnic groups. Considering the different nations and national minorities, the Croats, Slovenes, Germans, Hungarians, Slovaks and Czechs were Roman Catholic, the Serbs, Macedonians, Bulgarians and the emigrated Russians were Orthodox, while the Bosnians, Turks and nearly two thirds of the Albanians were Muslim. Almost 60% of the Muslims declared Serbo-Croat to be their mother tongue (908,000 people out of 1.561.000 in 1931). Nearly 40% of the Muslims belonged to some ethnic minority (Albanians, Turks). In the so-called Southern Serbia the Orthodox accounted for 50.4% of the population (Macedonians, Serbs, Vlachs) and the Muslims for 47.9% (Albanians, Turks, Bosnians). In Macedonia the proportion of the Orthodox was higher: the ratio of the Orthodox to Muslims was 2:1, while in Kosovo Muslims formed the majority (in similar proportions).¹⁶

INTEGRATION MEASURES IN YUGOSLAVIA

There were not only social differences between the different parts of the state of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes but their political institutions and traditions were also different. The political system of the Yugoslav state was established within a couple of years of the creation of the new state. A common parliamentary body and a unified government and public administration were established, and the common army was also formed based on the Serbian army. Some time later the judicial systems were also unified. Harmonisation failed only in the field of civil law.

¹⁶ PRPS 1921, Op. cit., XIX–XX.

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The issue of domestic political order was determined by the 1921 constitution (*Vidovdanski ustav*). It was the achievement of Serbian parties that the constitution was adopted not by qualified but only simple majority. During the debate they achieved that, apart from Serbian parties, the Bosnian and Muslim parties of Southern Serbia also voted for the constitution. The first constitution of the new kingdom did not recognize any autonomy, either territorial or ethnic.¹⁷

The restructuring of public administration was also decided by the constitution. The winning position was the one proposing the establishment of smaller administrative areas instead of larger territorial units with more extensive autonomy, based on some historical right (or ethnic borders). After the reorganisation of state administration in 1922, the central power completely limited the districts' self-governance. Thus, a centralized and unitary political system was established. By 1924, even the remaining regional governments stopped working (in Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Vojvodina).¹⁸

After the establishment of the state, the primary task was the unification of the economic institutions. Organising the economic life and starting the integrating processes encouraged by the government required substantial efforts. One of the most important tasks was the establishment of the country's own currency system and the stabilisation of the national currency. Before World War I, the Southern Slavic regions basically belonged to one of two currency zones: the regions forming part of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy used the

¹⁷ Gligorijević, Br. Parlament i političke stranke u Jugoslaviji 1919–1929. Beograd, 1979, 89–114; Sagadin, St. Ustrojstvo naše države: Kralj, Narodna skupština, Državna uprava, Državno činovništvo. – In: Jubilarni zbornik života i rada Srba Hrvata i Slovenaca 1918–1928. Knj. I. Beograd, 1928, 72–113; Hohnjec, J. O ustavi naše države. – In: Mal, J. (ur.), Slovenci v desetletju 1918–1928, Zbornik razprav iz kulturne, gospodarske in politične zgodovine. Ljubljana, 1928, 295–338; Mrdenović, D. (ur.), Ustavi i vlade Kneževine Srbije, Kraljevine SHS i Kraljevine Jugoslavije (1835–1941). Beograd, 1988, 209–229.

¹⁸ Mrdenović, D., (ur.), Op. cit., 221–222.

crown as legal tender, while Serbia used dinar and Montenegro used Montenegrin perper. The introduction of the common currency was completed in 1921, not without political debates. The National Bank was created, the use of the dinar was extended to the entire country, its gold cover and convertibility were guaranteed, and the use of other currencies was prohibited.¹⁹

In 1919, the ministry of financial affairs was created, and in the following two years numerous laws and decrees regulating duties, state monopolies, use taxes and customs were adopted. The laws were based on former Serbian decrees, and most often the process began by simply extending the laws in force in the Kingdom of Serbia to the entire country. The system of state revenues and expenditures was organised by the mid-1920s, and the unification of direct taxes completed the establishment of the fiscal system. Unified customs tariffs were introduced in 1925.

The slowest and politically most debated part of the organisation of state revenues was the unification of direct taxes. 1918 saw five different direct tax systems in force in the territory of the Southern Slavic state, which implied differing tax burdens in the different parts of the country. This heterogeneous fiscal system was in force for nearly ten years. The fiscal system was unified by the law on taxes adopted on 8 February 1928. The law determined the types of taxes (land tax, property rental tax, corporate profit tax, interest tax, income tax, bachelor tax) and the way to calculate the tax base.²⁰

In the multi-ethnic Yugoslavia the question of which part of the country, which nation had the highest tax burden was an ever topical political issue and cause for debate. There is no way to do justice but the available data show that during the

¹⁹ Slokar, Iv. Valutne razmere, devizna politika in bankarstvo. – In: Mal (ur.), *Op. cit.*, p. 553.; Ugričić, M. *Novačni sistem Jugoslavije*. Beograd, 1967, 95.

²⁰ Murko, Vl. *Državne in samoupravne finance v dravski banovini v l. 1918–1938*. – In: Lavrič, J., J. Mal, Fr. Stele, (ur.), *Spominski zbornik Slovenije, Ob dvajsetletnici Kraljevine Jugoslavije*. Ljubljana, 1939, 474–476; Murko, Vl. *Systém jihoslovanských přímých daní*. Bratislava, 1938.

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whole period of Yugoslavia the parts of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy paid the largest amount of tax. From 1919 to 1929 the direct tax per capita in Vojvodina and Slovenia could easily amount to 3 to 5 times the direct tax paid in the southern parts of the country, while Croats paid more than 1.5 times as much as Serbs. The unified fiscal system did not bring about substantial changes, as shown by the data published in the Statistical Year Book (see Table 4).²¹

Table 4. Direct taxes and duties per banovinas, 1939.

Banovina	Direct taxes	Taxes and duties	Direct taxes	Taxes and duties
	Total		Per capita	
Drava	323.546.287	411.603.267	270	336
Sava	539.619.616	779.116.811	185	267
Danube	521.878.477	1.056.868.038	206	417
Littoral	58.936.467	73.601.132	61	76
Morava	116.215.387	195.660.335	71	119
Drina	142.235.535	178.504.685	78	98
Vrbas	43.689.735	108.545.321	36	91
Zeta	56.858.001	66.690.442	54	64
Vardar	89.930.027	103.282.144	51	57
Belgrade	449.911.913	717.405.233	110	765
Yugoslavia	2.351.821.445	3.691.277.408	152	238

There is no real reason for assuming political motivation behind the tax imposition, although the government must have had some reason for delaying the tax unification until 1929 and letting the regions of the former Monarchy pay higher taxes. The degree of tax payment also reveals the differences in development between the different regions.

After the establishment of the Yugoslav state, there were huge disparities also in the fields of education and culture. In 1918, there were five different laws in force on primary

²¹ Statistički Godišnjak, 10, 1940, 467.

education. A unified educational system would have been necessary for various reasons: an efficient educational policy could have reduced the educational differences between the various parts of the country, and the curriculum drawn up in the spirit of Yugoslavism could have brought the Southern Slavic nations closer to each other, which could have strengthened their loyalty towards the newly founded state.²²

Before 1918, the cultural life of some Southern Slavic nations was directed from various centres (Belgrade, Zagreb, Ljubljana, Sarajevo, Novi Sad and Split). The state centralisation started in the 1920s also reached the fields of education and culture. The centralisation of educational and cultural affairs under the supervision of a common ministry was finished after the withdrawal of local government rights and duties, the introduction of the new public administration and the cancellation of regional governments (1923–1924), that is, five years after the creation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. The first educational programme, which never came into force, was only drawn up by December 1927.²³ The restructuring and development of the school system did not appear to be an easy task. There were two basically opposing concepts regarding the organisation of the education. The Unitarian concept aiming for the establishment of a unified school system was based on the idea that a unified school system was the most efficient means to educate the young generation in the spirit of the new state ideology. The political unity of one nation with three names and tribes was already expressed by the establishment of the common state, thus, according to the advocates of the Unitarian approach, the remaining economic and cultural

²² Dimić, L. Kulturna politika i modernizacija jugoslovenskog društva 1918–1941. Mogućnosti i ograničenja. – In: Perović, L., M. Obradović, D. Stojanović (ur.) Srbija u modernizacijskim procesima XX. veka. Beograd, 1994, 193–194.

²³ Dimić, L. Kulturna politika u Kraljevini Jugoslaviji 1918–1941. Knj. I. Društvo i država. Beograd, 1996, 184–189.

differences could be eliminated, among others, by breaking down cultural barriers and more specifically by means of a unified school education. The opposing approach would stick to the traditions and claims of the different areas, and would claim more flexibility in the solution of practical issues.²⁴ The conflict of the two opposing concepts, just like the issue of the country's new structure, was decided by the Vidovdan Constitution. It provided for education "under identical circumstances" in the entire country.²⁵

Although during the years several draft laws were prepared, the laws enacting the unified school system were only adopted ten years later. The first law to be adopted was the one on secondary education, on 31 August 1929. The act on public elementary schools, which affected the largest number of people and thus can be considered the most important act, was adopted on 5 December 1929. It declared that the objective of education was to educate children in the spirit of national and state unity and religious tolerance. Education was universal, free and compulsory for all in the entire country. The state had the right to oblige parents to send their children to school. (This was especially important as 30% of children of school age did not attend school.) The law prescribed eight years of compulsory education. Article 17 also aimed at smoothing out disparities within the country by ordaining the establishment of schools in all areas with at least 30 children of school age within a 4 km range. The law also determined the 14 subjects to be taught in a uniform way all over the country. Furthermore, the law stipulated that the language of public elementary school education was the language of the state, i.e. Serbo-Croat-Slovenian. Schools were only allowed to employ teachers who graduated from state-run teacher training colleges and worked as state employees.²⁶ According to a recent researcher of

²⁴ Tešić, Vl., M. Mirković, S. Ćunković, R. Vuković. *Sto godina Prosvetnog saveta Srbije 1880–1980*. Beograd, 1980, 89.

²⁵ Mrdenović D. (ur.), *Op. cit.*, 211.

²⁶ *Službene novine*, 9 December 1929.

Yugoslav cultural policy, this act combined the ideology of integral Yugoslavism with the modern educational policy objectives (or often simply desires and hopes) of smoothing out disparities of cultural levels within a short period of time. However, the ideas did not turn into practice; for example, compulsory education was not introduced in the entire country.²⁷

The educational system had two main sources of financing: state and local government budgets. Local governments (villages, towns, and voivodeships) allotted 4 to 16% of their budget to education. The ministry of education, which also controlled the cultural and scientific institutions, allotted 75 to 90% of its budget to education, the 50 to 67% of which was dedicated to elementary schooling.²⁸ Taking into account the average costs of that period, these funds were insufficient for bringing about significant cultural development and enabling disadvantaged regions to start catching up. Due to the previously different development levels and the insufficient funds for smoothing out differences, significant regional disparities continued to exist regarding the school system and cultural development levels in Yugoslavia. In the north and northwest there were almost thrice as many schools per capita and almost four times as many schools per sq km as in the less developed south, i.e. in Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina. This situation could be attributed both to the previous educational policy and to geographical factors. In the mountain areas villages were smaller and could not afford maintaining their own schools. Between the two world wars, regional differences hardly changed in this respect (see Tab. 5):²⁹

²⁷ Dimić, L. *Kulturna politika u Kraljevini Jugoslaviji 1918–1941*. Knj. II. Škola i crkva. Beograd, 1996, 134.

²⁸ Mayer, M. *Elementarbildung in Jugoslawien (1918–1941). Ein Beitrag zur gesellschaftlichen Modernisierung?* München, 1995, 95.

²⁹ Mayer, M., *Op. cit.*, 100.

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Table 5. Density of the elementary school network (1922–23
and 1938–39)

Region	1922–23		1938–39	
	Inhabitants per school	Sq km per school	Inhabitants per school	Sq km per school
Slovenia	1,288	25	1,404	24
Croatia	1,587	25	1,587	21
Dalmatia	1,193	24	1,256	22
Vojvodina	1,284	18	2,443	34
Bosnia and Herzegovina	3,425	93	2,550	49
Serbia	1,685	32	1,823	23
South Serbia	1,941	60	1,714	38
Montenegro	694	34	918	37
Yugoslavia	1,679	34	1,718	28

Nevertheless, the proportion of children attending school increased in all parts of the country: the number of pupils in the academic year 1921–22 was 989.000 while in 1938–39 1.426.000. There were more schools but the overall number of places did not increase more than the number of children as a result of natural population increase. Illiteracy rates also fell but to a smaller extent than desired, and regional differences remained (see Tab. 6).³⁰ According to official statistics, illiteracy rates decreased by 5.9% from 1921 to 1931: from 51.5% to 44.6%, and later on, by 1944 to 38%.³¹ In the age group of 11–24, i.e. pupils who began their studies in the Yugoslav state, illiteracy rates fell from 42% to 37%. Literacy rates within this age group equalled the number of children attending school.³²

³⁰ Statistički godišnjak, 1 (1929) 70–71, 6 (1934–35).

³¹ Mayer, M., Op. cit., 205.

³² Literacy rates per banovinas: Drava 97.5% (men 97.5%, women 98.4%), Sava 83.0% (88.2%, 77.8%), Danube 80.5% (87.9%, 73.0%), Littoral 52.6% (64.9%,

Table 6. Illiteracy rates per banovinas (1921, 1931).

Banovina	1921			1931		
	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total
Drava	8.9	8.9	8.9	5.26	5.79	5.54
Sava	25.7	40.1	31.1	19.57	35.15	27.67
Danube	24.5	43.0	34.1	17.52	39.56	28.87
Littoral	53.3	77.2	67.2	44.11	69.76	57.46
Vrbas	76.1	91.4	83.5	59.89	85.81	72.60
Drina	52.6	78.0	65.4	43.24	81.02	62.11
Morava	53.5	86.6	70.8	38.83	83.72	61.96
Zeta	59.5	86.8	73.5	48.80	82.90	66.04
Vardar	71.8	90.3	81.3	55.70	85.50	70.86
Belgrade	11.5	18.8	14.1	7.10	15.32	10.87
Yugoslavia	42.2	60.3	51.5	32.27	56.40	44.61

THE RESULTS OF THE INTEGRATION AND MACEDONIA

Macedonia's situation was determined mainly by the fact that the region was annexed to Serbia after the Balkan Wars. Vardar Macedonia found itself in a new situation, as previously its main economic and political relations were with the South, with Thessaloniki being the economic centre of the region. Its links with Serbia were weaker. Local people did not consider themselves Serbs, thus they did not regard their coming to form part of the new state. Serbia, however, considered the territories acquired in

40.5%), Drina 48.5% (66.1%, 29.8%), Morava 47.9% (69.9%, 25.3%), Zeta 45.3% (62.2%, 26.6%), Vardar 34.5% (52.4%, 25.0%), Vrbas 34.5% (48.2%, 20.4%), Belgrade 93.1% (93.4%, 92.7%). Yugoslavia 63.2% (74.1%, 52.0%). DRPS 1931. Knj. III. Prisutno stanovništvo po pismenosti i starosti. Beograd, 1939, 7.

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1913 as Serbian territories, and extended the Serbian laws to the Macedonian areas as well.³³

The Balkan Wars were followed by another war, World War I, after which an extremely complex state was established.³⁴ In terms of state organisation, in principle, the new state had different alternatives. 1. Full integration, which implied the necessity of creating unified institutions. This excluded any kind of autonomy. Supporters of this approach were of the opinion that after World War I a Yugoslav nation state was created, thus everyone in the country belonged to the same nation. 2. By contrast, the other option was a kind of decentralized state preserving certain forms of autonomous government. This implied that some policies, mostly cultural and social issues, would be handled at the local level. Only some policies would be the competence of the central government: foreign policy, trade, and defence.

As it is widely known, Yugoslavia's state structure was determined by the Constitution of 1920 as a centralized political system. Macedonian MPs voted for the Constitution, however, the MPs of the democratic and radical parties that obtained seats in the parliament were not local politicians but people appointed by the party headquarters in Serbia. MPs of the Muslim Džemijet were promised, in exchange for their votes, to be able to keep their estates in the course of the agrarian reforms. The antipathy towards the Yugoslav state was manifest in the fact that hardly more than half of the eligible voters

³³ See Boeckh, K. *Von den Balkankriegen zum Ersten Weltkrieg. Kleinstaatenpolitik und ethnische Selbstbestimmung auf dem Balkan*. München, 1996; Svirčević, M. *The New Territories of Serbia after the Balkan Wars of 1912–1913: The Establishment of the First Local Authorities*. – In: *Balkanica*, 44, 2014, 285–306.

³⁴ The most comprehensive studies about Macedonia within Yugoslavia are the following: Boškowska, N. *Das jugoslawische Makedonien, 1918–1941. Eine Randregion zwischen Repression und Integration*. Wien–Köln–Weimar, 2009; Jovanović, Vl. *Jugoslovenska država i Južna Srbija 1918–1929. Makedonija, Sandžak, Kosovo i Metohija u Kraljevini SHS*. Beograd, 2002; Jovanović, Vl. *Vardarska banovina, 1929–1941*. Beograd, 2011.

went to the polls (the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation, VMRO called for a boycott) and the Communist Party received the largest number of votes (Communist Party 15, Democratic Party 11, Radical Party 6 seats).³⁵

During the entire period in question, this region was not represented by local politicians in the parliament, and locals were hardly appointed for higher positions in the public administration.³⁶ It was not until the end of this period that local elite, furthering the interest of the region, was formed. In other parts of the country, however, there were groups that managed to achieve certain results. The Slovenian People's Party (at times in opposition, other times in the government) managed to obtain the right to decide on various issues, especially cultural and social issues, affecting the Slovenian areas, and also succeeded in establishing a voivodeship for the Slovenian territories in 1929. Almost the entire Croatian population supported the Croatian Peasant Party, and, as a consequence of the state of foreign affairs and constant opposition, Croatia was given autonomy in 1939 (*sporazum*, Serb–Croat agreement, establishment of Banovina Hrvatska). The Serbian elite considered Macedonia to be Serbian land, therefore it would not give autonomy to Macedonia as it did to Croatia in 1939. In addition, since the population of this region was considered Serbian and these territories were annexed to Serbia before 1914, adjudicating minority rights, laid down in the peace treaties, to the Macedonian population was completely out of question.³⁷

Nevertheless, Yugoslav authorities had to make enormous efforts to maintain peace in the region. A large part of the army

³⁵ Gligorijević, Parlament i političke stranke, op. cit., 83.

³⁶ See Cvetkovska, N. Makedonskoto prašanje vo jugoslovenskiot parlament među dvete svetski vojni. Skopje, 2000; the same, Političkite partii vo parlamentarnite izborni borbi vo vardarskiot del na Makedonija (1919–1929). Skopje, 2004; Katardžiev, I. Istorija na makedonskiot narod. T. 4. Makedonija među Balkanskite i Vtorata svetska vojna (1912–1941). Skopje, 2000.

³⁷ Boškovska, N., Op. cit., 361–364.

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and almost two thirds of the gendarmerie were stationed in Macedonia. The region constituted a real borderland, surrounded by countries with territorial claims and active propaganda. The population in the south of the country was not loyal to the Yugoslav state; in Kosovo it took years to put down the Albanian revolt, and the VMRO was ever active in organising anti-Yugoslav actions. The peaceful population did not like the officials coming from Belgrade and regarded the state power as an oppressive regime.³⁸

The Kingdom of Yugoslavia failed to acquire a unified national identity; neither the one nation with three names and tribes nor the “integral” Yugoslavism after 1929 managed to imbue the masses of people with such an identity. The national identity remained unattained, as loyalty towards Yugoslavia did not strengthen, and indeed, it was the different national identities that became stronger. Macedonia was in a special situation. The Serbs wanted the inhabitants of Macedonia to assimilate the Serbian national consciousness. But they did not have the facilities to develop culture in the region and attract the local population. At the same time, Serbian soldiers and officials were very much disliked by Macedonian people. Local Macedonians simply did not want to acquire the Serbian national consciousness.

Apart from the political system, it was necessary to form a common economic, monetary and customs system and a unified system of national education. To put it simply, we can say that the unification was carried out in all areas, mostly by extending the Serbian institutional systems. In the 1920s, the common currency was introduced and the tax revenue system was organised. The unification finished by the beginning of the 1930s. The northern territories complained that they were paying much higher taxes than the southern ones. For Macedonia, the biggest disadvantage was that tobacco became state monopoly.

In 1918 various different regions, which often had very

³⁸ Jovanović, Vl. Vardarska banovina: Društveno-politička skica. – Istorija 20 veka, 28, 2010, № 1, 70.

poor economic relations with each other, came to form part of the same country. While they belonged to the common state, significant changes took place in all the regions and also in the economic relations between them. It should be noted, first of all, that amongst the free market economy conditions investments focused on the previously developed areas. Therefore, industry went on developing in Slovenia and Croatia, and Belgrade became the centre of the banking system after the Great Depression. In the 1930s, Belgrade with its surroundings and certain Bosnian areas profited from the industrial projects. The food industry in Vojvodina and Croatia was in decline after having lost its markets in the Monarchy. In Macedonia, a larger number of firms were established compared to previous times, and the tobacco industry received the heaviest investments. The state played a significant role – 40% of the investments were made by the state. Investments in Macedonia were not considered profitable, therefore the amount of investments there was well below the amount in the more developed regions. Yet, in spite of the development, Macedonia remained one of the most underdeveloped areas of Yugoslavia.³⁹

As we have seen, at the beginning of the 1930s new laws on education were adopted, which introduced compulsory schooling, and the education system was unified in the spirit of integral Yugoslavianism. New schools were built in every part of the country, but, in spite of the obligation, 40% of Macedonian children did not attend school in order to be able to work at home or in the fields instead. Pursuant to the law, the language in schools was “Serbo-Croatian” but children in Macedonia did not understand the state language properly.

³⁹ Zografski, D. Glavne faze, obeležja i dimenzije razvitka industrije u Makedoniji do kraja drugog svetskog rata. - *Acta historico-oeconomica Iugoslaviae*, 1, 1974, 123–139; Lazarov, L. Opšestveno-ekonomski razvoj na NR Makedonija vo periodot na obnovata i industrijalizacijata (1944–1957). Skopje, 1988, 21–86; Djurkovska, L. Faktori za razvoj na stopanstvoto vo Skopje meѓu dvete svetski vojni. – *Glasnik*, 56, 2012, № 1–2, 111–116.

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Many teachers were sent from other parts of Yugoslavia to Macedonia as a punishment (for them Macedonia was the Yugoslav Siberia). Thus, education was not effective. There were no schools with teaching in Albanian language, so Albanian children did not attend school at all. A large part of Macedonian people remained illiterate.

When dealing with such a complex country as Yugoslavia, governments have to be able to make appropriate and effective efforts to help disadvantaged regions catch up with the rest. During the first (royal) Yugoslavia little was done to align the economic level of the different regions. Here we should mention some important measures.

1) Only in 1938 was a special fund established from which the less developed regions could receive additional money (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Kosovo, and Macedonia).⁴⁰ Only in the second half of the 1930s did prime minister Milan Stojadinović promise a development plan for the southern regions. In the 1930s, plans were drawn up for the development of Macedonia, improvement works (partly in order to stop the spread of malaria) and railway construction. However, rural development was very slow. In Macedonia the largest city, Skopje was developing the most rapidly. In the 1920s, major private investments began and in the 1930s communal and infrastructural constructions were going on with funding from the government and state banks.⁴¹

2) At this point we can mention some measures taken during the agrarian reform and colonisation, which contributed to the development of poorer regions. Approximately 20–22 thousand families (80–90 thousand people) moved to the south of the country, out of which approximately 4–6 thousand families moved to Macedonia (20 thousand people) and received land there. The government established new villages

⁴⁰ Stanarević, N., St. Milačić, M. Milošević, et al. (ur.). *Ministarstvo Financija Kraljevine Jugoslavije, 1918–1938*. Beograd, 1939, 182.

⁴¹ Boškovska, N., *Op. cit.*, 195–205.

and settlements (more than 100 in Macedonia), built houses, wells, and schools. 3–4 times more funds were spent on a colonist in the south than in the north.⁴² However, newcomers did not manage to become integrated in the Macedonian society as the local population considered them as strangers sent there with the purpose of serbianisation.

3) With the construction of railways the state sought to develop the less-developed areas and incorporate them into the transport system of the country. The main problem in the 1920s was that these railway lines mostly linked the regions with the former capitals, i.e. Vienna, Budapest, and Thessaloniki, and did not effectively help the communication between the different parts of Yugoslavia. So one of the most important tasks was the construction of the Belgrade–Zagreb line to facilitate transport links between the two largest cities in the country, as well as between Serbia and Croatia. During the first Yugoslavia, some lines were built in the mountainous regions of Macedonia, Bosnia and Kosovo. The railway lines constructed in Macedonia in this period are: till 1926 the line between Veles and Kočani (of military importance), in the 1930s the one between Veles and Bitola, and during World War I and after the World War a narrow gauge railroad between Skopje and Ohrid. However, the largest plan – the line between Belgrade and the Adriatic Sea – was never realized. Despite this, we can say that the new railway lines helped reduce regional disparities.⁴³

To sum it up, the unification of institutions and systems was successful. On the other hand, the socio-economic differences

⁴² Lekić, B. *Agrarna reforma i kolonizacija u Jugoslaviji 1918–1941*. Beograd, 2002, 463–474; Apostolov, Al. *Kolonizacijata na Makedonija vo stara Jugoslavija*. Skopje, 1989, 160–161.

⁴³ Ivanović, M. *Građenje železnica od 1918 do 1941 godine i građevinska politika u tome periodu*. – In: Blagovac, Bl. (ur.). *Sto godina železnica Jugoslavije*. Zbornik članaka povodom stogodišnjice železnica Jugoslavije. Beograd, 1951, 129–136; Lazić, M. *Investiciona politika Kraljevine Jugoslavije u železničkom i drumskom saobraćaju 1919–1941*. – In: Piljević, Đorđe O. (ur.), *Jugoslovenska država 1918–1998*. Beograd, 1999, 375–382.

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were not successfully reduced. As a result of economic development, modernisation kept taking place in the regions that had come to form part of the state of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes with a more developed social structure (except for Belgrade and its surroundings that gained the greatest advantage of becoming the centre of a bigger country). From a social point of view, the Yugoslav integration cannot be considered successful, although we have to acknowledge that time was often insufficient for smoothing out disparities and the factors facilitating the change were also missing. The governing authorities never showed understanding towards the viewpoints of the different regions and nations, such as the ever faster Macedonian national development. This latter led to the joy of many over the disintegration of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia.

Reducing the disparities between the different regions is a big challenge. The Yugoslav federation, which was established during World War II (1943) upon new foundations, was unable to achieve it. The socialist Yugoslavia pursued a more active policy in order to help the less developed regions catch up with the rest. In 1965 a special financial fund was created for supporting the less developed member republics and regions: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Crna Gora, Macedonia and Kosovo.⁴⁴ The country's economic structure underwent substantial changes after 1945, when a centralised economic management system was introduced. As a result of development measures, all the regions developed significantly compared to their previous situation. Nevertheless, the relative per-capita differences in terms of development between the regions remained unchanged, and so did the differences between their economies in terms of productivity and income generating capacity. It is not necessary to discuss the details of economic development to realize that the socialist attempt to

⁴⁴ Mihajlović, K. Privreda Jugoslavije 1920–1990. – In: Piljević D. O. (ur.), Op. cit., 119–123; Miljković, D., M. Nikolić, Razvoj republika SFR Jugoslavije, 1947–1990. godine. Beograd, 1996, 9–10.

promote the closing of the gap did not prove to be more successful.⁴⁵

The political and cultural relations, however, developed differently. In 1943 Macedonia was declared a member of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and thus it was given a significant economic and cultural autonomy. The literary language was developed. A school system with education in Macedonian language was established. New faculties were added to the university, and the Macedonian Academy of Sciences and Arts was created in 1968. As a consequence, the Macedonian national consciousness became stronger. When Yugoslavia was dissolved, on 8 September 1991 Macedonia's independence was proclaimed; and thus the country's integration into the Yugoslav state became history. Nevertheless, there is an issue that is not history yet: how to integrate regions of different development levels to everyone's satisfaction and how to prevent masses of people from migrating from poorer areas to the more developed regions. This is the challenge facing the European Union. Similarly, the question of how to integrate groups of different ethnicities and religions within one state is not history either. This is the challenge facing Macedonia.

⁴⁵ For detailed data, see Miljković D., M. Nikolić, *Op. cit.*, 21–38.

The Role and Aims of Turkey in the Balkan Entente according to the Hungarian Foreign Office¹

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This paper, based mainly on Hungarian and to lesser extent on British Foreign Office documents (incoming and outgoing dispatches, reports and memoranda), aims at illuminating the role that Turkey had in the Balkan Entente. It shows the objectives that Ankara wanted to achieve with the help of this organization in its Balkan policy. The role of the Balkan Entente in Turkish foreign policy is observed from the angle of a central European state which was very lively interested in the Balkan affairs and in whose foreign policy Turkey had a highly outstanding place. Therefore Hungary eagerly watched and analyzed every step that Turkey made toward the Balkans as a member state of the Balkan Pact, and also Ankara's intentions to become one of the leading powers within this group of the Balkan states – both in political and military sense.

The road that led Ankara to the Balkan Pact was quite long and rugged both in fact and according to the Hungarian foreign officials. The first two decades of the 20th century were very stormy for Turkey: it lost the First Balkan War and as a consequence of it lost almost all territories that it possessed in the Balkans for more than half a millennium. Its defeat in the World War I caused nearly similar sequels and only due to the

¹ The paper was written within the framework of the OTKA (the Hungarian Scientific Research Found) K 113004 project.

successful war of independence resulted in a shameless new peace signed in Lausanne in 1923. The memories were very fresh at the end of the third decade and Turkey understandably did not have so friendly feelings toward the Balkan national states, especially not towards Greece. Yet, despite that its foreign policy had to adapt to the new situation, the Turkish Republic, being engaged with the empowerment and reconstruction of the state and society, persuaded harmonic relations with all its neighbours including Greece.² Nevertheless, according to the Hungarian observers, it did not mean that Ankara abandoned its aim to become the leading power in the Eastern part of the Mediterranean in the future.³

The idea of Balkan nations' independency, emancipation and collaboration with each other arouse at the end of the 1920s. Briand's plan of Pan European Union played quite a big role in it, since it was regarded by the Balkan nations as opposite to their interests and enforced the idea of a collaboration leaving out all the Great Powers. However, the main impulse on this mutual collaboration was given by the economic crisis, whose graduation was directly proportional to strengthening the idea of the necessity of concentration the Balkan nations' forces.⁴

Since there were many unsolved and pending political questions among the Balkan states that made their cultural, economic and political rapprochement difficult, the initiative was taken by the "civilians". Since 1930 annual Balkan conferences were kept where the participating countries were represented by businessmen, scholars and people from the public life etc. Politicians were present just as observers at the meetings that aimed to help the collaboration of the states of the Peninsula. The initiative came from the Greeks, more precisely from the Greek prime minister Eleftherios Venizelos

² MOL, K63-1929-32/1, 66 pol. (1745) Report of Kálmán Kánya, the Hungarian minister in Berlin on the visit of Tewfik Rüstü Arras bey to Germany on May 8, 1929.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Avramovski, Ž. *Balkanska antanta, (1934–1940)*. Beograd, 1986. 35.

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who managed to convince İsmet İnönü, the Turkish prime minister, and Tevfik Rüşti Bey, the minister of foreign affairs who also became an ardent supporter of the idea.⁵ But not only him, the Hungarian minister in Ankara could also report – already in 1931, that “the idea of the Balkan movement had deep roots in the Turkish public opinion too”, and the leaders of the Movement in Turkey were the most prominent members of parliament, journalists and people, coming from the economic sphere.⁶

In his report László Tahy (at that time Hungarian minister in Ankara, who was possibly the most significant Hungarian minister to Turkey in the 20th century) briefly summed up the Turkish aims regarding the Balkans. According to him Turkey would prefer a horizontal disbandment of the Peninsula. The Southern part would be consisted of the Greeks, Bulgarians, Turks, and eventually the Albanians, and the Northern part – of the Serbs (Yugoslavia) and the Rumanians. In such a case Turkey – with its political and military power – would definitely convince the majority of the group to which it would

⁵ The report of the British Minister in Ankara described very well the transformation of the Turkish opinion concerning the Balkan Entente. „At first the attitude of the Turkish Government as expounded by Tevfik Rüşti Bey was sceptical though friendly. Turkey considered such a federation premature and chimerical, and held that if it took the form of an extension of the Little Entente it would be definitively harmful. At the same time Turkey felt she could not disinterest herself in Balkan politics although she was not purely Balkan State. Her position, Tevfik Rüşti Bey suggested, resembled that of the British Empire in relation to schemes of European federation. During the latter half of the year, however, this attitude developed somewhat as a result of M. Veniselos's visit and Tevfik Rüşti Bey's journey to Geneva, and it seems likely that Turkey will in the future be willing to play a more active part in Balkan affairs. She will undoubtedly throw all her influence into the scale against any scheme for the absorption by Yugoslavia of Bulgaria whose independence is a matter of utmost concern to Turkey.” Turkish National Archives, Foreign Office [further abbr.: TNA FO] 371/15376 E 913/913/44, Sir Georg Clerk's 1930 annual report on Turkey.

⁶ MOL, K63-1931-32/1, 3726 pol. 1931. Tahy's strictly confident despatch about the endeavours of establishment a Balkan Union (25.08.1931).

join.⁷ What was the aim of the Turks with this movement? – asked Tahy and gave his answer as follows: “*to create a group of states that are under the hegemony of Ankara and by whose help, per analogiam - the Little Entente, Turkey and the members of this group could play bigger role in the European politics and could improve its position in the League of Nations.*”⁸

Finally, four years after the Balkan conferences the four-power pact of the Balkan states was signed on 9th February 1934. According to the Hungarian officials Turkey’s foreign policy during the six months preceding this agreement could be characterised as *pact mania* and it was because of Ankara’s efforts to preserve the already started process of country’s modernization from any kind of disturbances caused by wars.⁹ This aim made Turkey break up with its policy of sympathy towards revisionism and help the encirclement and isolation of Bulgaria that led to the establishment of the Balkan Entente – thought the Hungarian minister.¹⁰

Certainly the Hungarian officials were not happy about the creation of the Balkan Entente. From the very beginning Budapest wanted to dissuade Ankara from the Balkan Entente. In these efforts Hungary drew Turkey’s attention on the dangers that such an organisation might mean to Turkey. In a conversation the Hungarian minister, Tahy asked Tefvik Rüştü Bey: “Do you not think that such a Balkan Union could turn against Turkey and endanger it?” But Tefvik Rüştü answered with the greatest optimism: such an Union can never be established without Turkey and even if it happens how can someone assume that the Turks are so naive that will not assure themselves with adequate political warranties?!”¹¹

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ ibid.

⁹ MOL, K63-1934-1932/1-I. Annual report of the Hungarian minister in Ankara on Turkey for 1934.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Ibid.

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Why was such a Balkan Entente unfavourable for Hungary? For Hungary it meant that beside the Little Entente, which was created for safeguarding the status quo in Central Europe, there will be another organisation too, that could be considered even as an extension of the Little Entente. Also we should have in mind that for Hungary the ideal Southern neighbourhood was a divided Balkan.¹² It is not surprising therefore that Hungarians eagerly observed every movement of the Balkan Entente and were so happy seeing that the newly established organisation did not function as its creators planned. In September 1934 the acting minister in Ankara reported – with a certain dozen of malice – that despite the enthusiasm demonstrated by Turkey and by the Balkan politicians concerning the Balkan Entente there appeared signs of its slow extinction. *“It did not have many effective results; the so called Balkan weeks, that should have been kept in every country, were cancelled everywhere; the football matches kept were good business only for the sport managers; and the establishment of a Balkan Commercial Chamber also was not fruitful.”*¹³ The facts differed from the expectations. According to the new Hungarian minister to Turkey, Jungerth-Arnóthy Mihály it was undeniable that the Turkish public and political opinion celebrated with great enthusiasm the Balkan Entente believing that it had strengthened the international positions of the Turkish Republic and thought that in case of war Turkey – due to its membership in the Balkan Entente – would be on the stronger side, therefore everybody not simply supported the new organisation but was in favour of strengthening and developing it.¹⁴

Being aware of the Hungarian concerns the Turkish government wanted to calm down the Hungarian anxiety stating that the Balkan Entente aimed at safeguarding the status quo in the Balkans, but Turkey was going to have a neutral position

¹² Emre Saral. Törökország és a Balkán Paktum szerepe a magyar követi jelentések tükrében (1931–1935). - Keletkutatás, 2013, ősz, 87.

¹³ MOL, K63–1934–1932/1–I. 3082/Pol. 1934.

¹⁴ MOL, K63–1934–1932/1–I, 3870/Pol. 1934, 10.11.1934.

in case of possible territorial changes in the Danubian basin.¹⁵ But these words could not calm Hungarians' anxiety.

Most of the Hungarian officials believed that the Balkan Entente served as a tool for Turkey to get closer to Yugoslavia and Romania. This way Ankara realised better relations with France and indirectly counterbalanced the Italian threat through the French-Italian alliance from 1935.¹⁶

Beside the desire for safety and peace the Turkish foreign political activity was indisputably motivated during the last years – more and more with the prestige – reported the Hungarian minister in Ankara. *“The new regime considers Turkey as an European Great Power and its efforts aim at participating in all European matters, at being listened to, and even more, at not allowing to happen anything without it. The ambitions of the minister of foreign affairs, Tevfik Rüştü – who has its own ambitions to place his country among the important European powers and himself could be counted as one of the leading European politicians and statesmen – also contribute to this.”* In the course of 1935 the Turkish foreign policy suffered from many disappointments; therefore Ankara based its policy on the following pillars: demonstrating friendly relationships with Russia; strengthening the Balkan Entente and making it an important political factor; closer cooperation between the Little Entente and the Balkan Entente. Ankara aimed at being heard in all European questions and tried to enter into the solution processes through the Balkan Entente. According to the annual report of the Hungarian minister in Turkey its further goal was to get closer to Romania and Yugoslavia and by the help of these two countries to participate in the creation of a bloc or at least in a close cooperation scheme stretching from Ankara to Prague. Since the military value of the Balkan Entente decreased due to

¹⁵ MOL, K63–1934–32/7, 6470/Pol. 1934. Strictly confidential despatch of the political director of Hungarian Foreign Ministry from 22.11.1934.

¹⁶ MOL, K63–1934–32/7, 9/Pol. 1935. Report of the Hungarian Minister in Ankara for 1935 (31.01.1935).

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the events in Greece, Turkey consolidated its military alliance with Romania and Yugoslavia. The latter was the basis of Turkey's Balkan policy. *"The Turks think, stated the Hungarian minister in his report, that Yugoslavia is the biggest and strongest state in the Balkans which will be the most useful for the Turkish interests in case of combined attack from Bulgaria and Italy. Nevertheless in Ankara there are permanent concerns about a Serbo-Bulgarian alliance that could be warded best by the help of strong and reliable relations with Yugoslavia, strengthening the Balkan Entente and involving Bulgaria into it."*¹⁷

The role of Turkey in the Balkan Entente increased greatly in 1936 (the second anniversary of its formation) when the Turkish Foreign Minister became president of the Balkan Entente Council (9.02.1936). In a press interview which Tevfik Rüştü gave shortly afterwards he summarised the policy of the Entente as follows: *"Peace and friendship between the Balkan states: peace and order in Europe: finally world peace. Fidelity to the system of collective security and textual execution of engagements undertaken towards the League of Nations"*. Certainly these words were not simply slightly overestimating the role and importance of the Balkan Entente in the European politics. Possibly we can agree with the evaluation of the British minister in Ankara that *"on the whole in 1936 the Balkan Entente served the purposes of its authors and withstood reasonably well, though not without some creaking, the strains put on it as a result of flux in European affairs."*¹⁸ This evaluation can be true for the forthcoming 1937 and 1938 years, too. It partly fulfilled the expectations of its initiators. It was safeguarding Turkey for years

¹⁷ Tevfik Rüştü Bey said to Hungarian minister that Turkey was absolutely calm since believed that any kind of Yugoslav-Bulgarian rapprochement, even the closest one could be paralysed by Turkish-Greek alliance. MOL, K63-1934-32/7, 1592/Pol. 1934. Tahy's report from May 19, 1934.

¹⁸ TNA FO, 371/20866 (E 823/823/44). Annual report on Turkey for 1936 (28.01.1937).

and it was possibly the most important benefit that Ankara expected from its establishment, namely to give chance to Turkey to increase its importance in this part of world and to get involved to a bigger extent into the European affairs; all this fulfilled. But in 1939 due to the dramatically changed political situation and altered balance of power the Balkan Entente could not serve these purposes and help the fulfilment of the above mentioned aims any more, even more it became an obstacle to them and its existence could endanger its participants. Turkey, just like the other Balkan Entente states, normally wanted to ensure its interest by the help of another scheme through leaning on the Western powers (at least accepting their friendship) and this meant that in 1939 the days of the Balkan Entente were numbered.

Политиката на България в областта на авиацията в периода 1920–1940 г. и нейните европейски аспекти

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Първата световна война завършва с тежки последици за България, като голям удар е нанесен и на българското военно въздухоплаване. По силата на Ньойския договор въздушните войски са унищожени. Клаузите на договора разпореждат:

- Военните сили на България да не включват никакви въздушни военни части;

- В срок от два месеца след влизането на мирния договор в сила личният състав на Въздухоплавателната дружина трябва да бъде демобилизиран;

- До шест месеца след влизането на договора в сила да се прекрати в цяла България производството и вносът на въздушни уреди.¹

- Освен това България трябва на свои разноски да предаде на съюзните сили всички наличен въздухоплавателен материал, а хангарите – в Божурище и Ямбол, трябва да бъдат разрушени. През месец декември 1919 г. съглашенските окупационни власти описват цялото българско въздухоплавателно имущество, а през 1920 г. на летище Божурище са унищожени с чукове и триони пред очите на пилотите наличните въздушни уреди, части и материали от летище Варна, Ямбол и Божурище.

- Унищожени са 51 самолета, 113 въздушни мотори и др.²

¹ ДВИА, ф.1049, оп.1, а.е. 111, л. 320^б.

² Пак там.

По силата на част 10-та от Ньойския договор България може да има единствено гражданско въздухоплаване при редица ограничения, които са проблем за създаването и изграждането на едно модерно за времето си въздухоплаване.³

През 1921 г. се формира гражданско въздухоплавателно отделение при Главната дирекция на пощите, телеграфите, телефоните и въздухоплаването. На отделението се възлагат следните служби: пощенско-пътнически съобщения, плано-снимачнокадастрална служба, пощенска охрана на горите и изпълнение на специалния договор от 1 февруари 1921 г. относно поддържането на летищните центрове – Божурище, Ямбол и Варна.

Оказали се в края на Първата световна война в лагера на победените, България и Унгария са наказани сурово от победителите чрез наложените им мирни договори. Проблемите, които стоят пред тях за разрешаване, са сходни.⁴ Общата злополучна съдба на двата народа, военното им сътрудничество по време на Първата световна война като бивши съюзници, както и аналогичните им цели за премахване на нанесените им от мирните договори несправедливости, са предпоставки, които създават подходящ политико-психологически климат за сътрудничество и сближаване между двете държави през изследвания период.

Непосредствено след войната контактите между правителствата на двете държави са съвсем плахи. Българската страна се страхува да отговори на унгарската инициатива за по-активни отношения, за да не си спечели гнева на съседите. По-късно връзките между двете страни се засилват, за да стигнат в навечерието на Втората световна война до провеждане на чести взаимни консултации и сондажи.⁵

Ньойският договор затваря вратите на България за развитието на военна авиация в периода след 1919 г., но отваря

³ Пак там.

⁴ Гърдев, К., цит. съч., 5.

⁵ Пак там.

широко вратите за развитие на гражданското въздухоплаване, което по-късно прави страната ни част от европейската международната въздушна мрежа за гражданската авиация (макар и летище „Божурище“ да е използвано предимно като транзитно летище). Осъществяването на граждански полетите от–за и през България на едни от добре развитите европейски авиокомпании дава възможност на страната ни да насочи усилията си към съвместни дейности в развитието на икономическите, културни и туристически отношения с Германия, Италия, Франция, Полша а по-късно и Унгария.

Тази авиационна политика на страната задълбочава културните и икономическите отношения между България и европейските държави и „вписва“ страната ни в общата европейска въздушна мрежа за осъществяване на граждански полети през 1930–1937 г. Експлоатирането на въздушни трасета за мирни цели от Германия, Франция, Италия, Полша и др. над България задълбочава сътрудничеството между тези държави, като интегрира успешно България към Европа. За това съдейства и откриването през 1923–1924 г. на авиационното училище на летище „Божурище“ с нова мирновременна програма. Обучението на пилотите и механиците продължава в граждански условия. Началото е трудно, но обещаващо.

В края на 1926 г. в навечерието на сключването на първия договор за даване право на френското дружество „Сидна“ да експлоатира редовни въздушни линии над българска земя, българското правителство прави постъпки за премахване на чуждия контрол над родното въздухоплаване, защото като редовен член на ОН е редно България да бъде третирана като суверенна държава.⁶

След кратки преговори от 21.XI. до 14.XII.1926 г. между българската делегация и конференцията на посланиците е приготвен протокол с четири приложения, чиито

⁶ ДВИА, ф. 1049, оп.1, а.е.111, л. 321⁶.

постановления се изразяват на първо място в това, че за цивилното българско въздухоплаване се дава пълна свобода, без каквито и да е ограничения.⁷ Така българското въздухоплаване продължава да съществува като гражданско.

Първата въздушна линия над България е открита на 15 март 1927 г. от френската авиокомпания „Сидна“ по маршрут Париж–Белград–София–Цариград съгласно спогодба, сключена между българското правителство и Франция.⁸ С допълнителен протокол от 1931 г. е разрешено самолети на френската фирма „Ер Франс“ (приемник на „Сидна“) да прелитат над българска територия по линията Букурещ–Бургас–Цариград с евентуално кацане в Бургас.⁹ През 1931 г. е дадено право на германското въздухоплавателно дружество „Дойче Лувтханза“ да открие въздушна линия Берлин–Белград–София–Цариград и София–Солун.¹⁰ На 16 март 1931 г. с концесионен договор България предоставя на германския превозвач постоянно право на прелитане над страната. Това дава повод на германското министерство на транспорта да предприеме стъпки за сключване на междудържавна въздушна спогодба. Година по-късно София дава съгласие, но едва през април 1933 г. проучвателната комисия одобрява проекта, в основата на който лежи германско–норвежки договор.¹¹

В същия период от 1930 до 1940 година по силата на сключени спогодби полското предприятие „Лот“ открива въздушната линия Варшава–Букурещ–Солун; югославското „Аеропут“–София–Белград, италианското „Ала литория“ – Рим–Бриндизи–Тирана–Солун–София, румънското „Ларес“ – Букурещ–София–Солун–Атина; унгарското дружество

⁷ Пак там, л. 321⁶.

⁸ Енциклопедия България. Т. I. С., 1978, 772.

⁹ Пак там.

¹⁰ Пак там.

¹¹ Златарски, Вл. Райхът и царството. Германското присъствие в България, 1933-1940 г. С., 2014, 98.

поддържа линията Будапеща–Белград–София–Солун–Атина. На 11 ноември 1939 г. предприятието „Аерофлот“ открива въздушната линия Москва–Херсон–Бургас–София.¹²

В периода между двете световни войни България не разполага със собствена авиокомпания, нито е съоръжена с необходимите въздухоплавателни средства, чрез които да има възможността да осъществява превози в национален и международен план за нуждите на гражданската авиация.

Авиационната политика на страната осигурява използването на въздушното пространство за мирни цели, в смисъл на осъществяване на полети на самолетите на гражданската авиация над страната ни по определени трасета за страни като Германия, Италия, Франция, Румъния, Югославия, Полша, Унгария и пр., което от своя страна способства да се развие двустранното (икономическо, културно и туристическо) сътрудничество между тези държави.

За периода от 1930 до 1938 г. (след като през 1938 г. по силата на Солунската спогодба от 31 юли с.г. летище „Божурище“ отново става военно летище и българските въздушни войски се възраждат) България е записана и в международната европейска мрежа за осъществяване на полети на самолети на гражданската авиация над страната ни за държави като Германия, Полша, Франция, Италия и др., както и в световната карта за въздушни линии (последната е съставена през лятото на 1935 г. от английското списание „The Aeroplane“ и съдържа всички по-важни въздушни линии в света). В световната карта са и две важни въздушни линии, които пресичат България: едната е Балтийско море – Средиземно море, от Гдиня и Рига през Варшава–Букурещ–София–Солун, която е използвана от полското въздухоплавателно дружество; а другата е Средна Европа – Средиземно море, от Берлин, който е свързан с всички центрове в Централна и Западна Европа, през Виена–Будапеща–

¹² Енциклопедия България. Т. I. С., 1978, 772.

Белград–София към Солун (свързан посредством Атина с всички линии от Средиземно море от запад към изток). Тази въздушна линия се експлоатира от германското дружество „Дойче Луфтханза“. Над България за същия период преминава и линията Париж–Страсбург през Виена–Будапеща–Белград–София–Цариград, използвана от Френско то дружество „Air France“.

В края на декември 1939 г. в София завършват преговорите между унгарска и българска делегация за установяване на въздушна линия Будапеща–София. Те протичат в изключително приятелски дух. На 30 януари 1940 г. договорот е изготвен и Българо–унгарската въздухоплавателна компания е парафирана. По този повод и в резултат на военното сближаване между Унгария и България 25 български офицери получават унгарски отличия. Българското Външно министерство награждава осем унгарски граждани, между които и главния авиационен съветник И. Сегьо.¹³

На 4 декември 1940 г. Народното събрание одобрява подписаната на 10 ноември 1940 г. в София от И. Попов и от унгарския пълномощен министър в София М. Юнгерг–Арноти Конвенция за въздухоплаване между България и Унгария, както и Спогодба за установяване и експлоатация на редовни въздушни линии между двете държави. Тя е в сила за срок от две години, може да се продължава с мълчаливо споразумение и да се денонсира със съобщение, направено една година по-рано; съставена в два екземпляра на френски език и е подписана от ген. В. Бойдев и от М. Юнгерг–Арноти.¹⁴

В разискванията народните представители изтъкват, че конвенцията за въздухоплаване между България и Унгария е първият държавен акт, сключен между двете приятелски държави. Народните представители подчертават, че приятелството между България и Унгария е изградено върху

¹³ Гърдев, К., цит. съч., 127.

¹⁴ Пак там, 144.

две здрави основи – икономическа и политическа. Смята се, че подписаната конвенция ще допринесе твърде много, за да се задълбочат стопанските връзки между двете страни. Като политическа основа на приятелството се посочва „еднаквата политика на мирен ревизионизъм, която двете държави следват след Ньой и Трианон”. Приятелството на унгарците с България се определя като „кристално чисто” и „без сметки”. Те сърдечно желаят България да осъществи своите национални идеали и затова приемат нашата кауза като своя.¹⁵

¹⁵ Пак там, 145.

Kis iskola – nagy alku. A brailai magyar oktatás ügye a két világháború között

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BEVEZETÉS

A hazai történetírás már felfigyelt a Magyarországról, és különösen a – magyar állam keleti-délkeleti periferiájának számító, gazdasági integrációját és fejlettségét tekintve elmaradott, ugyanakkor Romániával közvetlenül határos, a román fővároshoz és a nagyobb román ipari centrumokhoz földrajzilag közelebb fekvő – Székelyföldről a regáti területekre irányuló kivándorlás jelenségére a román egységállam 19. sz. 2. felében megvalósuló megalakulásától az első világháború kitöréséig.¹ A történeti kutatások nemcsak ennek a folyamatnak a méreteit és szociális mozgatórugóit igyekeztek feltérképezni, hanem a királyi Romániában letelepedő magyarság jogi státuszával, anyaországi kapcsolatrendszerével, továbbá a nemzeti, társadalmi, kulturális és felekezeti önszerveződésével összefüggő problémákra is reflektáltak.²

¹ Itt és a későbbiekben a „Regát” toponíma alatt az 1919 előtti román állam történelmi Moldva nélküli földrajzi régióit értjük, azaz Olténia, Munténia, Dobrudzsa és a Duna-mellék egészét, azt az iparosodó vagy kereskedelmi szempontból frekvenciált településterületet, amely a legnagyobb vonzerőt gyakorolta az Erdélyből kivándorlókra.

² A legújabb hazai történeti irodalomban mindenekelőtt Makkai Béla szakmunkáit kell megemlítenünk. A teljesség igénye nélkül csak a regáti magyar katolikusságot is érintő főbb tanulmányaira utalunk. Ld. Makkai B. Magyarság gondozás Galațin (1901–1920). – In: Hagyomány, közösség, művelődés. Tanulmányok a hatvanéves Kósa László tiszteletére. Bp., 2002, 492–504; Uő., A kivándorolt magyarság anyaországi támogatása a 20. sz. elején – Ploiești példáján. – Századok, 2002, N 1,

Hasonló migrációs folyamatok zajlottak le az első világháború után román fennhatóság alá kerülő magyar kisebbségi tömegek körében, amelyek intenzitása, megítélésünk szerint, a korábbiakhoz képest nemhogy gyengült, hanem inkább erősödött, részben annak köszönhetően, hogy a felduzzasztott területű Nagy-Romániában eltűntek az államhatárok Erdély és a hagyományos migrációs célterületnek számító regáti régiók között. A két világháború között a munténiai és Duna–melléki nagyvárosokba kirajzó magyar népi elemet akár a romániai magyarság erdélyi etnikai törzsterületének nyulványaként vagy a magyar etnikai határok kitolódásaként is lehetett értelmezni, valójában azonban ezt a diaszpórát a látványos felmorzsolódása és az idegen környezetben őt érő számos akkulturációs hatás miatt inkább a teljes magyar entitás súlyos etnikai-demográfiai veszteségeként kellett elkönyvelni.³ Nem lehetett ezért véletlen, hogy a magyarság elvándorlásának problémája folyamatosan jelen volt az asszimilációs trendekre rendkívül érzékenyen reflektáló erdélyi magyar közvélemény korabeli diskurzusában, hiszen az a kisebbségi jövőkép szempontjából akár egyfajta sorsszimbólumként is felfogható és interpretálható volt. A nagyvárosi magyar kolóniák belső közösségi fejlődéstörténetére vonatkozó ismereteink mégis aránylag szerénynek mondhatók, még úgy is, ha azokat a regáti magyarság dualizmuskori történeti tudományos feldolgozottságával vetjük össze.

Tanulmányunkban a dualizmus korában alapított, de az első világháború után a magyar anyanyelvű oktatási hálózathoz kikerült brailai magyar katolikus iskola, illetve az annak helyet adó épület sorsát vizsgáljuk meg. Azért esett a választásunk erre a konkrét kérdéskörre, mert a bemutatása révén rá tudunk világítani arra a regáti magyarság általános helyzetén és kisebbségtörténeti

3–29. Ld. még: Magyar élet a régi Bukarestben. Levelestár a 19. sz. 2. feléből. Bevezető tanulmánnyal ellátta és jegyzetekkel közzéteszi: Kovách G. Encyclopaedia Transylvanica. Források és tanulmányok. Bp., 1996, 7–35.

³ Rónai A. Erdély népességi viszonyai. – Magyar Kisebbség, 2002, N 4, 125–126. Vita S. Tallózás az 1930. évi román népszámlálás köteteiben. Ibid. 145–146.

problémáin túlmutató, nem ritkán döntő érvényű politikatörténeti mozzanatra is, hogy milyen alkufolyamatok zajlottak le a magyar–román bilaterális kapcsolatokban egy-egy sokszereplős (különbféle felekezetek egyházi szervezetei, nemzetközi tényezők, magyar kormány, román kormány stb.) problémacsomó rendezésének hátterében. Az eset rekonstruálásához magyar diplomáciai forrásokat vettünk alapul. Hosszas bukaresti kutatásaink során sajnos sem a Román Nemzeti Levéltárban, sem a Román Külügyminisztérium Levéltárában nem találtuk meg ennek a szerteágazó kérdéskörnek a parallel román forrásanyagát. A rendelkezésünkre álló magyar forráskör kiegészítése és ezzel együtt a román kormányzati és egyházi aktorok szempontjainak még mélyrehatóbb elemzése a közeljövőben minden bizonnyal a Bukaresti Katolikus Érsekség Levéltárában lévő iratbázis feldolgozásával válik majd lehetővé.

A SZENT LÁSZLÓ TÁRSULAT ÉS A BRALILAI KATOLIKUS MAGYARSÁG A DUALIZMUS KORÁBAN

A bukaresti katolikus érsekség egyik első egyháztörténésze, Julius Hering által a brailai hitélet kezdeteit feltáró leírás alapján világosan arra tudunk következtetni, hogy a 19. században a felekezeti ellátás megszervezésében vezető szerepet játszottak az olykor az erdélyi egyházmegyéből érkező magyar származású lelkészek. A katolikus közösség az általa tárgyalt időszakon belül a századfordulón érte el a legnagyobb lélekszámot, a plébániai nyilvántartás szerint 1898-ban 3200 főre emelkedett. Ennek a létszámnak a felét az ő adatai szerint magyar nemzetiségűek tették ki. A szerző – a bukaresti katolikus érsekség archívumában őrzött kéziratos munkájában – részletesen kitért a felekezeti oktatás megteremtésére is. Eszerint a négyosztályos plébániai vegyes fiú- és lányiskola megnyitása is egy magyar lelkipásztor, Kis Lajos nevéhez kötődik az 1860-as évek legvégén. Kiderül továbbá, hogy már az 1870-es évektől Nagy Ádám tanító magyar nyelvet, 1888-tól pedig, Knossala János plébános szolgálatának kezdetétől az önálló magyar iskolaépület létrehozásáig a magyar

ajkú plébánoshelyettesek magyar katekizmust is oktattak a gyerekeknek. Hering azt is tudatta, hogy a magyar nyelven oktató pedagógust a szerény plébániai bevételek miatt alapvetően a budapesti Szt. László Társulat javadalmazta.⁴

Noha a fentebbiekben idézett szakmunka szerzője sejtetni engedte, hogy Brailában egy idő után önálló épülettel bíró magyar iskolát is létrehoztak, nem említette meg, hogy ez pontosan melyik évben történt. Deszke Mihálynak, a helyi Római Katolikus Temetkezési Egylet vezetőjének egy jóval későbbi leveléből azonban megtudjuk, hogy az iskolaépületet 1912-ben adták át, s ekkor kezdte meg működését az önálló magyar tanintézmény. Ő ebben a levelében azt állította, hogy az iskola létrehozásának teljes költségét, az épület helyüil szolgáló telek megvételét és az építkezési költségeket teljes egészében a Szt. László Társulat fedezte, az építési tervek elkészítésével pedig egy budapesti mérnököt bíztak meg.⁵ Később úgy emlékezett vissza, hogy az építkezési költségek biztosításához építési anyagok, téglák és mész megvásárlásával, illetve pénzadományok révén a helyi magyar hívek is hozzájárultak.⁶ Az épület fontos szerepet játszott a helyi magyar közösség művelődési igényeinek kielégítésében, oktatási funkciója mellett egyúttal a magyar dalárda, az olvasóköri és a temetkezési egylet székhelyüil is szolgált, sőt, alkalmanként imaházként is funkcionált, a magyar ajkú lelkipásztorok esténként ott tartották a különféle összejöveteleket és magyar nyelvű prédikációkat.⁷ Mivel az idegen állampolgárokat tömörítő oktatási, kulturális és társadalmi szervezetek akkoriban nem rendelkezettek nyilvánossági joggal Romániában, a Szt. László Társulat mind a

⁴ Hering, J. Analele parohiei romano-catolice Brăila cu hramul „Adormirea Maicii Domnului”. – Pro Memoria. Revistă de istorie ecleziastică, 2007, N 6, 104–109.

⁵ Deszke Mihálynak, a brailai Római Katolikus Temetkezési Egylet elnökének levele Shvoy Lajos székesfehérvári püspöknek. Braila, 11.02.1934. MNL OL, P 1431, 17. d., 1. t., 9/1934. sz.

⁶ Deszke levele Krywald Ottónak, a Szt. László Társulat ügyvezető alelnökének. Braila, 5.1.1934. MNL OL, P 1431, 17. d., 1. t., 150/1934. sz.

⁷ Deszke levele Krywaldnak. Braila, 2.03.1934. MNL OL, P 1431, 17. d., 1. t., 18/1934. sz.

telek, mind az iskola tulajdonosául August Kuczkát, a bukaresti érsekség teológiai szemináriumának lengyel származású rektorát és az egyházmegye főtanfelügyelőjét jegyeztette be.⁸

Mielőtt az eseményeket a továbbiakban nyomon követnénk, érdemes néhány gondolat erejéig kitérni azok egyik főszereplőjének, a Szt. László Társulatnak a történetére. A Szt. László Társulat 1861-ben alakult meg Pesten katolikus egyházi jótékonyági szervezetként. Az élén mindig valamely katolikus egyházi főméltóság, érsek vagy püspök állt. A legfőbb célkitűzése a történelmi Magyarország határaival kelet és dél-kelet felől szomszédos területeken élő, a magyar etnikum Kárpát-medencei törzsterületéhez képest peremhelyzetben lévő magyar eredetű és tudatú katolikus népcsoportok anyanyelvű felekezeti gondozása, az etnikai különállásukat nagymértékben elősegítő nemzeti talajú egyházi és oktatási hálózat kiépítése és fejlesztése, illetve az ehhez szükséges segélyprogram koordinálása volt. A leginkább patronált közösségek sorába tartozott a 19. sz. 2. felétől, döntően gazdasági és szociális tényezők miatt, főként Erdélyből és a Székelyföldről a román egységállam déli, dél-keleti területeire (Regát) vándorló, s a nagyobb városokban koncentrálódó magyar lakosság is.⁹

A dualizmus korában a Szt. László Társulat alapozta meg a regáti magyar gyermekek magyarországi iskoláztatásának intézményes kereteit, létrehozta az ehhez szükséges ösztöndíj-rendszert, amelyek segítségével az ott élő magyarok köréből egy, a közösségéhez kötődő saját plebejus értelmiségi réteget, papokat, tanítókat és iparosokat igyekezett kineveltetni. Hozzájárult a Románia nagyobb városaiba kiküldött, eredetileg magyar honosságú tanítók rendszeres javadalmazásához, az egyházi szertartáshoz szükséges kellékekkel, kegyzserekkel (miseruhák, áldozati kelyhek), magyar nyelvű egyházi kiadványokkal (ima- és énekeskönyvek, katekizmusok) látta el a magyar közösségeket és lelki vezetőiket, illetve – legalább részben – fedezte egyházi

⁸ Deszke levele Shvoynak. Braila, 11.02.1934. Loc. cit.

⁹ Borovi J. A szórványban élő magyar katolikusok lelkigondozásának története. Bp., 2000, 15–18.

építményeik (templomok, kápolnák) építési és felújítási költségeit is.

A Társulat igazán számottevő eredményeket a bukovinai székelység nemzeti gondozása mellett ekkoriban leginkább éppen a regáti városokba áramló, a magyar állampolgárságukat megtartó magyarok körében könyvelhetett el. Ennek viszonylagos sikerét az alapozhatta meg, hogy a román kormány engedélyezte a magyar nyelvű oktatást azon Romániában élő és dolgozó egyének gyermekei számára, akik nem mondtak le a magyar állampolgárságukról.¹⁰ Az első világháború kitörésének évében a Társulat Bukarestben két óvodát, három elemi iskolát, továbbá néhány szakiskolát is fenntartott összesen 20 tanítóval. A vidéki városok közül – különböző időszakokban – nemcsak Brailában, hanem Craiovában és Ploieşti-ben is működött egy-egy elemi iskola, de más városokban, így például Turnu Severinben, Piteşti-ben, Târgovişte-ben, és Galacon is állomásozott a Társulat által fizetett tanító. A vidéki városokban oktató magyar tanerők összlétszáma meghaladta a háromtucatnyit is. Bukarestben 1915-ben adták át a részben a helyi hívek adományaiból, részben a Társulat ráfordításával felépített, a magyar közösség hitéletét szolgáló, s magyar papság vezetése alatt álló Szt. Ilona templomot.¹¹

Szükséges aláhúzni, hogy az egyesület a Regátban elért eredményeit, és ezen belül különösen az ottani magyar oktatási hálózat szubvenciójának rendszerezését, nem kis mértékben a magyar állami szervek hozzájárulásának és közreműködésének köszönhetette. A segélykerete ugyanis az 1890-es évek első felére fokozatosan kimerült, s az évtized második felében a korábbiakhoz képest nagyságrendekkel szűkebb, már csak eseti jellegű finanszírozási lehetőségeket biztosított.¹² Az általa

¹⁰ Erre részletesen ld. Szemes József, A Szent László Társulat története 1861–1941. Veszprém, 1942, 20–64.

¹¹ Oberding J. Gy. A bukaresti magyarság egyházi, társadalmi és kulturális szervezete a világháború előtt és ma. – Kisebbségvédelem, 1939, N 6, 2.

¹² Ebben nem kis szerepet játszott az, hogy ekkorra már megmutakoztak a bukovinai székely néptöredékek 1880-as és 1890-es években véghezvitt al-dunai és

létrehozott regáti magyar katolikus egyházi oktatási hálózat zökkenőmentes működését ezért a századfordulótól egy nagyrészt kormányzati pénzekből dotált segélyprogram, az 1902-ben meginduló ún. „romániai magyar akció” katolikus ága tette lehetővé. A támogatás pénzügyi feltételeit jórészt kormányzati anyagi eszközökkel – mindenekelőtt a Vallás- és Közoktatásügyi Minisztérium ún. „vallásalapjából” és a Miniszterelnökség akcióinak titkos keretét képező ún. „külföldi alapból” – teremtték meg, de a korábban a Társulat által kezelt kisebb alapítványi vagyonokat is a kultusztárca vette át és osztotta szét. Az egyesület továbbította az érintettek számára a rendelkezésükre bocsátott összegeket, amelyek tekintetében elszámolási kötelezettséggel tartozott a kormányzat felé. Ebben a mechanizmusban a Társulat valójában a Magyarország határain kívül letelepedett magyarok javára kialakított kormányzati támogatási rendszer egyik társadalmi fedőszervévé vált.¹³

Románia hadba lépése az első világháborúban súlyos hatást gyakorolt a nagyobb városokban rekedt regáti magyarok életviszonyaira és népi közösségi perspektíváira, még a pusztaság létük is veszélyben forgott, különféle retorziókkal, elűldözéssel, internálással, gazdasági javaik konfiskálásával sújtották őket.¹⁴ Mindezek következtében a világégés komoly zavarokat, majd

dél-erdélyi visszatelepítési kísérleteinek társadalompolitikai (földbirtok-politikai nehézségek, természetföldrajzi kihívások, etnikai konfliktushelyzetek kialakulásának veszélye) ellentmondásai, amit a magyar közvélemény részben kudarcként élt meg. Ennek hatására érezhetően csökkent a Társulat iránti társadalmi figyelem és érdeklődés, illetve ezzel együtt a javára irányuló adakozási kedv. Nem lehet ezért véletlen, hogy az egyesület vezetése az évtized második felében kénytelen volt a kormányzat anyagi segítségét kérni. A dotációs nehézségekre ld.: Seres A. A magyarországi segélyezés szerepe a moldvai csángók egyházi oktatásában a 19. sz. végén. – Székelyföld, 2004, N 6, 98–104.

¹³ A támogatási szisztémára és elszámolási mechanizmusra részletesen ld. Makkai B. Magyarság gondozás Bukovinában. – Kisebbségkutatás, 2000, N 3, 475–476.

¹⁴ August Kuczának, a bukaresti érsekség főtanfelügyelőjének beszámolója a magyar Miniszterelnökségnek. Bukarest, 6.07.1918. MNL OL, K 26, 1185. cs., XVIII. t., 3517/1918. sz.

végso soron törést okozott az egyesület és a Kárpátokon kívüli magyar népcsoportok közötti összeköttetési rendszerben: Romániában szétesett a magyar nyelvű felekezeti oktatás Társulat által korábban kiépített és működtetett infrastruktúrája, az egyesület és patronáltjai közötti kapcsolatok az első világháború befejezését követően hosszú ideig szüneteltek. Románia háborús szerepvállalása az Antant oldalán Magyarország ellen a brailai magyarok életére is rendkívül kedvezőtlen következményekkel járt: a helyi magyarság jelentős része elhagyta az országot, a katolikus plébánost és helyettesét, a már említett Knossala Jánost és a magyar közösség körében szintén nagy tiszteletnek örvendő Sebastian Hübert internálták. A magyar katolikus iskolába beiratkozott gyermekek létszáma az első háborús tanévben, 1914-1915-ben regisztrált 178 főről az utolsó háborús tanévre, tehát 1917–1918-ra 84 főre zuhant. 1918 őszén a román hatóságok bezáratták az iskolát, majd az épületet kisajátították és nacionalizálták.¹⁵

A SZENT LÁSZLÓ TÁRSULAT INGATLANVAGYONA ROMÁNIÁBAN AZ ELSŐ VILÁGHÁBORÚ UTÁN

A román hatóságok által 1918-ban lefoglalt regáti magyar tanintézmények nacionalizálását jogilag az 1923-ban meghozott ún. „kisajátítási törvény” szentesítette, amely a Romániával egykor ellenséges államok alattvalóinak tulajdonában román területen lévő ingó- és ingatlanvagyon likvidálásáról határozott.¹⁶ Ennek értelmében zár alá vették a Szt. László Társulat romániai ingatlanait is, és kivették a kezéből a tulajdonosi jogok gyakorlását. Noha a törvény értelmében meginduló likvidálási eljárás évekig elhúzódott, a román pénzügyminisztérium 1926. ápr. 9-én és 10-én végül kimondta az egykor magyar tulajdonú ingatlanegyüttes elvételét a román háborús kárpótlási alap javára. A Szt. László Társulat legnagyobb épületkomplexuma Bukarestben volt, itt a

¹⁵ Hering, J., *Op. cit.*, 110–113.

¹⁶ Ld.: *Monitorul Oficial*, 13.06.1923. 1–3.

jogszabály érvényesítése összesen mintegy 12 ezer m² területen elterülő, három nagyobb épülettömb, illetve a hozzájuk tartozó telkek konfiskálásával járt együtt, amelyek összértéke az 1920-as évek második felében elérte a 20 millió lejt.¹⁷ Természetesen az intézkedések érintették az egyesület fővároson kívüli ingatlanait is, giurgiu-i, târgoviște-i, ploiești-i tanítói lakásokat, tantermeket, illetve Brailában a Bălcescu u. 7. sz. alatti, két épületszárnyból álló iskola épületét. Az objektumok többségét a román nemzeti oktatási célok érdekében hasznosították, internátusokat rendeztek be azokban ortodox fiatalok számára stb.¹⁸

Azt, hogy az ingatlanok elvétele nemcsak anyagi tekintetben sértette a magyar egyházi érdekeket, hanem a regáti magyarság szellemi kapacitásaira (illetve utánpótlására) is súlyos csapást mért, jól illusztrálja Raymund Netzhammer bukaresti katolikus érsek egyik összeállítása a Szt. László-iskolákba járó tanulók létszámáról. Az érsek által az egyházi nyilvántartások alapján összeállított kimutatás az 1918. évi állapotokra hivatkozik. Nem lehet tudni pontosan, hogy a Románia központi hatalmaktól elszenvedett veresége, illetve a bukaresti békeegyezmény utáni viszonyokat tükrözi, amikor az elüldözött magyarok egy része, s velük együtt a magyar iskolák tanári kara visszatérhetett Romániába, s néhány hónap erejéig regenerálhatta a „régai Bukarest” magyar hétköznapijait, vagy a Románia újbóli hadba lépése utáni helyzetet, amikor a magyarok ismét nemkívánatos elemekké váltak a Regátban. Tanulságos mindenesetre, hogy a Társulat 7 különféle bukaresti oktatási egységében összesen 927, a brailai Szt. László-iskolában 84, Ploiești-ben 46, Târgoviște-ben 38, míg Giurgiuban 32 tanulót számoltak össze.¹⁹

¹⁷ A Bukaresti Ítéletábra végzése. Bukarest, 1927. nov. 2. MNL OL, P 1431, 29. d., 8. t., sz. nélk.

¹⁸ Kimutatás a Romániában a háború után zár alá vett magyar egyházi ingatlanokról. Villani Frigyes bukaresti követ jelentésének 2. sz. melléklete. Bukarest, 1928. febr. 1. MNL OL, K 64, 95. cs., 1942/27. t., 115/1928. res. pol. sz.

¹⁹ Raymund Netzhammer feljegyzése G. G. Derussi román külügyminiszternek.

A bukaresti magyar követség felállítását követő első években, 1921-től, a magyar diplomácia inkább arra törekedett, hogy a bukaresti katolikus érsekségen keresztül érvényesítse az érdekeit. Az egyházmegye főpásztora 1924-ig az előbb említett Raymund Netzhammer volt, aki német nyelvterületen született, s sokáig ott szolgált, így minden bizonnyal az indíttatásából fakadóan is, nem táplált ellenszenvet a magyarokkal szemben. Emellett pragmatikus szempontok is azt diktálták számára, hogy elejét vegye az ilyenfajta ellenséges érületnek. A viszonylag fiatal, csak 1884-ben megalakult egyházmegyét még a román tényezők is alapvetően „nemzetiségi egyházmegyének” tekintették. Joggal, ugyanis abban a román ajkúak aránya teljesen elhanyagolható volt, a döntő etnikai elemét, mind a papság, mind a hívek körében, a nem államalkotó nemzetiségek képviselői, németek, magyarok és lengyelek tették ki. Az akár mesterségesen generált etnikai konfliktusok nyilván akadályozták volna a még friss és kialakulatlan egyházi infrastruktúra fejlesztését, amelynek legnagyobb terhe 1905-től éppen Netzhammer vállára nehezedett.²⁰ Mivel Várady Lipót Árpád, a Szt. László Társulat akkori elnöke, a magyar diplomácia jóváhagyását is maga mögött tudva, a magyar nyelvűséget előtérbe helyező preferenciák ellenében hajlott arra, hogy átruházza az épületek tulajdonjogát a bukaresti érsekségre,²¹ a német főpásztor regnálása idején az egyetemes katolikus egyház szempontjaira és az intézmények karitatív jellegére hivatkozva, a bukaresti érsekség reprezentánsai lépéseket tettek a kormányzatnál az elkobzás visszavonása érdekében. Az érsek az eseményeket napi

Bukarest, 10.01.1922. Arhiva Ministerului Afacerilor de Externe (AMAE), fond „Problema 16” (Școli străine în România), Vol. 21, Nr. 2761/1922.

²⁰ Netzhammer, N., Kr. Zach (Eds.). Raymund Netzhammer, Episcop în România. Înt-o epocă a conflictelor naționale și religioase. Vol. 1. București, 2005, 20–23, 29–34.

²¹ A Társulat részéről mindvégig hangsúlyozták, hogy ez az ajándékozás csak színlelt jogügylet lenne. Ennek keretében a kedvezményezettnek egy bizalmas nyilatkozatot kellene kiállítania, amellyel elismerné a Társulat birtokjogát, s annak fejében évi jelképes összeg megfizetésére kötelezné magát. A Szt. László Társulat igazgatósági ülésének jegyzőkönyve. Bp., 31.05.1922. MNL OL, P 1431, 24. d., 6. t.

pontossággal visszaidéző naplójában minden esetben utal arra, amikor az illetékes kormánytényezőkkel, olykor magával a kormányfővel folytatott személyes konzultációin felvetette ezt a kérdést, s többször is bővebb emlékeket őrzött meg arról, hogy a felek részéről milyen érvek hangzottak el ezeken a megbeszéléseken.²² Ő valóban energikusan szorgalmazta a kérdés megoldását, igaz, a zár alóli feloldásra, továbbá az iskolák magyar jellegének megőrzésére és az ott folyó oktatásban a magyar nemzeti szempontok tolerálására maga is csak abban az esetben látott garanciát, ha az ominózus ingatlanok az érsekség kezelésébe kerülnek és az oktatás az érsekségi iskolahálózat keretében valósul meg.²³ A magyar diplomáciai iratokból tudjuk azt, hogy 1923-ban a már említett August Kuczka prelátus is egy memorandummal fordult a kormányhoz a kérdés megoldása érdekében. A bukaresti katolikus klérus erőfeszítései azonban eredménytelenek maradtak.

Az események az 1926. áprilisi pénzügyminiszteri rendelet meghozatalát követően felgyorsultak, ugyanis ezek a rendelkezések végérvényessé tették a szekvesztrummal bekövetkező állapotokat. A magyar kormány május 11-én diplomáciai jegyzékben tiltakozott ez ellen, de Villani Frigyes bukaresti követ személyesen is interveniált a román külügyi tárcánál a végrehajtás felfüggesztése, illetve a szóban forgó vagyonelemek zár alóli felszabadítása érdekében.²⁴

A román kormányzat álláspontját belpolitikai szempontok is befolyásolták. Mint ismert, 1926. ápr. 1-jén lemondott posztjáról Ugron István, az Országos Magyar Párt elnöke. A helyére egyelőre ideiglenesen designált politikus, Bethlen György felújította az Alexandru Averescu nevével fémjelzett, s március 27-től kormányzati pozícióban levő Román Néppárttal

²² Raymund Netzhammer, *Op. cit.*, Vol. II. 863, 928, 1002–1003, 1036–1037, 1074, 1122–1123, 1148, 1191, 1124, 1128, 1241, 1243–1244, 1251.

²³ *Ibid.* 1035.

²⁴ Összefoglaló jelentés a Szent László Társulat ingatlanai ügyében. Villani Frigyes bukaresti követ jelentésének 1. sz. melléklete. Bukarest, 1.02.1928. *Loc. cit.*

folytatott korábbi kooperációt, s ápr. 26-án választási kartellt kötött vele.²⁵ A magyar követ személyes eljárása során óvatosan utalt is a kormány és a magyar etnikai párt közötti együttműködésre. Noha Bukarest a békeszerződés 232. cikkelyére hivatkozva elutasította a magyar követelést,²⁶ minden bizonnyal belpolitikai megfontolásból, azaz az OMP támogatásának megőrzésére való tekintettel, egy kisebb engedményt téve, a bukaresti Szt. Ilona templomot kivonta a szekvesztrum alól. Román részről azzal is érveltek, hogy a pénzügyminiszteri rendeletekkel szemben Majláth Gusztáv Károly erdélyi püspök időközben jogi úton terjesztett be kifogást.²⁷

Noha a püspök és az államrezon közötti peres eljárás 1926–1927 folyamán két joghatóságra (ilfovi törvényszék, bukaresti ítélőtábla) is eljutott, az nem vezetett eredményre,²⁸ alapjában véve annak köszönhetően, hogy azok egyike sem ismerte el a püspök illetékességét a kérdésben. Noha utóbbi érveit döntően az egyetemes katolicizmus érdekeire, a kánonjogra, és a Szt. László Társulattól kapott formális megbízatására alapozta, továbbá hivatkozott a közben román állampolgárságúvá lett erdélyi és a regáti magyar katolikus hívek közadakozásának elsődleges

²⁵ Az Országos Magyar Pártnak szüksége volt román szövetségesre, hogy kiegészíthesse a választói névjegyzékeket, vagyis szavazóbázisa részt vehessen a választásokon. A választási kartell belpolitikai előzményeire részletesen ld. Mikó I. Huszonkét év. Az erdélyi magyarság története 1918. dec. 1-től 1940. aug. 30-ig. Bp., 1941, 54–60.

²⁶ A trianoni békeszerződés 232. cikkelye kimondta, hogy a szövetséges hatalmak jogában áll azokat a javakat, jogokat és érdekeket felszámolni, amelyek a saját területükön a Magyar Királyság állampolgárainak vagy az ellenőrzésük alatt álló szervezeteknek a tulajdonában állnak. A passzus rendelkezett arról is, hogy a felszámolás az illető szövetséges állam törvényeinek megfelelően történik. Az 1921/XXIII. tc. vonatkozó cikkelyének szövegét ld.: Magyar törvénytár. 1921. évi törvénycikkek. Jegyzetekkel ellátta: Dr. Térffy Gy. Bp., 1922, 276–280.

²⁷ Összefoglaló jelentés a Szent László Társulat ingatlanai ügyében. Villani Frigyes bukaresti követ jelentésének 1. sz. melléklete. Bukarest, 1928. február 1. Loc. cit.

²⁸ A Szt. László Társulat igazgatósági ülésének jegyzőkönyve. Bp., 23.02.1928. MOL, P 1431, 24. d., 6. t.

szerepére is a bukaresti egyházi ingatlanok felépítésében, a román bíróság a jogcímét azok vonatkozásában nem látta igazoltnak.²⁹ Nem lehet ezért meglepő, hogy a Szt. László Társulat egyik budapesti közgyűlésén felvetődött egy olyan elképzelés is, hogy az egyesületet Romániában is jegyezzék be jogi személyként abból a célból, hogy a további működésének is zálogául tekintett vagyontörzs legtetemesebb részét képező romániai ingatlan-komplexumot legalább a romániai peres eljárás keretén belül, törvényes úton visszaszerezhesse.³⁰ Egyes dokumentumok alapján bizonyos, hogy a per egészen az 1930-as évek első feléig elhúzódott, döntően amiatt, hogy szinte minden román jogalany élt az időhúzás taktikájával. A bukaresti ítélőtábla 1927. évi végzésével szemben az erdélyi püspökség által megbízott román ügyvéd fellebbezéssel kívánt élni a semmitőszéknél, de a fellebbezéshez szükséges hivatalos dokumentáció beszerzését mind a pénzügyi tárca, mind az ítélőtábla hátráltatta.³¹

A magyar kormányzat ezzel párhuzamosan kísérletet tett arra is, hogy az OMP és a kormánypárt közötti együttműködést kiaknázva mozdítsa előre az ügyet, ezért bukaresti követe révén sürgette a magyar kisebbségi vezetők fellépését. Erre alapot adott az is, hogy a két politikai erő, az OMP és a Néppárt közötti választási paktum 3. fejezetének 1. pontja kifejezetten előírta a zár alá vett magyar katolikus és református iskolák visszaadására irányuló egyeztetések megkezdését. Bethlen György pártelnök és Gyárfás Elemér, a Katolikus Státus világi elnöke által tett puhatolózások a kérdés rendezésének lehetőségét illetőleg mégsem jártak sikerrel. A két vezető ezért végül azt

²⁹ A Bukaresti Itélőtábla végzése. Bukarest, 2.11.1927, Loc. cit.

³⁰ A Szt. László Társulat igazgatósági ülésének jegyzőkönyve. Bp., 23.02.1928, Loc. cit.

³¹ Török Ferenc levele Faluhelyi (Frey) Ottó ügyvédnek, Majláth Gusztáv Károly magyarországi jogi képviselőjének. Gyulafehérvár, 1933. január 28. MNL OL, P 1431, 29. d., 8. t., sz. nélk. Minden bizonnyal a semmitőszék is az elévülésre játszott, a fellebbezéssel kapcsolatban még 1934-ben sem hozott ítéletet. A Szt. László Társulat választmányi ülésének jegyzőkönyve. Bp., 8.06.1934. MNL OL, P 1431, 22. d., 1. t.

javasolta, hogy bizonyos feltételek teljesülése esetén a Szt. László Társulat javait ruházzák át a bukaresti katolikus érsekségre. Ezt, a korábbi magyar elképzelésekhez részben visszanyúló javaslatukat 1927. nov. 21-én közölték a magyar követtel. Úgy vélték, hogy ha Alexander Theodor Cisar bukaresti érseket bevonják a megbeszélésekbe, akkor nagyobb reménnyel juthatnak megállapodásra a kormánnyal. Igaz, ebben a konstrukcióban a *modus vivendi* megteremtését nagymértékben nehezítette, hogy az érsek elődjéhez képest jóval kevésbé hajlott a magyar nemzeti szempontok akceptálására.³² Az erdélyi magyar politikusok elképzelése szerint ugyanis a javak átadásáért cserébe az oktatási intézmények működtetésére vegyes iskolaszéket kellett volna alakítani a bukaresti érsek, az erdélyi, a nagyváradi és a szatmári püspök jelöltjeiből. Ebben a román szellemű érsekség és a magyar dominanciájú egyházmegyék között paritás létezett volna. Ezzel szemben az érsek legfeljebb a helybeli magyarság részvételével megalakuló oktatási önkormányzati testületet engedélyezett volna. Nem járult hozzá továbbá ahhoz sem, hogy a visszaadott iskolák tannyelve a magyar legyen, legfeljebb a magyar nyelv elsődlegességét méltányolta volna.³³

A kormányközi megállapodás esélyét ráadásul a minimálisra csökkentette, hogy az Averescu-kormány alig egyéves regnálása után, 1927. jún. 4-én megbukott, s ezzel sokak szerint vele bukott az OMP addigi politikai vonalvezetése is, hiszen a magyar vezetők egyetlen kívánságuk teljesítését sem tudták elérni azoknál, akik győzelmüket részben a magyar szavazatoknak köszönhették. Ezt követően az OMP a kisebbségi politizálás felé próbált orientálódni,

³² Netzhammert a Vatikán a román kormány nyomására váltotta le az érsekség éléről. Eltávolítására az egyik legfőbb ürügyet éppen a nemzetiségek és a kisebbségi nyelvhasználat iránti empátiája, és ezzel a „román nemzeti érdekek sérelme” szolgáltatta. Cisar érseksége valóban egy új korszak nyitányát jelentette, ő elődjénél érezhetően merevebb álláspontot képviselt egyházmegyéjének magyarságával szemben. Raymund Netzhammer, *Op. cit.*, Vol. I. 63–71.

³³ Összefoglaló jelentés a Szt. László Társulat ingatlanai ügyében. Villani Frigyes bukaresti követ jelentésének 1. sz. melléklete. Bukarest, 1.02.1928, *Loc. cit.*

ami leginkább a magyar–német választási blokk 1927. jún. 14-i megalakításában öltött testet,³⁴ majd 1928-tól önállóan mérettette meg magát a parlamenti választásokon.³⁵ Nyilvánvaló, hogy Bethlen és Gyárfás novemberi javaslata már a politikai erőviszonyok kedvezőtlen átalakulását, a pártközi kapcsolatokban az OMP által élvezett alkupozíció elvesztését is tükrözte.

Mint láttuk, a magyar kormány a megegyezést – a háttérből mozgatva –, belpolitikai és egyházi vonalon, illetve jogi úton is igyekezett kikényszeríteni. Bukarest nagyobb engedékenységre bírása érdekében emellett a diplomáciai nyomásgyakorlás eszközével is élt, ugyanis a budapesti Gozsdu Alapítvány státuszának román részről már régóta szorgalmazott megoldását összekötötte a Szt. László Társulat ingatlanainak kérdésével is. Mint ismert, Gozsdu Manó (1802–1870) román származású író és politikus, továbbá társadalmi és kulturális mecénás,³⁶ az 1869-ben meghozott végrendeletében a vagyonából egy magánalapítványt hozott létre, amely román nemzetiségű, ortodox hitű fiatalok tanulmányait támogatta. Az alapítvány vagyona, amelyre román részről igényt tartottak, az impériumváltás után Magyarországon maradt. A magyar kormány álláspontja az volt, hogy az alapítvány ügyét a Romániában 1919 után elkobzott magyar egyesületi vagyonok tulajdonjogi kérdésével együtt kell rendezni rekompenzációs alapon. Mivel a román vezetés vonakodott ettől, a magyar kormány 1926-ban zárolta a Gozsdu Alapítvány budapesti bankszámláját. Az általunk tanulmányozott iratokból arra lehet következtetni, hogy az elsődlegesen erdélyi egyházi karitatív és oktatási intézményeket tartalmazó magyar követeléslistára csak

³⁴ György B. Magyar–német kisebbségi blokk Romániában (1927). – In: Nazare, D. et al. (Red.). In honorem Gernot Nussbächer. Braşov, 2004, 349–353.

³⁵ Utoljára 1938-ban került sor arra, hogy az OMP választási paktumot kötött román politikai erővel, mégpedig az Octavian Goga nevével fémjelzett Nemzeti Keresztény Párttal. Az OMP egész korszakon átívelő kisebbségpolitikai stratégiáira részletesen ld.: Bárdi Nándor, A romániai magyarság kisebbségpolitikai stratégiái a két világháború között. – Regio, 1997, N 2, 32–66.

³⁶ Románul Manuil Gojdu.

később kerültek fel a Szt. László Társulat regáti ingatlanai,³⁷ s Villani Frigyes magyar követ minden bizonnyal csak 1927. ápr. 26-án jelezte a román külügyminisztériumban, hogy a magyar kormány e két probléma között is junktimot fog teremteni,³⁸ amivel nyilván a Bukarestre gyakorolt nyomást kívánta kombinálni.

A romániai ingatlanvagyon kérdése a két világháború közötti időszakban végig megterhelte a Szt. László Társulat tevékenységét, s az 1920-as években szinte kizárólagos jelleggel dominált a vezető testületeinek (választmány, igazgatóság) ülésén. Sőt, 1929-től az egyesület megújulási folyamatának kezdete is közvetve ezzel a kérdéskörrel hozható összefüggésbe. 1912–1923 között, így az első világháború idején a már említett Várady Lipót Árpád győri püspök majd kalocsai érsek volt a Társulat egyházi elnöke, akit Glattfelder Gyula szeged-csanádi püspök követett az egyesület élén. Az 1911-ben püspökké designált utóbbiról közismert, hogy az impériumváltás után is egyházmegyéje korabeli székhelyén, Temesváron maradt. Az 1920-as évek legelején többször hangot adott a magyar nemzetiségűeket diszkrimináló román földbirtok-politikával szembeni álláspontjának, továbbá a Románia és a Szentszék közötti konkordátumtárgyalásokon ő fogta össze a magyar nemzetiségű püspököket, és következetesen képviselte a magyar érdekeket. Mindez a román hatóságokkal való sorozatos összeütközésekhez vezetett, s ez a konfliktus idővel tarthatatlanná tette a helyzetét Romániában.³⁹ Tiltakozó körleveleire⁴⁰ válaszul a román hatóságok 1923-ban kiutasították az országból.

A román kormánnyal való szembeszegülése azonban

³⁷ Khuen-Héderváry K. feljegyzése a Gozsdu Alapról folytatott tárgyalásokról. Bp., 5.03.1927. MOL, K 28, 201. cs., 380. t., 1526/1935. M. E. al. sz., 144/1927. biz. sz.

³⁸ Összefoglaló jelentés a Szt. László Társulat ingatlanai ügyében. Villani Frigyes bukaresti követ jelentésének 1. sz. melléklete. Bukarest, 1.02.1928. Loc. cit.

³⁹ Erre részletesen ld.: Varga A. *Chronica Aulae Episcopalis Timisoaraensis*. (Seria Documente Istorie Mărturii). Cluj–Napoca, 2008, 349–373. Ld. még: Juhász K. Temesvártól Szegedig. – Erdélyi Tudósító, 1941, N 6, 85.

⁴⁰ Ld. pl.: Glattfelder püspök nagyszabású pásztorlevele. – Temesvári Hírlap, 1923. feb. 9., 2–3.

megalapozta Glattfelder tekintélyét a magyarországi politikai közvélemény és egyházi vezetés körében,⁴¹ később számos egyházi funkciója mellett a Szt. László Társulat elnökévé is megválasztották, amelynek végül hat évig állt az élén. A tiszteről 1929-ben mondott le. Erre vonatkozó döntését az egyesület április 22-i választmányi ülésén jelentette be, s azzal indokolta, hogy a román állam és a Vatikán közötti konkordátum megkötésével a Társulat és a román kormányzat között új jogi status quo alakult ki.⁴² (Az egyezmény 21. cikkelye ugyanis kimondta, hogy azon egyházi javak tulajdonjogának kérdése, amelyek Romániában fekszenek, de olyan egyházi és vallási jogi személyhez tartoznak, amelyeknek a székhelye a román állam határain kívülre esik, külön megegyezés tárgyát képezik.⁴³) Glattfelder azon véleményének adott hangot, hogy a konkordátum rendelkezései engedékenyebb magatartásra készítetik majd a román kormányt a bukaresti ingatlanok kérdésében. Arra hivatkozott, hogy az ő személye „vörös posztó” a román hatóságok szemében, és ezt a személyi akadályt el kell távolítani a majdan meginduló tárgyalások elől. A választmányi ülést ezért még aznap közgyűléssé alakították, amely hivatott volt személyi kérdésekben, így az új elnök meg-

⁴¹ Gergely J. Glattfelder Gyula csanádi püspök a magyar Katolikus Püspöki Kar konferenciáin (1911–1943). – In: Zombori I. (Ed.). Igazságot – szeretettel. Glattfelder Gyula élete és munkássága. A Szegeden, 1993. szept. 3-án tartott konferencia kibővített anyaga. Bp.–Szeged, 1995, 42–44. 1927-ben, Prohászka Ottokár székesfehérvári püspök halála után Glattfelder lett a rangidős a megyéspüspökök sorában, ráadásul ő rendelkezett a legnagyobb közéleti tapasztalatokkal, nem lehetett tehát véletlen, hogy elhunyt püspöktársa számos magas egyházi funkcióját vette át. Még ugyanabban az évben, Csernoch János esztergomi érsek halála után az érseki szék várományosaként is felmerült a neve, a magyar kormányzat az ő személyének jelölése érdekében próbált meg közbenjárni a Szentszéknél. Zombori I. Glattfelder Gyula tevékenysége a parlamentben (1911–1943). Ibid. 111.

⁴² A Szt. László Társulat választmányi ülésének és közgyűlésének jegyzőkönyve. Bp., 22.04.1929. MNL OL, P 1431, 1. t., 17. d., 3/1929. sz.

⁴³ Konkordátum és Római Egyezmény. Cluj–Kolozsvár, Szt. Bonaventura Könyvnyomda, 1933, 12.

választásáról is dönteni. Az új vezetőség köréből a későbbiekben két személy neve fémjelezte a Társulat tevékenységét: az új egyházi elnök Shvoy Lajos székesfehérvári püspök, az új egyházi alelnök, az egyesület „motorja” Krywald Ottó prépost, a budatétényi Názáret Missziósház vezetője lett.⁴⁴

Véleményünk szerint Glattfelder helyzetértékelése téves volt, amit természetesen csak az események későbbi menetének ismeretében állíthatunk. A konkordátum ugyanis kivonta a magyar–román egyezkedési folyamatból a katolikus érdekek egyetemes védelmezőjének tekintett, egyúttal nemzetközi tényezőnek minősülő pápai államot, s ezzel a vagyoni jogi kérdések tisztázását kizárólag a két, egyébként egyenlőtlen fajsúlyú ország illetékességébe utalta. A Szentszék autoritásának hiánya ebben a vitás kérdésben a román kormány részéről könnyen időhúzáshoz, a probléma elodázásához vezethetett. Úgy tűnik ráadásul, hogy a magyar engedmények tárgya részben a bukaresti épületkomplexum lett, ugyanis a Gozsdu Alapítvány státuszát rendező jóval későbbi, 1937. október 27-i magyar–román kétoldalú megállapodásba végül nem vették fel az óromániai javak kérdésének megoldását. Már itt megelőlegezzük azt is, hogy az általunk tárgyalt tágabb korszak végéig, azaz 1944-ig, a kérdés magyar nemzeti érdekeknek megfelelő regulációját egyáltalán nem sikerült elérni.⁴⁵

A BRAILAI KATOLIKUS ISKOLA STÁTUSÁNAK KÉRDÉSE

A brailai katolikus iskolaépület ügye nem vált el teljesen a Szt. László Társulat bukaresti ingatlankomplexumának sorsától, 1926-tól kezdődően mégis más jogi megítélés alá esett. Mint korábban utaltunk rá, a Társulat annak idején az iskola tulajdonjogát, az oktatás megkezdésének lehetővé tétele érdekében August Kuczka prelátus nevére íratta, aki akkoriban német

⁴⁴ Ugyanekkor Glattfeldert tiszteletbeli elnökké választották. A Szt. László Társulat választmányi ülésének és közgyűlésének jegyzőkönyve. Bp., 22.04.1929. Loc. cit.

⁴⁵ Árvay Zs. A bukaresti magyarok lélekszámának alakulása. – In: Györfi Ibolya et. al. (Eds.). A Bukaresti Petőfi Művelődési Társaság Értesítője. 1994–1997. Bukarest, 1998, 99–100.

állampolgárnak számított, mivel a német fennhatóság alá tartozó sziléziai Osinyben látta meg a napvilágot.⁴⁶ Ez a terület azonban a világháború után Lengyelország birtokába került. A területiális átrendeződés Kuczka számára kedvező jogi konstellációt teremtett, hiszen erre támaszkodva ki tudta jární, hogy lengyel honosságot szerezzen. Így a tulajdonában lévő ingatlanra nem terjedhetett ki a kisajátítási törvény hatálya, hiszen – a háború idején még nem is létező – Lengyelország nem állt katonai konfliktusban Romániával.⁴⁷ Kuczka a román állammal szembeni jogigényét így is egy peres eljárás keretében tudta csak érvényesíteni, igaz, a per megnyerése érdekében a diplomáciai kapcsolatait is mozgósította, a processzus idején végig a lengyel követ támogatását élvezte. Nem volt tehát véletlen, hogy az iskolaépület zár alóli feloldását a saját érdemének tudta be. Ráadásul mindvégig azt hangoztatta, hogy mind a pereskedésre, mind az épületen később végzett állagmegóvási munkálatokra tetemes összegeket áldozott a saját megtakarításaiból.⁴⁸ Deszke Mihály, a helyi Római Katolikus Temetkezési Egylet vezetője ugyanakkor felhívta a figyelmet arra, hogy Kuczka a per lefolyása – és megnyerése – után 1 millió 200 ezer lejes kártérítést is nyert a román államtól. Az ő leveleiből is tudhatjuk azt is, hogy a háború után az iskolaépületbe helyezett román állami leányiskola növendékeit a tulajdonjogi viszonyok tisztázása után kiköltöztették onnan.⁴⁹

A katolikus iskolaépület tulajdonviszonyainak rehabilitálása a brailai magyarság anyanyelvű oktatási perspektíváit döntő módon befolyásoló pillanatban következett be, ugyanis a még magyar

⁴⁶ Iosif, G. Istoria seminarului catolic din București. – Pro Memoria. Revistă de istorie ecleziastică. 2007, N 6, 234. Osiny németül: Rothhaus.

⁴⁷ Magyary A. bukaresti követ jelentése Walko L. külügyminiszternek. Bukarest, 21.01.1930. MNL OL, K 64, 39. cs., 1930/27. t., 41/1930. res. pol. sz.

⁴⁸ Nagy L. bukaresti ideiglenes ügyvivő jelentése Kánya K. külügyminiszternek. Bukarest, 21.04.1934. MNL OL, K 64, 95. cs., 1942/27. t., 168/1934. res. pol. sz.

⁴⁹ Deszke levele Shvoynak. Braila, 11.02.1934. Loc. cit. Az épületet a hadsereg foglalta le, s az utolsó háborús évben, illetve minden bizonnyal még 1919-ben is katonai raktárként használták azt. R. Netzhammer, Op. cit., Vol. II. 862.

tannyelvű református elemi iskola éppen a zár alóli feloldással egy időben szüntette meg a működését.

Hegyi Mózesnek, az 1936–1940 között a helyi református egyházközség élén álló lelkésznek a könyvéből tudhatjuk, hogy a reformátusok által 1867-ben alapított, az 1873-1886 közötti majd másfél évtizedes szünet után újrainduló, s ezt követően folyamatosan fenntartott brailai iskolát a román hatóságok 1918-ban, a világháború végén, ugyancsak bezárták. Igaz, az intézmény 1921-ben, Torró Miklós lelkészsege idején, második kényszerszünete után ismét megkezdte működését.⁵⁰ A városban tehát a háború után is létezett intézményes kerete a magyar anyanyelvű oktatásnak, s mindennek témánk szempontjából is van jelentősége, hiszen Hegyi Mózes egyik mellékelt táblázatából egyértelműen kiderül, hogy felekezeti jellege ellenére az iskolába más vallású gyerekek is jártak, sőt, az 1921-1922-től 1926-1927-ig tartó hat tanévben, az elsőt leszámítva, a katolikus növendékek alkották a legnagyobb létszámú csoportot. Rajtuk kívül lutheránus és izraelita tanulók is színesítették a konfesszionális összképet. A legtöbb tanuló, 33 fő, az 1925-1926. tanévben iratkozott be az iskolába, közülük 17 volt a katolikus. A következő tanévben a beiratkozottak száma 23 főre csökkent,⁵¹ majd 1927 őszére, döntően a szülők elköltözése miatt, csak 5 növendékük maradt, ezért a lelkész felfüggesztette az iskola működését.⁵² Hegyi véleménye szerint a református iskolának a kegyelemdőfést nem is az 1918-1921 közötti kényszerszünet, hanem az 1912-1913. tanév adta meg, amikor megnyitották a Szt. László Társulat katolikus iskoláját, amely a gyermekek megnyerése érdekében kedvezményesen, esetleg díjmentesen vállalta az oktatást. Az 1890-es és 1900-as években, olykor még a 150 fős létszámot is elérő, de mindvégig stabilan több mint 100 gyermeket oktató és nevelő, ugyanakkor a szülőktől némi tandíjat szedő református

⁵⁰ Hegyi M. Végvár. A 75 éves brailai református egyházközség történetéből. Kolozsvár, 1937, 72.

⁵¹ Ibid. III. sz. tábl.

⁵² Ibid. 74.

iskola létszáma ezt követően apadt le vészesen, sőt, később emiatt kellett azt vegyes jellegűvé alakítani.⁵³

A per megnyerése, illetve a zárlat feloldása után az időközben Brailából Turnu Severinbe áthelyezett Kuczka a felmerülő tulajdonjogi ellenmondások kontextusában eleinte maga is hangsúlyozta, hogy kompromisszumra törekszik a Szt. László Társulat vezetőségével.⁵⁴ Magyary Antal bukaresti követ a vele folytatott beszélgetésről is ebben az értelemben jelentett a Dísz térre: „*Kuczka prälátus [sic! – S. A.], akinek a romániai magyar katolikus iskolák úgyszólván életművét képezik, most arról óhajtana gondoskodni, hogy a brailai iskolaépület tulajdonjoga cessió, ajándék, névleges eladás, vagy bármely más úton ismét magyar kezekbe jusson, nehogy halála esetén a tulajdonjog körül bonyodalmak keletkezzenek.*”⁵⁵ Ennek azonban némiképp ellentmond, hogy – mint az általa írt terjedelmes memorandumból kitűnik – az iskolaépület átadását a Szt. László Társulathoz igazából ő maga sem tartotta megfelelő megoldásnak. Eleve célszerűtlennek, sőt lehetetlennek vélte ezt addig, amíg magyar szempontból nem rendeződik kedvezően a Társulat teljes ingatlanvagyonának státusza. Más romániai magyar szervezetekre sem kívánta átruházni az épület tulajdonjogát. Alapvetően azzal érvelt, hogy annak idején az iskolát a magyar útlevéllel rendelkező

⁵³ Ibid. 72. Az 1930. évi román népszámlálás hivatalos statisztikái szerint az adatfelvétel időpontjában Brailában közel 1150 fő vallotta magát magyar nemzetiségűnek, ami százalékarányosan a város – kerekítve mintegy 68 ezer fős – összlakosságának csupán 1,7 %-át tette ki. Forrás: *Recensământul general al populației României din 29 decembrie 1930. Vol. 2. Neam, limba maternă, religie.* Publicat de Sabin Manuilă. București, 1938. LXII. tábl. A helyi viszonyokat jól ismerő magyar egyháziak becslései az 1920-as, 1930-as évek fordulóján ennél jóval nagyobbra, 3-4 ezer fősre tették a helyi magyarság lélekszámát. Erre ld. pl.: Vécsey József Aurél beadványa a Szt. László Társulat elnökségének. Hely nélkül, dátum nélkül. [Bp., 23.02.1928 előtt]. MNL OL, P 1431, 17. d., 1. t., 1/1928. sz. Továbbá: Deszke levele Krywaldnak. Braila, 5.11.1934. Loc. cit.

⁵⁴ Kuczka német nyelvű memorandumja Shvoynak. Bukarest, 31.08.1934. MNL OL, P 1431, 17. d., 1. t., sz. nélkül.

⁵⁵ Magyary jelentése Walkónak. Bukarest, 21.01.1930. Loc. cit.

katolikusok gyerekei részére hozták létre, s mivel Brailában a háború után alig maradt magyar állampolgár, a magyar szülőktől származó, de román honosságú gyermekek javára történő hasznosítása ellentmondana az alapító okiratban foglalt alapelveknek, ezért a román hivatalos szervek egészen biztosan áthidalhatatlan akadályokat gördítenének a működése elé.⁵⁶

A kompromisszum kialakítását jelentős mértékben megnehezítette a Kuczka és a helyi magyar katolikus közösség között az iskolaépület hasznosítása körül kialakult konfliktus. Deszke Mihály egyik későbbi levelében tömör, de érzékletes képet festett erről: „*Mi kértük szépen [t. i. a per megnyerése után – S. A.], adná vissza iskolánkat, és azt felelte, az iskola saját tulajdona, azt tesz véle, amit akar.*”⁵⁷ Ennek háttérében minden bizonnyal az is meghúzódott, hogy a lengyel lelkipásztor közvetlenül a Szt. László Társulat vezetőségével kívánt egyezkedni, és nem az általa inkompetensnek tartott helyi temetkezési egyesület előljáróival. Nyilván erre azért is érezhetett erkölcsi alapot, mert a személyét a világháború előtti tevékenysége okán általános közmegbecsülés övezte a Társulat tagsága körében. Erre egyértelműen utal az, hogy a Társulat igazgatóságának tagjai egyhangúlag méltánylandónak ítélték, hogy a romániai magyar iskolák érdekében teljesített szolgálata címén végellátásban részesüljön, ezért 1921. ápr. 1-től számítva évi 40 ezer koronás kegydíj kiutalásáról

⁵⁶ Kuczka német nyelvű memoranduma Shvoynak. Bukarest, 1934. augusztus 31. Loc. cit. A meglehetősen terjedelmes irat jelentős forrásértékkel rendelkezik, hiszen Kuczka, amellet, hogy ismerteti a XIX. századi bukaresti katolikus érsekek és az egyházmegye területén élő magyar ajkú hívek közötti viszonyrendszert, részletesen kitér az egyházmegye magyar honosságú híveinek 1918–1919. évi kálváriájára. Leírja például, hogy a magyar gyülekezettel együtt internálták őt is, s miután kitoloncolták őket Romániából, rövid ideig a budapesti Központi Szemináriumban tudott elhelyezkedni. A proletárdiktatúra hatalomra jutása után személyesen találkozott Kun Bélával, aki, némi készpénzt is biztosítva számára, elintézte, hogy magyar utazási igazolvánnyal a németországi rokonaihoz távozhasson.

⁵⁷ Deszke levele Shvoynak. Braila, 11.02.1934. Loc. cit.

határoztak a számára.⁵⁸ (Az – ekkor egyébként a történetének talán legsúlyosabb finaciális válságával küszködő – egyesület pénztárnaplójának tanúsága szerint 1923 harmadik negyedévéig, negyedéves bontásban rendszerint át is utalták neki a számára elkülönített összeget.⁵⁹) Kuczka olyan információkat is közölt, melyek szerint a brailai Római Katolikus Temetkezési Egylet – noha a saját okmányai szerint a vezetősége (elnöke, titkára, számviteli ellenőre) magyar származásúakból állt –, az idők során fokozatosan elvesztette a magyar etnikai jellegét, elrománosodott, s az 1930-as évek második felére a tagságát már 80–90 %-ban ortodox románok alkották.⁶⁰

Kuczka elmondásából is egyértelműen arra lehet következtetni, hogy a brailai ingatlan ügyében megfordult Magyarországon, de állítása szerint ott „süket fülekre” talált.⁶¹ Valóban konstatálható, hogy 1930. jan. 22-én Budapestre utazott, hogy a Szt. László Társulat újonnan megválasztott vezetőségével tárgyaljon,⁶² a személyes találkozója Shvoyjal mégsem jött létre.⁶³

A *modus vivendi* kialakítását nyilván az is hátráltatta, hogy a Szt. László Társulat a tisztújítás ellenére sokáig „tetszhalott-állapotban” volt. Az újjáalakulással kapcsolatos nehézségeket jelzi, hogy az ügyvitel átvétele, s azzal együtt a készpénz- és ingatlanvagyon felmérése, leltározása, az irattár

⁵⁸ Kuczka a munkaképtelenségére hivatkozva saját maga fordult ilyen irányú kérelemmel a Társulat vezetőségéhez. A Szent László Társulat igazgatósági ülésének jegyzőkönyve. Bp., 19.11.1921. MNL OL, P 1431, 24. d., 6. t.

⁵⁹ Az 1934-1944 közötti pénztárnaplót ld.: MNL OL, P 1431, 7. t., 29. d.

⁶⁰ Gyárfás Elemér romániai parlamenti szenátor levele Teleki Pálnak, a Szt. László Társulat világi elnökének. Bukarest, 17.05.1935. MNL OL, P 1431, 18. d., 1. t., 21/1935. sz.

⁶¹ Nagy jelentése Kányának. Bukarest, 21.04.1934. Loc. cit.

⁶² Magyar jelentése Walkónak. Bukarest, 21.01.1930. Loc. cit.

⁶³ A Szt. László Társulat választmányi ülésének jegyzőkönyve. Bp., 21.09.1930. MNL OL, P 1431, 24. d., 6. t. Kollányi Ferenc közlése szerint Kuczka „csak az idő rövidsége miatt nem kereshette fel Shvoyt.”

rendbetétele, az új tisztikar és a személyi állomány kialakítása, továbbá az egyházi és kormányzati szervekkel való kapcsolatok kiépítése még éveket vett igénybe. Az újrakezdést szimbolikusan is kifejezte, hogy 1933. márc. 23-án egy ünnepélyes (újja)alakuló közgyűlést tartottak, amelyre az esemény rangjának emelése érdekében meghívták a katolikus klérus összes reprezentánsát. A közgyűlésen jelen volt Zichy Gyula kalocsai érsek, Radnai Farkas, a Csehszlovákiából kiutasított egykori beszercebányai püspök, címzetes érsek, Glattfelder Gyula, Rott Nándor veszprémi püspök, Mikes János szombathelyi püspök és Hanauer Árpád István váci püspök.⁶⁴ Krywald Ottó ebből az alkalomból ismertette a Társulat új hitbuzgalmi és nemzetgondozási programjára vonatkozó, általa kidolgozott javaslatokat. Ennek egyik meghatározó eleme volt a Monarchia utódállamaiban élő magyar katolikus szórványok felekezeti ellátásának kérdése. A tervezet szükségesnek vélte, hogy a szomszédos államok kormányaitól eszközöljenek ki engedélyt arra nézve, hogy tisztán vallásos célból magyarországi papok is átmelessenek a területükre, és ott népmissziókat, tridiumokat, konferenciákat tarthassanak, mivel ezen államok hatóságai magyar papoknak csak azzal a záradékkal adtak vízumot, ha azok minden papi funkciótól és egyházi tevékenységtől tartózkodnak. A programtervezet előíranyozta azt is, hogy az egyesület eredeti célkitűzéseihöz híven először a Kárpát-medencén kívüli autochton magyar népcsoportok, a bukovinai székelyek és a moldvai csángók, illetve a regáti magyarok helyzetén igyekezzenek javítani, amihez diplomáciai segítséget, adott esetben a Szentszék közbenjárását is kérni fogják.⁶⁵

⁶⁴ A Társulat közgyűlésének jegyzőkönyve. Bp., 23.03.1933. MOL, P 1431, 24. d., 6. t. Előzetesen Serédi Jusztinián esztergomi érsek is jelezte részvételi szándékát, de a Pázmány P. Tudományegyetem diákságának 24-én kezdődő lelkigyakorlata miatt 23-ára kellett előrehoznia az egyetemen eredetileg egy nappal későbbre tervezett előadását. Serédi levele Shvoynak. Esztergom, 11.03.1933. MNL OL, P 1431, 17. d., 1. t., 10/1933. sz.

⁶⁵ Shvoy jelentése a püspöki karnak a Társulat működéséről. Hely nélkül, dátum nélkül. [Székesfehérvár], 13.11.1933 után. MNL OL, P 1431, 17. d., 1. t., 16/1933. sz.

A fentebbiekből kiindulva nem hinnénk, hogy a brailai iskola ügyében valamiféle, akárcsak átmeneti megoldás is körvonalazódott volna az érintett felek között. Alexander Theodor Cisar érsek tanúsága szerint Kuczka az épületet eleinte katolikus egyházi célokra hasznosította, az 1932–1933-as tanév elejétől ugyanis egy fogyatékosok képzésével foglalkozó karitatív intézményt (ún. „fogyatékosok kertjét”) rendezett be abban. Az intézmény működtetéséhez az érsek is hozzájárult azzal, hogy az egyházmegyéje területén dolgozó iskolanővéreket küldött oda gondozókként, akik között állítása szerint magyar anyanyelvű is volt. A lengyel pap időközben kinyilvánította abbéli szándékát is, hogy az épületet majdan az érseki szemináriumnak adományozza abban az esetben, ha ő lesz annak vezetője egészen a haláláig.⁶⁶

Gyárfás Elemér, a Katolikus Státus világi elnöke, aki a Szt. László Társulat megbízásából 1934-től Bukarestben személyesen vette kézbe az ügy intézését, már arról tudósított, hogy Kuczka akkoriban már nem is a katolikus hittestvérei, hanem az újonnan felállított görögkatolikus plébánia részére bocsátotta rendelkezésre az épületet, amelynek vezetője elfogadta az évi 60 ezer lejes bérleti díjra vonatkozó igényét, míg a katolikus egyházközség csak 20 ezer lejt tudott felajánlani erre a célra. A görög rítusú plébánia az épület egyik egykori tantermét használta a szertartások elvégzésére. Gyárfás úgy vélte, hogy Kuczka a bérleti szerződést már eleve a jövőbeni végleges elidegenítés tudatában kötötte meg az unitusokkal, tehát opciós jogot biztosított számukra. A reményei azonban nem

⁶⁶ Alexander Theodor Cisar bukaresti katolikus érsek levele Shvoynak. Bukarest, 7.04.1934. MNL OL, P 1431, 17. d., 1. t., 43/1934. sz. Cisar Shvoynak küldött levele azt sugallja, hogy az épület hasznosítása a Szt. László Társulat jóváhagyásával valósult meg valamilyen bérleti konstrukció keretében, és az épület kiadásából befolyó bérleti díjat Kuczka a háború előtt a Társulat számára teljesített szolgálataiért jutalmul honorárium gyanánt megtarthatta magának. Ezt a helyzetképet azonban semmilyen más forrás nem támasztja alá.

teljesültek maradéktalanul, mivel utóbbiak 1934-ben nem fizették ki a bérleti díjat. Kuczka minden bizonnyal ekkor döntött úgy, hogy az épületet átruhazza a bukaresti katolikus érsekségre, s noha tényleg kiállított ilyen értelmű nyilatkozatot, az nem lett benyújtva a bíróságra a romániai ingatlanátírási szabályoknak megfelelően, így jogilag ő maradt az ingatlan tulajdonosa, s neki állt módjában felette rendelkezni. Az épület elidegenítésére vonatkozóan Kuczka tárgyalásokba kezdett a balázsfalvi görögkatolikus érsekséggel, amelyek a bukaresti katolikus érsek egyetértésével, de legalább is tudtával zajlottak.⁶⁷ Miután az ingatlan eladására vonatkozó egyezkedések híre Budapestre is eljutott, Shvoy egy éles hangú levelet írt Kuczkának, melyben követelte, hogy részletesen informálja az ügyről.⁶⁸

A Szt. László Társulat eközben a legfelsőbb vatikáni egyházigazgatási fórumok előtt is felvetette a romániai ingatlanvagyonának a kérdését. Shvoy székesfehérvári püspökként három ízben, 1928-ban, 1933-ban és 1938-ban járt Rómában *ad limina* látogatáson, a két utóbbi alkalommal a Szt. László Társulat egyházi elnökeként már a nagy múltú egyesületet is képviselhette a Szentszék előtt. Sajnos azonban a visszaemlékezéseiben csak szűkszavúan osztja meg az ezekkel az útjaival kapcsolatos emlékeit. Inkább az 1938. évre tér ki bővebben, de ezen a helyen is inkább egy élményszerű és meghatódott leírást ad arról, hogy milyen nagy hatást gyakorolt rá a pápával való találkozás. Eszerint nem egyedül, hanem az egyházmegye néhány esperesével, papjával és hívével ment, s a körülbelül 50-60 fős nyájat az akkor már nagyon beteg XI. Pius fogadta, akivel együtt énekelték el a pápai himnuszt. Az érdemi megbeszéléseiről mindössze annyit ír, hogy 1933-ban és 1938-ban is beszámolt a pápának a fíllialátogatásairól, s ezzel összefüggésben az egyházmegye

⁶⁷ Gyárfás levele Shvoynak. Bukarest, 21.02.1935. MNL OL, P 1431, 18. d., 1. t., 79/1935. sz.

⁶⁸ Shvoy levele Kuczkának. Bp., 20.03.1934. MNL OL, P 1431, 17. d., 1. t., 28/1934. sz.

hitéletéről, utóbbi alkalommal a papnevelés helyzetéről is.⁶⁹

A püspökkari konferencia számára a Szt. László Társulat működéséről készített első jelentéséből azonban utal arra, hogy az 1933. októberi római útja alkalmával a zsinati kúrián ismertette a Romániában élő magyar katolikusok problémáival kapcsolatos álláspontját.⁷⁰ Nyilvánvalóan csak félreértés következménye lehet az a hazai történeti irodalomban napvilágot látott információ, mely szerint Shvoy már ekkor bemutatott egy memorandumot, amely felhívta a figyelmet a Kárpátokon túli magyarság anyanyelvű lelki gondozásának problémáira, illetve a Társulat regáti ingatlankomplexumának rendezetlen helyzetére.⁷¹ A valóság azonban az, hogy Krywald csak Shvoy hazatérése után, a Társulat november 13-i igazgatósági ülésén mutatta be a püspök utasítása alapján elkészített, és a pápának küldendő emlékirat magyar nyelvű szövegtervezetét. Ezen a tanácskozáson határoztak a memorandum szövegének olaszra fordításáról,⁷² amely minden bizonnyal csak a következő év elejére készült el, hiszen a fordítónak járó 50 pengőt kitevő munkadíjat január 8-án utalták ki a Társulat pénztárából.⁷³

A memorandum kitért a bukaresti ingatlanvagyon rendezetlen státuszára is, hangsúlyozva, hogy hatékonyabban szolgálhatná a bukaresti magyar anyanyelvű katolikus hívek vallási életének megújódását, ha újból rendelkezhetnének korábbi spirituális,

⁶⁹ Shvoy L. Önéletrajz. Szerkesztette, a bevezetőt írta, jegyzetekkel ellátta, és a mutatókat összeállította: Mózy G. (Források a Székesfehérvári Egyházmegye történetéből. I.) Székesfehérvár, 2002, 75.

⁷⁰ Shvoy jelentése a püspöki karnak a Társulat működéséről. Hely nélkül, dátum nélkül. [Székesfehérvár], 13.11.1933 után. Loc. cit.

⁷¹ Vincze G. (Ed.). Asszimiláció vagy kivándorlás? Források a moldvai magyar etnikai csoport, a csángók modern kori történelmének tanulmányozásához (1860–1989). A Magyarságkutatás könyvtára, XXVII. Bp.–Kolozsvár, 2004, 30.

⁷² Shvoy jelentése a püspöki karnak a Társulat működéséről. Hely nélkül, dátum nélkül. [Székesfehérvár], 13.11.1933 után. Loc. cit.

⁷³ Bejegyzés a Társulat pénztárnaplójának kiadási oldalán. Bp., 08.01.1934. MNL OL, P 1431, 29. d., 7. t.

kulturális és szociális központjaikkal.⁷⁴ A Szt. László Társulat nem sokkal később, még 1934 tavaszán egy különálló levélben tudatta Angelo Rotta budapesti pápai nunciussal, hogy sérelmesnek tartja az egykori brailai Szt. László-iskola görögkatolikusoknak történő esetleges eladásával kialakuló helyzetet is.⁷⁵

Egyáltalán nem zárható ki azonban, hogy az eleve a szentatyának címzett memorandum, akárcsak a budapesti nunciushoz címzett, a brailai iskola ügyét szóvá tevő levél, végül nem is jutott el közvetlenül a pápa kezeihez, hanem a szentszéki állam- és diplomáciai apparátus más szintjein vizsgálták meg a benne foglaltakat. A Szt. László Társulat vezetősége a memorandumot is csak közvetve, hivatalos csatornán, vagyis a budapesti apostoli nunciatúrán keresztül juttathatta el az egyházfőhöz. Rotta mindkét előterjesztést továbbította a Vatikánba, ahol azonban azokat a bukaresti nunciatúra hatáskörébe utalták.⁷⁶ A brailai iskola ügyében ezzel egy időben a magyar kormány is diplomáciai lépéseket tett és erőteljes nyomást gyakorolt a bukaresti érsekre. Barcza György vatikáni magyar követ közvetlenül a szentszéki államtitkárságnál interveniált az épület eladásának megakadályozása érdekében,⁷⁷ illetve Shvoy, részben a Dísz tér ösztönzésére, telefonon beszélt Cisarral és kontaktusba lépett Valerio Valeri bukaresti szentszéki megbízottal is.⁷⁸ A helyi belpolitikai és egyházpolitikai viszonyokra, illetve a román államhatalom és a romániai katolikus egyház között egyházszervezeti kérdésekben az 1929. évi konkordátum révén kialakult kényes egyensúlyra hivatkozva utóbbi megvalósít-

⁷⁴ A Szt. László Társulat olasz nyelvű memorandumja a Szentszékhez a regáti magyarok és a moldvai csángók felekezeti ápolásának problémáiról. Hely nélkül, dátum nélkül. [Bp., 4.03.1934]. MNL OL, P 1431, 17. d., 1. t., 22/1934. sz.

⁷⁵ Shvoy levele Angelo Rotta budapesti apostoli nunciushoz. Hely nélkül, dátum nélkül. [Bp., 4.03.1934 – 25.05. között]. MOL, P 1431, 17. d., 1. t., 126/1934. sz.

⁷⁶ Rotta levele Shvoynak. Bp., 25.05.1934. Ibid.

⁷⁷ Barcza György vatikáni követ jelentése Kányának. Róma, 04.05.1934. MNL OL, K 64, 95. cs., 1942/27. t., 207/1934. res. pol. sz.

⁷⁸ Gömbös Gyula miniszterelnök átirata Kányának. Bp., 14.05.1934. Ibid. 223/1934. res. pol. sz.

hatatlannak ítélte a Szt. László Társulat nagyszabású pasztorációs és restitúciós kezdeményezéseit és célkitűzéseit. Csak a zár alól kivont ingatlanok, vagyis éppen a brailai iskolaépület ügyében látott esélyt az előrelépésre, aláhúзва azonban, hogy ezt is csak egy majdani magyar–román bilaterális megegyezés keretében tartja kivitelezhetőnek. A bukaresti nuncius, álláspontja kialakításához Gyárfás Elemér véleményét is kikérte, és a válaszában kifejtett helyzetértékelés a vele folytatott eszmecsere elhangzottakat is tükrözte, igaz, arra, hogy egy vatikáni vizsgálat befejezéséig felfüggeszteti a brailai iskolaépület adásvételi tranzakcióját, csak a bukaresti magyar követ intervenciójára reagálva tett ígéretet.⁷⁹ A bukaresti érsekséget képviselő mindkét egyházi tényező, Kuczka és Cisar is, sérelmesnek vélte, hogy a Szt. László Társulat diplomáciai síkra terelte a kérdést.

Az események menetének talán nem érdektelen mellékszála a Kuczka és a nála közel harminc évvel fiatalabb, 1933-tól Brailában plébánosként szolgáló Emanuel Kreis közötti konfliktus alakulása. Nem kizárt, hogy kettejük ellentéte egészen 1924-ig vezethető vissza, amikor a városba plébánosnak kinevezett Kuczka új helyettest hozott magával az 1922-től káplánként ott fungáló Kreis helyébe. Julius Hering már említett történeti feldolgozása alapján nehezen ítékelhető meg, hogy Kuczka érkezése és Kreis távozása összefüggésben állt-e egymással. Az általa megrajzolt – de a közeljövőben minden bizonnyal több helyen árnyalható – történeti kép azt sugallja, hogy közvetlenül a háború után a helyi magyarság szempontjából Kuczka személye kedvezőbb volt, mint Kreis ténykedése, ugyanis míg előbbi elsajátította a magyar nyelvet, és a nevéből ítélve a vikáriusa is magyar származású lehetett, addig utóbbi nem beszélt magyarul, sőt azon első papok közé tartozott, akik románul prédikáltak Brailában.⁸⁰ Ezzel szemben az általunk feltárt forrásokból arra is következtetni lehet, hogy az 1930-as évek első felében akár Kreis személye is garancia lehetett a magyar

⁷⁹ Nagy jelentése Kányának. Bukarest, 14.04.1934. Ibid. 152/1934. res. pol. sz.

⁸⁰ Hering, J., Op. cit., 115.

érdekek védelmére. A Szt. László Társulat vezetősége is inkább „magyarbarátként” könyvelte el, amit plasztikusan szemléltet az, hogy az egyesület 1934. évi támogatási keretének szétosztására vonatkozó első tervezet az ő nevét is tartalmazta, és 200 pengő segélyt irányzott elő számára.⁸¹ Egyúttal az is igaz, hogy ha a brailai iskola ügyére vonatkozó teljes dokumentációt tüzetesen átnézzük, akkor arra kell gyanakodnunk, hogy a német származású Kreis alapvetően nem a helyi magyarság, hanem a helyi egyházközség érdekeit védelmezte Kuczkával szemben, s az épületet valójában a részben német tannyelvű plébániai iskola számára, az ott folyó oktatás kiterjesztése céljából szeretne volna megszerezni. Minderre azért is ki kellett térnünk, mert ez alapján tapintható ki, hogy Kuczkának megvolt a maga belső ellenzéke az egyházmegyén belül, ami csökkentette a mozgásterét a Társulattal folytatott egyezkedések során. Minden bizonnyal erre vezethető vissza az is, hogy korábban Cisar nem merte maradéktalanul elfogadni az iskolaépület tulajdonjogának átruházásáért cserébe szabott feltételeit, például nem kívánta a teológiai szeminárium előljárójává tenni.⁸²

A bukaresti nunciussal szoros összeköttetésben álló Gyárfás a nevére szóló, a Szt. László Társulattól nyert 1934. november 22-i felhatalmazására hivatkozva lépett kapcsolatba az érdekeltekkel. Noha utalt a Kuczka és Kreis között feszülő ellentétekre is, rámutatott, hogy előbbi, ha megakadályozná abban, hogy realizálja a balázsfalvi görögkatolikus érsekséggel kötött opciós egyezségét, érvényesíteni fogja a Szt. László Társulattal szembeni magánjogi igényeit. Ebben a helyzetben Gyárfás csak egy megegyezésre látott lehetőséget az épület vételárának felhasználásával kapcsolatban. A *modus vivendi* szükségességét nyomatékosította, hogy a bukaresti nuncius is a kompromisszumos megoldás mellé állt, mivel el akarta

⁸¹ Papp Józsefnek, a Szt. László Társulat alelnökének tervezete az 1934. évi támogatási keret szétosztásáról. Bp., 1934. nov. 3. MNL OL, P 1431, 17. d., 1. t., 179/1934. sz.

⁸² Cisar levele Shvoynak. Bukarest, 7.04.1934. Loc. cit.

kerülni a konfrontációt az unitusokkal.

A kompromisszum lényege lett volna, hogy a vételárat a bukaresti érsekség magyar nyelvű pasztorációs céljaira fordítják: Kuczka elképzelése szerint azt valamilyen jövedelmező alapon helyezték volna el, s az így rendszeresen befolyó pénzüsszegeből egy, a bukaresti érseki teológián a magyar nyelvet tanító, a református iskolába járó gyermekek hitoktatását ellátó, illetve a Szt. Ilona templom gyülekezetének lelki szolgálatára is megbízatást nyerő katolikus pap ellátmányát biztosították volna. Gyárfás ezzel szemben arra tett javaslatot, hogy az összeget a Szt. Ilona templom melletti, s az érsekség tulajdonát képező telken felépítendő plébánialak építési költségeire fordítsák, s az érsekség részéről biztosítsák az így megalakítandó önálló Szt. Ilona-plébánia magyar jellegét. Igaz, a majdani plébánia magyar jellegének szavatolására hosszú távon maga is csak úgy látott lehetőséget, hogy a Szt. László Társulat a templom tulajdonjogát átruhazza az elvitathatatlanul magyar érzelmű erdélyi ferences rendtartományra. Úgy érvelt, hogy Cisar nehezen tagadhatná meg a szerzetesek letelepedését a fővárosban, ha arra hivatkoznának, hogy azért mennek oda, mert ott van saját templomuk.

Véleményünk szerint Gyárfás jól érzékelte, hogy Kuczka propozíciói kérdésessé tették volna a magyar katolicizmus szempontjainak érvényesítését. Javaslatának értelmében ugyanis a vételárat akár ingatlanba is lehetett volna fektetni, amelynek bérjövedelme képezte volna a magyar lelkész ellátmányát. Ez a megoldás gyakorlatilag visszatérést jelentett volna a probléma kiindulópontjához. A bukaresti szemináriumban akkoriban egyébként is létezett magyar nyelvű tanszék, amelynek dotációja megoldott volt.⁸³ Ráadásul a Szt. László Társulat feltételei messzebb mentek Gyárfás elképzeléseinél. Azok szerint, azon túlmenően, hogy az érsekségnek letelepedési engedélyt kellett volna adnia Bukarestben az erdélyi Szt. Ferenc-rend számára, az eladott brailai épületben valamely magyar katolikus egyesületnek

⁸³ Gyárfás levele Shvoynak. Bukarest, 21.02.1935. MNL OL, P 1431, 18. d., 1. t., 79/1935. sz.

örök időre megfelelő helyiséget kellett volna biztosítani, a helyi magyar gyerekeket kedvezményes tandíjjal kellett volna felvenni, akiknek hitoktatását magyar nyelven kellett volna biztosítani. Kikötötték azt is, hogy a vételárból a bukaresti Szt. Ilona templom telkén plébánialakot kell építeni, s az esetleg fennmaradó összeget értékpapírba kell fektetni, amelynek hozamai a plébánia javát szolgálnák.⁸⁴

Mivel az 1923. évi kultusztörvény és a konkordátum értelmében a honosított szerzetesrendek is csak kormányhatósági engedéllyel nyithattak új rendházakat Romániában, semmi kilátás nem volt arra, hogy az erdélyi ferencesek bukaresti működési engedélyt szerezzenek, Gyárfás kezdettől fogva arra gondolt, hogy nem bevallottan rendház épülne, hanem az érsek egyszerűen megbízna 2-3 rendtagot a létesítendő plébánia vezetésével, amivel elkerülhető lett volna a kormányengedély megszerzése. Kérte a Társulat vezetését, hogy minden olyan feltételt vonjon vissza, amelynek teljesítése nem függ Kuczkától, ugyanakkor a Szt. Ilona-plébánia kialakításának és átvételének pénzügyi biztosítékait megteremtve, a brailai épület eladásából befolyó összeget a bukaresti nunciatúrán helyezték letétbe, amit a nuncius a megfelelő időben a Társulat rendelkezésére bocsáthat azzal a megkötéssel, hogy azt az országból nem viheti ki és lehetőség szerint Bukarestben vagy az ókirályságban fogja felekezeti célokra fordítani. Amennyiben a nunciatúrán a szükséges keretösszeget letétbe helyezték, a Társulat egy formális okmányban az erdélyi ferences rendtartománynak ajándékozná a templomot, amelynek birtokában már nem a Társulat, hanem a rend fordulna az érsekhez, s arra hivatkozva, hogy rendelkezésére állnak a plébánialak építéséhez szükséges pénzügyi eszközök, kérnék, hogy engedje át nekik a tulajdonában álló üres telket, s bízza rájuk a plébánia vezetését.⁸⁵

A Társulat magáévá tette a Gyárfás által felvázolt menetrendet

⁸⁴ Krywald levele Gyárfásnak. Bp., 14.03.1935. Ibid. 75/1935. sz.

⁸⁵ Gyárfás levele Krywaldnak. Bukarest, 28.03.1935. Ibid. 81/1935. sz.

a templom melletti telek megszerzésére s a plébánialak felépítésére, igaz, ezzel együtt a brailai épület helyiségeinek hasznosítására és a magyar gyermekek oktatására vonatkozó álláspontján nem kívánt módosítani.⁸⁶ Kuczka azonban elutasította ennek a két feltételnek az elfogadását, mivel szerinte egy ilyen restrikcio az adásvételt jogi és gyakorlati szempontból is ellehetetlenítette volna. Azt állította, hogy az egyébként is elrománosodott temetkezési egylet mellett nem létezik más magyar jellegű egyesület Brailában, illetve a magyar gyermekek tandíjkedvezménye megoldhatatlan, mert az ebből keletkező különbözetet a fenntartó egyházközségnek kellene pótolnia. Elfogadta ugyanakkor, hogy a vételárból a Szt. Ilona templom melletti telken építsenek egy plébánialakot, de azt ellenezte, hogy az összeget a nunciatúrán helyezték letétbe. Azzal érvelt, hogy nem bízik a lej értékállóságában és öregségére való tekintettel még az életében szeretné biztosítani az összeg megfelelő felhasználását, s a mintegy 600 négyszögöl területű telken építendő plébánia tervei már el is készültek. Amennyiben a Szt. László Társulat hozzájárul, hogy a brailai épület eladásából befolyó pénzüsszezből egy plébánialak építési költségeit fedezzék a Szt. Ilona templom melletti telken, a bukaresti érsek által kiadandó, s a nunciatúra által is láttamozandó bizalmas okmányban hajlandók írásban is garantálni, hogy a templomban vasárnap és ünnepnapokon a fő istentiszteleti nyelv a magyar legyen és plébánián mindenkor egy magyar nyelvet bíró lelkészt alkalmazzanak.

Később azonban kiderült, hogy az érsek semmi szín alatt nem járulna hozzá a franciskánusok fővárosi működéséhez. Valeri, aki Rómából kapott utasításra szóvá tette az érsek előtt a ferencesek letelepedésének kérdését, olyan ellenállásba ütközött, hogy végül maga is kénytelen volt a terv elvetését javasolni. Kuczka egyébként egy világi pap jelölését tartotta volna célszerűnek a plébánia élére.⁸⁷ Ezzel szemben Gyárfás,

⁸⁶ Teleki és Krywlad levele Gyárfásnak. Bp., 11.04.1935. MOL, K 64, 95. cs., 1942/27. t., 248/1935. res. pol. sz.

⁸⁷ Gyárfás levele Telekinek. Bukarest, 17.05.1935. MOL, P 1431, 18. d., 1.

tudván, hogy 1934-1935 folyamán Cisar a fővárosban szolgáló magyar származású egyházmegyes papokat szétszórta, és Bukarest-környéki vagy vidéki plébániákra helyezte el őket,⁸⁸ ezzel nem látott garanciát a magyar nyelvűség biztosítására a plébánián és a gyülekezeti hitéletben.

Egy lehetséges áthidaló megoldást vetett fel Zombory László, a bukaresti Szt. József székesegyház kanonokja, aki azt javasolta, hogy a Szt. Ilona-templomot a romániai jezsuita rendtartománynak engedjék át azzal a kikötéssel, hogy a fő istentiszteleti nyelv mindig a magyar legyen. A rendtartomány vezetése olasz kézben volt, ugyanakkor ebben az időben két magyar származású papot is állomásoztatott Bukarestben, s szervezeti kérdéseikben a rend római generálisa döntött, így nem voltak kitéve a bukaresti érsek főhatóságának. Szerinte a brailai épület vételárát is nekik kellene adni, hogy abból építhessenek egy rendházat.⁸⁹

A ferencesek jezsuitákkal való kiváltására irányuló elképzelés támogatására mind Cisar, mind a Társulat vezetősége hajlott. Figyelembe véve azonban, hogy a Jézus Társaság Romániában a görög rítusú katolikusok pasztorációjára is berendezkedett, és már két ilyen plébániát is fenntartott, illetőleg Bukarestben ekkoriban nem volt görögkatolikus templom, félő volt, hogy a Szt. Ilona-plébániát a görög rítusú hívek lelki igényeinek ellátására is felhasználja majd. Ezt elkerülendő, a Társulat kikötötte, hogy csak akkor ajándékozza véglegesen a templomot a rendnek, ha kizárólag latin szertartású miséket tart ott, addig csak használatra engedi át azt.⁹⁰

t., 21/1935. sz.

⁸⁸ 1934 tavaszán-nyarán Cisar négy, Bukarestben szolgáló magyar lelkészt helyezett vidékre, illetve kényszerített távozásra az egyházmegyéből. Köztük volt Gáll Antal és Tamás Pál, a Szent Ilona templom két egymást követő plébánosa is. Nagy jelentése Kányának. Bukarest, 1934. augusztus 21. MOL, K 105, 20. cs., 150/1934. biz. sz.

⁸⁹ Bárdossy László bukaresti követ jelentése Kányának. Bukarest, 1935. júl. 3. MOL, K 64, 95. cs., 1942/27. t., 474/1935. res. pol. sz.

⁹⁰ Gömbös átirata Kányának. Bp., 1935. aug. 12. Ibid. 568/1935. res. pol.

Vasile Suciú balázsfalvi görögkatolikus érsek 1935. jan. 25-i halála és az érseki székhely megüresedése miatt azonban a brailai iskolaépület adásvételi tranzakciója hosszú időre megtorpant. Az általunk vizsgált források arra is következtetni engednek, hogy mivel Kuczkának az ügyletet nem sikerült nyélbe ütnie, az időhúzás taktikájához folyamodva, ezek után leginkább csak a látszat kedvéért tartotta fenn a tárgyalásokat újabb és újabb követelésekkel előállva.⁹¹ Ebben a helyzetben döntött úgy a Szt. László Társulat vezetése, hogy ismét diplomáciai beavatkozással igyekszik nyomást gyakorolni a bukaresti érsekségre. Ennek megfelelően 1936. aug. 29-én a vatikáni magyar ügyvivő egy diplomáciai jegyzékben kérte Eugenio Pacelli szentszéki államtitkártól, hogy kötelezzék Kuczkát a Szt. László Társulathoz járó 860 ezer lej lefizetésére a nunciushoz. A jegyzék átadásakor a magyar diplomata aláhúzta, hogy a lengyel pap öregségére és a bukaresti katolikus magyar hívek anyanyelvű lelki gondozásának hiányára való tekintettel a magyar kormány nagy súlyt fektet arra, hogy a bukaresti magyar plébánia ügye minél hamarabb rendeződjön.⁹²

A Kuczka öregsége miatti aggodalmak nem voltak megalapozatlanok. Az akkor már meglehetősen idős pap ugyanis hamarosan, 1936. dec. 24-én elhunyt.⁹³ Sajnos az események további menetére vonatkozó dokumentáció rendkívül hiányos, de nyilván a főszereplő elhalálása is egy időre függőben hagyta a kérdés rendezését. A további fejleményekről alapvetően csak Gyárfás egy jóval későbbi összefoglalójából tájékozódhatunk. Ebben a magyar ügyvéd és politikus megerősítette azt a korábbi feltételezést, mely szerint Kuczka 1935–1936 fordulójától valójában már arra törekedett, hogy elodázza a Társulattal kötendő

SZ.

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² Thierry Heribert ideiglenes vatikáni ügyvivő jelentése Kányának. Róma, 29.08.1936. Ibid. 579/1936. res. pol. sz.

⁹³ Krywald beszéde a Társulat közgyűlésén. Bp., 08.06.1937. MNL OL, P 1431, 18. d., 1. t., 29/1937. t.

megállapodást, sőt, utóbb, a Gyárfásnak írt 1936. jún. 27-i levelében megszakítottnak deklarálta a kapcsolatát a magyarországi egyesülettel. Ebből a dokumentumból derül ki az is, hogy a lengyel pap a végrendeletében a jogilag az ő tulajdonát képező brailai ingatlant a bukaresti katolikus érsekségre hagyta, amely így annak kizárólagos és korlátlan tulajdonosává vált. Gyárfás ezért úgy vélte, hogy ettől kezdve az egyeztetéseket a bukaresti egyházmegye híveinek kellene folytatni az egyházi elöljáróval, mivel az általuk kezdeményezett megbeszélésektől az érsek nem zárkozhatna el. A bukaresti katolikus magyarság köréből ekkor szervezték meg a Katolikus Férfiszövetséget, amelynek elnöke Blaskó Pál mérnök lett, s amelynek egy önálló bizottsága volt hivatott tárgyalásokat folytatni a Szt. Ilona templom státuszáról. A testület azzal kívánta megvetni a brailai épületre irányuló igényének jogalapját, hogy előkészítette a Szt. Ilona templom melletti önálló magyar egyházközség megalapítását. Ennek szervezeti szabályzatát elküldték Cisarnak azzal, hogy jóváhagyása után ennek az egyházközségnek bocsássa rendelkezésére a Kuczkától örökölt brailai objektum eladásából befolyó vételárat. 1937. okt. 23-án a magyar katolikus szövetség vezetőit fogadta Cisar, majd az új bukaresti nuncius, Andrea Cassulo is. Előbbi ígéretet tett a magyar egyházközség szervezeti szabályzatának jóindulatú megvizsgálására, illetőleg a brailai iskolaépület eladásából befolyó – becslések szerint akkori értékén már legalább 1,5 millió lejes – vételárból az egyházközség céljainak támogatására. Ennek nyomán Blaskó 1938. febr. 24-én vételi ajánlatot nyújtott be azzal, hogy amennyiben az érsek hajlandó a Szt. Ilona templomot és a mellette elterülő telket a magyar katolikus hívek felekezeti, kulturális és oktatási céljaira fordítani, egy 1,2 millió lejes hitelkeretből megveszik a brailai épületet. Ennek az elképzelésnek a megvalósítását nemcsak az érsek halogató magatartása hátráltatta, hanem a részben világi személyeket tömörítő magyar katolikus szövetség és a Szt. Ilona templomban akkor szolgáló jezsuita páter, Horváth Sándor közötti ellentétek is. A fennmaradt iratokból lesűrűzhető, hogy

utóbbi inkább a Jézus Társaságának kezében szeretne volna látni a templomot és a telket, amelyen kifejezetten egy jezsuita rendházat kívánt volna felépíttetni, míg a helyi katolikus szövetség ezzel hosszú távon nem látta volna biztosítottnak a magyar nyelvű lelki gondozást, ezért inkább a megalakítandó egyházközség kompetenciáját próbálta érvényesíteni. A második bécsi döntés idejéig a kérdésben nem sikerült dűlőre jutni, a döntőbírósi egyezmény után pedig minimálisra csökkentette a megegyezés esélyét, hogy a bukaresti magyar szövetség vezetői Magyarországra repatriáltak.⁹⁴

EPILÓGUS

Nem tudjuk, pontosan mikor, de minden bizonnyal valamikor 1941–1942 fordulóján Cisar az akkori valós értékén aluli áron, 800 ezer lejért eladta a brailai iskola épületét, igaz, az összeget a jezsuitákat képviselő Horváth rendelkezésére bocsátotta. A vételárból a páter 200 ezer lejrt rögtön felhasznált a bukaresti rendház felépítésére felvett hitel törlesztésére, a maradékból pedig megvásárolta az épület melletti telket. Sem a Külügyminisztérium, sem a Szt. László Társulat levéltárában lévő iratok nem tisztázzák pontosan a kialakult helyzetet, de a külügyi dokumentumok arra engednek következtetni, hogy az összeg felhasználásának mikéntjét Horváth nem egyeztetette előzetesen a Szt. László Társulat vezetésével.⁹⁵ Ezt támasztja alá a kérdéssel az utókorra maradt utolsó irat, a vatikáni magyar követség 1942. szept. 18-i jelentése is. Eszerint az államtitkárságon interveniáló Luttor Ferenc kánonjogi tanácsos kérte, hogy szólítsák fel Cassulót a Szt. László Társulatot megillető tulajdon- és rendelkezési jog védelmére. Guilio Barbeta prelátus, a Római Kúria püspöke a nuncius korábbi jelentéseire hivatkozva

⁹⁴ Gyárfás összefoglaló feljegyzése. Hely nélkül, 04.09.1942. MNL OL, K 64, 95. cs., 1942/27. t., 336/1942. res. pol. sz.

⁹⁵ A Miniszterelnökség átirata a KÜM-nak. Bp., 08.08.1942. Ibid. 319/1942. res. pol. sz.

kifejtette, hogy „*az eladás jóhiszeműleg történt, és a magyar plébános, Horváth Sándor, mint látszólagos törvényes örökös [kiemelés – S. A.], vagyonmentés [címén – S. A.] rendelkezett az egyébként már régebben molesztált [sic! – S. A.] ingatlan felett.*” A bíboros is azon a véleményen volt, hogy jó lenne megállapítani, hogy a magyar plébánost „*mennyiben illette meg a rendelkezési jog, illetőleg mennyiben volt a magyar lelkipásztorkodás érdekében az eladás sürgős és indokolt.*”⁹⁶

A brailai magyar iskolaügy két világháború közötti továbbgyűrűződését követve láthatjuk, hogy a kérdés jóval túlnőtt a brailai magyar kisközösség alapfokú oktatási igényeinek lehetővé tételén, áttételesen a bukaresti magyarság anyanyelvű hitéletének biztosítása lett a tét. A történet egészéből lesűrhető az a tanulság, hogy a történelmi Magyarország határain kívüli magyar entitások (moldvai csángók, bukovinai székelyek, regáti magyarok) sorskérdései – a magyar kisebbségi jogvédelem megsokszorozódó feladatai ellenére – továbbra is a magyar kormányzati politika homlokterében maradtak. Igaz ugyanakkor, hogy még egy olyan, első ránézésre bagatell kérdés is, mint egy alapfokú iskola és iskolaépület tulajdonviszonyainak rendezése, magyar szempontból hosszú, évtizedeken át tartósan megmaradó politikai cselekvéskényszert indukált. Az elsődleges érintett, a Szt. László Társulat hirtelen egy sokszereplős politikai-felekezeti mezőben (magyar kormány, román kormány, Szentszék, Bukaresti Katolikus Érsekség, romániai görögkatolikus egyház, szerzetesrendek: ferencesek, jezsuiták stb.), találta magát, a legalapvetőbb érdekei érvényesítéséhez a magyar állami intervenció, a jogi út és ezekkel együtt az alkupozíció erősítése, a nemzetközi nyomásgyakorlás, a partnerség kényszere stb., illetve mindezek időnkénti kombinációja sem vezetett el.

⁹⁶ A vatikáni követség jelentése Kállay Miklós külügyminiszternek. Róma, 18.09.1942. Ibid. 354/1942. res. pol. sz.

Брачност, брачна структура, смесени бракове сред русите в България през междувоенния период

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В настоящото изследване обект на изучаване е развитието на брачността сред русите в България през 20-те години до средата на 30-те години – с акцент върху смесените бракове.

Защо – русите? През междувоенния период в България руската „бяла” имиграция е сред най-значителните демографски явления. Тогава руската диаспора наброява 20.000 души¹, в преобладаващата си част (80–90%) нови имигранти – бежанци, установили се в България след Октомврийската революция от 1917 г.; старата руска общност отпреди войните включва потомците на казаците старообрядци, заселили се в българските земи в началото на XIX в. и живеещи в две компактни селища около Варна и Силистра, ветераните от руската армия, останали в България след 1878 г., и трудовата миграция от началото на XX в.² При това съотношение между старите и новите членове на общността основните ѝ (демографски) характеристики (които безспорно са сред факторите за развитието на брачността) – доминираща принадлежност

¹ Според преброяването на населението в България от 1926 г. – 19.590 души по матерен език руски.

² Атанасова, Е. Руснаци. – В: Имиграцията в България. Съст. А. Кръстева. С., 2005, 120; Кьосева, Ц., България и руската емиграция, 20-те-50-те години на XX в. С., 2002, 144.

*Брачност, брачна структура, смесени бракове сред
русите в България през междувоенния период*

към източното православие, градски характер и липса на равновесие между двата пола в полза на мъжете – очевидно се определят от чертите на новата руска имиграция.

Защо – брачността? Брачността е ключова демографска характеристика, пряко свързана с възпроизводството на населението; влияе се от и оказва влияние върху ражданията, умирианията и миграциите. През разглежданата епоха бракът представлява ядрото на семейството, в което пък се осъществява развитието и смяната на поколенията, първата социализация на децата, формирането на личността, и в този смисъл той има отношение към процеса на интеграция на русите в българското общество.

В изследването открояваме спецификите в тяхното „брачно поведение” въз основа на българската статистика за движението на населението, която дава ежегодни сведения за ражданията, умирианията и женитбите на населението (от 1881 г. нататък). По отношение на русите откриваме сведения по народност само за женитбите до 1935 г. Чрез анализа на тези статистически данни проследяваме динамиката на брачността и етнически смесените бракове сред руските имигранти в България в териториален разрез градове-села и за двата пола, разкриваме предпоставките и нагласите в българската обществена среда като техен приемник за реализирането на (смесени) бракове.

БРАЧНА СТРУКТУРА

Изучаването на брачната структура на руската имиграция е от съществено значение, защото чрез нея може да се установи какъв е демографският механизъм за нейното „физическо” оцеляване. Броят и относителният дял на принадлежащите към категориите население по брачно състояние (в случая за разглежданата епоха „семеини”, „несемеини”, „разведени” и „овдовели”) зависи от неговия

възрастов състав. Така например, там, където преобладават децата, броят на семейните е по-малък и обратно. Затова относителните дялове на съответните категории население по брачен статус се изчислява не спрямо цялото население, а спрямо населението способно да сключва брак, като се има предвид определена гранична възраст (15 години за жените, 18–20 години за мъжете). Българските преброявания не дават сведения за русите в България по брачно състояние, нито пък по възраст. За да получи необходимата информация, сръбският изследовател на руската емиграция на Балканите М. Йованович се обръща към друг вид исторически извори. Той изучава списъци с лични данни за руските имигранти в град Варна от периода 1919–1922 г., съхраняващи се в Държавния архив на Руската федерация, и въз основа на случайна извадка от 2238 души представя брачната структура на тамошните руски имигранти над 18-годишна възраст – тук отразена в графика 1³.

Статистическите данни от графика 1 регистрират висок процент на несемейни сред руските имигранти в гр. Варна, което на пръв поглед изглежда доста необичайно имайки предвид традиционната брачност в Русия. В началото на XX в. за населението в по-голямата част на Русия е характерно ранно встъпване в брак и състояние на брачност практически на всички мъже и жени на възраст до петдесет години. По това време обаче в Русия вече се забелязва процес на упадък в патриархалното общество. Съществуващата от векове традиционна система на „брачно поведение“ започва постепенно да се измества – в посока от западните региони на страната към източните – от нов модел, за който е характерно по-късно встъпване в първи брак и значителен относителен дял на неженени мъже и неомъжени жени. През 20-те години на XX в. Европейска Русия е сред страните с най-висока брачност в


³ Йованович, М. Русская эмиграция на Балканах: 1920–1940. М., 2006, 402, табл. 56.

света, което се определя главно от преобладаването на средните и големите възрасти в разпределението на населението по възраст и от ниската средна брачна възраст⁴. Установеният висок относителен дял на несемейните сред руските имигранти във Варна се предопределя от значителния контингент военни в състава на руската емиграция в самото начало на 20-те години.

Според статистическите данни от графика 1 структурата на руската имиграция във Варна с оглед на брачния статус по пол съответства на някои общи, принципни положения в демографията, които в случая са подсилени от фактора „война”. Мъжете руси дават по-голям процент несемейни, докато при жените по-голям е относителният дял на семейните и овдовелите. По-големият процент на задомените рускини се обяснява с обстоятелството, че техният брой е значително по-малък от този на мъжете. Във вариацията на мъжете руси повече от половината са семейни (54.1%) и въпреки това е висок относителният дял на несемейните (43.2%). А това означава, че от Русия са емигрирали много несемейни мъже, докато несемейните жени, напуснали страната, са сравнително малко (17.6%). През последните десетилетия на XIX в. и първите десетилетия на XX в. жените емигрират все още рядко, или поне значително по-рядко от мъжете, което е свързано с тяхното подчинено и зависимо от мъжете положение в патриархалното общество и дори, когато емигрират, те тръгват заедно с мъжете си; редки са случаите, когато те се решават да тръгнат сами.

⁴ През 1926 г. (не разполагаме с данни за 1920 г.) например семейните в Русия са 65.7% от населението над 15-годишна възраст. По това време вече не е маловажен фактор за този висок показател на брачност са моралните норми на новата комунистическа идеология, проповядваща по-строги нрави. Вж. Мишайков, Д., Д. Чанков. Населението на България. С., 1935, 77.

Графика 1. Структура на руските имигранти в гр. Варна, над 18-годишна възраст, по брачно състояние, 1919–1922 г., по пол, в брой и %, случайна извадка⁵.



Впечатление прави големият относителен дял на вдовиците – значително по-голям от този на вдовците – което е свързано не само с чисто демографски явления като по-голяма смъртност при мъжете на средни и високи възрасти, по-голяма продължителност на живота при жените, по-често встъпване в брак от вдовците отколкото от вдовиците, но и с масовото избиване на мъжете по време на войната.

Във вариацията на разведените руски имигранти във Варна сме свидетели на пълно отсъствие на разведени мъже и наличие на съвсем малко разведени жени. По принцип разведени се срещат и сред мъжете, но много по-малко отколкото при жените. И причината не е в това, че мъжете се развеждат по-рядко, а че е по-чест случай мъжете да искат развод с цел да встъпят в брак с друга жена. Други фактори, определящи бракоразводността са темпераментът и моралът на населението, законодателните

⁵ Пак там.

постановления и през разглеждания от нас период, разбира се, нормите, които налагат вероизповеданията или доминиращото вероизповедание. За разлика от православните страни, в католическите разводи се по-малко, защото църквата не ги позволява. В патриархална Русия обаче разводът се разглежда от православната църква като най-тежък грях и се разрешава само при изключителни обстоятелства. Затова разводите до 1914 г. са голяма рядкост. Още повече, че с промяната на обществените условия, с постепенната еманципация на жените още в дореволюционно време се променят и възгледите за съпругеството и отношението към развода⁶.

ДИНАМИКА НА БРАЧНОСТТА

Динамиката на брачността въздейства пряко върху отделни страни от икономическия и социалния ѝ живот. Основата се на определени традиции, като обществена институция бракът претърпява сравнително бавни промени. Понякога се наблюдават колебания, които могат да бъдат предизвикани от войни, икономически кризи, масови миграции и др.⁷ Настъпващите в брачността изменения представляват интерес от гледна точка на връзката ѝ с възпроизводството⁸. Динамиката в брачността на русите в България изучаваме, изхождайки

от демографското разбиране за нея като процес, който се измерва чрез количеството на сключените бракове, а също и от разбирането за брака като най-често срещания семеен модел, узаконяващ отношенията между мъжа и

⁶ Иванова, Е. И. Трансформация брачности в России в XX веке: основные этапы.

http://demoscope.ru/weekly/knigi/konfer/konfer_010.html (28.08.2014)

⁷ Жекова, В. Промени в брачността и раждаемостта в България. С., 2011, 19.

⁸ Пак там, 11.

жената, и като необходима подготовка за раждане на дете⁹.

При ограничените възможности на наличните статистически данни за руската имиграция у нас – използваме най-общия показател за измерване на честотата на браковете и динамиката на брачността, т. нар. общ коефициент за брачност, изчисляващ се в промили (‰) като съотношение между броя на браковете и цялото население (с каквито данни разполагаме за населението в България с руска народност). Разбира се, в случая сме наясно, че този показател е твърде общ и недостатъчно прецизен, защото се влияе от възрастовия състав на разглежданото население (за който нямаме статистически данни), а неговите „възходи“ и „падения“ малко или много зависят от измененията на относителните дялове на мъжете и жените в най-активните брачни възрасти (за което също нямаме статистически данни). Все пак, въпреки неговите недостатъци и поради липсата на възможност да се постигнат по-точни количествени параметри, смятаме, че той разкрива достоверно общите тенденции и процеси в брачността на русите в България. Този общ коефициент на брачност при тях определяме за годините на преброяванията: от 8‰ брака на 1000 жители с руска народност през 1910 г. (т.е. за старата руска диаспора) той се покачва до 9,1‰ през 1920 г. – процес, наблюдаващ се и в Русия, и в България. Понисък е от общия коефициент на брачност в Русия от 12‰ след гражданската война, в началото на 20-те години, като се има предвид, че зад тази средна цифра се крие различен коефициент на брачност за различните региони на страната¹⁰, както и сравнително висока брачност в селата и ниска брачност в градовете, особено в големите градове:

⁹ Пак там.

¹⁰ За градското население на Среден Урал, напр., през 1920 г. той е 19,4‰. Вж. Чашин, А. Брачность городского населения Среднего Урала в 1920-1940 гг. – В: Актуальные проблемы исторических исследований: взгляд молодых учёных. Екатеринбург, 2011, 190-197.

както пише руският демограф С. А. Новоселски ниската в сравнение със селското население брачност на гражданите е характерно явление за страните от земеделски и селско-стопански тип и освен в Русия, се наблюдава в Сърбия, България, Румъния, Унгария.¹¹ В Русия се извършва трансформация на брачно-семеините отношения, чието начало се забелязва още в последните военни години. Последвалите промени се изразяват най-ярко в градското матримониадно поведение. Влияние върху тези явления имат процесите на урбанизация и индустриализация.


При руските имигранти (а и въобще) сключването на брак е икономически, социално и съсловно обусловено. Затова динамиката на тяхната брачност може да бъде разбрана само в контекста на обществено-икономическите промени, настъпили и в приемащата, и в изпращащата страна най-вече по време на и след Първата световна война. В България те оказват влияние върху семеината култура, която се освобождава от някои традиционни елементи и усвоява нови социални норми: колективистичните традиции в семеините отношения постепенно се разрушават, а индивидуализмът се превръща в определяща нравствена норма.¹² В българското село се разпада семеината форма на многолюдната задруга и задружните семеини домакинства,¹³ налага се нов семеен модел – малочисленото индивидуално семейство, състоящо се от две генерации – брачна двойка и незадомени деца, а от 30-те

¹¹ Новосельский С. А. Смертность и продолжительность жизни в России. М., 1916. За България също: Жекова, В., цит. съч., 20.

¹² Хаджийски, И. Бит и душевност на българския народ. Т. 2. С., 1974, 132, 205.

¹³ Многолюдната задруга или на т. нар. бащино неразделно семейство е основана на собствеността на бащата - глава на домакинството върху цялото движимо и недвижимо имущество, на задружния труд на членовете на домакинството и на колективното потребление. Негова характеристика е и консервативното отношение към жената. (Вж. Макаеева, Л. Българското семейство. Етно-социални аспекти. С., 1991, 135, 145).

Графика 2. Брой на браковете сред населението в България с руска народност в корелация с пол, 1909, 1910, 1920–1935 г.¹⁴



години нататък – по-малките четиричленни семейства.¹⁵ Утвърждаването на индивидуалното семейство води до промени в отношението към жената, която излиза от своята социална анонимност, започва да играе важна роля в стопанския живот на малкото индивидуално семейство¹⁶. Но и в индивидуалното семейство мъжът продължава да е главната фигура, а жената все още заема второстепенно място. Затова, за да създаде „домашно огнище“ мъжът се нуждае от материална основа. И като се добави неустановеното положение на руските бежанци в началото на 20-те

¹⁴ Източници на графика 2 и на таблици 1-8: Движение на населението в Царство България през 1909, 1910, 1920-1926 г. С., 1914–1916, 1926-1930; Женитби, бракоразводи, раждания и умираия изобщо за Царството и по околии 1909, 1910, 1927-1935 г. С., 1931–1938.

¹⁵ По данни на: Жекова, В., цит. съч., 140.

¹⁶ Макавеева, Л., цит. съч., 148.

години, а също и различни психологически, социални и икономически фактори, свързани с процеса на емиграцията им, то тогава са разбираеми настъпващите промени в брачността сред русите в България, ясно е защо тогава общият ѝ коефициент е доста по-нисък отколкото средния показател за цялата страна – 14‰.¹⁷ (Междувпрочем до войните последният обикновено варира между 8‰ и 10‰ и леките изменения се дължат на увеличаване на брако-способното население в резултат от нарастването на населението; осъществяването на отложените поради войните бракове през 1919 и 1920 г. водят до тогавашния скок в общия коефициент на брачност в България.¹⁸ В Русия този скок се наблюдава през 1918–1919 г.¹⁹) А през 1926 г. общият брачен коефициент в руската общност се покачва повече от два пъти, за достигне 21.1‰²⁰ при 10‰ за България²¹ (естествено, като се вземе под внимание, че през междувоенния период България е сред страните с най-ниска брачност в света и с най-нисък относителен дял на разведените²²). Тази висока стойност на общия брачен коефициент сред руската имиграция се определя (както е видно от графика 2) от мъжката брачност, която именно тогава достига пиковата си точка и безспорно има връзка с подобряването на условията за живот на руските имигранти,

¹⁷ Даскалов, Р., Българското общество 1878–1939. Т. 2, 16. 12,8‰ е брутният коефициент според Жекова, В., цит. съч, 21.

¹⁸ За 1919 г. брутният коефициент на брачност достига най-високото си равнище до 2007 г. – 16,8‰. Вж. Жекова, В., цит. съч, 21.

¹⁹ В Петербург общият коефициент на брачност достига 23,2‰, което според С. А. Новоселски е световен рекорд (Новосельский, С. А. Демография и статистика. М., 1978, 103).

²⁰ За 1934 г. коефициентът не може да бъде изчислен, тъй като данните от статистиката за женитбите са регистрирани по народност, а преброяването от тази година не предоставя такива.

²¹ Данаилов, Г. Т., Изследвания върху демографията на България. – Сб. БАН, кн. XXIV, 1930, 245.

²² Мишайков, Д. Основен курс по демография. С., 1941, 77.

със специалните мерки по тяхното трудоустрояване, предприети от правителството на Андрей Ляпчев. В еволюцията на брачността при мъжете–руси се наблюдава прогресивно спадане след 1931 г. до 1933 г., т.е. във времето на голямата икономическа криза – явление, което тогава е характерно за населението на България и е регистрирано от брутните коефициенти на брачност, бележещи най-ниското равнище за целия период от 1918 до 1980 г.²³ Изобщо през междувоенния период кривата на мъжката брачност сред русите има доста причудлива динамика на формирането на брачните двойки за разлика от кривата на женската брачност, която е сравнително равномерна и няма такива скокове и падения.

БРАЧНОСТТА В ГРАДОВЕТЕ И СЕЛАТА

Българската статистика за движение на населението обнародва данните за абсолютния брой на сключените бракове поотделно за градовете и селата, благодарение на което може да се проследи развитието на брачността на русите в България за градското и за селското население. Общ коефициент на брачност сред руските общности в българските градове и села не може да бъде изчислен, тъй като данните от преброяванията за наличното руско население по градовете и селата не са обнародвани в корелация с народност руси както е в случая със сведенията за тяхната брачност. Затова използваме друг показател, който се основава само на данните от статистиката за движение на населението (женитби) по народност руси: във вариацията на всички сключени от русите по народност бракове изчисляваме относителният дял на техните бракове в градовете и селата. Според сведенията за женитбите сред русите от 1909–1910 г., т.е. в старата руска диаспора, брачността в градовете е два пъти по-малка отколкото

²³ Жекова, В., цит. съч., 20.

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брачността в селата. След 1920 г., т.е. в новата руска диаспора е тъкмо обратното: в градовете през 20-те години тя обикновено надхвърля 63% като в редки случаи достига пикове от 82% (1921) или 71% (1923); през първата половина на 30-те години по правило надхвърля 71% с един пик от 77% през 1934 г. (табл. 1). Имайки предвид, че за целия период до Втората световна война в България количествено преобладаващо е селското семейство (което е както поризводствена, така и потребителска единица)²⁴ и коефициентът на брачност в селата е значително по-висок от този в градовете²⁵ стигахме до заключението за тъждественост между тенденциите в брачността на старата руска диаспора с тези в България и ясното различие в това отношение на новата руска диаспора; последното се дължи на обстоятелството, че новата руска диаспора се развива предимно като градска.

Таблица 1. Бракове сред населението в България с руска народност в корелация градове–села, в % (1909, 1910, 1920–1935 г.).

	1909	1910	1920	1921	1922	1923
Градове	30.4	30.0	63.9	81.8	64.9	70.8
Села	69.6	70.0	36.1	18.2	35.1	29.2
Общо	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

	1924	1925	1926	1927	1928	1929
Градове	69.6	65.3	63.1	66.8	66.3	68.5
Села	30.4	34.7	36.9	33.2	33.7	31.5
Общо	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

	1930	1931	1932	1933	1934	1935
Градове	65.7	71.3	72.9	71.6	77.0	69.8
Села	34.3	28.7	27.1	28.4	23.0	30.2
Общо	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

²⁴ Земеделските семейства представляват 75% от всички семейства в България. По данни на Л. Беров. Цитирано по: Макавеева, Л., цит. съч., 133.

²⁵ Пак там, с. 20; Данаилов, Г., цит. съч., 244.

В таблица 2 представяме същия показател за брачността сред русите в българските градове и села, но разграничен за двата пола. Вариацията на мъжете–руси от старата руска диаспора (1909–1910 г.) се отличава с малък относителен дял на браковете в градовете и с голям относителен дял на браковете в селата. Същата е и тенденцията сред рускините, макар там относителният дял на браковете в градовете да е с пет–шест процента по-голям. Наблюдаваното явление е в съответствие с принципното положение на по-висока брачност на село и в България, и в Русия, макар в следвоенните години тя да се покачва и в градовете. В България, както и в много други източно-европейски страни моделът е ранна и висока (на практика всеобща) брачност (най-вече по селата) за разлика от страните в Западна Европа – с късна и не толкова висока брачност.²⁶ Това демографско явление се обяснява с възможността при системата на дребно селско земевладение всички да си осигурят дом и известно количество земя (т.е. да могат да се изхранват) и с традицията на грижа за семейството, за неговото увеличаване и за продължаването на рода.²⁷

За разлика от старата руска диаспора в новата (след 1920 г.) относителният дял на браковете в градовете е два – два и половина пъти по-голям отколкото в селата – и при мъжете и при жените. При мъжете се забелязва тенденция към нарастване с няколко процента през 30-те години в сравнение с 20-те години, скок през 1934 г., след което следва спад до равнището от края на 20-те години. При жените от новата руска диаспора относителният дял на браковете в градовете е значително по-голям от този на мъжете, но... през първата половина на 20-те години делът

²⁶ Данаилов, Г., цит. съч., 54–57, 92–93, 247–255; Тотев, А. Ю. Населението на България, 1880–1980. Демографско-исторически очерк. – Год. на СУ, Юридически факултет, 1968, 12.

²⁷ Даскалов, Р., цит. съч., 2005, Т. 2, 16.

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Таблица 2. Бракове сред населението в България с руска народност в корелация градове-села и по пол, 1909, 1910, 1920–1935 г.

	Мъже					
	1909	1910	1920	1921	1922	1923
Градове	16.7	15.4	63.2	82.1	64.4	70.6
Села	83.3	84.6	36.8	17.9	35.6	29.4
Общо	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

	1924	1925	1926	1927	1928	1929
Градове	68.7	64.9	62.5	66.3	65.8	68.6
Села	31.3	35.1	37.5	33.7	34.2	31.4
Общо	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

	1930	1931	1932	1933	1934	1935
Градове	65.4	71.0	71.2	71.1	77.4	69.0
Села	34.6	29.0	28.8	28.9	22.6	31.0
Общо	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

	Жени					
	1909	1910	1920	1921	1922	1923
Градове	23.8	22.2	84.2	92.3	79.5	74.0
Села	76.2	77.8	15.8	7.7	20.5	26.0
Общо	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

	1924	1925	1926	1927	1928	1929
Градове	84.1	66.7	70.7	65.8	79.6	82.1
Села	15.9	33.3	29.3	34.2	20.4	17.9
Общо	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

	1930	1931	1932	1933	1934	1935
Градове	75.9	73.7	84.1	73.9	80.8	72.0
Села	24.1	26.3	15.9	26.1	19.2	28.0
Общо	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

на браковете им в селата е много по-малък от този в градовете, което е свързано с количествената диспропорция на половете и с новите за имигрантките обществени и битови условия в селската среда на страната–приемник, към които те все още са в процес на приспособяване.

СМЕСЕНИ БРАКОВЕ

В тесния смисъл на понятието етнически и/или религиозно смесената (хетерогенната) брачност представлява честотата на встъпване в такива бракове по отношение на общото количество на сключените бракове. В широкия смисъл на понятието смесената брачност е процес на образуване и функциониране на съпругески двойки от различни етноси или вероизповедания, обуславящ се от социално-културни норми. Проблемът за разпространението и честотата на (етнически и/или религиозно) смесените бракове е широко обсъждан в демографските и социологическите изследвания. Там те са осмисляни като един от най-важните фактори на етническата интеграция и асимилация. Американският социолог Милтън Гордън разглежда етнически смесените бракове или т. нар. „брачна асимилация” като трето измерение на адаптацията и като неизбежен резултат от структурната асимилация”, т.е. като широко мащабно навлизане на членовете на дадено етническо малцинство във формалните и неформалните обществени структури и институции, където „институцията семейство е един от основните обществени образувания”²⁸. Сами по себе си хетерогенните бракове са знак за активно междуетническо взаимодействие. Вследствие от тях се създават семейства, които се явяват непосредствена микросреда за процесите на интеграция и естествена асимилация (без това да е задължително). В този смисъл те са един от „мостовете” за сближаването на етносите – в частност, на русите с българите и с етническите групи в България, защото предполагат нагласа за трайно установяване в страната-приемник. Ръстът на техния брой и относителен дял свидетелстват за ролята им в етнокултурните и етносоциалните процеси. В смесените семейства основен тип взаимодействие между

²⁸ Gordon, M. *Human Nature, Class and Ethnicity*. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1978, 71.

различните култури е интеграцията; културите, срещащи се там не се самоунищожават, а съществуват в многообразни съчетания и проявления. Различията в ценностната система – като показатели за вътрешнокултурни различия – изпълняват ролята на фактори, усложняващи междуетническите взаимоотношения, и обратно, високата степен на близост на контактуващите групи по психологически параметри създават предпоставки за толерантност и възникване на механизми на взаимодействие. Разпространението на етнически смесени бракове сред дадено население зависи от много фактори. Важни детерминанти са демографските показатели на етническите групи в него, като численост, характер на териториалното разпределение (дисперсно или етнически еднородно), възрастово-половата и брачната структура, тип на демографското възпроизводство, миграционната им активност, но също културата им, изповядваната религия, традициите, обичаите, начина на живот, менталитета, народопсихологията и пр. Всички те, влияещи заедно, водят до разпространението на смесената брачност в различна степен за отделните региони. Основни фактори за хетерогенните бракове между руси и българи и руси и представители на други етнически групи в България е дисбалансът между мъжете и жените в руската общност (и по-точно казано голямото числено превъзходство на мъжете) и наличието на много лица без брак. Специално за смесените бракове между руси и българи не са за пренебрегване като фактори също и езиковата близост и еднаквото вероизповедание – източното православие. Що се отнася до смесените бракове между руси и представители на други етнически групи в България ще отбележим, че от една страна, за тях благоприятства наличието на търпими, толерантни взаимоотношения, и от друга страна страна, ги възпира главно „другостта” на религиозната принадлежност и свързаните с нея брачни традиции.

Въпреки че руската имиграция идва от страна, където

историческото развитие е предопределило полиетническият характер на населението и където живеят представители на десетки етнически и народностни групи, което априори би следвало да предполага благоприятни условия за осъществяването на смесени бракове, де факто ситуацията не е такава. В началото на XX в. етнически смесените бракове са малко разпространени в Русия. Това се обяснява с преобладаването на селското население, което е слабо дисперсно в етническо отношение и не предразполага към широко взаимодействие на етносите. Но разпространението на браковете между хора от различни етнически и народностни групи не зависи пряко от етническата разнородност на населението, диспропорцията на половете и други специални демографски характеристики. Основен фактор, влияещ върху честотата на смесените бракове, са религиозните забрани на бракове с друговерци и дълбоките социално-културни различия между етносите в даден регион. В изпращащата страна – Русия броят на етнически смесените бракове започва да расте след Октомврийската революция от 1917 г., като значителна роля в разрастването на смесената брачност играят отслабването на регламентиращата роля на църквата в сферата на междуличностните взаимоотношения при хора с различна етническа принадлежност, разпространението на грамотността, признаването на равнопоставеността между различните националности от страна на съветската власт, урбанизационните процеси, масовите миграции в годините на колективизацията, депортацията и преселването на цели народи²⁹.

В страната-приемник България, сред българите, които са доминиращия и съответно определящия общите тенденции в смесената брачност етнос, има много малък относителен дял на смесените бракове – през целия междувоенен период (табл. 3). Една от причините за това е консерватив-

²⁹ Алексахина, Н. А. Динамика межэтнического взаимодействия в Российской федерации. Open Society Institute, Praha–Budapest, 1999, 24.

ното българско семейно право, намиращо се под влияние на обичайното и на каноническото право. Брачното законодателство в България има религиозен характер, което означава, че правните норми, регулиращи венчаването, се определят от съответните духовни власти (а не от законодателния орган на държавата Народното събрание). За българския етнос това е Екзархийският устав на Българската православна църква,³⁰ според който тя не признава за действителни браковете, сключени само по граждански ред, и още – определя като главно условие за сключване на църковния брак еднаквостта на религиозната принадлежност на бъдещите съпрузи. Тоест според каноните на Българската православна църква браковете на християни с нехристияни са забранени; смесени бракове се допускат само между православни и инославни християни, като встъпващите в брак правят това пред православен свещеник и задължително подписват декларация, че децата им ще бъдат православни³¹. Все пак Българската православна църква проявява търпимост по отношение на брак между православен български поданик и инославна чужденка и обратно, венчани от инославен свещеник; според практиката на Светия Синод такъв брак се счита за незаконен – по каноническото право, но се търпи от православната църква, защото не е нищожен по право, а е само унищожаем, ако някоя от страните поиска това³². В сравнение с етносите, с които съжителстват и които са отчетени от статистиката на

³⁰ Създаден през 1883 г., приспособен в Княжеството през 1895 г. и допълнен през 1897 г.

³¹ Бобчев, Ст. Церковно право. Съкратен курс из лекциите по церковно право, четени на Юридическия факултет. С., 1927, 324; Айтова, А. Религиозният брак в България (1879–1945). – Съвременно право, 2013, № 5, 55.

³² Танчев, Хр. Екзархийски устав с тълкуванията и наредбите на Светия синод, Върховния касационен съд, Министерствата и съответните законоположения. Второ изд. с изменения и допълнения, внесени до края на 1931 г. Т. II. Ч. 6. Бракове. С., 1932, 25–26.

движението на населението (арменци, евреи, гърци, италианци, немци, румънци, сърби, татари, турци, цигани и др.) сред българите относителният дял на смесените бракове е изключително малък – след Първата световна война нараства от 0.8% до 1.2% (табл. 3). Единствен след тях, с най-ниско дялово участие на смесените бракове е турският етнос. При турците брачните норми се определят от Корана и Устава за духовното устройство на мюсюлманите в България от 1919 г. За разлика от другите вероизповедания представени в България, които дават равноправно положение на лицата от женски пол, в исляма чрез брака мъжът добива изключителното право на собственост върху личността на съпругата си.³³ Според таблица 3 най-висока смесена брачност се среща при сърбите – 100%, които стоят най-близо до българите в езиково отношение и също са православни. Висока смесена брачност показват още и други малки етнически групи западноевропейци - на първо място немците (поддържащи постоянно висока смесена брачност), а на второ италианците, което безспорно се дължи на обстоятелството, че в повечето европейски страни брачното право е светско, гражданският брак е широко разпространен (още от края на XIX в.)³⁴ и съответно

Таблица 3. Относителен дял на населението в България от различни народности, живеещо в смесени бракове спрямо цялото брачно население от същите народности през дадената година, общо и по пол, 1910, 1920, 1923, 1926, 1929, 1932 и 1934 г.

³³ Гълъбов, Г. Мюсюлманското право с кратък обзор върху историята и догмите на исляма. С., 1924, с. 8–9, 51; Айтова, А., цит. съч., 47–48.

³⁴ В Прусия гражданският брак е въведен през 1847 г., в Австро-Унгария през 1868 г., а в България – като задължителна и единствена валидна форма на бракосъчетание през 1945 г. Вж. Айтова, А., цит. съч., 45–46.

*Брачност, брачна структура, смесени бракове сред
русите в България през междувоенния период*

	1910	1920	1923	1926	1929	1932	1934
Общо							
Арменци	13.5	16.3	12.3	9.9	13.7	23.3	24.2
Българи	0.8	0.6	0.8	1.2	1.2	0.4	1.0
Гърци	14.2	13.9	14.6	46.1	56.8	73.4	60.0
Евреи	1.7	0.7	1.8	3.4	3.6	8.2	6.5
Италианци	54.5	64.7	91.7	100.0	85.7	95.6	100.0
Немци	80.0	57.1	76.2	81.7	91.5	81.4	82.5
Румънци	12.2	7.7	9.6	12.4	28.6	30.6	61.9
Сърби	41.2	100.0	96.1	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Татари	7.1	13.5	10.5	14.3	2.2	9.3	30.2
Турци	0.4	0.3	0.5	0.6	0.5	0.4	0.8
Цигани	1.6	7.7	1.7	1.1	0.5	1.2	1.2
Общо	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Мъже							
Арменци	11.7	15.0	11.6	8.4	13.3	19.3	18.3
Българи	0.4	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.4
Гърци	5.7	4.7	6.9	29.1	34.7	46.9	44.5
Евреи	0.0	0.6	0.5	1.0	0.9	2.9	2.4
Италианци	28.6	62.5	88.9	100.0	80.0	93.3	100.0
Немци	50.0	37.5	61.5	73.2	79.4	75.0	60.0
Румънци	5.3	4.4	5.5	7.0	15.5	14.0	40.8
Сърби	92.3	100.0	95.0	95.0	100.0	14.0	100.0
Татари	2.8	8.6	10.0	6.7	2.1	3.9	16.7
Турци	0.3	0.2	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.5
Цигани	0.1	7.7	0.8	0.5	0.4	0.5	0.6
Общо	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Жени							
Арменки	2.3	1.7	1.7	1.7	0.5	6.1	8.6
Българки	0.4	0.4	0.8	1.1	1.0	0.8	0.6
Гъркини	9.5	1.0	8.8	30.9	43.9	65.3	41.2
Еврейки	1.8	0.2	1.3	2.5	2.8	5.6	4.3
Италианки	44.4	14.3	75.0	100.0	66.7	88.9	100.0
Немкини	75.0	42.3	61.5	63.3	87.3	72.9	76.3
Румънки	7.7	3.7	4.8	6.3	17.8	21.8	48.4
Сръбкини	80.0	100.0	85.7	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Татарки	4.5	5.9	10.5	8.7	0.0	5.8	18.9
Туркини	0.1	0.3	0.1	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.3
Циганки	1.5	0.0	0.9	0.6	0.1	0.5	0.7
Общо	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

църковният брак е загубил предишната си значимост в разбиранията на европейците. Тенденция към покачване се наблюдава при арменците, гърците, евреите. Тук не бихме казали, че съществува връзка между размера на етническата група и нейното участие в междуетническа брачност. Но все пак този фактор не бива да бъде изцяло пренебрегван, тъй като той определя честотата на междуетническите контакти и съотношението на половете „на пазара на браковете”³⁵.

Русите от новата диаспора се отличават с изключително високи нива на смесена брачност през целия разглеждан период. През първата половина на 20-те години тя е около 85%, от 1924 до 1927 г. достига над 90% с пик през 1926 г. от 92.5%, от края на 20-те години до 1934 г. е като варира между 80% и 89% и внезапно спада през 1935 г. до равнището от 1921 г. В сравнение с останалите етнически и народностни групи в България старата руска диаспора (по данни за 1909–1910 г.) също показва високо равнище на смесена брачност (табл. 3), но все пак то си остава около два пъти по-ниско от това на новата (табл. 4).

Таблица 4. Относителен дял на населението в България от руска народност, живеещо в смесени бракове спрямо цялото брачно население от руска народност през дадената година, 1909, 1910, 1920–1935 г.

1909	1910	1920	1921	1922	1923	1924	1925	1926
30.4	45.0	85.5	75.2	84.7	84.4	91.6	91.5	92.5

1927	1928	1929	1930	1931	1932	1933	1934	1935
90.9	88.2	86.4	87.3	83.9	89.4	80.9	81.1	76.5

Смесената брачност сред русите в корелация градове–села изчисляваме като относителен дял на русите в България, живеещи в смесени бракове в градовете и селата спрямо

³⁵ Алексахина, Н. А., цит. съч., 26.

*Брачност, брачна структура, смесени бракове сред
русите в България през междувоенния период*

всички руси в България, живеещи в смесени бракове (табл. 5). Тя е по-висока в градовете отколкото в селата.

Таблица 5. Относителен дял на населението в България от руска народност, живеещо в смесени бракове, спрямо цялото брачно население с руска народност през дадената година в корелация градове-села, 1909, 1910, 1920–1935 г.

	1909	1910	1920	1921	1922	1923	1924	1925	1926
Градове	85.7	66.7	59.1	76.9	62.2	70.2	67.7	65.7	63.0
Села	14.3	33.3	40.9	23.1	37.8	29.8	32.3	34.3	37.0
Общо	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

	1927	1928	1929	1930	1931	1932	1933	1934	1935
Градове	67.4	62.9	66.1	64.2	71.1	71.8	71.2	75.6	70.1
Села	32.6	37.1	33.9	35.8	28.9	28.2	28.8	24.4	29.9
Общо	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Таблица 6. Относителен дял на населението в България с руска народност, живеещо в смесени бракове, в корелация градове-села, по пол, 1909, 1910, 1920–1935 г.

	1909	1910	1920	1921	1922	1923	1924	1925	1926
Мъже									
Градове	66.7	100.0	77.1	68.5	80.1	82.8	89.9	91.7	92.1
Села	0.0	0.0	96.4	95.0	91.0	85.3	94.4	90.5	92.8
Жени									
Градове	80.0	100.0	31.3	19.4	20.0	24.3	35.1	25.0	31.0
Села	6.2	21.4	66.7	66.7	22.2	23.1	14.3	7.1	8.4

	1927	1928	1929	1930	1931	1932	1933	1934	1935
Мъже									
Градове	91.5	85.7	83.1	84.7	83.3	86.5	80.0	78.7	75.4
Села	89.2	92.1	93.1	90.9	84.1	92.3	80.7	85.4	75.5
Жени									
Градове	25.9	18.6	6.5	20.5	14.3	50.9	17.7	16.7	19.4
Села	7.1	9.1	20.0	21.4	6.7	40.0	8.3	30.0	7.1

Според анализа на смесената брачност сред русите в градовете и селата по пол в старата руска диаспора

(1909–1910 г.) в селата при мъжете изобщо няма смесени бракове, при жените има известен процент, но той не е голям, докато в градовете смесените бракове достигат до сто процента и при двата пола (табл. 6). (Изразено с друг показател над шестдесет процента от всички смесени бракове – и в старата, и в новата руска диаспора са сключвани предимно в градовете.) Градското население се проявява като по-активен фактор в сключването на бракове с други народностни и етнически групи. Това явление е свързано преди всичко с обстоятелството, че градът, акумулирайки в себе си представители на различни етноси, допринася за „размиването” на етническите граници. Високото равнище на социална мобилност на градското население и липсата на силен социален контрол водят до занижаване на значимостта на фактора етническа принадлежност в сферата на сключването на смесени бракове.³⁶ В новата руска диаспора (където дисбалансът между половете е силно изявен в полза на мъжете) във вариацията на последните смесените бракове са в пъти повече отколкото при жените; освен това те са характерни по-скоро за селата отколкото за градовете, а във вариацията на жените през половината от разглеждания период (1923–1928, 1932, 1935 г.) е тъкмо обратното.

Според таблица 7 процентът на мъжете в старата руска диаспора (по данни за 1909–1910 г.), живеещи в смесени бракове е много малък – най-вече с българки и изобщо нямат бракове с жени от други етнически групи. За разлика от тях мъжете от новата руска диаспора (които тук не могат да бъдат разграничени от старата по признак руска народност, но все пак те са определящи, тъй като са доминиращи по численост) се отличават с най-висока смесена брачност в сравнение с останалите етнически и народностни групи в България и тази тенденция е трайна и валидна за целия разглеждан период; тя достига пиковите си точки от 1924

³⁶ Пак там.

*Брачност, брачна структура, смесени бракове сред
русите в България през междувоенния период*

Таблица 7. Относителен дял на браковете на мъжете в България по народност руси в корелация с народността на встъпилите в брак с тях жени, в %, 1909, 1910, 1920–1934 г.

Жени по народност	1909	1910	1920	1921	1922	1923	1924	1925	1926
Българки	11.1	15.4	79.0	68.7	80.4	80.1	88.1	86.4	89.2
Рускини	88.9	84.6	15.8	26.8	16.0	16.5	8.7	8.8	7.7
Сръбкини	0.0	0.0	2.6	0.9	0.9	0.4	0.3	0.8	0.0
Др. славянки	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.4	0.0	1.0	0.5
Арменки	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.9	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.2
Гъркини	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.8	1.4	1.7	0.9	0.8	1.0
Еврейки	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.9	0.0	0.0	0.9	0.0	0.0
Италианки	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.5
Немкини	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.9	0.0	0.2	0.0
Румънки	0.0	0.0	1.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.8	0.5
Татарки	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Французойки	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Циганки	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.9	0.0	0.0	0.5	0.2	0.2
Др. не слав.	0.0	0.0	1.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	0.2
Общо	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

	1927	1928	1929	1930	1931	1932	1933	1934	1935
Българки	86.2	83.8	82.7	84.0	81.5	85.2	74.6	75.9	71.9
Рускини	9.3	12.0	13.8	13.0	16.5	11.8	19.8	19.8	24.5
Сръбкини	0.3	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.2
Др. славянки	0.8	1.6	0.3	0.3	0.8	0.7	2.6	0.5	0.6
Арменки	0.0	0.5	0.0	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.0	0.6
Гъркини	1.1	0.3	1.0	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.5	1.4	0.0
Еврейки	0.0	0.0	0.5	0.0	0.0	0.4	0.0	0.9	0.0
Италианки	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.5	0.6
Немкини	0.8	0.3	0.3	0.0	0.3	0.4	1.0	0.5	0.0
Румънки	0.6	0.3	0.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.5	0.0	0.0
Татарки	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Французойки	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.5	0.6
Циганки	0.3	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.4	0.0	0.0	0.0
Др. не слав.	0.6	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.5	0.0	0.0
Общо	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

до 1927 г. – 91–92%, след което намалява. Те създават предимно хетерогенни бракове – главно с българки – от 1922 до 1931 г. над 80% от браковете са с българки, най-много такива бракове са сключени през 1926 г. – 89.2%. Минимален е относителният дял на мъжете-руси, чиито брачни партньорки са други славянки, арменки, гъркини, немкини (табл. 7). Жени от други, неславянски народности, с които мъжете-руси сключват бракове са: от местното население – най-често с гъркини, понякога тези бракове надвишават 1% и почти достигат до 2%, арменки, румънки и еврейки; от западноевропейките – с немкини, италианки и французойки, но тези бракове са редки – под 1%; под 0,5% са браковете с циганки (табл. 7).

Както при мъжете, така и при жените от старата руска диаспора в България брачните партньори са предимно от същия, т.е. руския етнос; относителният дял на смесените бракове е нисък, те се сключват с представители на българския етнос (табл. 8).

В сравнение с мъжете-руси при рускините относителният дял на браковете с българи е значително по-голям. Във вариацията на жените наблюдаваме и друга особеност: и в старата, и в новата руска диаспора смесените бракове с българи са еднакво характерни; тяхната крива обаче е скокообразна, силно варираща от 7% (1929) до 43% (1931).

За разлика от мъжете-руси рускините от новата диаспора сключват бракове предимно със свои сънародници, смесената брачност не е така характерна за рускините както за мъжете-руси, дори тази тенденция се засилва – до 1926 г. достига равнища 70–80%, а след това 80–90%. Смесени бракове сключват предимно с българи – доста променливо (табл. 8).

*Брачност, брачна структура, смесени бракове сред
русите в България през междувоенния период*

Таблица 8. Относителен дял на браковете на жените в България с руска народност в корелация с народността на встъпилите в брак с тях мъже, 1909, 1910, 1920–1934 г.

Мъже по народност	1909	1910	1920	1921	1922	1923	1924	1925	1926
Българи	19.0	33.3	31.6	23.1	18.2	22.0	25.0	19.0	19.5
Руси	76.2	61.1	63.2	76.9	79.5	76.0	68.1	81.0	75.7
Сърби	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.4
Др. славяни	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.3	0.0	2.3	0.0	2.4
Арменци	4.8	5.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Гърци	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Евреи	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Италианци	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Немци	0.0	0.0	5.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.3	0.0	0.0
Румънци	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Татари	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Турци	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Французи	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Цигани	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Др. не слав.	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.3	0.0	0.0
Общо	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

	1927	1928	1929	1930	1931	1932	1933	1934	1935
Българи	17.1	13.0	7.1	17.3	10.5	42.8	6.5	13.5	12.0
Руси	80.5	83.4	91.1	79.3	87.7	50.8	84.8	80.8	84.0
Сърби	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Др. славяни	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.9	0.0
Арменци	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.6	2.2	0.0	4.0
Гърци	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.6	0.0	0.0	0.0
Евреи	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Италианци	0.0	1.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.6	0.0	0.0	0.0
Немци	0.0	0.0	1.8	1.7	1.8	1.6	4.3	1.9	0.0
Румънци	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Татари	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Турци	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.9	0.0
Французи	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Цигани	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Др. не слав.	2.4	1.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.2	0.0	0.0
Общо	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

В сравнение с мъжете–руси рускините много по-рядко се омъжват за представители на друга, различна от българската, етническа група: по-чести са хетерогенните бракове с немци за периода след 1929 г. (но и сред жените от старата руска общност се срещат такива – регистрирани са бракове с арменци) (табл. 8).

ЗАКЛЮЧЕНИЕ

По статистическата информация за брачното състояние на русите в България през междувоенния период старите заселници не могат да бъдат разграничени от новите имигранти. Статистическите сведения за „женитбите“ от времето преди войните подсказва, че моделът на брачност в старата руска диаспора се отличава съществено от този на новата, доближавайки се до характерния за страната. Но тъй като новите заселници са доминиращото мнозинство, то те и определят характеристиките на брачността сред русите в България през междувоенния период. Тя се отличава с твърде висок за страната общ брачен коефициент от 21.1‰ (1926), който през 20-те години показва тенденция към повишаване. Това явление се дължи на наличието на голям брой неженени мъже (в преобладаваща си част бивши военни) в (предполагаема, тъй като няма данни за възрастовата характеристика) брачна възраст. Но не само... През 1930 г. поредното издание на Екзархийския устав отразява едно очевидно често срещано явление (след като Светия Синод предприема законодателни мерки) – става дума за това, че в България (мъжете)–руси – загубили вяра във възможността някога да се върнат в родината си – се женят повторно, независимо от това, че имат семейства в Русия. Така руските бежанци не спазват едно от условията за сключване на брак – лицата да не се намират в брачни връзки с други лица³⁷ и предизвикват реакцията на Светия

³⁷ Правилник за воденето на подведомствените на духовните съдилища

Синод, който тогава въвежда „предпазна” мярка – да се уведомяват чрез окръжно екзархийските началства, че занапред при благославяне на бракове между българи и руси свещениците трябва да изискват от русите удостоверение, издадено от началника на руските православни общини в България, че те са свободни да встъпят в брак.³⁸

Във вариацията на мъжете–руси брачността бележи спад по време на и след световната икономическа криза от края на 30-те години. Развиващата се като градска руска диаспора има значително по-високи нива на брачност в градовете отколкото в селата, като се наблюдават различия във вариациите по пол: при жените браковете в градовете се отличават със доста по-голям относителният дял в сравнение с мъжете. Що се отнася до смесената брачност междуетническите бракове на русите в България се случват в рамките на едно и също вероизповедание – православното, преимуществено с българите. Въз основа на анализирания статистически данни с право можем да кажем, че няма друга общност в България през разглеждания период, която трайно да поддържа толкова високи показатели по този фундаментален показател за интеграция, което само по себе си говори за наличието на нагласа и у имигрантите–руси и у приемащото българско общество за преодоляване на консервативността и патриархалността.

дела с Екзархийския устав в Царството. Ч. III–IV. С., 1928, 41.

³⁸ Параграф 973 на Екзархийския устав. Вж. Танчев, Хр. Екзархийски устав с тълкуванията и наредбите на Светия Синод, Върховния касационен съд, Министерствата и съответните законоположения. Второ изд. с изменения и допълнения, внесени до края на 1931 г. Т. II. Ч. 6. Бракове. С., 1932, 18.

«Наша критика не должна вылиться в крикливую перепалку».

**Почему разоблачение югославского
«ревизионизма» в советской прессе конца
1950-х годов не достигло остроты
сталинских пропагандистских кампаний**

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Процесс советско-югославского сближения, начавшийся после смерти Сталина,¹ достиг своей кульминации в июне 1956 г., когда делегация Федеративной народной республики Югославии (ФНРЮ) и Союза коммунистов Югославии (СКЮ) во главе с И. Брозом Тито совершила более чем 20-дневную поездку по СССР, которая получила подробнейшее освещение в советской прессе.² Многотысячный

¹ См.: Едемский, А. Б. От конфликта к нормализации. Советско-югославские отношения в 1953–1956 годах. М., 2008.

² См. постановления Президиума ЦК КПСС от 22 мая 1956 г. «Об освещении в советской печати вопросов советско-югославских отношений в связи с приездом в СССР т. Тито» и от 25 мая «О подготовке материалов с нашей стороны для югославской печати и радио»: РГАНИ, ф. 3, оп. 14, д. 24, л. 22; д. 26, л. 36–37. В соответствии с первым из этих постановлений во всех центральных органах советской прессы были опубликованы статьи, посвященные успехам, достигнутым в деле нормализации советско-югославских отношений со времени поездки в Белград в мае–июне 1955 г. партийно-правительственной делегации СССР. В «Правде» была перепечатана программная статья главного идеолога Союза коммунистов Югославии Э. Карделя «О руководящей роли СКЮ в социалистическом строительстве». – Правда, 1956, 2, 3 июня.

«Наша критика не должна вылиться в крикливую перепалку». Почему разоблачение югославского ...

митинг советско-югославской дружбы на стадионе «Динамо» 19 июня 1956 г. призван был символизировать полное преодоление взаимного недоверия. Важнейшим итогом этой поездки стало подписание межпартийной декларации.³ Однако при всей серьезности приготовлений и громкости пропагандистских фанфар сверхзадача переговоров так и не была решена, результатами июньского визита Тито в СССР в Кремле не были довольны.

Осознавая выгоду более тесного экономического сотрудничества с СССР, Югославия в то же время нисколько не хотела поступаться своим суверенитетом и продолжала дистанцироваться от советского лагеря, не проявив, в частности, никакого желания к вступлению в Организацию Варшавского договора (ОВД) и Совет экономической взаимопомощи (СЭВ). Подписанная межпартийная Декларация носила явно компромиссный характер со стороны КПСС, в ней ничего не говорилось ни о единстве двух партий, стоящих на общей идейной платформе, ни о принадлежности Югославии к социалистическому лагерю. Протоколы заседаний Президиума ЦК КПСС отражают разочарования советской стороны в итогах переговоров с югославами. При утверждении документа на Президиуме ЦК было принято решение *«сказать югославским товарищам, что мы не удовлетворены текстом декларации, но спорить не будем»*.⁴ При этом Москву весьма заботил вопрос о том,

³ Совместное заявление Правительств СССР и ФНРЮ в связи с государственным посещением Советского Союза президентом ФНРЮ И. Броз Тито и Декларация об отношениях между СКЮ и КПСС были подписаны утром 20 июня. См.: Правда, 1956, 21 июня.

⁴ РГАНИ, ф. 3, оп. 14, д. 35, л. 2. Подробнее об обсуждении проблем советско-югославских отношений на заседаниях руководства КПСС см.: Стыкалин, А. С. Записи заседаний Президиума ЦК КПСС 1950-х – первой половины 1960-х годов как источник по изучению советско-югославских отношений. – В: Россия и Сербия глазами историков двух стран. СПб, 2010, 244–271. Идя на компромисс с лидерами СКЮ, руководство КПСС, конечно, не могло не осознавать,

что лидеры братских партий стран «народной демократии» могут воспринять декларацию об отношениях между КПСС и СКЮ как свидетельство начавшегося принципиального пересмотра характера отношений между компартиями. Это заметил проникательный и хорошо информированный посол ФНРЮ в СССР В. Мичунович, сделавший соответствующую запись в дневнике. Чтобы в корне пресечь любую попытку в странах Восточной Европы извлечь нежелательные для Москвы выводы из опубликованного документа, представители КПСС, отметил он, на совещании руководителей стран советского блока (состоявшемся сразу после отъезда Тито из СССР) *«ясно дали понять лидерам стран лагеря, что то, что они подписали с Тито, не имеет значения для политики СССР по отношению к государствам и коммунистическим партиям стран лагеря»*.⁵ Только польский и венгерский вызовы октября 1956 г. (неповиновение Москве обновленного руководства Польской объединенной рабочей партии во главе с В. Гомулкой, а через считанные дни после этого венгерское восстание) заставили советских лидеров несколько по-иному взглянуть на методы сохранения единства социалистического лагеря, усомниться в эффективности прежней восточно-европейской политики СССР, при всей видимой всеохватности контроля над советской сферой влияния не способной, как это показали особенно венгерские события, обеспечить стабильность в регионе. На заседании Президиума ЦК КПСС от 30 октября 1956 г. при обсуждении текста Декларации об отношениях между социалистическими странами речь шла о том, что ходом событий обнаружился кризис в отношениях СССР со странами «народной демократии», а также был поставлен

что своим смелым сопротивлением сталинскому диктату югославские коммунисты завоевали немалый авторитет и уважение как в рамках мирового коммунистического движения, так и далеко за его пределами.

⁵ Micunović, V. Moskovske godiné 1956/1958. Zagreb, 1977, 93.

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вопрос о необходимости определенной корректировки концепции внутриблоковых отношений с учетом требований равноправия.⁶

Это было в конце октября, но уже за четыре месяца до этого, сразу после отъезда Тито из СССР, положение дел в Польше и Венгрии (волнения в г. Познани 28 июня, размах оппозиционных критических выступлений на дискуссиях Кружка Петёфи в Будапеште) усилило не только озабоченность советских лидеров происходящим, но и раздражение по поводу претензий югославов на поиски своего пути к социализму, тем более что на югославский опыт охотно ссылались активизировавшиеся оппоненты правящих режимов в странах Восточной Европы (отчасти также и сторонники далеко идущих реформ в СССР).⁷ Эта озабоченность нашла отражение в закрытом письме лидерам компартий стран социалистического лагеря, а также Франции и Италии, от 13 июля, принятом на заседании Президиума ЦК КПСС. В письме было акцентировано внимание на разногласиях с СКЮ, чье руководство отказалось заявить об идеологическом единстве с КПСС на основе марксизма-ленинизма и принадлежности Югославии к социалистическому лагерю. Были подвергнуты критике претензии югославов на слишком большую независимость

⁶ Фурсенко, А. А. (Гл. ред.). Президиум ЦК КПСС, 1954–1964. Т. 1. Черновые протокольные записи заседаний. Стенограммы. М., 2003, 187–191.

⁷ Донесения советских посольств из ряда восточноевропейских столиц свидетельствовали о немалом влиянии югославского примера на те силы в странах «народной демократии», которые были явно не удовлетворены избранным темпом и характером десталинизации в СССР (См., например, донесения из Венгрии: Орехова, Е. Д., В. Т. Середа, А. С. Стыкалин (Ред., сост.). Советский Союз и венгерский кризис 1956 года. Документы. М., 1998. См. также донесение из Польши от 29 сентября, в котором говорилось о том, что редколлегия газеты «Попросту» находится под большим влиянием югославского посольства в Варшаве: Президиум ЦК КПСС, 1954–1964. Т. 2. Постановления, 1954–1958. М., 2006, 453). Реальный опыт строительства социализма в Югославии при этом часто идеализировался.

во взаимоотношениях с другими коммунистическими и рабочими партиями, расцененные руководством КПСС как стремление *«обеспечить себе роль посредника, возможность, по сути, самостоятельно вести переговоры со всеми партиями, свободно лавировать и добиваться определенного лидерства»*.⁸ *«Кажется, они уже раскаялись, что подписали эту декларацию»*, – записал посол Мичунович 3 июля под впечатлением от только что опубликованного постановления ЦК КПСС «О преодолении культа личности и его последствий», воспринятого как определенный шаг назад в сравнении с решениями XX съезда КПСС, и от своих непосредственных контактов с кремлевской элитой, с некоторой стыдливостью отзывавшейся о советско-югославской декларации.⁹ За месяц до этого, в дни пребывания Тито в Москве, председатель Совета министров СССР Н. А. Булганин, дав 5 июня завтрак в Кремле в честь югославского лидера, поднял тост *«За друга, за ленинца, за нашего боевого товарища!»*, и эта характеристика, опубликованная на следующий день в «Правде», была растиражирована в прессе всего мира. Между тем, всего через месяц, в свете новых событий в Восточной

⁸ РГАНИ, ф. 3, оп. 14, д. 37, л. 23. В информации ЦК КПСС, разосланной низовым парторганизациям КПСС для ознакомления, также отмечалось, что «у югославских товарищей есть еще иное, чем у нашей марксистско-ленинской партии, понимание некоторых важных принципиальных вопросов».

⁹ Miciunović V., Op. cit., 97. О письме ЦК КПСС компартиям от 13 июля 1956 г. «Об итогах советско-югославских переговоров в июне 1956 г.» в Белграде узнали из конфиденциальных источников (от венгерских коммунистов–реформаторов, передавших в посольство ФНРЮ копию письма). Как сам факт отправки закрытого письма, так и его содержание вызвали неудовольствие лидеров СКЮ. Уже позже, после венгерской революции, в ходе межпартийной переписки руководство СКЮ упрекало лидеров КПСС в двойной игре – речь идет о противоречии между публичными декларациями и закрытыми документами, в которых без ведома югославских коммунистов им даются оценки, расходящиеся с открытыми заявлениями (Письмо от 7 февраля 1957 г.; РГАНИ, ф. 89, пер. 45, док. 83, 84).

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Европе, ее сочли несвоевременной. 29 июня Булганин был подвергнут критике на заседании Президиума ЦК КПСС (*«Преждевременно заявление т. Булганина. Назвал т. Тито ленинцем. Неосторожен – сказать об этом надо»*).¹⁰ Заявление Булганина было названо преждевременным и в вышеупомянутом письме зарубежным компартиям от 13 июля. Позже, в условиях уже произошедшего заметного охлаждения советско-югославских отношений, Хрущев на встрече с делегацией югославских журналистов в мае 1957 г. так объяснял свою позицию: *«Булганин имел неосторожность и назвал Тито ленинцем. Вы судите о нас как хотите, но мы называем ленинцами тех людей, с которыми не имеем расхождений идеологического порядка, когда мы по вопросам политики имеем точку зрения, которая, мы считаем, основывается на ленинских позициях. Мы считали по целому ряду вопросов, по которым имели различные точки зрения, что Югославия еще не встала на ленинские позиции, но мы считали, что вполне возможно развивать дружеские отношения. Потом уже сблизиться и потом найти полное единство взглядов. Это нормально. Булганина же мы покритиковали. А вы знаете, как мы критикуем? Если критикуем Тито и других, то Булганину попало больше, потому что он член Президиума. Мы ему сказали – почему ты так сказал? Мы смотрим так – у нас есть расхождения, пойдут ли у нас события так, что будут изживаться эти расхождения, а они могут и увеличиваться, а члены партии читают международную прессу, это понятно, коммунисты других стран также читают. И вот когда мы говорим «ленинец», а Ленин – это значит у нас полное единство*

¹⁰ Президиум ЦК КПСС, 1954–1964. Т. 1, 145. Упреки, адресованные Булганину, фактически означали признание правоты В. М. Молотова, который в мае 1955 г. критиковался некоторыми соратниками среди прочего за нежелание признать в Тито «ленинца». Ср.: «нельзя бросаться обвинениями – ‘антиленинец’» (А. И. Микоян, Запись заседания Президиума ЦК КПСС от 19 мая 1955 г. Там же. 141).

*взглядов, а вдруг не будет этого? Тогда что же, в дураках окажемся? Чтобы не получилось так, мы осудили Булганина, а когда мы давали информацию, мы написали. Английская контрразведка ознакомилась, или получила этот документ в Венгрии».*¹¹

В июле 1956 г. советское руководство было озабочено ситуацией в Венгрии, где активизировавшаяся внутрипартийная оппозиция усилила нажим на партийного лидера М. Ракоши, в конце концов смещенного. 12 июля при обсуждении на Президиуме ЦК КПСС положения в Венгрии был сделан акцент на подрывной деятельности империалистов, которые *«ослабить хотят интернациональные связи под флагом самостоятельности пути»*, *«хотят разобщить и поодиночке разбить»* социалистические страны.¹² На первый план однозначно выходит лозунг единства социалистического лагеря, тогда как требования расширения самостоятельности в поисках путей к социализму признаются неактуальными. Эта позиция нашла отражение и в центральной партийной прессе тех дней, хотя критики особой линии СКЮ пока еще избегали – слишком свеж у всех был в памяти торжественный прием, оказанный Тито в СССР.¹³ Первое упоминание югославских реалий, подспудно содержавшее критику политики СКЮ, пришлось лишь на конец августа – «Правда» опубликовала (без особых комментариев) заметку о продолжающемся преследовании в Югославии коминформовцев.¹⁴

Таким образом, уже в июле 1956 г. руководство КПСС видело опасность формирования в лице титовской Югославии альтернативного идеологического центра в мировом коммунистическом движении, создающего реальную угрозу раскола в нем. Этому способствовала и сохранявшаяся

¹¹ См. запись беседы: РГАНИ, ф. 52, оп. 1, д. 618, л. 11–55.

¹² Президиум ЦК КПСС, 1954–1964. Т. 1, 149.

¹³ См. редакционную статью «Правды» от 16 июля 1956 г.

¹⁴ В белградском окружном суде. Правда, 1956, 31 августа.

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независимая внешняя политика Югославии, последовательная в осуществлении линии на неприсоединение – встречаясь с деятелями стран «третьего мира», Тито неизменно выступал с критикой противостоящих друг другу военных блоков. В Кремле, однако, еще не потеряли терпения – слишком велико было стратегическое значение Югославии. Ради закрепления позиций СССР в Средиземноморье стоило поработать. Еще более важно было продемонстрировать миру единство или близость позиций КПСС и СКЮ, а значит отсутствие югославской схизмы в международном коммунистическом движении. Попытки мягко «образумить» Тито были предприняты Хрущевым в ходе их неформальных встреч на Адриатике и в Крыму в сентябре – начале октября 1956 г. ФНРЮ сравнили с солдатом, идущим «не в ногу» со всей ротой (т.е. содружеством стран, строящих социализм), просили воздержаться от проявления симпатий к оппозиционерам в странах Восточной Европы¹⁵ и предпринять сближение с теми странами, в отношениях с которыми сохранялась напряженность (с Венгрией, Болгарией, Албанией).¹⁶ Под давлением Москвы Тито принял у себя в Белграде нового лидера Венгерской партии трудящихся Э. Герё, однако возвращение венгерской делегации в Будапешт 23 октября

¹⁵ В Венгрии в канун революции в условиях обострившегося до предела кризиса сталинской системы югославская модель все сильнее продолжала притягивать к себе партийных реформаторов. Югославский фактор, выступая в разных ипостасях, оказывал заметное влияние на внутрисполитическую ситуацию в стране. Подробнее см.: Стыкалин А. С. Прерванная революция. Венгерский кризис 1956 года и политика Москвы. М., 2003.

¹⁶ См.: «Есть один путь к социализму, но могут быть разные методы, разные формы». Записки Н. С. Хрущева в Президиум ЦК КПСС по итогам встреч с И. Броз Тито. – Источник. М., 2003. № 6. См. также: РГАНИ, ф. 5, оп. 28, д. 403, л. 2-18. О трудностях в нормализации венгеро-югославских отношений см.: Стыкалин А. С. Советско-югославское сближение (1954 – лето 1956 гг.) и внутрисполитическая ситуация в Венгрии. – В: Человек на Балканах в эпоху кризисов и этнополитических столкновений XX века. СПб, 2002, 323–345.

совпало с началом мощного вос-
стания, для подавления
которого были приведены в действие советские войска,
что лишь усилило ожесточен-
ность повстанческого
сопротивления.

Руководство СКЮ после нескольких дней ожиданий
солидаризировалось с курсом нового венгерского прави-
тельства Имре Надя на расширение национального сувере-
нитета, возложив главную вину за создавшееся положение
на прежнее руководство, своей политикой подорвавшее
веру многих трудящихся в перспективы социализма (что
нанесло урон интересам сил социализма во всем мире).
Поддержав И. Надя в его решимости опереться на возник-
шие в те дни рабочие советы, Тито в то же время довольно
скептически отнесся к идее восстановления многопар-
тийности в Венгрии, поскольку речь могла в перспективе
пойти об утрате коммунистами власти. Он выражал также
озабоченность в связи с угрозой анархии и возможными
выступлениями реакции, причем по мере развития
событий его обеспокоенность только усиливалась. К гра-
нице с Венгрией были подтянуты югославские войска. В
ночь со 2 на 3 ноября на о. Бриони в Адриатике Тито,
приняв Н. С. Хрущева и Г. М. Маленкова, дал, как известно,
согласие на советскую военную акцию в целях приведения
к власти в Венгрии более надежного правительства (пре-
дложенная югославами кандидатура Я. Кадара как главы
этого правительства не вызвала возражений советской сто-
роны). Тито также выразил готовность, связавшись с
Надем, склонить его подать в отставку, что облегчило бы
реализацию советских силовых планов, к этому времени
уже единственно способных, по его мнению, спасти
«завоевания социализма» в Венгрии.¹⁷

Как известно, в результате венгерских октябрьских–
ноябрьских событий произошло заметное ухудшение

¹⁷ Едемский, А. Б. По следам конкретных консультаций на Брионах 2–3
ноября 1956 г. – В: Славянский альманах, 2010. М., 2011, 462–488.

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советско-югославских отношений. Все началось с того, что на рассвете 4 ноября, с началом решающей советской военной акции, действующий премьер-министр Имре Надь, осудив перед всем миром эту акцию в своем выступлении по радио, укрылся затем в югославском посольстве. В Москве это восприняли как явное нарушение брионской договоренности. Ведь на Бриони, где Н. С. Хрущев и Г. М. Маленков всю ночь напролет обсуждали с И. Броз Тито, Э. Карделем и А. Ранковичем пути решения венгерского вопроса, речь шла о возможном содействии Белграда в нейтрализации неугодного руководству СССР правительства. Лидеры Югославии, имевшие влияние на венгерских коммунистов-реформаторов из команды И. Нады, фактически, по согласованию с Москвой, взялись за то, чтобы уговорить их добровольно самоустраниться, уступив место у руля другому правительству, способному железной рукой пресечь анархию и навести порядок. Об укрытии же в югославском посольстве политиков, перед этим выступивших с антисоветскими заявлениями, отнюдь не договаривались.

Проходит неделя, и 11 ноября Тито на партактиве в хорватском городе Пуле решил сыграть на опережение, информировав публику о секретной брионской встрече, не дожидаясь, когда весь мир узнает о советско-югославской договоренности по свержению венгерского правительства из уст лидеров КПСС (это нанесло бы слишком сильный удар по репутации Югославии как нейтрального, внеблокового государства). Между тем, несогласованная утечка информации была воспринята в Москве как грубое нарушение устоявшейся в мировом коммунистическом движении этики межпартийных взаимоотношений. Но мало того, выступая в Пуле, Тито, к острому раздражению Москвы, назвал венгерский кризис в определенной мере следствием советской политики (неравноправные отношения в социалистическом лагере не могли не вызывать анти-советских настроений). Использование советских войск

для подавления демонстрации 23 октября он счел грубой ошибкой. С другой стороны, Тито осудил И. Надя за уступки реакции и выразил готовность поддержать новое правительство Я. Кадара, сформированное в СССР, – ведь надо было не только отмежеваться от СССР в целях сохранения своего лица в глазах международного общественного мнения, но и каким-то образом оправдать свое согласие с интервенцией. Речь Тито уже не могла не остаться без отклика официальной Москвы. «Правда» 19 ноября опубликовала обзор ее основных положений, а 23 ноября выступила с острой критической статьей.¹⁸ В связи с венгерскими событиями Москва обвиняла Белград в нарушении договоренностей, в умышленном создании затруднений правительству Кадара, в неспособности отмежеваться от попыток реакции использовать югославский пример и опыт в интересах борьбы против социализма. При этом советская публика долгое время так и не была информирована о пребывании Имре Надя и его соратников в югославском посольстве в Будапеште, «Правда» об этом вскользь сообщила только в 20-х числах ноября, когда после выхода из посольства они были задержаны советскими спецслужбами и депортированы в Румынию вопреки их воле и возражениям югославской стороны, отмежевавшейся от незаконной акции.

Прошел почти месяц после известной речи Тито в Пуле, и 7 ноября второе лицо в СКЮ и его главный идеолог Э. Кардель, выступая в Союзной скупщине ФНРЮ, раскрыти-
ковал бюрократический социализм советского образца, противопоставив ему венгерские рабочие советы.¹⁹ Тогдаш-

¹⁸ См. редакционную статью «Правды» от 23 ноября 1956 г.: «За дальнейшее сплочение сил социализма на основе марксистско-ленинских принципов».

¹⁹ «Революционную борьбу» в Венгрии он назвал «первым крупным примером насильственного сведения счетов с теми преградами для дальнейшего развития социализма, которые являются продуктом окрепшей бюрократической политической системы», вызывающей в

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ний посол Югославии в СССР В. Мичунович позже вспоминал, что никогда не видел Хрущева столь же взбешенным, как в ходе встречи, состоявшейся в тот декабрьский день 1956 г., когда ему принесли информацию о программной речи Карделя, к тому же распространенной югославской делегацией в ООН.²⁰ Через считанные дни, на декабрьском пленуме ЦК КПСС, советский лидер дал волю эмоциям: *«Тито болтает всякие глупости о новых путях какого-то югославского строительства социализма, а этот путь мы знаем что такое: получать подачки за то, что прислуживаться перед американскими империалистами. Конечно, тут большого ума не требуется для строительства такого югославского социализма, а нам, рабочему классу Советского Союза под руководством Ленина, пришлось самим первым пробивать дорогу и строить свое государство,*

обществе «бессознательное стихийное возмущение». Альтернативой этой системе Кардель считал противостоявшие кадаровской власти (находившейся под полным советским контролем) рабочие советы – выросшую на венгерской почве «единственную реальную социалистическую силу, которая, вероятно, очень скоро избавилась бы от чуждых антисоциалистических влияний, если бы взяла на себя главную ответственность за власть на предприятиях». Силовые действия СССР по свержению правительства И.Надя, на его взгляд, могли бы быть оправданы лишь в том случае, если бы привели к изменению политической системы, тормозящей социалистическое развитие, в противном же случае история осудит акт военного вмешательства. Дальнейшее же присутствие советских войск в Венгрии югославские лидеры в любом случае считали фактором, не благоприятствующим урегулированию конфликта. Как бы то ни было, Кардель в Скупщине в декабре, как и Тито за месяц до этого в Пуле, критикуя советскую политику, вместе с тем заявил о признании Югославией приведенного к власти в Венгрии по инициативе Москвы правительства Я. Кадара и о готовности сотрудничать с ним.

²⁰ О частых встречах Мичуновича с Хрущевым в этот период дает представление его более поздняя книга, в основе которой лежат записи 1950-х годов: Mićunović, V., *Moskovske godine 1956/1958*. Beograd, 1984. Запись их беседы от 11 декабря см.: Ibid., 204–208.

*накапливать средства, строить свои заводы, свою индустрию, и это действительно достойно подражания для других стран рабочего класса, что Советский Союз, более отсталая по сравнению с другими, западными государствами страна, первый завоевал власть рабочего класса и первый создал самую могущественную индустриальную страну из отсталой и настолько поднял промышленность, культуру своего народа, что разбил самого мощного врага во вторую мировую войну, и в результате нашей победы живет сейчас и учит югославскому социализму сам Тито, потому что если бы не было нашей победы, то его бы [войск] не хватило позавтракать гитлеровской армии».*²¹

Между КПСС и СКЮ развернулась острая полемика в закрытой переписке,²² дискуссия перекинулась и в прессу. В отличие от привычной пропагандистской практики, в соответствии с которой позиции оппонентов КПСС в лучшем случае излагались в пересказе, текст выступления Карделя был опубликован в журнале «Коммунист»²³ в сопровождении статьи одного из наиболее либеральных идеологов КПСС, главного редактора этого журнала специалиста по политэкономии, а в будущем академика А. М. Румянцева. Статья имела характерное название: «Социалистическая действительность и "теории" тов. Карделя»²⁴

Критика в прессе была значительно сдержаннее некоторых закрытых, главным образом рассчитанных на внутрипартийную аудиторию заявлений. Ясно одно: в Москве ни в коей мере не хотели создавать видимости возвращения к ситуации 1948-1949 гг., когда динамика советско-югославского конфликта набрала такие обороты,

²¹ РГАНИ, ф. 2, оп. 1, д. 198, л. 103–104.

²² Письмо ЦК СКЮ в адрес ЦК КПСС от 3 декабря 1956 г. см.: Советский Союз и венгерский кризис 1956 года. Документы. С. 730–737. Последующую переписку см.: РГАНИ, ф. 89, перечень 45. док. 83, 84.

²³ Коммунист, 1956, № 18, 35–51.

²⁴ Там же, 11–34.

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когда Тито и окружение, обвинявшиеся поначалу в ревизионизме и национализме, после процесса по делу Ласло Райка (Венгрия, сентябрь 1949 г.) были публично объявлены шпионами и убийцами, и в соответствии с этой установкой работал вплоть до самой смерти Сталина весь пропагандистский механизм стран советского лагеря. В закрытой межпартийной переписке и беседах с советским послом в Белграде Н. П. Фирюбиным югославские лидеры, рассчитывавшие на продолжение выгодного для них экономического сотрудничества и, конечно, не желавшие вновь оказаться в положении изгоев в мировом коммунистическом движении, получали заверения в том, что возврат к прошлому невозможен, — с советской стороны будут приложены усилия для устранения возникших наслоений, но только не за счет «принципиальных идеологических уступок». Та же установка была изложена в ряде писем руководителям «братских партий»: давая отпор «неверным утверждениям» югославов, КПСС считает, однако, необходимым держаться в полемике спокойного тона, не обостряя отношений по государственной линии и продолжая поддерживать контакт по партийной линии.²⁵

С югославской стороны, однако, существовали реальные опасения возвращения к ситуации 1948 г. Пригласив 27 января 1957 г. Н. П. Фирюбина на охоту, Тито много говорил о том, что он *«очень обеспокоен нашими теперешними отношениями»* и много думает над тем, *«каким образом поправить и развивать дальше добрые отношения между обеими партиями и нашими государствами»*.²⁶ Обеспокоенность возросла после того, как в конце марта советский премьер Н. А. Булганин на митинге советско-венгерской дружбы публично заговорил о причастности югославов к идейной подготовке венгерской «контрреволюции» и это

²⁵ РГАНИ, ф. 3, оп. 14.

²⁶ Там же, оп. 12, д. 173, л. 35–36; оп. 14, д. 96, л. 25–28.

нашло отражение на страницах «Правды»²⁷ и могло быть истолковано во всем мире как начало новой массовой пропагандистской кампании антиюгославской направленности. Эти ожидания не оправдались, напротив, в апрельских публикациях «Правды», освещавших приезд в СССР партийно-правительственной делегации Албании, и в том числе в двустороннем коммюнике по итогам переговоров²⁸, подчеркивалась необходимость нормальных межгосударственных отношений и сотрудничества СССР и стран народной демократии с Югославией.

Вместе с тем в Венгрии в это время уже начали готовить судебный процесс по делу Имре Надя, который позже, в июне 1958 г., был обвинен в пособничестве контрреволюции, причастности к антигосударственному заговору и казнен. В Белграде очень боялись, что суд над И. Надем сыграет такую же роль, какую сыграл в 1949 г. судебный процесс по делу другого венгерского коммунистического политика, Ласло Райка, — антиюгославская кампания, инициированная Сталиным в 1948 г., после сфабрикованного дела Райка возшла, как уже отмечалось, на новый виток. «Представители югославского посольства в Будапеште при каждой беседе с венгерскими товарищами пытаются подчеркнуть ненужность организации процесса над Имре Надем», — доносил 21 июня в Москву из Будапешта дипломат В. А. Крючков, будущий председатель КГБ²⁹. Обозначившаяся в этих условиях склонность Белграда к далеко идущим уступкам не укрылась от венгерского лидера Я. Кадара, говорившего 6 июня новому советскому послу в Венгрии Е. И. Громову (сменившему незадолго до этого Ю. В. Андропова) о том, что югославы в последнее время предпринимают очевидные попытки улучшить отношения с СССР и его союзниками. Посол, следуя сохранявшейся линии центра

²⁷ Правда, 1957, 28 марта.

²⁸ Правда, 1957, 19 апреля.

²⁹ АВП РФ, ф. 077, оп. 38, папка 192, д. 036, Т. 2, л. 193.

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на укрепление единства мирового коммунистического движения (а в это время уже была начата работа по подготовке широкого совещания компартий, первого после XX съезда КПСС), в ответ заметил, что если эти попытки являются искренними, надо предпринять встречные шаги, не идя вместе с тем на идеологические компромиссы.³⁰ Зная о большом международном авторитете маршала Тито (в том числе и в формирующемся движении неприсоединения) и о популярности югославской модели социализма среди коммунистов-реформаторов всего мира, отлучать СКЮ от мирового коммунистического движения в Москве сочли нецелесообразным, ибо югославская схизма угрожала более широким расколом в лагере борцов за коммунизм.

Кампания в советской прессе с критикой югославского ревизионизма так и не была в это время, вопреки некоторым ожиданиям, инициирована. Более того, в Москве возобладала точка зрения о необходимости дополнительных усилий в целях улучшения советско-югославских отношений. В повестку дня заседания Президиума ЦК КПСС от 31 мая был внесен пункт «О Югославии». Решено было «проявить инициативу по вопросу созыва совещания руководителей партий социалистических стран» с участием Югославии.³¹ Был утвержден текст соответствующего письма для ЦК СКЮ.³² 3 июня посол СССР Н.П. Фирюбин был принят Тито, который заверил его, что ЦК СКЮ будет со своей стороны укреплять и развивать советско-югославские отношения, заметив одновременно, что перед совещанием братских партий было бы целесообразно провести двустороннюю встречу делегаций КПСС и СКЮ для взаимного прояснения позиций.³³ Провал антихрущевского путча в июне 1957 г. привел к удалению из партийного

³⁰ Там же, д. 035, л. 54.

³¹ Президиум ЦК КПСС, 1954–1964. Т. 1, 256.

³² Там же, Т. 2, 673.

³³ РГАНИ, ф. 3, оп. 14, д. 131, л. 2–3, 37–41.

руководства В. М. Молотова (всегда скептически относившегося к перспективам советско-югославского сближения), что, вне всякого сомнения, благоприятно повлияло на готовность лидеров СКЮ активизировать контакты с КПСС. В июле 1957 г. в СССР по приглашению Хрущева отдыхали наиболее влиятельные соратники Тито – Э. Кардель и А. Ранкович. 18 июля они были приняты Н. С. Хрущевым.³⁴ Первая же после брионских переговоров начала ноября 1956 г. встреча Хрущева и Тито состоялась 1–2 августа 1957 г. на нейтральной территории – в Румынии. Был обсужден широкий круг проблем, предприняты небезуспешные попытки сблизить позиции по спорным вопросам (суть событий в Венгрии, проблема рабочих советов и т.д.), выражена решимость и дальше работать над устранением препятствий, затрудняющих развитие двусторонних отношений. Москва заверила Белград в отсутствии намерений использовать дело И. Надя для раздувания антиюгославской пропагандистской кампании (а несколько позже настояла на том, чтобы венгерское руководство не проводило судебный процесс до предполагаемого совещания компартий с участием югославов и вообще не выпячивало антиюгославских обвинений).³⁵

Руководство СКЮ в принципе выразило готовность принять участие в планируемом совещании компартий социалистических стран – приглашение придавало уверенности в том, что повторения ситуации 1948–1949 гг., т.е. разрыва с советским лагерем и шумной антиюгославской кампании в прессе, не будет. Тем не менее, ознакомившись с проектом декларации предстоящего совещания, югославы

³⁴ Известия, 1957, 19 июля.

³⁵ См. соответствующую записку зав. новым, созданным в 1957 г., отделом ЦК КПСС по связям с коммунистическими и рабочими партиями социалистических стран Ю. В. Андропова от 29 августа (РГАНИ, ф. 89, перечень 45, док. 75, л. 1–2).

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дали знать приехавшим в Белград советским эмиссарам Ю.В. Андропову и Б. Н. Пономареву, что его не подпишут.³⁶ Деятелям СКЮ особенно не понравился в представленном Москвой проекте декларации тезис о борьбе с ревизионизмом. Небезосновательно спроецировав его на свою партию, Кардель заметил, что подписание СКЮ документа подобного содержания может создать впечатление, что югославские коммунисты, неоднократно обвинявшиеся в ревизионизме (не только при Сталине, но и позже, в том числе в связи с позицией, занятой в отношении венгерских событий), признают свои мнимые ошибки, выступают с самокритикой. В действительности же они отнюдь не считают звучавшую критику справедливой и не собираются сдавать своих позиций. Вообще публикация декларации, указывающей на существование социалистического лагеря, по мнению лидеров СКЮ, заставит многих подумать о возрождении распущенного в апреле 1956 г. Коминформа (теперь уже с участием югославов), что неизбежно обострит разногласия в рядах коммунистов разных стран и вызовет негативную реакцию в мире. С другой стороны, жесткость некоторых положений декларации (там, где дело касалось, в частности, критики американского империализма), по мнению югославских деятелей, может только сыграть на руку реакционным кругам на Западе, которые, ссылаясь на коммунистическую угрозу, развяжут массированную пропагандистскую атаку на социалистические страны. Не желая связывать себя подписанием жестких заявлений от имени социалистического блока, югославы вместе с тем совсем не хотели снова оказаться в положении изгоев в коммунистическом движении. Они высказались за многообразие

³⁶ О содержании бесед можно судить по запискам Андропова и Пономарева в ЦК КПСС от 15 и 18 октября 1957 г. Были посланы из Москвы для информации лидерам социалистических стран и известны по венгерской публикации: Top secret. Magyar-jugoszláv kapcsolatok, 1956–1959. Dokumentumok. 1997, 216–219.

форм контактов между компартиями, проведение совещаний и дали принципиальное согласие приехать в Москву в дни празднования 40-летнего юбилея октябрьской революции для участия не только в юбилейных торжествах, но и во встречах с представителями братских партий всего мира. В Москве Хрущев пытался оказать давление на югославскую делегацию во главе Карделем, заставив-таки ее подписать Декларацию совещания компартий социалистических стран, но безуспешно. Не подписав Декларации, довольно жесткой по своим формулировкам, принятой под давлением китайской компартии, югославы в то же время подписали другой программный документ мирового коммунистического движения – Манифест мира, опубликованный от имени представителей всех 68 приехавших на торжества в Москву компартий.

Хотя попытка Москвы заставить Белград играть по своим правилам снова закончилась полным фиаско, руководство КПСС и на этот раз воздержалось от того, чтобы встать на путь конфронтации с СКЮ и инициировать массированную проработку югославы в прессе. Вплоть до мая 1958 г. «Правда» фактически воздерживалась от публикации статей с критикой югославского «ревизионизма». В условиях постепенно назревавших советско-китайских разногласий, борьбы двух коммунистических держав за влияние важно было блюсти хотя бы видимость сохранения единства коммунистического движения. Публичная критика ревизионизма СКЮ развернулась лишь через несколько месяцев после московских совещаний, после принятия на VII съезде СКЮ в апреле 1958 г. новой Программы партии, признанной в Москве как ревизионистская (заявленный тезис о неприятии блоковой политики давал повод для обвинений югославы в постановке на одну доску НАТО и ОВД, фактическом проведении знака равенства между политикой СССР и США). Теперь установки меняются. Зная о крайне негативном отношении лидеров китайской

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компартии к новой программе СКЮ, руководители СССР решили принести югославов в жертву сохранению советско-китайской дружбы. С публикации «Правдой» 9 мая большой редакционной статьи с критикой программы СКЮ ³⁷ набирает силу антиревизионистская кампания ярко выраженной антиюгославской направленности. Она не ограничивалась советской прессой, велась в масштабах всего социалистического лагеря. ³⁸ Однако и в это время сохранилась установка «и в дальнейшем поддерживать нормальные отношения с Югославией, прежде всего по государственной линии, а не вести дело на разрыв с ней», что нашло отражение в материалах майского пленума 1958 г. и решениях Президиума ЦК КПСС, принятых в те же недели. Наша критика, отмечалось в вышепротитированном уставночном документе, *«не должна вылиться в крикливую перепалку; не следует размениваться на мелочи, задевать национальные чувства югославов. Критика должна быть принципиальной, аргументированной и вестись в спокойном тоне, не впадая в крайности 1949–1953 гг.»*.³⁹ В Кремле и на Старой площади извлекли уроки из прошлого, по пути сталинских агиткампаний принципиально решено было не идти, это было бы в ущерб влиянию КПСС, учитывая, что несправедливая и грубая критика не казалась многим в мире убедительной, а скорее приносила обратный эффект – лишь

³⁷ В единстве и сплоченности марксистско-ленинских партий – залог дальнейших побед мировой социалистической системы. – Правда, 1958, 9 мая.

³⁸ Причем, статьи из органов прессы социалистических стран перепечатывались и в «Правде». Так, 6 мая была опубликована статья из «Женьминь жибао» «Современный ревизионизм должен быть осужден!», с которой, собственно говоря, и началась в международном масштабе антиревизионистская кампания. 8 мая «Правда» перепечатывает статью из органа КПЧ «Руде право»: «Взгляды, несовместимые с марксизмом-ленинизмом».

³⁹ Закрытое письмо ЦК КПСС партийным организациям о советско-югославских отношениях (май 1958 г.). РГАНИ, ф. 3, оп. 14, д. 207, л. 75.

способствовала повышению авторитета югославских коммунистов как носителей антисталинской альтернативы в мировом коммунистическом движении.⁴⁰ С другой стороны, Югославию решили проучить, прибегнув к методам экономического давления. Речь идет об одностороннем пересмотре планов экономического сотрудничества и отсрочке в предоставлении обещанных Советским Союзом Югославии кредитов.

В дальнейшем критика югославского ревизионизма в советской печати явно идет на спад. Как отмечалось в документе ЦК КПСС, относящемся к апрелю 1959 г., *«нет необходимости уделять в нашей печати много внимания политике руководства Югославии. Большие того, повышенное внимание к Югославии отвечало бы интересам югославских руководителей, желающих, чтобы о их политике и идеологии много писали, чтобы их политика занимала все более видное место, что не отвечает ни удельному весу Югославии на международной арене, ни влиянию югославских руководителей в международном рабочем и коммунистическом движении»*.⁴¹

Тем не менее дежурная критика югославского «ревизионизма», иногда довольно резкая, звучала в выступлениях Хрущева и других советских лидеров, в том числе на съездах зарубежных компартий. Эта критика в значительной мере была данью компромиссу между КПСС и КПК. В ноябре 1960 г. КПСС согласилась на включение довольно резкого выпада в адрес СКЮ в итоговый документ следующего

⁴⁰ Хрущев на майском пленуме ЦК КПСС 1958 г. сам много говорил о нелепости и необоснованности обвинений в адрес югославов, звучавших при Сталине. Как можно было Тито и его окружение обвинять в сотрудничестве с нацистской Германией, когда весь мир знал, что уж они-то сражались с нацистами «как дай Бог каждому», вопрошал советский лидер (См.: РГАНИ, ф. 2, оп. 1, д. 318, л. 31–36).

⁴¹ РГАНИ, ф. 5, оп. 33, д. 99, л. 90. Обзор «Ревизионистское извращение теории и практики марксизма-ленинизма».

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большого совещания компартий.⁴² Эту цену опять-таки решено было заплатить ради сохранения хоть на короткое время дававшего трещину союза КПСС с китайской компартией. Однако принесение югославов «в жертву» единству с КПК оказалось на этот раз совсем не эффективным, достигнутая на совещании 1960 г. компромиссная платформа между двумя великими коммунистическими державами смогла лишь на считанные месяцы отсрочить открытый конфликт между КПСС и КПК. На конъюнктурный характер критики указывает продолжавшееся сотрудничество между КПСС и СКЮ на международной арене. 17 февраля 1961 г. на Президиуме ЦК КПСС были утверждены указания послу СССР в ФНРЮ для беседы с Тито в связи с предстоящим возобновлением работы XV сессии Генассамблеи ООН. Послу было поручено изложить югославскому лидеру суть линии СССР по некоторым важным проблемам международных отношений. При этом посол должен был исходить из того, что *«позиции Югославии и Советского Союза по многим международным вопросам в основном совпадают и что полезно было бы и впредь по вопросам, представляющим взаимный интерес, консультироваться»*.⁴³

Решительный сдвиг в советско-югославских отношениях относится к маю 1962 г. Зная, что подходит срок, когда Москва в соответствии со своими прежними декларациями должна вернуться к вопросу о предоставлении Югославии обещанного еще в 1956 г. кредита, Тито 6 мая, выступая на партактиве в Сплите, однозначно заявил о готовности СКЮ встать на сторону КПСС в углубляющемся конфликте между КПСС и КПК. Всего через 10 дней, 16 мая, Хрущев, находившийся с визитом в Болгарии, в своей речи отметил, что сейчас у СССР сложились с Югославией «нормальные, более того, хорошие отношения»⁴⁴. В

⁴² Правда, 1960, 6 декабря.

⁴³ РГИА, ф. 3, оп. 12, д. 867, л. 75.

⁴⁴ Правда, 1962, 17 мая.

итоговой советско-болгарской декларации от 21 мая критика реви- зионизма вопреки уже сложившейся в последние годы практике обошлась без упоминания югославов. Впрочем, в установочных статьях идеологов КПСС, опубликованных в «Правде», критика Программы СКЮ как образца сов- ременного ревизионизма и после этого продолжала звучать.⁴⁵

Как бы то ни было, новая ситуация, сложившаяся в мировом коммунистическом движении, теперь работала на советско-югославское сближение. Публично заявленная Тито в мае 1962 г. готовность (при всех разногласиях с КПСС) однозначно поддержать ее в идеологических спорах с китайской компартией дала довольно мощный толчок новому подъему в советско-югославских отношениях. Причем, в условиях глубокого раскола между СССР и КНР в Москве смирились наконец (зная о крайне негативном в то время отношении Пекина к белградским «ревизионистам») с особым статусом Югославии среди социалистических стран и в общем приостановили все заведомо бесплодные попытки вовлечь нейтральное социалистическое государство, заинтересованное прежде всего в тесном экономическом сотрудничестве с СССР, в советский блок. Записи заседаний Президиума ЦК КПСС отражают стремление лидеров КПСС, не отрицая существующих разногласий с руководством СКЮ, вместе с тем защитить югославскую сторону от китайских нападок.⁴⁶ 10 февраля 1963 г. в открытой дискуссии с идеологами КПК «Правда» отмечала, что в СКЮ и ФНРЮ «происходят положительные процессы в сторону сбли- жения с социалистическим содружеством, с мировым

⁴⁵ См.: Пономарев, Б. Н. Победоносное знамя коммунистов мира. - Правда, 1962, 18 ноября.

⁴⁶ См. краткие записи заседаний от 30 декабря 1962 г. (по итогам состоявшихся перед этим встреч Хрущева и Тито в СССР, первых после длительного перерыва), 29 января и 12 марта 1963 г.; Президиум ЦК КПСС, 1954-1964. Т. 1, 664, 695–696, 700.

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комму-нистическим движением». Новая советская концепция, сформулированная в ходе обсуждения на Президиуме ЦК КПСС содержания полемической статьи «Правды», заключалась в следующем: спорные вопросы между КПСС и СКЮ остаются, но своей товарищеской критикой *«мы должны содействовать процессу освобождения [югославов] от ошибочных позиций, помочь изживать недостатки»*.⁴⁷

Начало возымело продолжение. Посетив 20 августа – 3 сентября 1963 г. Югославию, Хрущев, хотя и не скрывал своей неудовлетворенности в связи с упорным нежеланием правительства этой страны синхронизировать свою внешнюю политику с линией советского блока,⁴⁸ вместе с тем, по некоторым сведениям, настолько увлекся моделью «самоуправления», что после возвращения домой распорядился всерьез заняться изучением югославского опыта в целях внедрения элементов самоуправления на советских предприятиях. Правда, отвечавший за связи с соцстранами секретарь ЦК КПСС Ю.В. Андропов, всегда скептически относившийся к югославской модели, не торопился выполнять это поручение. С отставкой Хрущева в октябре 1964 г. оно отпало само собой.⁴⁹

В дальнейшем советско-югославские отношения в целом отличались относительной стабильностью и устойчивостью при сохранении некоторой дистанции Социалистической федеративной республики Югославии (СФРЮ)

⁴⁷ Там же, 696. Поводом для полемики стали нападки идеологов КПК на отдельные положения, прозвучавшие в докладе Н. С. Хрущева на сессии Верховного Совета СССР 12 декабря 1962 г. «Современное международное положение и внешняя политика Советского Союза» и его речи на VI съезде Социалистической единой партии Германии (СЕПГ) 16 января 1963 г. в Восточном Берлине.

⁴⁸ «Не следует обольщаться, что у нас 100%-ное единство, этого нет», – говорил Хрущев на заседании Президиума ЦК КПСС 4 сентября (Там же, 736).

⁴⁹ См.: Бернов, Ю. В. Записки дипломата. М., 1995, 81–82.

от социалистического лагеря и признании со стороны КПСС права Югославии на свой путь к социализму как порождение конкретных и неповторимых специфических условий (серьезный кризис двусторонних отношений в августе 1968 г., когда Югославия не поддержала силовую акцию в отношении Чехословакии, был преодолен совместными усилиями).

Az államszocializmus évtizedei Bulgáriában (1944–1989)

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A kelet-európai szocialista országok közül Bulgária volt az egyetlen, amely 1944-től egyszer sem okozott gondot a Szovjet-uniónak. Hiszen itt az államszocialista rendszert nem veszélyeztették belső társadalmi megrázkódtatások, és az ország vezetői is hűségesen igazodtak a mindenkori szovjet politika irányvonalához. A szovjetek mindezekért kitüntetett bánásmódban részesítették Bulgáriát. A lakosság létszamarányát tekintve Bulgária volt a gazdaságilag leginkább támogatott kelet-európai ország egészen a gorbacsovi peresztrojka kezdetéig.¹ Az élet-színvonal emelkedésének, az 1960-1970-es években, illetve a bolgár lakosság hagyományos russzofil beállítottságának köszönhetően – melynek okai a közös ortodox hitben, és az öt évszázados török uralom alóli felszabadítás miatt érzett hálában keresendők – a bolgár társadalom egy jelentős része, a többi szocialista országtól eltérően nem tekintette az államszocializmust egy gyűlölt, idegen hatalom által ráerőszakolt rendszernek.²

Mindez, továbbá néhány, általunk a későbbiekben megtárgyalásra kerülő tényező azt eredményezte, hogy a Bolgár Kommunista Párt (BKP) a többi kelet-európai testvérpárttól

¹ Lévésque, J. 1989 – Egy birodalom végjátéka. A Szovjetunió és Kelet-Európa felszabadulása. Bp., 2001, 163.

² Dillon, P., F. C. Nykoff. Creating Capitalism. Transitions and Growth in Post-Soviet Europe. Cheltenham, UK, MA, USA, 2002, 116, 119; Gornev, G., P. Boyadjieva. Social Injustice and the Crisis of Legitimacy. – In: Coenen-Huther, J. (Ed.). Bulgaria at the Crossroads. New York, 1996, 109.

eltérően szilárd társadalmi beágyazottsággal bírt. Ennek köszönhetően a BKP képes volt irányítása alatt tartani a peresztrojka által generált események menetét 1989–1990-ben, és a külföldi megfigyelők legnagyobb meglepetésére egész Kelet-Európában egyedülként megnyerte az első szabad választásokat. A bolgár rendszerváltás menete abban is különbözött a közép-kelet-európai országokban bekövetkezett eseményektől, hogy az 1980-as évek közepétől megjelenő ellenzék túl gyenge és szervezetlen volt ahhoz, hogy nyomásgyakorlással változtatásokra kényszerítse a BKP-t. Ráadásul, a kommunista pártból egészen 1989-ig hiányzott a reformkommunista, valamint szociáldemokrata nézeteket valló belső ellenzék – az időszakonként felbukkanó, elhajló nézeteket valló elemeket gondosan eltávolították a pártból.³

„A Kommunista Párt Központi Bizottságának 1989. november 10-i plénuma [...] menesztette Todor Zsivkovot (pártfőtáitkárt – M.J.), a nyílt népi nyomás teljes hiányában. [...] Így a demokratikus ellenzéket megfosztották a győzelem élményétől, és a Kommunista Párt azzal büszkélkedhetett, hogy ő volt a demokratikus változások kezdeményezője az országban”. Csak Todor Zsivkov bukása után kezdődtek meg a nagy ellenzéki tömegdemonstrációk, és attól kezdve az ellenzéki szervezetek gyakran éltek ezzel a nyomásgyakorlási eszközzel a rendszerváltás – az e tanulmányban már nem tárgyalandó – éveit során. A szomszédos balkáni szocialista országokhoz képest Bulgáriában sikerült megelőzni az etnikai feszültségek kirobbanását azzal, hogy az eseményeket politikai mederbe terelték. Végül – ez a legfontosabb momentum az államszocializmus lebontása szempontjából – a BKP és az ellenzéki szervezetek, közép-európai mintára, kerekasztal tárgya-

³ Ágh, A. *Emerging Democracies in East Central Europe and the Balkans*. Cheltenham, Northampton, 1998, 235; Drezov, K. *Bulgaria. Transition Comes Full Circle, 1989–1997*. – In: Pridham, G., T. Gallagher (Eds.). *Experimenting with Democracy. Regime Changes in the Balkans*. London, New York, 2000, 196–197.

lásokon kötött megállapodásokban határozták meg a demokratikus átalakulás menetét. Ezt a folyamatot politikai szempontból az 1991 nyarán elfogadott új alkotmány koronázta meg.⁴

Tanulmányom mégis Todor Zsivkov hatalmi pozíciójából való eltávolításával zárom. Szimbolikusan ezzel az eseménnyel zárul az államszocializmus kora Bulgáriában. A gyakorlatban viszont ekkor gyorsult fel az államszocializmus rendszerét lebontó rendszerváltás folyamata. Mivel tanulmányomnak nem célja a rendszerváltás eseményeinek komplex és mélyreható elemzése – ezt egy korábbi dolgozatomban már megtettem⁵ –, a rendszerváltásnak csak az 1989. november 10-ig, a pártfőtitkár menesztésig tartó folyamatait veszem górcső alá.

A SZTALINIZMUS ÉVEI

1944. szeptember 9-én – két nappal az után, hogy a Szovjetunió hadat üzent a németbarát bolgár cári kormánynak, és megkezdte az ország megszállását – a bolgár hadsereg kommunista szimpatizáns tisztjeinek közreműködésével (Zveno politikai kör) a Bolgár Munkáspárt (BMP – kommunisták) sikeres államcsínyt hajtott végre. Ezt követően megalakult az addig illegálisnak minősülő baloldali pártokat és politikai csoportokat tömörítő Hazafias Front (HF, közkeletű magyar elnevezéssel: népfront) kormánya - tagszervezetei a BMP, a Bolgár Földműves Népi Szövetség (BFNSZ), a Bolgár Munkás Szociáldemokrata Párt (BMSZDP – szociáldemokraták), és a Zveno -, Kimon Georgiev tábornok vezetésével.⁶

A Hazafias Frontot uraló kommunisták a térségben egyedülálló módon már a két világháború között is jelentős társadalmi

⁴ Lévesque, J., Op. cit., 163; Ágh, A., Op. cit., 234; Drezov, K., Op. cit., 196.

⁵ Miczov, J. Rendszerváltás Bulgáriában (A többpártrendszer kialakulása és megszilárdulása 1989 és 1991 között). – In: Krausz T., Mitrovits M., Zahorán Cs. (Eds.). Rendszerváltás és történelem. Tanulmányok a kelet-európai átalakulásról. Bp., 2010, 193–224.

⁶ Csikhelyi L. Bulgária. – In: Kardos, J., Simándi, I. (Eds.). Európai politikai rendszerek. Bp., 2000, 120.

befolyással rendelkeztek, különösen a városi értelmiség köreiben. A szeptember 9-i fordulat után, hónapok alatt negyed millióra duzzadt a párt taglétszáma, amiben döntő szerepet játszott a bolgár lakosság hagyományos oroszbarátsága. A belügyi és igazságügyi tárcák birtokában a kommunisták rögtön a hatalomra jutás után megkezdték a proletárdiktatúra kiépítését, noha szovjet utasításra egészen 1947-ig – amikor is bekövetkezett a Szovjetunió és nyugati szövetségesei közötti szakítás, és elkezdődött a hidegháború – kénytelenek voltak felületesen betartani a parlamentáris demokrácia játékszabályait.⁷

A HF-kormány programjának megfelelően 1944 végén népbíróságokat állítottak fel a Bulgáriát náci német szövetségesként a világháborúba beléptető, és a hazai antifasiszta ellenállókat üldöző háborús bűnösök elítélésére. A kommunisták célja az általuk monarcho-fasisztának minősített, cári tekintélyuralmi rendszerhez kötődő polgári rétegek megfélemlítése, illetve azok prominens személyiségeinek megsemmisítése volt. Összesen 11.122 ember felett ítéleztek. Köztük volt három régens, huszonkét korábbi miniszter, százharminc parlamenti képviselő, és más hivatalos személyek. Az elítéltek közül 2830 főt halálbüntetéssel és 1305-öt életfogytiglani fegyházzal sújtottak. Összeurópai viszonylatban, az ország lakosságának nagyságához, illetve a megbukott cári rezsim „puhaságához” képest kirívóan kemény ítéletek születtek. A kommunisták számára komoly gondot okozott az a tény, hogy a többi kelet-európai országhoz mérten a bolgár politikai elit és az értelmiség épségben átvészelte a háború viszontagságait. A megtorlással a kommunisták elérték a polgári pártok likvidálását, ugyanakkor a jobboldali érzelmű értelmiséget is sikerült rendszabályozniuk. Ez volt az oka annak, hogy a rendszerváltás idején a jobboldali ellenzék nem volt képes önálló tényezőként fellépni, és csak 1991-re tudta magát megszervezni.⁸

⁷ Crampton, J. R. *A Concise History of Bulgaria*. Cambridge, 1997, 184.

Dimitrov, V. *Bulgaria. The Uneven Transition*. London, New York, 2001, 23.

⁸ Csíkhelyi, L., *Op. cit.*, 121. Bideleux, R., Jeffries, I. *The Balkans. A*

Lezajlott továbbá az államigazgatásnak a politikailag megbízhatatlan káderektől való megtisztítása; rövid időn belül több ezer személyt bocsátottak el. A hadsereg átszervezése azonban egészen 1946-ig elhúzódott, mert szovjet kívánságra a bolgár hadsereg részt vett a Németország elleni hadműveletekben, és szükség volt a régi tiszti állományra. 1945 januárjában jelent meg egy fontos törvényerejű rendelet a néphatalom védelméről, a fasiszta ideológia, a rémhírtérjesztés, a hadsereg demoralizálása és Bulgária nemzetközi tekintélyét sértő cselekedetek üldözéséről. Ez a jogszabály szolgált alapul az ellenzéki és egyházi vezetők ellen indított koncepciós perek sorához.⁹

A kommunisták számára az agrárpárt, a BFNSZ képezte a legfőbb akadályt a proletárdiktatúra kiépítésének útjában. Bulgária szegény agrárállam volt, és lakosságának 80%-a ekkor még falun élt. Ráadásul Bulgáriában nem létezett nagybirtok, mivel a megművelhető földterület döntő része kisbirtokok formájában paraszti kézen volt. Éppen emiatt a bolgár kommunistáknak nem volt lehetőségük arra, hogy földosztás ígéretével paraszti tömegeket állítsanak maguk mellé, ahogyan azt a lengyel, magyar, román és csehszlovák elvtársaik tették. Így a BFNSZ, noha az 1930-as évek elején több frakcióra esett szét, továbbra is az ország legjelentősebb pártjának számított. A kommunista politikusokat különösen aggasztotta, hogy 1945-től fokozatosan növekedett az agrárpárt Nikola Petkov által vezetett szárnyának a népszerűsége, amely nem értett egyet a kommunista vezetésű HF-kormány politikájával.¹⁰

1946 szeptemberében népszavazást tartottak az államforma megváltoztatásának kérdéséről, melynek sikerét követően megszüntették az alkotmányos királyságot, és Bulgária népköztársasággá vált. Majd pedig, 1946 októberére alkotmányozó nemzetgyűlési választásokat írtak ki, ahol a rendőri terror ellenére, a Nikola Petkov vezette agrárius csoport és a szociáldemokraták

Post-communist History. London, New York, 2007, 86.

⁹ Csikhelyi, L., Op. cit., 121–122.

¹⁰ Bideleux, R., I. Jeffries, Op. cit., 87; Crampton, R., Op. cit., 187.

szakadár ellenzéki frakciója megszerezte a szavazatok 30%-át.¹¹

Az ellenzék megtörése 1947 nyarán következett be. Nikola Petkovot letartóztatták, és kémkedés vádjával egy koncepciós perben halálra ítélték, majd kivégezték. A vezetőjét elvesztő agrárpárti ellenzék feloszlott. Egyedül a Hazafias Frontban részt vevő BFNSZ frakció maradhatott meg, amely elismerte a kommunisták vezető szerepét és programját. Ezzel a BFNSZ egészen 1990-ig koalíciós partnerként vett részt népfrontkormányokban, de nem rendelkezett tényleges beleszólással a hatalomba. Ami ezután következett, már csak formalitás volt. 1946 decemberében az alkotmányozó nemzetgyűlés elfogadta az 1936-os szovjet alkotmány mintájára kidolgozott ún. dimitrovi alkotmányt – Georgi Dimitrov volt a kommunista párt vezetője, és az ország miniszterelnöke 1946 és 1949 között. A társadalmi bázisát elvesztő szociáldemokrata párt 1948 elején beolvadt a BMP-be, amely az év végén hivatalosan is visszavette régi nevét, a Bolgár Kommunista Pártot (BKP).¹²

Az ellenzéki politikai pártok és a hozzájuk fűződő civil szervezetek felszámolása után, 1949 elején az ortodox egyházat is az állam alá rendelték, eltiltották az oktatástól, és megfosztották saját anyagi forrásaitól. Két évre rá leváltották az egyházfőt, az exarchát, és rangemeléssel pátriárkátust hoztak létre. Az autokefáli ranggal megszakadt a hierarchikus kapcsolat a konstantinápolyi pátriárkával. A kis létszámú katolikus és protestáns egyházakat gyanús nyugati kapcsolataik miatt teljesen felszámolták, papjaikat pedig börtönbe zárták. Mivel Törökország vált Bulgária fő hidegháborús ellenfelévé, fokozott figyelem irányult az iszlám vallású török kisebbségre, melynek tagjait ki akarták űzni az országból. 1951-ig –amikor is a török kormány lezárta a Bulgária felőli határait – csaknem 150 ezer török hagyta el Bulgáriát.¹³

A rendszer ellenségeit üldöző politika hullámai elérték a

¹¹ Uo.

¹² Crampton, R., *Op. cit.*, 189–190; Csíkhelyi, L., *Op. cit.*, 107.

¹³ Dimitrov, V., *Op. cit.*, 24–25.

hatalmon lévő kommunista párt tagságát is. Ennek oka a Szovjetunió és Jugoszlávia között 1948-ban bekövetkező szakítás volt. 1944 és 1948 között a jugoszláv és a bolgár pártvezetés szovjet jóváhagyással tárgyalásokat folytatott egymással egy balkáni konföderáció létrehozásáról. A tárgyalások akadozva haladtak, mert a bolgárok a két ország egyenlő alapon történő egyesülését szorgalmazták, míg a jugoszláv fél a hetedik köztársaságként kívánta volna beléptetni Bulgáriát a már létező délszláv államba. Az álláspontok közeledésének jeleként megállapodtak abban, hogy Bulgária átengedi saját délnyugati országrészét, az ún. pirini Macedóniát, amely egyesülne a jugoszláv Macedóniával. Ez a politika rendkívül népszerűtlenné vált a bolgár lakosság körében, mert ezáltal a kommunista pártvezetés elismerte a macedón nemzet létét, és feladta azt a hagyományos bolgár nemzeti álláspontot, miszerint Macedónia szláv lakosai tulajdonképpen bolgárok, és a bolgár állam egyik fő célja egész Macedónia Bulgáriához való csatolásával egyesíteni a széttagolt nemzetet.¹⁴

1948 februárjában Sztálin kritikával illette a jugoszláv és bolgár kommunisták a szovjetektől túlzottan önállósuló politikáját. A bolgár pártvezetés, Georgi Dimitrovval az élen, teljes önkritikát gyakorolt. Georgi Dimitrov 1949-ben bekövetkező halálával megkezdődött a pártvezetésen belüli harc a főtitkári posztért. A világháborút Moszkvában átvészelő kommunista vezetők – a moszkoviták –, élükön Válko Cservenkovval (Dimitrov sógora), megragadták az alkalmat, hogy „titoizmus” és „nacionalista elhajlás” vádjával félreállítsák a legesélyesebb utódjelöltet, a népszerű „hazai” – azaz a világháború idején, Bulgáriában végig illegalitásban tartózkodó – kommunistát, Trajco Kosztovot, aki többször is bírálta a szovjetek Bulgáriával szembeni gazdaságpolitikáját. Kosztovot letartóztatták, egy kirakatperben halálra ítélték, és 1949 decemberében kivégezték. A Kosztov-perrel kezdetét vette a bolgár kommunista párt történetének legnagyobb belső

¹⁴ Jelavich, B. A Balkán története, II. Köt., 20. sz. Bp., 1996, 281–282.

tisztogatása, melynek során több mint százezer párttagot zártak ki, és sújtottak különböző büntetésekkel.¹⁵

A Kosztov-per után Vălko Cservenkov kezébe került a pártfőtitkárság és a kormányfői pozíció. Cservenkov vezetősége idején lépett Bulgária a klasszikus sztálini gazdasági- és társadalmi fejlődés útjára. Az ipar és a kereskedelem államosítása már 1947-re befejeződött, és 1947-ben életbe lépett az első két éves terv. 1949-ben kezdődött az első öt éves terv az ország gyorsütemű iparosítására. Bulgária ipara addig főleg kézműiparból, és mezőgazdasági termékeket (pl. dohány) feldolgozó iparból állt. A két világháború közötti kormányok iparfejlesztő intézkedései is csak a könnyűipart lendítették fel. A nehézipari ágazatok (vas- és acélipar, gépgyártás, vegyipar és energia-termelés) fejlődése még nem tekinthető szignifikánsnak, mivel Bulgária nem rendelkezett a nehéziparhoz szükséges fekete-szénnel, vassal és olajjal. Ezeket, a nyersanyagokat a Szovjet-unióból kellett importálni. Ugyanez vonatkozott a szükséges gépi berendezésekre és a szakember gárdára is.¹⁶

Az erőltetett nehézipar-fejlesztés azért érhetett el sikereket, mert a nyersanyagokat és a technológiát a szovjetek nagyon kedvező áron szállították, és biztosították a gyenge minőségű bolgár iparcikkek számára a felvevőpiacot. A vas- és acélgyártás meghonosításával, valamint a gyors villamosítással létrejött a modern gazdaság alapja. Az agrárszektorból az iparba történő munkaerő-átcsoportosítással lassan megoldódott a túlnépesedett, falun rekedt szegénység problémája, ezáltal egészségesebbé vált a társadalom szerkezete. Az 1950-es évek elején az életszínvonal az erőltetett modernizáció következtében romlott, mert a városokban súlyos lakáshiány alakult ki, és kevés volt a fogyasztási cikk. A lakásépítés nem tudott lépést tartani a városokba áramló új munkások számának növekedésével, illetve a nehézipar fejlesztése

¹⁵ Bideleux, R., I. Jeffries, Op. cit., 87.

¹⁶ Jelavich, B., Op. cit., 318–319; Berivói (Boér) F. Bulgária. Bp., 1941, 5–6; Berend I. Válságos évtizedek. Közép- és Kelet-Európa a két világháború között. Bp., 1982, 22.

miatt elhanyagolták a fogyasztási cikkek termelő ágazatokat. Mégis, ekkor hozta létre az állam a mindenki számára elérhető közoktatást, egészségügyi hálózatot, és a jóléti rendszer alapjait.¹⁷

Az első ötéves terv részét képezte a mezőgazdaság teljes kollektivizálása, és a szovjet típusú termelőszövetkezetek kialakítása. Ez azonban jelentős paraszti ellenállásba ütközött, amit 1951-re sikerült ugyan letörni, de így is csak a parasztság felét sikerült beterelni a termelőszövetkezetekbe. Mindenesetre, a mezőgazdasági termelés drasztikusan visszaesett, mert az új termelőszövetkezetek nem rendelkeztek elegendő vetőmaggal, állattállománnyal, gépekkel és vegyszerekkel. A kollektivizálást egy újabb hullámban, 1957-1958-ban sikerült befejezni sokkal átgondoltabb módon. A parasztságnak ezúttal engedélyezték háztáji gazdaságok kialakítását és művelését, valamint a termelőszövetkezeteket is ellátták a szükséges eszközökkel. Ettől kezdve a mezőgazdasági termelés mennyisége és minősége nagymértékben javult.¹⁸

TODOR ZSIVKOV HATALOMRA KERÜLÉSE, ÉS AZ ÁLLAMSZOCIALIZMUS VIRÁGKORA

Sztálin 1953 márciusában bekövetkező halála után megrendült Cservenkovnak és körének helyzete. Az új szovjet főtitkár, Nyikita Hruscsov által kezdeményezett desztalinizáció, a kapcsolatok javítása Jugoszláviával, valamint a hidegháborús feszültség csökkentése érdekében indított enyhülési politika következtében Bulgáriában is gyengült a rezsim szigora. 1953 márciusában, a plovdivi dohányipari munkások tiltakozó megmozdulásaira válaszul a pártvezetés ígéretet tett, hogy a módosított második ötéves ipari tervben javítanak a lakásviszonyok siralmas állapotán, és a nehézipari beruházások visszafogása mellett nagyobb hangsúlyt helyeznek a fogyasztási és könnyűiparok fejlesztésére. Befejeződtek a politikai tisztogatások, a

¹⁷ Dimitrov, V., Op. cit., 25; Jelavich, B., Op. cit., 319.

¹⁸ Crampton, R., Op. cit., 192–193; Dimitrov, Op. cit., 26.

munkatáborokat pedig bezárták. A szovjet példát követve szétválasztották a párt- és állami funkciókat. 1954 áprilisában a BKP VI. kongresszusán Cservenkov bejelentette, hogy megváltik a pártfőtitkári pozíciótól, és csak a miniszterelnökséget tartja meg. A BKP főtitkára egy 43 éves, hazai kommunista, Todor Zsivkov lett. Zsivkov megválasztása egyben a korábbi tisztogatások során a pártból kizárt hazai vezető kommunisták rehabilitálását, és újbóli hatalomra kerülését is jelentette.¹⁹

Todor Zsivkov 1961-ig a fokozatosan visszaszoruló Cservenkovval, és a rehabilitált korábbi belügyminiszterrel, Anton Jugovval együtt kormányozta Bulgáriát. Eközben, Hruscsov támogatását élvezve, lassan kiszorította a pártból a doktriner moszkovita kommunistákat, és helyükre sokkal pragmatikusabb, fiatal, hazai kommunistákat helyezett. Hruscsov Sztálin bűneit feltáró beszéde az SZKP XX. kongresszusán jelentősen megerősítette Zsivkov pozícióit Cservenkovval szemben. 1956. április elején a BKP Központi Bizottságának (KB) plénumán Zsivkov a szovjet példa fontosságát hangsúlyozva bírálta Cservenkov személyi kultuszát, és a lenini normák megsértését. A kritika hatására Cservenkov kénytelen volt lemondani a miniszterelnökségről Anton Jugov javára. Viszont kormányfő-helyettesként meg tudta őrizni befolyásának egy részét. A változások következtében a párton belüli hangnem kritikusabbá vált, a sajtóban egyre többen követelték a demokratikus jogok szélesítését, főként a szólásszabadság határainak újragondolását. Érezhetővé vált a kulturális olvadás.²⁰

A desztalinizáció keresztülvitele során a bolgár kommunista párt vezetői nagyobb egységet tudtak felmutatni, mint a lengyel és magyar elvtársaik, ami biztosította a BKP számára a társadalom feletti ellenőrzést. 1953 májusában megrendszabályozták a vezetés szerint túlzott liberalizációt követelő párttagokat és értelmiségieket. Az 1956-os őszi lengyelországi megmozdulások, és a magyarországi forradalom megke-

¹⁹ Crampton, R., 195; Jelavich, B., Op. cit., 318; Csíkhelyi, L., Op. cit., 123.

²⁰ Dimitrov, V., Op. cit., 27; Csíkhelyi, L., Op. cit., 113.

ményítették a BKP álláspontját. Újabb tisztogatásokra került sor mind a párton belül, mind pedig az ország szellemi életében. Ezeket, köztük sok frissen szabadult politikai foglyot tartóztattak le, és küldtek vissza az ismét megnyitott munkatáborokba. Mindazonáltal a BKP ún. „áprilisi irányvonala”, amely Zsivkovnak a BKP KB 1956 áprilisi plenumán elhangzott beszéde alapján nagyobb párton belüli demokráciát és kulturális liberalizálást irányzott elő, napirenden maradt azért, hogy legitimálhassa a jövő reformprogramjait.²¹

A BKP részben azért is tudta viszonylag könnyen kezelni a desztalinizáció által előidézett válságot, mert a bolgár társadalom szerkezete továbbra is az európai félperiféria jegyeit hordozta magán. Bulgáriában csak a parasztság felől érkezhetett volna érdemi ellenállás a BKP uralmával szemben. A parasztság ellenkezését azonban megtörte Nikola Petkov pártjának szétverése 1947-ben, valamint a földek nagy részének kollektivizálása 1950–1951-ben. A munkásosztály, amely az 1956-os lengyel és magyar események fő társadalmi bázisát alkotta, Bulgáriában ekkor kezdett számbelileg is jelentős csoporttá válni, de még nem rendelkezett szilárd öntudattal. A falusi nyomorból felemelkedett első generációs munkások tömegei éppen az államszocialista rendszertől várták sorsuk további jobbra fordulását. A világháborút követő népbírószági tisztogatásokat túlélő értelmiség pedig, a további üldözést elkerülendő, szorgosan igyekezett hozzáidomulni a rendszer által felemelt új szocialista értelmiséghez.²²

1958-ra befejeződött a földbirtokok kollektivizálása, és a meglévő termelőszövetkezetek jelentős részét a termelés racionális ösztönzése érdekében összevonták (3450-ről 932-re). Ekkor újra napirendre került az ország gyors iparosításának terve. A kínai példa hatására 1959-ben a pártvezetés úgy döntött, hogy átveszik a Nagy Ugrás bizonyos elemeit, és az öt éves tervet három év alatt fogják teljesíteni. A nagyszabású

²¹ Dimitrov, V., Op. cit., 28; Csíkhelyi, L., Op. cit.

²² Dimitrov, V., Op. cit., 28.

lakossági mozgósítások ellenére, 1961-re ez a célkitűzés teljes mértékben kudarcot vallott a megvalósíthatatlan tervek és a szűkös anyagi feltételek – tőke és nyersanyaghiány – miatt. A kormány a sikert csak a korábbi tervmutatók megváltoztatásával tudta igazolni. Miután a szovjet–kínai szakítás megtörtént, a BKP lemondott a kínai modell követéséről.²³

Todor Zsivkov sikeresen elhárította magáról a felelősséget a Nagy Ugrás kudarcáért. Ahhoz, hogy riválisait félreállíthassa, kapóra jött számára Hruscsov újabb antisztálinista kirohanása 1961-ben, az SZKP XXII. kongresszusán. 1961 végén kizárták Cservenkovot a KB-ből, majd pedig a pártból is. 1962 májusában Hruscsov hosszú látogatást tett Bulgáriában, ahol nyilvánvalóvá vált, hogy a szovjet pártfőtitkár, Jugov helyett Zsivkovot támogatta. A BKP soron következő, VIII. kongresszusa elmozdította Jugovot a kormányfői bársonyszékből, és a szocialista törvényesség megszegésének vétké miatt a pártból is kizárták. Zsivkov ezzel teljesen megszilárdította a hatalmát, és a pártfőtitkári pozíció mellé a miniszterelnöki tisztséget is megszerezte.²⁴

Zsivkov 1964-re, annyira megszilárdította a párton belüli helyzetét, hogy sikeresen átvészelte Hruscsov bukását. 1965 áprilisában az állambiztonsági szervek sikeresen megakadályoztak egy Zsivkov eltávolítását tervező maoista összeesküvést. A szervezkedés élén Zsivkov egykori partizántársa, Ivan Todorov-Gorunja tábornok állt, aki elfogatása előtt öngyilkos lett. A többi összeesküvő – összesen kilenc személy, köztük három tábornok – meglepően enyhe ítéletben részesült (3-15 év kényszermunka). A további tisztogatás csak három év múlva következett be. Ettől kezdve Zsivkov hatalmát többé nem fenyegette komoly veszély, egészen 1989-ig.²⁵

A Bolgár Kommunista Párton belül nem alakult ki a magyar, lengyel és csehszlovák testvérpártokhoz hasonlóan reformkommunista szárny. A zsivkovi kormányzást bíráló halk

²³ Crampton, R., *Op. cit.*, 196–197; Jelavich, B., *Op. cit.*, 320.

²⁴ Dimitrov, V., *Op. cit.*, 29.

²⁵ Csíkhelyi, L., *Op. cit.*, 113; Bideleux, R., I. Jeffries, *Op. cit.*, 88.

hangok is csak a párt radikálisan baloldali doktriner része felől voltak nagyritkán hallhatók. Ezek a párttagok az 1960-as és 1970-es évek konszolidálódott Zsivkov-rezsimjét a marxizmus-leninizmus elárulásával, és a dekadens nyugati életmód bulgáriai meghonosításával vádolták, miközben visszasírták az 1940-1950-es évek aszketikus fegyelmét. Noha Zsivkov mindig szilárdan kézben tartotta a hatalom gyeplőit, és meglehetősen óvatos és konzervatív politikát folytatott, annyiban azért igazuk volt a szélsőbaloldali bírálóknak, hogy a szovjet politikai irányvonal rezdüléseire gondosan ügyelve, Zsivkov saját maga játszotta el a reformer szerepét. A nagy gonddal kidolgozott, és látványosan kezdeményezett gazdasági reformokat szükség esetén, mindig a kellő időben csendesesen leállította, miközben a hivatalos közbeszédben azok továbbviteléről folyt a diskurzus. Más szóval, a reformokról folytatott állandó viták a valódi reformok pótlását szolgálták.²⁶

Erre a sorsra jutottak az 1965-ben, a gazdaság dinamizálására elindított reformok is. A központi gazdaságirányítás visszafogásával a vállalatok nagyobb önállóságot kaptak, és saját terveket készíthettek. Az 1968-as csehszlovákiai események tapasztalata azonban a reformkísérlet leállításához vezetett, és a párt visszatért centralizált tervutasításos rendszerre. Továbbgyűrűző hatásként a BKP szigorította a különböző társadalmi szervezetek feletti ellenőrzését, és a párton belül is fokozottan számon kérték a „vasfegyelmet”.²⁷

A visszatérő központosítás és az ideológiai konformitás Bulgária 1971-es alkotmányában tükröződött, valamint az ugyanekkor kidolgozott új pártprogramban is. Az 1971-es alkotmány kinyilatkoztatta „a szocializmus győzelmét” Bulgáriában, és „az együttműködést és kölcsönös segítségnyújtást a Szovjetunióval”. Az alaptörvény leszögezte a kommunista párt vezető szerepét a társadalomban és az államban. Hangsúlyozta az állami szervek és a társadalmi szervezetek szocialista jellegét. Újdonság gyanánt

²⁶ Drezov, K., Op. cit., 197–198; Dimitrov, V., Op. cit., 30–31.

²⁷ Crampton, R., Op. cit., 198.

bővítette az állampolgárok társadalmi-gazdasági jogait: a munkához (ami egyben kötelesség is volt), a pihenéshez, a biztosításhoz, az ingyenes oktatáshoz és az egészségügyi ellátáshoz való jogot. Bevezetésre került a „fejlett szocialista társadalom” fogalma. Hatalomtechnikai szempontból pedig a legfontosabb újítás a hatalom egységének kinyilvánítása volt. Ezzel a megállapítással nyíltan összemosták a törvényhozó és a végrehajtó hatalom szerepkörét. A hatalom egységének megtestesítésére létrehoztak egy állandóan működő új szervet, az államtanácsot, amely egyesítette a döntéshozatalt és a végrehajtást. Az államtanács elnöke lett az állam feje. Todor Zsivkov lemondott a presztízsértékét veszítő miniszterelnökségről, hogy a párt az államtanács elnökévé választhassa őt.²⁸

Az új pártprogram leszögezte, hogy a BKP továbbra is az 1956-os „áprilisi irányvonalat” követi. A szocializmus felépülésével mégis szükség van egy új stratégiára, amely továbbvezeti a pártot és a nemzetet az érett szocializmus, és az egységesített társadalom építésének útján. Ez az egységesítés az ország homogenizációját takarta, ami az 1970-es években még a városi és a vidéki életmód, illetve a szellemi és fizikai munka közötti határokat kívánta megszüntetni. Később, az 1980-as években ez a homogenizáció etnikai dimenziókat kapott, amennyiben az etnikai kisebbségeknek a többségi bolgár nemzetbe történő beolvasztásához – illetve elüldözéséhez – szolgáltatott ideológiai háttérrel. A pártprogram értelmében, az érett szocializmus építése az extenzív növekedésről az intenzív gyarapodásra való áttérést jelentette. Ez a tudományos-technikai forradalom révén valósulhat meg, ami növeli a termelékenységet és a jólétet.²⁹

Az 1971-ben bevezetett újítások nem sokat módosítottak Todor Zsivkov rendszerén. Legfőbb jellemzője továbbra is a Szovjetunió mindenkori politikájához való hűséges igazodás volt. Ebben odáig ment, hogy Zsivkov előbb Hruscsovnak, majd pedig Brezsnyevnek is felvetette, hogy Bulgária a tizenhatodik

²⁸ Csíkhelyi, L., *Op. cit.*, 107–108; Bideleux, R., I. Jeffries, *Op. cit.*, 88.

²⁹ Crampton, R., *Op. cit.*, 198–199.

tagköztársaságként csatlakozna a Szovjetunióhoz. Mindkét-szer elutasításban részesült: Hruscsov nem óhajtotta a szovjet állam nyakába venni a bolgár gazdaság terheit, Brezsnyev viszont tartott az esetleges nemzetközi diplomáciai bonyodalmaktól.³⁰

A fokozatos gazdasági fejlődés alapját a hatvanas években elindított, a korábbinál ésszerűbb iparosítás biztosította. A szükséges nyersanyagok teljes hiánya miatt az iparfejlesztés attól vált gazdaságossá, hogy a Szovjetunió a világpiacínál sokkal kedvezőbb áron szállította Bulgáriának a szenet, vasat és olajt. Így épülhettek meg a bolgár szocialista nehézipar óriásai, mint a Szófia melletti Kremikovci acélgyára, a burgaszi olajfinomító, a sztara zagorai (műtrágya) vegyiművek, és a Marica-Iztok vízerőmű.³¹

A bolgár gazdaság fejlődését nagymértékben elősegítette a KGST keretei között megvalósuló munkamegosztás. A bolgárok készségesen vállalták a mezőgazdasági szállító szerepét. Bulgária elsősorban a Szovjetuniót látta el kertészeti, mediterrán és más feldolgozott mezőgazdasági termékekkel. Cserébe technológiai támogatást kapott az iparilag fejlettebb KGST tagoktól. 1965-től import szovjet alkatrészekből szereltek össze személyautókat és tehergépkocsikat Bulgáriában. Az ország specializálhatta magát a hajóépítés, a vasúti gördülőanyag és a villamos targoncagyártás terén. 1975-re a szállítóeszközöket készítő ágazatok tették ki Bulgária ipari termelésének egyharmadát. Meghonosodott a számítástechnikai iparág is: mágneslemezeket és egyéb számítógépalkatrészeket állítottak elő a kelet-európai piac számára. A látszólag nagyívű ipari fejlődésnek azonban volt egy igencsak komoly gyengesége, amely úgymond egyoldalúvá tette az elért sikereket: a viszonylag gyenge minőségű, és alacsony technikai színvonalat mutató bolgár termékek jelentős részét versenyképtelenségük miatt nem lehetett értékesíteni keményvalutáért a világpiacon. Ezeket az árukat elsősorban a Szovjetunió vette át, illetve a többi KGST ország. Nem is csoda, hogy Bulgária volt az a szocialista ország, amely leginkább függött gazdaságilag a

³⁰ Bideleux, R., I. Jeffries, Op. cit., 88; Crampton, R., Op. cit., 200.

³¹ Dimitrov, V., Op. cit., 29.

Szovjetuniótól. A hetvenes évek közepén a bolgár külkereskedelmi ügyletek közel 50%-a a Szovjetunióval került lebonyolításra. A többi KGST országot is ide számítva, ez az arány megközelítette a 80%-ot.³²

A Zsivkov-rendszer és az ország belpolitikai életének stabilitását az 1960-as, 1970-es években a lakosság életszínvonalának fokozatos emelkedése biztosította. A párt nagyobb figyelmet szentelt a fogyasztási cikkek biztosítására, a lakásvizonyok javítására, illetve az oktatás és az egészségügy fejlesztésére. Az emberek nagy többsége elégedett volt életkörülményei javulása miatt, ugyanakkor apátiával viseltettek a politikai élet iránt. Az 1940-es és 1950-es évek politikai terrorja megszűnt. A rendszer elszigetelt és kis létszámú bírálóit rendőrségi vegzatúrákkal törekedtek elhallgattatni.³³

Ellenben a zsivkovi rezsime a külföldi nyilvánosság előtt is diszkreditáló ellenzékieket a legdrasztikusabb eszközökkel igyekeztek elhallgattatni. 1977 szeptemberében egy merénylet oltotta ki a londoni utcán sétáló ellenzéki író, Georgi Markov életét, aki pellengérre állította a bolgár politikai elit életvitelét. Ez volt a hírhedt esernyős gyilkosság. Két hétre rá sikertelen merényletet hajtottak végre Párizsban a bolgár titkosszolgálat működéséről adatokat kiszivárogtató Vladimir Kosztov ellen.³⁴

Noha a BKP-n belül nem léteztek a hivatalos pártvonaltól eltérő reformista vagy ultrakonzervatív csoportok, Todor Zsivkov mégis nagy gondot fordított a személyes hatalmát veszélyeztető utódjelöltek eltávolítására. Egy korabeli bon-mot szerint Bulgáriában a legveszélyesebb pozíciónak számított másodiknak lenni Zsivkov után. Zsivkov több ízben távolított el a pártvezetésből számára veszélyt jelentő személyeket (1966-ban Mitko Grigorovot, 1977-ben Venelin Kosztevet, és 1984-ben Alexandár Lilovot). Arra azonban ügyelt, hogy biztosítsa számukra a kényelmes visszavonulást

³² Bideleux, R., I. Jeffries, *Op. cit.*, 89; Crampton, R., *Op. cit.*, 200–201.

³³ Crampton, R., *Op. cit.*, 200–201.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 202.

valamilyen jól fizető állásba. Ezzel a kemény, de nagylelkű vezető képét próbálta sugározni a környezete felé.³⁵

A Zsivkov-érában mégis a korábbiakhoz képest szokatlan káderstabilitás jellemezte a politikai életet. Az ellenőrzést szigorúan kézben tartva, Zsivkov előszeretettel adott át döntéshozatali jogköröket alárendeltjeinek. Munkatársai kiválasztásánál elsősorban nem a szakmai alkalmasság szempontja dominált, hanem a közös partizán múlt, vagy a látványos pártaktivista tevékenység. Zsivkov, más országok kommunista vezetőitől eltérően, nem volt a nép számára elérhetetlen, mert kifejezetten élvezte az érintkezést az egyszerű emberekkel a különböző rendezvényeken. Ez egy fajta populista jellemvonás volt, amelyet tovább erősített a róla kialakított szerénység képe. Zsivkov sosem engedélyezte személyének túlzásba vitt dicsérését, például úgy, ahogy a román Nicolae Ceaușescu tette.³⁶

Ceaușescu rendszeréhez hasonlóan a zsivkovi politika sem nélkülözte a nacionalista vonásokat. Az 1968-as csehszlovákiai bevonulást követően a BKP is leállította a gazdasági reformkísérleteket, és visszatért a konzervatív államszocialista vonalhoz. A visszarendeződés miatt csökkenő ideológiai elkötelezettség a társadalom körében szükségessé tette a párt legitimációjának újabb eszközökkel történő erősítését. A társadalom bolgár nemzeti öntudatának fokozása erre kiválóan alkalmasnak tűnt. Pedig ez külpolitikai vonatkozásban komoly elvi nehézségeket okozott a pártnak, hiszen a bolgár diplomácia az internacionalizmus jelszavával mindig konzekvensen követte az éppen aktuális szovjet külpolitikai irányvonalat.³⁷

Az egységes szocialista nemzet létrehozását kitűző 1971-es pártprogram elfogadása után meg is kezdődtek az asszimilációs törekvések a kisebb etnikai csoportok, a cigányok, valamint a bolgár származású és nyelvű muszlim pomákok beolvasztására. Mindaddig, az 1960-as évek folyamán csak tétova lépések

³⁵ Dimitrov, V., Op. cit., 30.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Crampton, R., Op. cit., 203.

történtek a cigányok és pomákok beolvasztására. 1962 áprilisában a BKP Politikai Bizottságának (PB) plénuma határozatot fogadott el a cigányok, tatárok és pomákok török irányultsága ellen. A PB határozat kívánatosnak tartotta a kulturális váltást e népcsoportok életmódjában, és javasolta a személynevek önkéntes alapon történő megváltoztatását. A tiltakozások hatására a BKP PB 1964 májusában elítélte a bolgár lakosság és a párttagság körében megjelenő nacionalista törekvéseket. Mégis 1970 júliusában újabb döntés született a cigányok és a pomákok egy részének átnevezéséről. Az 1971-es pártprogram elfogadása után megkezdődtek a hatósági intézkedések, és 1973-ra 200 ezer ember változtatta meg a nevét. A cigány nyelvű kiadványok megjelentetését leállították, s ezután csak bolgár nyelven jelenhettek meg könyvek és sajtótermékek. Bezárt a népszerű szófiai cigány színház is. A pomákokat pedig büntetés terhe mellett egyenesen kötelezték, hogy muszlim személyneveiket lecseréljék szláv nevekre. A legnagyobb etnikai kisebbséget alkotó törökséget – leszámítva sajtótermékeik számának csökkentését, és a kivándorlásukat elősegítő intézkedéseket – nem érték súlyosabb atrocitások az 1970-es évek során. 1968-ban Bulgária és Törökország egyezményt kötött az 1950-es évek kivándorlásai során szétszakadt családok törökországi újraegyesítésének előmozdítására. Az egyezmény tíz éves érvényességi ideje alatt körülbelül 130 ezer török hagyta el végleg Bulgáriát.³⁸

A macedón kérdés szintén jó lehetőséget biztosított a BKP számára a nemzeti érzelmek legitimációs célú felhasználására. A jugoszlávokkal 1948-ban bekövetkező szakítás után a macedón, mint önálló etnikai kategória többé nem létező fogalommá vált Bulgáriában. Bármilyen macedón ügyben tett lépés Bulgárián belül összekapcsolódott a délszláv államhoz fűződő viszonnal. 1948 után akárhányszor elhidegült Moszkva és Belgrád viszonya, a szófiai hivatalos körök azonmód megkezdték a retorikai kirohanásokat a jugoszláv Macedónia ellen. A bolgár

³⁸ Crampton, R., *Op. cit.*, 203. Nedelcheva, T. Will the Ethnic Crisis be Overcome in Bulgaria? – In: Coenen-Huther, J. (Ed.), *Op. cit.*, 144–145.

vezetés számára akkor keletkezett komolyabb probléma, amikor Hruscsov elhatározta, hogy javít a szovjet-jugoszláv kapcsolatokon. A szovjet ösztönzések ellenére bolgárok végig bizalmatlanok és kritikusak voltak a jugoszlávokkal szemben. Ugyanakkor a problémakör kezelése sosem csúszott ki Zsivkov ellenőrzése alól, és a hatalomban töltött évei során egyszer sem okozott komolyabb nemzetközi bonyodalmat.³⁹

A bulgáriai nacionalizmus 1970-es években bekövetkező felerősödésének legérdekesebb mozzanata nem is annyira magához Todor Zsivkovhoz fűződik, mint inkább a lányához, Ljudmila Zsivkovához. Apja igen gondos neveltetésben részesítette az 1942-ben született Ljudmilát – így tanulhatott Oxfordban is –, mert saját hivatali örökösének szánta. Politikai pályáját kulturális vonalon kezdte: 1971-ben kinevezték a párt kultúráért és művészetért felelős bizottságának elnökhelyettesévé. 1975-től vezetőjévé vált a bizottságnak, s hamarosan ellenőrzése alá került a rádió, a televízió és a nyomtatott sajtó is. Ettől kezdve egészen az 1981-ben bekövetkezett haláláig az ország kultúrpolitikájának teljhatalmú irányítója volt.⁴⁰

Ljudmila Zsivkova tevékenysége jelentős kulturális olvadást hozott a közéletben. Személye rendkívüli népszerűségnek örvendett az értelmiség körében, mert Zsivkova nagy érdeklődést tanúsított a bolgár történelmi múlt, és a bolgár kultúra teljesítményeinek újraértékelése iránt. Ráadásul Zsivkova különösen vonzódott a marxizmustól távol álló miszticizmushoz. Ő szervezte meg 1981-ben a bolgár államiság 1300 éves évfordulója alkalmából rendezett nagyszabású állami ünnepséget, amely a bolgár nemzeti öntudat és büszkeség külvilág felé történő manifesztációja volt. Ettől kezdve a némi szocialista mázzal borított nemzeti diskurzus a közélet részévé vált.⁴¹

³⁹ Crampton, R., *Op. cit.*, 203–204.

⁴⁰ Dimitrov, V., *Op. cit.*, 31; Crampton, R., *Op. cit.*, 204.

⁴¹ Crampton, R., *Op. cit.*, 204–205; Csíkhelyi, L., *Op. cit.*, 113.

*A NYOLCVANAS ÉVEK VÁLSÁGA, ÉS
TODOR ZSIVKOV BUKÁSA*

Az 1970-es évek végére a Zsivkov-rendszer elérte fejlődési lehetőségeinek határait. Összességében ekkor úgy tűnt, hogy Bulgária hatalmas erőfeszítések árán nagyrészt sikeresen behozta történelmi lemaradását az európai centrum-területekhez képest: agrárállamból ipari országgá vált. Az agrárnépesség az összlakosság ötödére zsugorodott, ugyanakkor széles első- és másodgenerációs munkásosztály jött létre, s a városi középrétegek is megerősödtek. A szovjet mintájú tervutasításos extenzív gazdaságfejlesztés lehetőségei azonban végleg kimerültek. Az életszínvonal emelkedését biztosító gazdasági növekedés lelassult, majd csökkenni kezdett. Ez alapjaiban veszélyeztette a rendszer stabilitását és legitimációját. 1985-ig, Mihail Gorbacsov hatalomra kerüléséig, a gazdasági visszaesést többé-kevésbé még sikerült kompenzálni a világpiaci ár alatt kapott szovjet nyersanyagok re-exportjával. Egy 1979-ben hozott döntés alapján a pártvezetés 1982-től elindította az Új Gazdasági Mechanizmust a termelékenység növelése, valamint a bolgár termékek és szolgáltatások minőségének javítása érdekében. Előirányozták a decentralizálást és a piaci mechanizmusok bevezetését a gazdaságirányításba. A vállalatok nagyobb önállóságot kaptak, és ösztönözték a munkások részvételét a termelés irányításában.⁴²

Az egész nagyszabású kísérlet azonban 1984-re teljes kudarcba fulladt, aminek okai elsősorban a kedvezőtlen nemzetközi körülményekben keresendők. Az 1979-től kiéleződő szovjet-amerikai ellentétek – az ún. kis hidegháború – megnehezítették a fejlesztésekhez szükséges nyugati technológia importját. Az Európai Gazdasági Közösség is igyekezett piacvédelmi okokból távol tartani saját belső piacáról az egyedülként versenyképes bolgár mezőgazdasági termékeket. A világpiacra szánt exportból származó keményvalutát pedig jórészt adósságszolgálatra

⁴² Ágh, A., Op. cit., 234; Dimitrov, V., Op. cit., 31.

kellett fordítani. 1979 és 1985 között sikerült is lecsökkenteni a külső adósságállományt 4,5 milliárd dollárról 2,4 milliárdra.⁴³

Az egyre fokozódó gazdasági válság arra sarkallta a kommunista vezetőket, hogy újabb eszközökkel próbálják megtartani a hatalom megrendülő stabilitását. A gondok elkenődésére, és a tömegtámogatás elnyerése érdekében előtérbe került a nemzeti kérdés. A bolgár népesség romló demográfiai mutatóinak javítása érdekében napirendre került az etnikai kisebbségek fokozottabb integrálása és asszimilációja a többségi bolgár nemzetbe. A pomákok sikeres névváltoztatásának 1970-es évekbeli tapasztalataiból kiindulva 1984 decemberében a BKP KB elindította az ún. „újjaszületési folyamatot” a lakosság körülbelül 10%-át kitevő török kisebbség számára. Todor Zsivkov egy beszédében kifejtette, hogy a bulgáriai törökség utolsó maradványai az 1970-es években kivándoroltak Törökországba. Akik maradtak, azok valójában (muszlim) bolgárok, és most megkapják a lehetőséget, hogy visszatérjenek a bolgár nemzet kebelére. A párttörténészek által kidolgozott elmélet szerint a bulgáriai törökség nem az oszmán időkben vándorolt be Anatóliából, hanem annak a türk nyelvű ősbolgár népcsoportnak a leszármazottai, akik nem olvadtak be a középkor folyamán a szláv többségbe. Ezeket a türk nyelvű bolgárokat az oszmán hatalom térítette át az iszlámra, akárcsak a bolgár nyelvet beszélő pomákokat. A tetszetős elmélet szerint mindezt alátámasztja, hogy Északkelet Bulgáriában is fennmaradtak a türk nyelvet beszélő keresztény gagauzok, akik ugyancsak az ősbolgárok el nem szlávosodott leszármazottai.⁴⁴

A nemzeti kommunistává átalakuló rezsim beemelte az „újjaszületési folyamat” ideológiai rendszerébe a hagyományos bolgár nacionalizmus egyik alappillérét, a vallást is, csak hogy

⁴³ Crampton, R., *Op. cit.*, 206–207; Dimitrov, V., *Op. cit.*, 31.

⁴⁴ Csíkhelyi, L., *Op. cit.*, 113–114. Димитров, Стр. Тюркоезичието, стереотипите на мислене и националото поминение. – Векове, 1990, N 2, 47–48.

fokozza az akció népszerűségét a bolgár lakosság körében. A hagyományos bolgár nemzeteszme szerint csak az tekinthető igazi bolgárnak, aki szláv – bolgár nyelvű és kultúrájú – és ortodox keresztény. Ezzel viszont az „újjászületési folyamat” egy általános iszlám-ellenes élt is kapott.⁴⁵

Az „újjászületési folyamat” első lépése gyanánt a hatóságok felszólították a török kisebbség tagjait, hogy két héten belül önként válasszanak maguknak szláv neveket egy előre összeállított listáról. Akik ezt elmulasztották megtenni, vagy ellenálltak, azok hatóságilag kaptak új nevet. Nem számítva azokat a tüntetéseket, melyeket eme felszólítás a török lakta települések némelyikén kiváltott, az akció a hivatalos várakozásoknak megfelelően országszerte rendben lezajlott. A neki-bátorodott államhatalom ezután egyre több korlátozó intézkedést hozott. Megszűnt a török nyelvű sajtótermékek kiadása és rádióadások sugárzása. Bezárták a török tannyelvű iskolákat. Sőt, betiltották a török nyelv nyilvános használatát, és számos maradinak és embertelennek minősített muszlim szokás – például fejkendő viselése a nőknél, körülmetélés – gyakorlását.⁴⁶

Ezek a lépések viszont már komoly tiltakozást váltottak ki. Az ellenszegülő törökök egyre nyíltabban kezdték használni eredeti neveiket, demonstratív módon törököül beszéltek, változások álltak be továbbá a vallásgyakorlásukban is, ugyanis sűrűbben látogatták a mecseteket. Egyre hevesebb tömegmozdulások történtek, és megszerveződött az illegális ellenállás is. 1985-ben megalakult a földalatti Török Mozgalom a Nemzeti Felszabadításért nevű szervezet. A hatóságok az ellenállás elfojtása mellett döntöttek. A földalatti török mozgalom kétszáz vezető aktivistáját letartóztatták. Hadiállapotot vezettek be az ország törökök lakta vidékein, és egy nagyszabású katonai erődemonstráció keretében pacifikálták az elégedetlenkedő lakosságot. A rendszer belpolitikai stabilitását erősíteni hivatott asszimilációs akció külpolitikai szempontból mégis hatalmas

⁴⁵ Bideleux, R., I. Jeffries, Op. cit., 91; Nedelcheva, T., Op. cit., 150.

⁴⁶ Dimitrov, V., Op. cit., 31; Nedelcheva, T., Op. cit., 145–146.

öngólnak bizonyult. A török kormány kezdeményezésére 1985 és 1987 között számos nemzetközi szervezet, mint például az ENSZ Emberjogi Bizottsága, az Amnesty International és az Iszlám Konferencia Szervezete is elítélte a bulgáriai török kisebbséget sújtó atrocitásokat.⁴⁷

A nemzetközi nyomás hatására a bolgár kormány enyhített az „újjaszületési folyamat” politikáján, és új stratégiát jelentett be. Sor került néhány műemlék mecset látványos felújítására, és családegyesítési célból a kormány kiutazási vízumot biztosított a Törökországba utazni vágyók számára, ami persze jelentős kivándorláshoz vezetett. Ezzel a török kisebbség ügyét sikerült egy időre – 1989 májusáig – a háttérbe szorítani, ennek ellenére Bulgária rossz nemzetközi megítélése és elszigeteltsége egy szemernyit sem javult. A bolgár pártvezetést az érintette a legérzékenyebben, hogy az 1985-ben hatalomra kerülő új szovjet pártfőtitkár, Mihail Gorbacsov számára Todor Zsivkov személye és politikája egyre inkább tehertétellé vált.⁴⁸

A gorbacsovi peresztrojka mind politikai, mind gazdasági szempontból felkészületlenül érte Zsivkovot. Természetesen a bolgár pártvezér már hozzászokott ahhoz, hogy alkalmazkodjon a Szovjetunióból érkező impulzusokhoz. Ezekhez mindig hozzáadott valami saját, „eredeti” koncepciót, így a többi kelet-európai kommunista vezetőnél sokkal könnyebben tudott idomulni a peresztrojka szlogenjeihez, és a vele járó intézkedésekhez. A divatos eszméket kedvelő Zsivkov számos értelmiségi szemináriumot szervezett, melyeken ő maga elnökölt. Ezekre a szemináriumokra a peresztrojka „sztárjainak” számító szovjet személyiségeket is meghívta. Ugyanakkor, több politikai és társadalmi kérdésekről íródott művet küldött Moszkvába véleményezésre, amelyek ott nem arattak túlzottan nagy sikert.⁴⁹

A peresztrojka első időszakában, az „uszokorenije” jel-szavával a gazdaság fejlődésének gyorsítása, és az új techno-

⁴⁷ Nedelcheva, T., Op. cit., 146; Bideleux, R., I. Jeffries, Op. cit., 91.

⁴⁸ Crampton, R., Op. cit., 210; Nedelcheva, T., Op. cit., 146.

⁴⁹ Lévesque, J., Op. cit., 164.

lógiaák bevezetése révén a termelékenység növelése volt a cél. Ekkor Zsivkov a nyugati technológiai transzferre – vagy sokkal inkább annak reményére – alapozva egy nagyszabású, mikro-elektronikai termékek gyártását célzó programot indított be, hogy Bulgária Kelet-Európa „kis Japánjává” válhasson. A tervbe vett technológiai áttörés kudarca egy-két év alatt világossá vált, és Bulgária kénytelen volt a Szovjetunióhoz és a KGST-hez fordulni gazdasági segítségért.⁵⁰

A Szovjetunióval fenntartott kapcsolatok megrendülése a demokratizálásra, és a politikai átalakításokra hangsúlyt fektető, 1987. januári SZKP KB plénum után vált nyilvánvalóvá. Zsivkov kijelentette, hogy Bulgáriában nincs szükség további politikai reformokra, mert a BKP 1956-os „áprilisi irányvonala” már megfogalmazta a megfelelő intézkedéseket. Gorbacsov elítélte Zsivkov álláspontját, és valódi reformok megindítását sürgette. Válaszként Zsivkov nagyszabású beszédet mondott a BKP KB 1987. július 27-29-i ülésén *A szocializmus továbbfejlesztési koncepciójának alapjai a Bolgár Népköztársaságban* címmel. A beszédben megfogalmazódó ún. „júliusi koncepció” hivatalosan is felváltotta a BKP addigi „áprilisi irányvonalát”. A szocializmus egy olyan új modelljének kidolgozására fektette a hangsúlyt, amely tekintetbe veszi az új történelmi realitásokat.⁵¹

A BKP új programja leszögezte a párt társadalomban betöltött szerepének megváltozását. A párt ettől kezdve csak ihlető forrásnak tekintendő, és egyre több teret kell engedni a társadalmi szervezeteknek. A hatékonyság növelése érdekében valóságos támadás indult a közép szintű állami- és pártbürokrácia ellen. Körülbelül 30 ezer funkcionáriust bocsátottak el, az ország közigazgatási körzeteit huszonnyolcra nyolcra csökkentették, és számos minisztériumot megszüntettek vagy reor-

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Csíkhelyi, L., Op. cit., 114. A szocializmus továbbfejlesztési koncepciójának alapjai a Bolgár Népköztársaságban. (Todor Zsivkov beszéde a BKP KB 1987. júl. 28-29-i ülésén) (Részletek). – In: Pándi L. (Ed.). A kelet-európai diktatúrák bukása 1985–1990. (Kronológia, dokumentumok, bibliográfia). Szeged, 1993, 172.

ganizáltak. Új törvények egész sorát fogadták el a munkáról, a vállalatok és szövetkezetek önállóságának növeléséről, és garantálták az igazgatók választás útján történő kinevezését. Tervbe vették továbbá egy új alkotmány kidolgozását a változások szentesítésére.⁵²

A felgyorsított reformintézkedések ellenére Zsivkov nem tudta megnyerni a szovjet vezetés bizalmát. Ennek jeleként 1988 márciusában visszahívták Szófiából a már hosszú ideje ott szolgáló Grekov szovjet nagykövetet, és helyére a Gorbacsov bizalmát élvező Viktor Sarapov érkezett. A szovjeteknek eme lépését Zsivkov saját személyének barátságtalan elutasításaként értékelte. 1988 júliusában – nem sokkal a Gorbacsov hatalmát megerősítő SZKP XXIX. kongresszusa után – Zsivkov gyors és látványos lépéseket tett párton belüli helyzetének megerősítésére. Először mondvacsinált indokkal félreállította a szovjetek által is preferált fiatal, energikus Sădomir Alexandrovot, akit már a BKP berkein belül is Zsivkov esetleges utódának tekintettek (az összeeszkábált titkosszolgálati jelentést, miszerint Alexandrov apósa a világháború idején információkat adott át a cári hatóságoknak, még Moszkvában is hitetlenkedve fogadták). Ezután egy politikai bizottsági ülésen Zsivkov bejelentette, hogy megválnak tisztségeitől. A meglepett PB tagok egyhangúan elutasították lemondási szándékát. Ezzel a lépésével Zsivkov több mint egy évre megszilárdította helyzetét a BKP élén.⁵³

Zsivkov rendszerének problémái mégis ez alatt a szűk néhány esztendő alatt váltak visszafordíthatatlanul súlyossá. A tömeges és rosszul időzített átszervezések a gazdaság szétfelbomlásához vezettek. A visszaeső gazdasági teljesítmény, és a számos szovjet szubvenció megszűnésének pótlására a kormány nagy értékű kölcsönöket vett fel a nyugati pénzpiacokon. 1985 és 1989 között Bulgária külső államadóssága több mint háromszorosára növekedett: 2,4 milliárd dollárról 9,2 milliárdra. A sok hitel viszont arra már nem volt elegendő, hogy megállítsa a

⁵² Lévesque, J., Op. cit., 164.

⁵³ Ibid., 165–166.

lakosság életszínvonalának gyorsuló ütemű csökkenését. A sorozatos szovjet figyelmeztetések hatására Zsivkov lassított ugyan a strukturális átalakítások ütemén, de újíttási kedve töretlen maradt. 1989-ben kijelentette, hogy az állami vállalatok többségét félig privatizált vegyes vállalatokká alakítják át. Ennek verge-hajtására azonban már nem jutott idő.⁵⁴

A szovjet-bolgár kapcsolatok 1989-re mélypontra jutottak. Teljesen megszűnt a szovjet gazdasági támogatás és nyers-anyagszállítás. A hatalmas szovjet piac bezárult a bolgár termékek előtt. Egy 1989. februári szovjet értékelés szerint Bulgáriában lényegében csak szimulálták a peresztrojkát, ami nagyrészt Zsivkov személyes ambícióinak volt köszönhető. A szocializmus új elméleti modelljének megteremtéséről szóló nagyhangú nyilatkozatok a gyakorlatban csak folyamatos átszervezéseket eredményeztek. Ide-oda tologatták a kádereket, miközben egyre nőtt az elnyomás. A szovjetek szerint mindez diszkreditálta a pártot, a szocializmust, és árnyékot vetett magára a peresztrojkára is. Ugyanakkor Zsivkov továbbra is teljes mértékben ura volt a helyzetnek, amit manipulatív módszerinek és a jól szervezett adminisztratív apparátusának köszönhetett. A szovjet dokumentum megállapítása szerint az elégedetlenség egyre növekedett mind a párton belül, mind pedig a lakosság körében.⁵⁵

Bulgáriában 1985 előtt csak elvétve lehetett ellenzéki szamizdat irodalomhoz hozzáférni. A pártközeli értelmiségi körök ugyan folyamatosan kitermeltek másként gondolkodó alkotókat, azonban az állambiztonsági szervek olyan sikeresen távol tartották ezeket a személyeket egymástól és a társadalomtól is, hogy semmiféle ellenzéki csoportosulás vagy mozgalom nem alakulhatott ki. A Szovjetunióból érkező glasznosztj, illetve a

⁵⁴ Ibid., 166; Dimitrov, V., Op. cit., 31.

⁵⁵ Csíkhelyi, L., Op. cit., 114. Az SZKP KB Nemzetközi Osztályának feljegyzése Alekszandr Jakovlev részére: Az európai szocialista való kapcsolatok fő kérdéseiről, 1989. február. – In: Baráth M., Rainer M. J. (Eds.). Gorbacsov tárgyalásai magyar vezetőkkel. Dokumentumok az egykori SZKP és MSZMP archívumaiból, 1985–1991. Bp., 2000, 247.

súlyosbodó gazdasági válság és életszínvonal-romlás gyorsan előidézte a párthoz közeli városi értelmiség és a középrétegek körében az ellenzékiesség különféle formáit. Mivel a bolgár nyelv közel áll az oroszhoz, a peresztrojka eszméi közvetlen erjesztő hatást válthattak ki a bolgár társadalomban. 1986-tól hirtelen megnőtt a Bulgáriában is fogható, addig unalmasnak tekintett szovjet TV-csatornák nézettsége, és egyre többen – köztük sok párttag is – előfizetett a különféle szovjet napilapokra és folyóiratokra. A megjelenő – egyelőre kis létszámú –, immár a párttól független új csoportosulások aktivistái között domináltak az elégedetlen párttagok. Ezekkel szemben az államhatalom már nem mert közvetlen megtorlást alkalmazni, mivel a Szovjetunió követése volt a meghirdetett cél.⁵⁶

A formálódó bolgár ellenzék környezetvédelmi és emberi jogi kérdések felvetésén keresztül kezdte meg a pártállam bírálatát. Természetesen egyelőre fel sem merülhetett az ellenzéki pártformációk megalakításának gondolata. Helyette az ellenzéki értelmiségiek tiltakozó társadalmi mozgalmakat szerveztek a szocialista iparosítás súlyos környezetromboló hatásai, és a török kisebbséget elnyomó állami politika ellen. A környezetvédelem kérdése Bulgáriában is az 1986-ban bekövetkező csernobili atomerőmű-katasztrófa kapcsán merült fel. Az első komolyabb ellenzéki szervezet a Duna-menti Rusze városában alakult meg. 1987-től kezdve a ruszei kisgyermekes anyák tiltakozó megmozdulásokat szerveztek a város levegőjét szennyező giurgiui vegyikombinát működése ellen. Támogatásukra a város értelmisége létrehozta a Rusze Bizottságot. Az országos mozgalommá terebélyesedő tiltakozás követelte a bolgár kormánytól, hogy tegyen lépéseket a román félnél a határ menti vegyi üzem bezárása érdekében. A mozgalom 1989. április 11-én hivatalosan is felvette az Ekoglasznoszt elnevezést. Meghirdetett programjában az ökológiai politika demokratikus társadalmi ellenőrzésén túl már a sajtószabadság igénye, és a

⁵⁶ Drezov, K., Op. cit., 199; Lévesque, J., Op. cit., 166.

többi emberi jog követelése is megfogalmazódott.⁵⁷

Nyugaton először 1987 januárjában figyeltek fel a bolgár másként gondolkodók tevékenységére. Ekkor hat disszidens beadványt nyújtott be az Európai Biztonsági és Együttműködési Értekezlet (EBEÉ) bécsi konferenciáján a „bulgáriai emberi jogok és alapvető szabadságok” hiányát hangsúlyozva. Ez a kis csoportosulás 1988. január 17-én megalakította a Független Szervezetet az Emberi Jogok Védelmére, azzal a céllal, hogy adatokat gyűjtsön az emberi jogok bulgáriai megsértéséről, és segítse a bolgár kormányt az emberi jogok minél nagyobb fokú biztosításában. A nemzetközi figyelem hatására a hatalom látványos intézkedésekkel létrehozta a kincstári Emberi Jogi Bizottságot, hogy ezzel is bizonyítsa, hogy valóban törődik az emberi jogokkal, és kifogja a szelet az ellenzéki vitorlákból.⁵⁸

Az első tisztán politikai célokat kitűző szervezetet száztíz vezető értelmiségi hozta létre a szófiai egyetemen, 1988. november 3-án. A tömörülés felvette a Nyilvánosságot és Átépítést Támogató Független Vitaklub elnevezést – közkeletű nevén, Peresztrojka (Vita)klub. A klub megalapításában részt vett néhány magas rangú BKP funkcionárius is, akiket ezért kizártak a pártból. Ez mindenestre komoly figyelmeztető jelzés volt a hatalom számára, hogy a disszidens gondolatok beszivárogtak a pártapparátus struktúrái közé. A Vitaklub elnökévé az egyik legnevesebb bolgár másként gondolkodót, a filozófus Zselju Zselevet választották. Zselev 1982-ben publikálta a fasizmus és szocializmus összehasonlításáról szóló – azonnal be is tiltott – művét, amellyel országos hírnévre tett szert.⁵⁹

⁵⁷ Crampton, R., *Op. cit.*, 214. Perry, D. M. *From Opposition to Government: Bulgaria's "Union of Democratic Forces" and its Antecedents.* – In: Höpken, W. (Hrsg.). *Revolution auf Raten. Bulgariens Weg zur Demokratie.* München, 1996, 29. Az Ekoglasznoszt társadalmi mozgalom politikai program- nyilatkozata. – In: Pándi L. (Ed.). *A kelet-európai diktatúrák bukása, 1985–1990.* Szeged, 1993, 182–184.

⁵⁸ Perry, D. M., *Op. cit.*, 28.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 29. Kapronczay, P. *Bulgária a rendszerváltás felgyorsulásának korában.* – In: Glatz F. (Ed.). *Proletárdiktatúrákból a polgári demokráciákba (1989–1992).*

Todor Zsivkov bukásáig nem indulhatott meg az ellenzéki csoportok és mozgalmak pártokká szerveződése az egypárti hatalom szilárdsága miatt. A pártosodás későbbi viszonylag gyors lezajlását mégis elősegítette az a tény, hogy 1989 elejétől elkezdődött az addig szigorúan állampárti felügyelet alatt álló szakszervezeti mozgalom bomlása. A kezdeményezés ezúttal is a városi értelmiség felől érkezett. 1989. február 11-én Konsztantin Trencsev vezetésével Plovdivban megalakult az értelmiségiek és művészek szakszervezete, a Podkrepa (Támogatás). A radikálisan antikommunista szakszervezet 1989 végére több foglalkozási ágra is kiterjesztette érdekvédelmi tevékenységét, és 1991-re több mint 400 ezer tagot számláló valódi munkásszakszervezetté gyarapodott.⁶⁰

Todor Zsivkov rezsimjének bukását felgyorsította az 1989 májusában ismét fellobbanó nemzetiségi konfliktus, amely két következménnyel is járt: elmélyítette a gazdaság válságát, és fokozta Bulgária nemzetközi elszigeteltségét. Az etnikai krízist teljesen banális módon egy rémhír váltotta ki: miután a bolgár parlament elfogadta világútlevélről és a kettős állampolgárságról szóló törvényt, szárnyra kapott az a feltételezés az észak-kelet bulgáriai török kisebbség körében, hogy a kivándorolni szándékozókat Ankara nem fogadja be, ha megváltoztatták a nevüket. 1989. május 19. és 31. között a török lakosság tüntetésekkel és tömeges éhségsztrájkokkal tiltakozott nemzetiségi jogainak és vallásszabadságának korlátozása miatt. Az etnikai zavargások átterjedtek a dél-kelet bulgáriai török lakta vidékekre is. A megmozdulások megfékezésére a hatóságok kijárási tilalmat hirdettek az érintett területeken, és csak a katonaság és a karhatalom bevetésével tudtak véget vetni a tiltakozásoknak, ami halálos áldozatokkal is járt.⁶¹

1989. május 29-én Todor Zsivkov a rádióban és televízióban is

Rendszerváltások Európában és a nagyvilágban. Bp., 2004, 115–116.

⁶⁰ Perry, D. M., Op. cit., 30; Kapronczay, P., Op. cit., 117.

⁶¹ Molnár É., Nagy Z., Vladár T. (Eds.). Földindulás Kelet-Európában, 1989-1990, Bulgária. Bp., MTI Sajtóadatbank, 15.

sugárzott beszédében a bulgáriai mohamedán lakosság lázításával vádolta Törökországot, és felszólította a török kormányt, hogy nyissa meg országa határait az áttelepülni szándékozók előtt. A szaporodó nehézségeket a rezsim a bolgár lakosság nacionalista érzelmeinek felkorbácsolásával próbálta palástolni. A nyár folyamán előbb Szófiában, majd pedig országsszerte kormánypárti tömeggyűlések szervezésére került sor, amelyeken Zsivkov beszédével összhangban követelték a török kormány „bolgár belügyekbe történő beavatkozásának” beszüntetését, és az áttelepülni szándékozó bulgáriai muzulmánok előtt a török határ megnyitását. Természetesen elítélték és hazaárulással vádolták a török kisebbség jogai mellett többször is felszólaló Peresztrojka Vitaklubot és a Podkrepa szakszervezetet.⁶²

A bolgár nyomás hatására a török hatóságok megnyitották a határt, de a meginduló menekültáradat rövid időn belül humanitárius válsághelyzetet idézett elő Törökországban. Mire 1989. augusztus 22-én a török kormány ismét lezárta a határt, már legalább 350 ezer személy emigrált török földre (1989 végéig közülük 150 ezren visszatértek Bulgáriába). A török kisebbség exodusa súlyos munkaerőhiányt és ellátási gondokat idézett elő Bulgáriában. Elsősorban a mezőgazdasági termelés (pl. dohánytermelés) esett vissza, de számos ipari üzem is leállni kényszerült. A kormány munkaerő átcsoportosítási kísérletei nem sok eredménnyel jártak.⁶³

Az etnikai konfliktus ismét jelentős nemzetközi presztízsvesztést okozott Bulgáriának. 1989. szeptember 26-án a strassbourgi Európai Parlament felszólította Bulgáriát, hogy vessen véget erőszakos asszimilációs politikájának, de egyben figyelmeztette Törökországot is, hogy szüntesse be a bulgáriai muszlim lakosság irányában kifejtett propagandisztikus tájékoztatást. Az Iszlám Konferencia Szervezetének külügyminiszeri értekezlete is hasonló szellemben nyilatkozott, és felszólította mindkét államot, hogy kezdjenek tárgyalásokat a

⁶² Perry, D. M., *Op. cit.*, 32; Földindulás Kelet-Európában, *Op. cit.*, 16.

⁶³ Kapronczay, P., *Op. cit.*, 122–123.

bulgáriai török kisebbségről, és a menekültek helyzetének rendezéséről. Az ügyben döntő jelentőséggel bírt, hogy az amerikai kormány biztosította Ankarát támogatásáról, ugyanakkor a szovjetek is jelezték Szófiának, hogy nem kívánnak belekeveredni Bulgária nemzeti kérdésébe. A magára maradt bolgár kormány 1989. október 30-án, Kuvaitban, tárgyalóasztalhoz ült török partnerével, de csak abban tudtak megállapodni, hogy folytatják a tárgyalást. A két ország viszonyának normalizálása, és a bulgáriai török kisebbség helyzetének rendezése így már csak a Zsivkov-rendszer bukása után történhetett meg.⁶⁴

A végső lökést Todor Zsivkov hatalomból történő eltávolításához – a nemzetközi elszigeteltség mellett – az ellenzék tevékenységének felerősödése idézte elő 1989 októberében. A bolgár ellenzék aktivizálódását az a szerencsés körülmény segítette elő, hogy 1989. október 15. és november 3. között nemzetközi ökológiai konferenciát rendeztek Szófiában, a helsinki záróokmányt aláíró harmincöt ország képviselőinek részvételével. Az Ekoglasznoszt és a többi ellenzéki csoport kihasználta a konferenciára akkreditált nemzetközi sajtó rájuk irányuló figyelmét. A konferencia ideje alatt több nemzetközi sajtótájékoztatót és felvonulást szerveztek, bírálva a bolgár kormány környezetkárosító és a szabadságjogokat sértő politikáját. A hatóságok kezdetben az aktivisták letartóztatásával reagáltak, de a nemzetközi felháborodás hatására végül kellenlenül engedélyezték a felvonulásokat, amelyek egyre nagyobb tömegeket vonzottak. 1989. november 3-án az Ekoglasznoszt már egy 4 ezer fős, nyíltan demokráciát követelő tömeggyűlést tartott Szófiában.⁶⁵

A kelet-európai államszocialista rendszerek egymás utáni összeomlása, és az ellenzék látványos megerősödése a BKP vezetői előtt is felvetette a társadalmi robbanás, valamint a hatalom elvesztésének rémképét. A hatalomelvesztéstől való félelem,

⁶⁴ Földindulás Kelet-Európában, Op. cit., 16–17; Crampton, R., Op. cit., 215.

⁶⁵ Földindulás Kelet-Európában, Op. cit., 17.

illetőleg a szándék, hogy kézben tartsák a megállíthatatlan változásokat, cselekvésre ösztönözte a kommunista párt legfelsőbb vezetését, amely a gorbacsovi peresztrojka megvalósításán túl nem igazán óhajtotta az addigi hatalmi monopólium elvesztésével járó nyugati típusú többpártrendszer kialakulását. Egyetlen akadály állt az útjukban: Todor Zsivkov személye. A szovjetek hallgatólagos támogatását élvezve, Zsivkov legközvetlenebb munkatársai közül Petăr Mladenov külügyminiszter, Andrej Lukanov KGST-be delegált miniszterelnök-helyettes, valamint Dobri Dzsurov tábornok, honvédelmi miniszter, több más PB-tag támogatásával összeesküvést szerveztek azzal a céllal, hogy Zsivkovot elmozdítsák a párt éléről. Habár Zsivkov tudta, hogy mi készülődik ellene (november 8-án Dzsurov informálisan visszavonulásra szólította fel), már nem maradt elég ereje ahhoz, hogy a PB november 10-i ülésén megakadályozza menesztését a párt éléről, valamint Petăr Mladenov főtitkári posztra való kinevezését.⁶⁶

BEFEJEZÉS

Todor Zsivkov távozása a hatalomból felgyorsította a politikai változások ütemét. A BKP új vezetése elsősorban saját helyzetét igyekezett stabilizálni a párt és az ország élén. A Politikai Bizottság 1989. november 16-i ülésén leváltottak több Zsivkov-párti tagot, s újakat kooptáltak – köztük a korábban Zsivkov kegyeiből kieső Alexandăr Lilovot. A rákövetkező napon az egypárti parlament leváltotta Zsivkovot az Államtanács éléről. Mladenov lett az új államfő. Beiktatási beszédében kijelentette, hogy a legfontosabb feladat a totalitarizmusból a demokráciába való békés átmenet biztosítása az ország számára. Ígéretet tett új nemzetgyűlési választások megrendezésére, és a gazdasági rendszer reformjára. A demokratikus jogállammá átalakuló Bulgária számára egy új alkotmány

⁶⁶ Ágh, A., *Op. cit.*, 236; Dimitrov, V., *Op. cit.*, 35–36; Lévesque, J., *Op. cit.*, 172.

kidolgozását ígérte, amely igazságosan rendezi majd a nemzeti kérdést és a nemzeti egység tartós pillére lesz. Mladenov kitért az ország ökológiai helyzetére is. A külkapcsolatok terén az Európa felé történő gazdasági és politikai nyitást szorgalmazta, miközben hitet tett a Szovjetunióhoz fűződő történelmi barátság és együttműködés fenntartására.⁶⁷

Az államfő ígéretei nem fékezték le az ellenzék aktivizálódását. 1989. november 18-án az ellenzéki csoportok kezdeményezésére 150 ezren tüntettek Szófia főterén Zsivkov felelősségre vonását, az új alkotmány kidolgozását, és a demokratikus szabadságjogok biztosítását követelve. Ez volt az első igaz ellenzéki tömegdemonstráció, és ettől kezdve egészen 1990 végéig az ellenzék rendszeresen élt a békés utcai nyomásgyakorlás eme eszközével, hogy elfogadtassa követeléseit a BKP vezetőivel. Az ellenzék tevékenységének felerősödése elindította a pártosodás folyamatát, ami nagyon rövid idő alatt, 1990 elejére lezajlott.⁶⁸

⁶⁷ Földindulás Kelet-Európában, Op. cit., 17. „A bogár nép és Bulgária érdeke mindenkinek felett fog állni” (Petăr Mladenov államfő nemzetgyűlési beszéde) (1989. nov. 17.). – In: Pándi L., Op. cit., 185–187.

⁶⁸ Földindulás Kelet-Európában, Op.cit., 17. Kănev, Kr. From Totalitarianism to a Constitutional State. – In: Coenen-Huther, J. (Ed.), Op. cit., 53; Kapronczay, P., Op. cit., 117.

Cooperation or Contest: Comecon Initiatives in Respect the ‘Developing countries’ by the Time of 1973 Oil Crisis with Specific References to Hungary and Bulgaria

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Analyzing the problems of cooperation between Comecon member-states (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance) concerning economic activities regarding the ‘developing’ countries of the Third world has an important significance for testing the capabilities of Moscow to impose its ideas of collaboration in the community as a whole, as well as for studying the obstacles for the ‘developing’ countries in the communist bloc in accomplishing the paramount objective of acceleration of the modernization process. A specific comparison between the Bulgarian and Hungarian economic performance gives suitable ground in this direction. The research is confined by the Oil crisis of 1973 as long as its consequences reflected negatively all spheres of relations in Comecon.

Designed by Stalin as a form of control over the East European Soviet satellites through supranational structures of economic binding, Comecon was constituted in 1949. Lacking practice in arranging imperial mechanisms, the communist Kremlin was unable to promote significant initiatives in the early years of the Comecon development and the head office started its actions with initiatives of redirecting the foreign economic relations of member-states within the boundaries of the organization, predominantly in bilateral trade form. However, increasing economic difficulties forced the East

European countries, even in Stalin's lifetime, to undertake certain sole steps aiming to stimulate economic relations with the so-called Third world countries. Trying mainly to compensate deficiencies of convertible currency, the communist regimes imagined it could be earned by exports of overstocks in light and heavy industry output, like artificial fertilizers, in addition to a few agricultural commodities. In contrast to Bulgaria, the Hungarian People's Republic (HPR) succeeded to certain traditions regarding the economic relations with the Latin American countries and despite the fact that it was one of the camp of the defeated in the World War II it rapidly restored its economic contacts. For the period between 1948 and 1955 Budapest was successful to reach the pre-war level of the trade volume with the Latin America. The share of these countries in the Hungarian export increased to 4%.¹

The People's Republic of Bulgaria (PRB) ought to pave the way for enforcing economic relations with the developing countries solely as well, but in comparison to Hungary, the achieved results were of limited size in addition to the different direction, in which these contacts developed, namely, the historically and geographically close region of the Middle East. After signing of the peace treaty in 1947 Sofia was successful only in restoration its economic relations with Egypt, although lacking potential of imposing the Bulgarian economic interests.² According to a Politburo resolution of February 1953, a Bulgarian trade delegation visited numerous developing countries in the Middle East, Asia and Africa in the autumn of the same year. The members of the delegation reported that there were passable conditions for the development of profitable trade,

¹ Domeny, J., The History of Hungarian-Latin-American Relations after the Second World War: A Brief Account.

<http://www.coldwar.hu/html/en/publications/latin.html>

² Филипова, Н. Българската дипломация в Египет, Сирия и Ирак във времето на Студената война (средата на 50-те – средата на 70-те години на XX в. С., 2008, 32–34.

especially in key points like Lebanon, Syria and Iran, but added that the coordination between the communist regimes was of critical importance and at first level, as regards jointly arranged transportation of goods. The Bulgarian Black sea port of Bourgas could be, even under the estimation of an authoritative Lebanese mediatory company, developed as a convenient sea transport exit for Hungarian and Czechoslovakian commodities as well. Similar joint venture would guarantee a loading of sea vessels at maximum effectiveness, decreasing transport expenses for all of the participating countries.³

For the underdeveloped Bulgaria it also seemed inappropriate that every Comecon-state solely 'discovered' and was practicing the more profitable forms of trade, not announcing them before the allies. In the above mentioned report it was pointed out that Hungary had already outpaced its allies and was benefiting from employing local mediatory companies, which were interested in increasing the sales of the Hungarian trade surplus for the agreed opportunity to share sales earnings. The Bulgarian experts added that not simply the lack of coordination, but the rivalry between member-states of Comecon was irritating as long as each of the state organizations was trying to secure the implementation of plan targets. It was unmistakably concluded that the Bulgarian industrial products were hardly salable even on the markets of the 'developing' countries due to high production costs and their poor quality.⁴ In such a context, any ideologically grounded behavior of coordinated price policy was illusionary.

The Hungarian foreign trade initiatives aroused Sofia's envy as well as for the sole breakthrough in the Egyptian market, going beyond trade exchange and developing more profitable forms of economic infiltration. By 1955 a Hungarian state company had already constructed six bridges in the country on the Nile River

³ The Central State Archives of the Republic of Bulgaria (hereafter CSA), F. 259, Inventory 9, Doc. 47, 1–11, 18, 56.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 8–10.

and that year Hungary became the first communist country to offer Cairo a construction of a plant for artificial fertilizers.⁵ Demonstrating independent creativity in the construction branch, in 1956 a Bulgarian company started building such projects in Syria at loss or at small profit, trying to pay attention over the Bulgarian constructors' professional potential and the negotiators' 'conciliatoriness'.⁶

In the pursuit of securing his sole power positions on the political Olympus in Kremlin, Nikita Khrushchev launched in the mid-1950s a series of actions that had to distinguish categorically his policy from Stalin's approach and to contribute to attempts at stabilizing the tottering imperial building of the Communist bloc. Khrushchev's new political and economic approach regarding the 'developing' countries had to make an essential contribution towards the fulfillment of his imperial ambitions. At the 20th congress of the Communist party of the Soviet Union the countries 'emancipating from colonialism' were given an ideological 'inauguration' by the Soviet leader being recognized as a part of the powers of the 'progress' entitled to transfer mankind to the just final point of history, communism, via socialism.⁷

Along with Khrushchev's clear political message, the triggering of economic relations of the communist bloc with the Third world countries was of even more critical importance. Stalin's death allowed the satellites to share their economic difficulties more frankly. Moscow believed that the role of Comecon was not only to develop intra-communist economic relations but also to enhance and coordinate trade relations of the Soviet Union and its satellites with the Third world, and more importantly, to coordinate initiatives of the USSR and

⁵ The Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Bulgaria (hereafter DA-MFA), Inventory 7 secret /7s/, Doc. 393, 18.

⁶ DA-MFA, Inv. 15, Doc. 782, 25.

⁷ Хрущёв Н.С., О культе личности и его последствиях. Доклад XX съезду КПСС. - Известия ЦК КПСС, 1956, № 3, 25-30, 40.

the East European regimes as regards 'lending economic and technical assistance' to the 'developing' countries. These aims and mechanisms were also given appropriate ideological explanations.

However, lifting the ideological curtain, it was evident that the 'pure' purposes of the communist assistance did not differ from the strategy of the West qualified as neo-colonial. The simple logic of the Comecon states was to secure direct supplies of cheap industrial raw materials from the 'developing' countries due to various basic and unexpected complications: increasing deficits within the Comecon community, Moscow's incapacity to cover those deficits, the expensive experiment of their import in Comecon from the Western markets, paying in convertible currency. Reciprocally, in Comecon simply planned that such imports could be covered by exports of the communist overproduction of industrial goods, machinery, manufacture equipment and labor force as well. Securing the achievement of that goal was of critical importance too. According to rough Comecon analyses at the end of 1955 the overproduction was estimated at 2 billion rubles.⁸ Even underdeveloped countries like Bulgaria were out of capacity to buy machinery overstocks of the developed Central European communist states because of the lack of financial resources – Sofia announced before the 8th Session of Comecon of June 1957 that by 1960 the ambitions of the Comecon machinery producing countries to sell their products on the Bulgarian market had to be cooled down.⁹

However, according to the communist ideological dogma, it was needed to continue investing into the branches of heavy industry, regardless the fact that their selling was hard to be provided. With the envisaged difficulties of selling industrial output within Comecon space and on the Western markets, the 'developing' countries were assumed as an easily achievable target.

⁸ Никова, Г. The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance and Bulgaria /in Bulgarian. C., 1989, 107.

⁹ CSA, F. 1B, Inv. 5, Doc. 3273, 8–10.

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Taking into account many negative circumstances for the communist bloc like the constant propaganda threat about the communist economic and political enslavement, in addition to traditional trade links between the 'developing' countries and the former metropolises, the important mission to coordinate actions of its member-states with the uppermost task to avoid any intra-organizational contest fell on Comecon. The Bulgarian leadership was the most supportive of the proclaimed idea for extending Comecon's relations with the Third world as well as for a directive order of coordinating the economic initiatives of all communist countries. During Bulgarian foreign trade representatives' consultations with the government in June 1957 the party leader Todor Zhivkov warned about the danger of economic 'draining' of Comecon in case actions of different states in the 'developing' countries were left to follow market logic and a contest between them was not prevented.¹⁰ As regards all other spheres of intra-communal economic activities, Sofia expected that the developed communist states demonstrated their good will and 'proletarian internationalism'¹¹ lending assistance to Bulgaria while sustaining economic losses.

Sofia's stand under the slogan 'let us behave in the spirit of Comecon decisions' could be easily explained by the experience recorded in numerous analyses – already accumulated by the early 1960s – on non-competitiveness of the Bulgarian industrial goods even as regards the underestimated markets of the 'peripheral' Third world.¹² For similar sorts of machinery the Hungarian trade organizations offered better price levels compared to the Bulgarian ones. Those achievements supported the Hungarian efforts to increase sales and to contend successfully even the Czechoslovakian positions.¹³ It became clear that coordination couldn't be reached even regarding an

¹⁰ CSA, F. 1B, Inv. 5, Doc. 270, 251–252.

¹¹ CSA, F. 1B, Inv. 6, Doc. 3273, 9.

¹² DA–MFA, Inv. 8s, Doc. 714, 2–4.

¹³ CSA, F. 473, Inv. 1, Doc. 37, 88; CSA, F. 473, Inv. 2, Doc. 35, 104.

easily surmountable issue like organizing joint exhibitions for machinery products and every communist state, pursuing maximum profits, organized separate representations.¹⁴

Rivalry covered all areas and Bulgarian foreign trade organizations experienced losses when Hungarian organizations succeeded in underbidding market offering lower prices for processed vegetables,¹⁵ a sphere in which Bulgaria assumed to be a Comecon producing leader. It is reasonable to suggest that those Hungarian goods were in fact of Bulgarian origin, exchanged via bilateral trade clearing system.

Despite the clear difficulties with the coordination at the level of external for the Comecon trade relations, in the late 1950s head bodies of the organization were developing plans for cooperation regarding the more profitable and long-term forms of economic activity in the Third world – those of design and construction of industrial plants, execution of infrastructural projects and export of labor force of different professional spheres and qualification. For the 1957–1959 period the members of the Comecon Commission of industrial equipment exports repeatedly were discussing necessity of joint initiatives, however such were executed only by the developed communist states. It was also estimated that in order to make a significant breakthrough in the ‘developing’ countries the Comecon states had to secure additional financial resources for crediting of their economic initiatives. Regardless Comecon decisions, Hungary acted solely also in this direction. In the beginning of 1960s Hungarian state organizations exported industrial equipment for 86.7 billion rubles and gave credits for construction of power plants and other industrial projects.¹⁶

As a result of the discussed negative circumstances, in addition to financial weakness and the low level of industrialization of the Bulgarian economy, Bulgarian construction

¹⁴ CSA, F. 259, Inv. 13, Doc. 46, 40.

¹⁵ CSA, F. 473, Inv. 2, Doc. 35, 106.

¹⁶ Nikova, G., *Op. cit.*, 251–252, 256–259.

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organizations were rarely chosen as sub-contractors only by Soviet state firms. In the beginning the Bulgarian organizations could take part in joint projects thanks to credits given by Moscow to the 'developing' countries. Under such conditions in 1960 the Bulgarian "Techno export" started building a plant for drying onion in Egypt earning a minimum profit. By the beginning of 1960s Bulgaria was solely 'lending technical assistance' in construction business in the Third world for 75 million rubles.¹⁷

Discrepancy between the Soviet appeals and actions concerning the communist cooperation regarding economic activities in the Third world became evident at the meeting of the Warsaw Pact in February 1960, when Nikita Khrushchev 'blundered accidentally' that 'the socialist countries will continue lending assistance to the developing countries in a form of bilateral agreements'.¹⁸ For the 14th Comecon Session in February 1961 the official report declared that Comecon member-states were developing 552 industrial and infrastructural projects in the Third world. However – as if it had been written without Soviet participation – the analysis summarized that about 90% of the mentioned economic activities were performed by Soviet organizations while simultaneously criticizing non-coordinated approach at Comecon level, poor cooperation, too long terms of accomplishment of the industrial projects, technological backwardness of the exported manufacturing enterprises. The report concluded that if those failures were not overcome, the very future development of those activities in the 'developing' countries would be threatened by collapse partly due to the Western contest, including supra-state international trusts, partly due to successful maneuvering of the Third world regimes between the two Cold war blocs.¹⁹ And again, going round in vicious circle, at its meeting on December 20, 1962, the

¹⁷ CSA, F. 1B, Inv. 6, Doc. 4384, 26; DA-MFA, Inv. 21, Doc. 3616, 39; DA-MFA, Inv. 21, Doc. 3616, 37-40, 58-59.

¹⁸ CSA, F. 1B, Inv. 6, Doc. 4093, 26-28.

¹⁹ CSA, F. 1B, Inv. 6, Doc. 4384, 21-26.

Executive Committee of Comecon launched ‘Common principles of the economic cooperation of Comecon member-states with the developing countries’, and the next year – an ‘Order for participating in auctions’, framework suggestions that had to be followed by all communist states.²⁰ Moreover, what would become a time-bomb, particularly in crisis situations, was the fact mentioned on the Session of December 1962 that from the whole volume of activities concerning ‘lending economic and technical assistance’ to the ‘developing’ countries, amounting to 4.4 billion devaluated rubles, 80% was performed at credit.²¹

Already by the end of the 1950s the Bulgarian leadership realized that the cooperation with the developed Comecon countries in performing joint economic projects in the Third world was an illusionary ambition. Aiming to circumvent the problem of the non-competitiveness of the Bulgarian industry, Sofia noticed in *‘the aspiration for achieving full political and economic independence on behalf of the newly liberated from colonialism countries’* a possibility for ever growing exports of Bulgarian arms and military equipment. Without illusions regarding the loud resistance that the realization of such an ambition would provoke within the ally Warsaw pact space, the Bulgarian Politburo was determined to obtain allowance for sales of arms manufactured under Soviet licenses, as well as for the increase of the Bulgarian arms production and sales on the markets of the ‘developing’ countries. In the beginning of 1960s Sofia boosted negotiations for such exports to Indonesia, Tunisia, Morocco, Syria, Guinea, and Ghana with an aspiration to compensate solely the losses deriving from the lack of cooperation in Comecon.²²

Crises were particularly indicative about the resistance to coordination in Comecon regarding economic links to the Third world – for instance, in situations of deterioration of

²⁰ CSA, F. 1B, Inv. 6, Doc. 4990, 18; CSA, F. 1244, Inv. 1, Doc. 2435, 55, 93.

²¹ CSA, F. 1B, Inv. 6, Doc. 4990, 19.

²² CSA, F. 1B, Inv. 64, Doc. 268, 1–6.

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political relations between the communist camp and a certain state or a union of Third world states; at a time of internal political and/or economic complications in some 'developing' country; in cases of more complicated crisis environment like a regional war. One of the first cases of the crisis series developed when the first quasi-republican Iraqi dictator Abd Al-Karim Qasim was overthrown in February 1963 by Ba'athist forces. The communist regimes which succeeded in developing their economic relations with this strategically and economically important region in the period between the Iraqi 'revolution' and 1963 were discredited by the new government in Baghdad. However, despite the clear political base of the foisted economic 'sanctions', the Comecon states did not agree on elaborating joint defensive economic strategy. The Bulgarian embassy was even complaining that none of the other communist states was sustaining economic restrictions similar to those imposed on Bulgarian trade and construction enterprises. The economic losses due to the anti-Ba'athist propaganda maintained by the supported by the Bulgarian government Arab radio stations, following actively Moscow's initiatives, were not compensated by the other communist regimes on Iraqi ground.²³ Not earlier than the beginning of 1965 and only in the face of the threat of collapse of the Bulgarian economic activities in Iraq some of the communist trade representatives in Baghdad decided to make a suggestion for their governments in order to liberate Sofia from the burden of being a horn for joint venture communist enterprise of criticizing Iraqi government.²⁴ Apparently that proposal was not taken into account, and Todor Zhivkov had to solely give explanations to the Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser during the meeting in Cairo in November 1965.²⁵

In the following two years the changes in the Third world were even more provocative for the positions and skills of the

²³ DA-MFA, Inv. 19s, Doc. 610, 3.

²⁴ DA-MFA, Inv. 21, Doc. 1314, 46-47.

²⁵ Filipova, N., Op. cit., 163-164.

communist regimes to respond properly to upheavals. As a result of military coups two of the 'friendly' regimes in strategically significant points in Asia and Africa were overthrown – Sukarno's regime in Indonesia and Nkrumah's government in Ghana. In the Middle East Israel struck crushingly the Arab regimes who were supported by Moscow and its allies, which discredited the Arab socialism and destabilized politically, economically and financially the governments in Cairo and Damascus. Observing that series of 'failures' in the Third world, in June 1967 members of the Bulgarian politburo even questioned the communist ideological prognosis about the forthcoming worldwide victory of socialism, just ten years after Khrushchev's confirmations.²⁶

In the analyses about the consequences of the crises in the Third world at Comecon level it was concluded that the recommendations of the early 1960s for the development of intra-communal coordination regarding trade strategy, credit policy, design and construction of industrial and infrastructural projects, and lending professional labour force were not followed by member-states.²⁷ Communist countries continued to compete and by 1968 the cooperation in 'economic and technical assistance', i.e. construction of industrial enterprises and lending labour force was just 1% of the whole volume of Comecon agreements with the 'developing' countries. Bulgaria was executing agreements for 'economic and technical assistance' for 62 million rubles, and Hungary – for 107 million rubles. However, the volume of utilized but outstanding credits for those activities significantly arose. By 1968 the sum of all Comecon credits for Third world was estimated at 3.372 million rubles, and the Bulgarian and Hungarian shares – respectively 12.6 million rubles and 50.8 million rubles²⁸ but Ghana and Indonesia asked

²⁶ Ibid, 186.

²⁷ CSA, F. 1B, Inv. 6, Doc. 5165, 47-48.; CSA, F. 1B, Inv. 6, Doc. 5755, 96.

²⁸ CSA, F. 1244, Inv. 1, Doc. 2430, 5-7.

officially credit payments to be put on installment plans.²⁹ Comecon countries were unable to demand the following of time-tables for credit payments as long as the biggest part of credits for the 'developing' countries like agreements with Ghana, Indonesia, Syria and Egypt was under clearing payment system. That way of payment seemed plausible in the beginning of 1960s, but in the crisis period of the late 1960s a huge indebtedness to the communist camp was generated. In addition, the Third world governments increasingly insisted that the Comecon states should buy production of the industrial plants they had constructed.³⁰ However, such requests were firmly against the initial Comecon strategy – to sell, not to buy industrial goods of poor quality.

Deterioration of the conditions for the fulfillment of the formulated paramount Comecon targets was evident when discussing trade exchange between the communist and Third world countries since it was under clearing payment system as well. Hungary noted that the accumulation of enormous clearing assets in trade with Syria and Egypt was hard to be paid in the situation when partners refused to 'sell', in sufficient amount, the goods preferred by Hungary, like cotton, and unilaterally increased its price. As a result, Hungary had to significantly decrease the clearing crediting of the export of Hungarian machinery and new industrial plants, regardless Budapest's deep interest in increasing such sales.³¹ After the June war of 1967 Egypt and Syria stopped balancing the clearing trade with Bulgaria as well, and Sofia had to increase crediting of the export of the Bulgarian bestsellers – arms, wheat, and artificial fertilizers – due to the deterioration of the economic and financial state of the 'friendly' regimes and as a result of the negative 'side effects' of 'clearing' that gave opportunity to blackmail the partner. Simultaneously, the

²⁹ CSA, F. 1244, Inv. 1, Doc. 2435, 137.

³⁰ Ibid., 91.

³¹ CSA, F. 259, Inv. 18, Doc. 117, 203–204.

export of Bulgarian machinery was decreasing for the falling demand and lack of profits.³²

The negative tendencies for the economic activities of the communist countries that developed in the Third world in crisis situations forced the contest between the Comecon states. The foreign trade organizations of each communist country rushed to improve their balances and to take the maximum among the small amount of the partner's commodities. Despite the coordination problems in Comecon, in the end of 1960s the head office reported also initiatives of cooperation on the markets of the 'developing' countries – 1% of the whole amount of 'economic and technical assistance' given by the bloc. Among those initiatives were the Hungarian-Bulgarian company Intransmach delivering equipment for metallurgic plants, as well as transport equipment to Algeria, Iran and Turkey; cooperation between the two countries for deliveries of equipment for canning industry in the Third world and also Soviet plans to hire Bulgarian and Hungarian companies as sub-contractors.³³

The issue of increasing deficit of industrial raw materials became clearly problematic for Comecon in the mid-1960s. According to an analysis of July 1964, reported at a meeting of the Executive committee of Comecon, by 1970 the deficits of oil, non-ferrous metals, synthetic rubber, and phosphorus containing raw materials would be increasingly high.³⁴ A year later it was estimated that the shortage of solid and liquid fuels in Comecon would arise to 107 million tons, so for the depletion of the Soviet reserves in the European part of the state Moscow, would be incapable to cover the Eastern European demand.³⁵ It should be added that by the beginning of 1970s the process of passing from solid to liquid fuels in Comecon states was in advance. In 1970 Bulgaria and Hungary were the leaders in using liquid fuels, i.e.

³² Filipova, N., *Op. cit.*, 206, 222–223.

³³ CSA, F. 1244, Inv. 1, Doc. 2435, 16, 136, 181.

³⁴ CSA, F. 1B, Inv. 6, Doc. 5513, 69–70.

³⁵ CSA, F. 1B, Inv. 6, Doc. 6009, 73–74.

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oil and gas among communist countries – oil constituted 43.3% of the Bulgarian energy balance and 29.7% of the Hungarian one, while gas consumption counted 2.5% of the Bulgarian energy package and 14% of the Hungarian one.³⁶

In the beginning of 1966 the deficit of raw materials for the profitable chemical industry was estimated by Comecon experts to increase significantly – it was calculated that shortage of raw materials containing phosphorus would be 25% of all needed amounts, and between 10% and 20% regarding raw materials containing sulphur. Bulgaria's needs of such imports were even bigger.³⁷ In this context Moscow advised its satellites to intensify negotiations in the Third world aiming to provide increasing imports.³⁸ In 1968 Comecon head advisors recommended also that member-states should examine possibilities for imports of copper, lead and iron ore, nickel, bauxite, and apatite. In the beginning of 1970s the Soviet Union repeated its advice to allies to raise imports of oil.³⁹ The problem was growing in the communist bloc with huge raw materials and energy consumption caused by the technological backwardness of the continuing industrialization process.⁴⁰

In the context of the additional intra-community difficulties each Comecon state contended the others to provide the needed amounts of raw materials from the 'developing' countries. Hungary outpaced Bulgaria starting importing oil from Syria in 1967, despite the poor quality of the Syrian oil. On other hand, it gave Hungary the opportunity to diminish negatives deriving from the clearing payment system. On its turn, in 1967 Sofia presented an offer and in 1968 started deliveries for a mine and dressing plant for phosphates in Syria. According to the

³⁶ Park, D. *Oil and Gas in Comecon Countries*. London, 1979, 97–98.

³⁷ CSA, F. 1B, Inv. 6, Doc. 6140, 59–60.

³⁸ Filipova, N., *Op. cit.* 139–140.

³⁹ CSA, F. 1244, Inv. 1, Doc. 2430, 12; Park, D., *Op. cit.*, 102.

⁴⁰ Berend, I. T. *Central and Eastern Europe 1944–1993: Detour from the Periphery to the periphery*. Cambridge Univ. Press, 1996, 197–198.

agreement, the Bulgarian deliveries would be paid by Syrian export of phosphor concentrates.⁴¹

In the beginning of 1970 the significance of Algeria and Libya as oil suppliers for the Eastern European Soviet satellites arose due to the increased demand in the Mediterranean basin after the closure of the Suez Canal in 1967. Sofia was ambitious to make a breakthrough with the implementation of projects regarding extraction and processing of oil. However, even the most vociferous supporter of the idea for multilateral cooperation in Comecon, Bulgaria, re-oriented its efforts on the implementation of joint projects only in partnership with the Soviet Union.⁴²

The analysis of Comecon's economic performance on the markets of the 'developing' countries of the Third world demonstrates contest rather than cooperation between its member-states. Moscow was not able to impose collaboration in this sphere and the economic units of the communist countries were in rivalry in the pursuit of fulfillment of separate economic targets. Unlike Budapest, Sofia was significantly supportive of the ideas of cooperation, trying to avoid the drawbacks stemming from the low level of industrialization of the Bulgarian economy. However, the Bulgarian leadership could not rely on the ideological paradigm of 'lending assistance to the underdeveloped communist countries' as Moscow was not able to develop either mechanisms of hard power to rule its satellites or mechanisms of soft power in order to convince member states that state interest should be diminished in favor of the interests of the whole community.

⁴¹ CSA, F. 259, Inv. 18, Doc. 34, 17, 23.

⁴² Non-processed Archives of the Bulgarian Communist Party, F. 1B, Inv. 81: 'Instructions to the Bulgarian Ambassador in Libya', September, 1972, 4; CSA, F. 1B, Inv. 35, Doc. 3304, 52–54.

Craving the Support – France in the Bulgarian–Yugoslavian Dispute in the First Half of the 1970s

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Resuming the main strategic axes of the Gaullist international attitude, the French President Georges Pompidou (20 June 1969 – 2 April 1974) introduced a new region of special national interest in the French foreign policy – the Mediterranean. The American and the Soviet presence had already been registered there, but that was a security zone for France, which wanted to reinforce its positions in the Mediterranean. Paris undertook the course of closer relations with the littoral countries on the basis of former French mandated territories or colonies in the East and South Mediterranean and the EEC and/or NATO partnership in the North.¹

Until the late 1960s observed only, the Balkans, as part of the area, attained double significance. These countries were perceived in a wider geopolitical context, for example: the Turkish Straits and the proximity to the politically and economically valuable Iran, Lebanon and other Mideast Arab countries; or the Yugoslavian role in the so called Non-Aligned Movement. Therefore France intensified its efforts to enhance its influence in the region.² On the other hand, the goodwill in

¹ Colard, D. La politique méditerranéenne et proche-orientale de G. Pompidou. – Politique étrangère, 43, 1978, N 3, 283, 301–302; Labouret, V. Politique méditerranéenne de la France. – Politique étrangère, 36, 1971, N -6, 489–490, 494.

² ЦДИА, ф. 1477, оп. 26, а.е. 2594, л. 160, 249; а.е. 2622, л. 74–75; оп. 27, а.е. 2789, л. 45; оп. 29, а.е. 2754, л. 116–122, 207, 212–216; а.е. 2766, л.

relations between the Balkan countries was seen as a counterpoint to the Super Powers confrontation and bloc policy. In this respect, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs Maurice Schumann delivered a meaningful speech before the National Assembly: *“For a long time the Balkans used to give a detestable example to the world and now the opposite happens: the peace rules among all the regimes. Albania is supposed to represent the Chinese bridge. Yugoslavia has its own road to socialism, as well as Romania, which is a part of the Warsaw pact. Bulgaria is, on the contrary, a very instinctively, very historically and sincerely loyal country to the Soviet alliance. Finally, there is Greece of the colonels I have just talked about and Turkey whose regime in the present circumstances is rather indefinable. All these countries foreshadow the future conference for security and cooperation by the good relations they have with each other... Why have the Balkan countries taken this way? A kind of instinct pushes them not to want – in this part of the world, around or behind the Mediterranean – the fate that decisions would be entirely made without them.”*³ The increased French activity was an important factor in the background of which tensions between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia aggravated.

Due to internal disturbance (federal republics' autonomy movement) Tito's regime tried to redirect the social indignation to a common factor of irritation that was found abroad – Bulgaria. After several years of calm relations Yugoslavia returned to the controversial issue of the legitimacy of the Macedonian republic and the composition (Bulgarian or Macedonian) of the population of the Pirin region in Bulgaria,⁴ a behavior that escalated to an

17–24, 29–30, 33, 179; а.е. 2767, л. 173–174.

³ ЦДА, ф. 1477, оп. 29, а.е. 2766, л. 11; Journal officielle de la République française N° 68. Débats parlementaires. Senat. Jeudi, 2.12.1971, 2586.

⁴ ЦДА, ф. 1477, оп. 25, а.е. 3655а, 42; Калинова, Е. Балканската политика на България - предизвикателствата от запад и от юг (1944–1989). – In: Изследвания по история на социализма в България 1944–1989. С., 2010, 740–742; Fejtő, Fr. Le mouvement communiste international: l'évolution des relations

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open hostility after the Czechoslovakian events by imputing to Sofia an irredentist policy. Moscow's aspirations to attract Yugoslavia back to the Socialist camp restrained Bulgaria to effectively defend its national positions. In this situation, Sofia was forced to diversify its friendships preparing them – just in case – for sort of alliance since the main ally, the Soviet Union, did not back it. As we shall see, Belgrade took advantage of the French interest in the Balkans as well.

As was said above, in the late 1960s Paris began to pay more attention to Balkan relations. The Greek and the Turkish government competed for a French support in the Cyprus issue but France was unwilling to take side between two equally important strategic partners and, maybe, to be involved in an internationally complicated crisis. What was the French stance toward the Bulgarian-Yugoslavian dispute?

To start with, French diplomats from the Embassy in Sofia frequented the Bulgarian ones in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in order to inform themselves, making no suggestions. The same activity was developed in Belgrade, as French archives' papers show. In the Quai an analysis was written on the basis of the collected data.

French expectations were – after Gromyko's visit to Belgrade, in September 1969 – the following the visit of the Bulgarian Minister of Foreign Affairs Ivan Bashev – to be successful. But it ended with failure and the Quai outlined the reasons arguing that Yugoslavia was responsible too, contrary to its assertions. Contradictions issued from the ideological differences as well as from the Macedonian question. Regarding this problem two points of view existed. Bulgaria denied having claims to change the border, but insisted on having the right to keep up the publications on the Macedonian question because there existed no Macedonian nation separately from the Bulgarian. However, Belgrade believed that the Zhivkov–Tito settlement – this issue was to be concerned only

entre les partis communistes. – *Études Internationales*, 3, 1972, N 4, 466–467.

in scientific researches (and to not be treated politically) – was used for a customized and tendentious publication from the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences. Yugoslavia, on the contrary, sustained the existence of a Macedonian nation the majority of which was integrated in a republic with the same name within the federation. But the Macedonians in the Pirin region were submitted to a violent Bulgarianization. And in Belgrade they were convinced that Bulgaria would use every chance in case of revision of the European borders or difficulties in case of Tito's disappearance from the political scene to tear off Yugoslav territories.

Both countries claimed that they were trying to maintain neighborhood relations but *“in this respect, as if Bulgarians show more persistency as, it seems, less than three months after the events in August 1968 Sofia has taken the initiative to propose a meeting between Bashev and Tepavats.”* In December 1969, it was carried out in Belgrade and after this Yugoslavia issued a communiqué which gave the impression that the two Ministers didn't come to an understanding. The French Embassies in Sofia and Belgrade revealed that Tepavats asked Bashev to recognize the existence of the Macedonian nation and the belonging of the population of the Pirin region to it referring to the recognition in this sense by Georgi Dimitrov. Ivan Bashev shortly replied that he wasn't authorized to discuss the issue and offered an agreement renouncing the use of force in relation to the border between the two countries. *“If these reports are true, they confirm that the Yugoslav side didn't seem to show a spirit of reconciliation.”* The Quai had several assumptions about the reasons for this behavior of Belgrade: either determination for a final settlement of the Macedonian question, or irritation of the Bulgarian support of the limited sovereignty doctrine, or to discredit Bulgaria before Moscow as antagonistic, or the suppression of internal problems by provoking Yugoslav unity against traditional rival in the Balkans. The Ministry concluded that the Macedonian issue was a Balkan dispute, an old and insoluble contradiction which

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periodically sharpened “given the traditionally volatile and complex nature of the Yugoslav relations with the countries of the socialist camp.”⁵

Bashev’s proposal (an agreement renouncing the use of force) was not made only to appease Belgrade and to present a well-meaning reassurance. On the one hand, the Yugoslav campaign representing Bulgaria as belligerent harmed the international image of the latter. On the other hand, Belgrade’s declarations about a Macedonian minority in the Pirin region were imminent threat to the Bulgarian national security. That is why Bulgaria was motivated in supporting the idea of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, because all participating countries would engage to respect the principles of territorial integrity, inviolability of borders, national sovereignty etc. Also, Sofia had not forgotten the short-lived anti-Bulgarian Balkan Pact in the 1950s (Greece, Turkey, Yugoslavia), so from the beginning of the 1960s, the years of détente, Bulgaria pursued a consistent policy of establishing political, economic and cultural cooperation with its neighbors in order to prevent another anti-Bulgarian sentiments and alliances. Paradoxically, its relations with NATO members Greece and Turkey showed the most progress. The Bulgarian approach to the establishment of a lasting peace and cooperation in the Balkans greatly impressed Paris although, in principle, the Quai was always supposing the promotion of the Soviet interests. However, the analysis of the Ministry showed that for the moment it was more sympathetic to the positions and the efforts of Bulgaria.

The Quai continued its observations. In March 1970, in Paris the regular political consultations between delegations of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of Bulgaria and France took

⁵ Note du MAE, Direction des Affaires Politiques, la Sous-direction d’Europe Orientale, a.s. les relations entre la Bulgarie et la Yougoslavie après la visite à Belgrade de M. Bachev, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères bulgare (8–13 décembre 1969), Paris, le 7 Mars 1970. Archives Diplomatiques, Ministère des Affaires Etrangères (ADMAE), Série Europe 1961–1970, Sous-série Bulgarie, cote 174.

place. The chief of the Quai Political Directorate, Jacques de Beaumarchais asked the Bulgarian Deputy Minister Gero Grozev whether there was a specific reason for the deterioration of the relations between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia in 1968. Grozev explained that in relation to the celebration of the 90th anniversary of the Bulgarian Liberation in the newspapers features appeared about the San Stefano Treaty which served as a pretext to Belgrade to launch a campaign against Sofia, asserting that Bulgaria raised territorial claims. And after the Czechoslovakian events it deployed troops on the border *“although the Yugoslav leadership knew perfectly well that Bulgaria had no offensive intentions. Apparently, thus they wanted to settle some of their internal problems.”*⁶

For many years Yugoslavia was ignored by France as General de Gaulle couldn't forgive to Tito the death sentence of lieutenant-colonel Draža Mihailović (1946), Serbian leader of the Yugoslav resistance in the Second World War and a representative of the Yugoslav government in exile in London, recognized by the French resistance of General de Gaulle, with whom the French President studied at the Military school (1930s). Given this background, Tito was a usurper, an illegitimate communist leader. The undisguised anti-French behavior of Yugoslavia in the Suez crisis, the Algerian war (in 1959 the Ambassadors were temporarily recalled) etc. created another tensions. De Gaulle spoke of Yugoslavia as an artificial and ephemeral state. During the presidency of Georges Pompidou some improvement of relations between France and Yugoslavia occurred, but didn't evolve to a special closeness.⁷ However, at first Sofia didn't know how the dialogue would develop and the

⁶ ЦДИА, ф. 1477, оп. 26, а.е. 2583, л. 35–41; Note du MAE, Direction des Affaires Politiques, Sous-direction d'Europe Orientale, a.s. les consultations franco-bulgares: séance du 17 mars. ADMAE, Série Europe 1961–1970, Sous-série Bulgarie, cote 173.

⁷ Troude, G. La Yougoslavie titiste vue par les diplomates français (1955–1974). – Balkanica. Annual of the Institute for Balkan Studies – Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts. Belgrade, XL (2009), 2010, 167–181.

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Bulgarian leadership was anxious about the visit (22–24.04.1971) of the Prime Minister Jacques-Chaban Delmas to Yugoslavia. The Bulgarian Embassy in Paris reported that similar political positions were expressed (the Mediterranean should belong to the Mediterranean countries; the principle of national independence was discussed).⁸ Uneasy, Sofia feared the worst – that Belgrade would take advantage of that better climate to initiate a united front with France against Bulgaria. That was the reason for Sofia to seek ways to prevent such an alliance by undertaking political gestures (including the release of a French citizen imprisoned for ideological subversion).

At the same time, Bulgaria became aware that sparing statements served the Yugoslav propaganda and Sofia had to voice its position. First, Bulgaria had accepted the reality of the existence of a Macedonian republic within the Yugoslav federation, but definitely rejected Belgrade's attempts to manipulate the past in order to legitimize a Macedonian nationality and language. The Medieval Bulgarian state, named Bulgarian in Turkish, Greek, Austrian, French and other documents, the Ottoman conquest in the Balkans, the Liberation and the fragmentation of Bulgaria through the Berlin Treaty, the controversial division of the former administrative region of Macedonia between Bulgaria, Greece and Serbia in the Balkan War (1912) were recalled. *“Proving that historically back to the Middle Ages there was a Macedonian nation the Yugoslav side went so far as to claiming that there was a Macedonian minority in Bulgaria at present and, in particular, that the population of Blagoevgrad district which was precisely the part that Bulgaria joined after the Balkan war was a Macedonian population. We couldn't agree with that because this population had never been*

⁸ Information of Pavel Pavlov, a Second Secretary at the Bulgarian Embassy in Paris, about the official visit of the French Prime Minister Jacques-Chaban Delmas to Yugoslavia, 22–24.04.1971, Paris, 27.04.1971. ЦДИА, ф. 1Б, оп. 81 (Section “Foreign Policy and International Relations” of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party, France, unprocessed fond).

Macedonian since, as I said, there was no Macedonian people, nation, language and culture in the past. Throughout the development of the Bulgarian state this population was considering itself Bulgarian, with Bulgarian self-consciousness, its language, schools and customs were Bulgarian."⁹

In the meantime, while taking care of world public opinion Sofia never ceased its attempts to persuade Belgrade to settle the dispute. At the insistence of Bulgaria three meetings at different levels were held but they were unsuccessful. The last one was between the Deputy Ministers of Foreign Affairs (April 1971) and despite the expressed consent of Yugoslavia for further talks, no forthcoming meeting outlined. Bulgaria also hoped that the dispute would not affect bilateral relations as a whole. However, relations were almost completely frozen but in the field of economic cooperation.¹⁰ The Bulgarian démarches were caught in Paris: „*It must be noted that in this area the Belgrade leaders apparently demonstrate more susceptibility than their colleagues in Sofia who, without giving up their basic positions, assert gladly willing to improve their bilateral relations.*”¹¹ The French Minister of Foreign Affairs Maurice Schumann who visited Bulgaria (10–11.11.1971) praised its Balkan policy which he called „model” of the CSCE.¹²

However, Sofia did not loosen its national security vigilance. The concern was visible in the argumentation of the resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party on “*directions and tasks of foreign policy*”

⁹ ЦДА, ф. 1477, оп. 27, а.е. 2792, л. 22–24; Conversations franco-bulgares entre M. de Beaumarchais et M. Grigorov (Vice-ministre des Affaires Etrangères), Sofia, 17.06.1971. ADMAE, Série Europe 1970–1976, Sous-série Bulgarie, cote 3168.

¹⁰ ЦДА, ф. 1477, оп. 27, а.е. 2792, л. 24; Conversations franco-bulgares entre M. de Beaumarchais et M. Grigorov (Vice-ministre des Affaires Etrangères), Sofia, 17.06.1971. Ibid.

¹¹ Note du MAE, Direction des Affaires Politiques, la Sous-direction d'Europe Orientale, a.s. la Bulgarie et ses voisins balkaniques, Paris, 11.06.1971. Ibid.

¹² ЦДА, ф. 1477, оп. 27, а.е. 2777, л. 121.

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activity of the People's Republic of Bulgaria toward France and the development of Bulgarian-French relations in the course of 1972–1975” (early 1972): “*The policy of the PR of Bulgaria toward France contributes to the protection of the Bulgarian national interests in the Balkans and assists, in particular, that France does not hold unfavorable position for PR of Bulgaria on controversial Balkan issues.*” And the French interest in the Balkans “*reveals opportunities to reinforce the position of PR of Bulgaria in this region of the world, in particular against a trend of some Balkan countries to get close on anti-Bulgarian basis. For the realization of the PR of Bulgaria's national interests in the Balkans, the level of the Bulgarian-French relations should not be lower than that of France's ties with other Balkan countries, some of which marked a significant progress in recent years.*”¹³

French documents showed that Bulgaria had no reason to worry. Information of the end of 1972 representing the ethnic composition of the population of Bulgaria noted the minorities – Gypsies, Turks and Pomaks, without mentioning Macedonian minority.¹⁴ French neutral position on the Bulgarian–Yugoslav dispute went on contenting to quote the existing views – Yugoslavia claimed that it certainly can talk about Macedonian “national minority” in Bulgaria, referring to the first censuses after the war. “*In no way, meet the Bulgarians, for which Macedonians and Bulgarians for centuries form one people and which commemorate – to the chagrin of Yugoslavs – the role of famous Macedonians in the history of Bulgaria.*”¹⁵

After all, Sofia was right to fear. In March 1973 French parliamentary elections took place, a month later new government

¹³ ЦДИА, ф. 1477, оп. 28, а.е. 2927, л. 6, 10.

¹⁴ Note du MAE, Direction des Affaires Politiques, la Sous-direction d'Europe Orientale, a.s. la situation intérieure de la Bulgarie, Paris, 22.11.1972. ADMAE, Série Europe 1970–1976, Sous-série Bulgarie, cote 3168.

¹⁵ Note du MAE, Direction des Affaires Politiques, la Sous-direction d'Europe Orientale, a.s. la Bulgarie et ses voisins balkaniques, Paris, 22.11.1972. Ibid.

was named and along with the change in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs – now led by Michel Jobert – French attitude toward the Macedonian issue totally altered, i.e. the Yugoslav propaganda made its way. On 20 April 1973 the French Ambassador Pol le Gourriérec visited the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Nenko Chendov and, as usual, he interested about the development of Bulgaria's relations with its neighbors. But to the preceding neutral question on the progress of the settlement of the Macedonian issue he inserted a comment – *“they speak in Yugoslavia that part of the Macedonians lives in Bulgaria”* – which he would be allowed only by explicit instructions. Even more disturbing was that this remark came at a time when Paris was preparing to receive the Yugoslav Minister of Foreign Affairs Miloš Minić. Michel Jobert spoke very kindly about talks with him on 28 May 1973 and he highlighted identical interests of France and Yugoslavia regarding the view that the international problems should not be decided by the two Super Powers and also their common desire for the reduction of tension in the Mediterranean by settling the Middle Eastern crisis according to the UN resolutions. Jobert pointed out that the Yugoslav neutrality and the French membership in NATO and the EEC was not an obstacle for them to rediscover and to work together for the success of the CSCE.¹⁶

At the same time Peter Mladenov visited Greece where he signed, among other documents, Declaration of principles of neighborliness, understanding and cooperation. This act contributed to the strengthening of the positive image of Bulgaria and it certainly impressed Paris, judging by the words of Pol le Gourriérec: *“This is a very important document that Bulgaria signed for the first time with a non-socialist country.”* He believed that this was the result of the realistic policy of the Bulgarian government to develop and reinforce relations between

¹⁶ ЦДИА, ф. 1477, оп. 29, а.е. 2768, л. 14–15; Toast de M. Michel Jobert pour le dîner offert à M. Milos Minic, Ministre yougoslave des Affaires Etrangères, du lundi 28 mai 1973. ADMAE, Série Europe 1970–1976, Sous-série Bulgarie, cote 3169.

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the Balkan countries, regardless the differences in their social systems, in a spirit of understanding and cooperation. In this respect, *“he said that the positive evaluation and position of France toward the realistic and peaceful policy of Bulgaria in the Balkans has not changed since the visit of the former French Minister of Foreign Affairs Schumann to Bulgaria in September 1971.”*¹⁷ But the statement didn't concern the Macedonian issue.

The Quai prepared information and it reminded that the dispute worsened since the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs had spoken in April 1973 about the artificial nature of the Macedonian people and its language. The paper presented the following positions: according to Yugoslavia, there was a Macedonian nation which was divided and, after having established the federative republic of Macedonia, its citizens in Bulgaria and Greece should be given the status of a minority; Greece had always denied the existence of a Macedonian minority on its territory; after the war Bulgaria recognized the presence of a Macedonian national minority in its territory that was reported in the census too. Obviously Belgrade kept silent that even before the end of the Second World War Stalin adopted the idea of Tito (Soviet ally in the war unlike Sofia) for the establishment of a South Slav federation by Yugoslavia, Albania and Bulgaria under the auspices of Moscow, a federation in which the three parts of the former Macedonia (Aegean, Vardar and Pirin) will be merged; that later Stalin ordered that the Pirin region get cultural (Macedonian) autonomy and in consequence Bulgarian authorities forced the population to be reported as a Macedonian in the census. Although the project failed the procedure was repeated in 1956 in accordance with the Soviet directive to improve relations with Yugoslavia that worsened in 1949.¹⁸ After Tito-Stalin split, the French report continued,

¹⁷ ЦДА, ф. 1477, оп. 29, а.е. 2768, л. 19–20.

¹⁸ Калинова, Е., Op. cit., 713–727; Sfetas, Sp. The Bulgarian–Yugoslav Dispute over the Macedonian Question as a Reflection of the Soviet-Yugoslav Controversy (1968–1980). – Balkanica. Annual of the Institute for Balkan Studies – Serbian

Bulgaria undertook a violent campaign against the Macedonian Republic arguing that this population and its history were Bulgarian and, in parallel, in the census data Macedonians in Bulgaria “*decreased (about 2000 in 1965 and 1500 now).*” The document noted the mollifying of the Bulgarian irredentist position (sic!) since USSR–Yugoslavia relations thawed out, as well the recent statement of Peter Mladenov before the French Ambassador that Bulgaria recognized the nascence of a Macedonian nation within the Federative Republic of Macedonia and its language.¹⁹

Few months later, the Quai repeated the opinion mentioned above. French concept of the Macedonian issue hasn't changed. It noted that Sofia made more efforts to get this issue out of the way of the development of the bilateral relations because Brezhnev's word had more weight in Bulgaria than in Yugoslavia, while the Yugoslav press made jokes from appeasing Bulgarian statements. The Quai also reminded Kosygin's words (September 1973) about the “*Macedonian people who conquered its freedom ... in socialist Yugoslavia.*” The report noted that the recent visit of Miloš Minić to Bulgaria (early November 1973) aimed to thaw out relations between Sofia and Belgrade but the Macedonian issue remained a bone of contention in which both Bulgaria had to comply with the Soviet directive for the pursued unity with Yugoslavia, but also showed itself very unyielding.²⁰ The report was prepared in connection with the forthcoming visit of Peter Mladenov to France (21–24 November 1973). The Bulgarian

Academy of Sciences and Arts. Belgrade, XLIII, 2012, 243–246.

¹⁹ Fiche du MAE, Direction des Affaires Politiques, la Sous-direction d'Europe Orientale, a.s. la question macédonienne, Paris, le 5 Juillet 1973. ADMAE, Série Europe 1970-1976, Sous-série Bulgarie, cote 3169.

²⁰ Note du MAE, Direction des Affaires Politiques, la Sous-direction d'Europe Orientale, a.s. la question macédonienne, Paris, le 12 Novembre 1973; Note du MAE, Direction des Affaires Politiques, la Sous-direction d'Europe Orientale, a.s. la politique extérieure de la Bulgarie, Paris, le 14 Novembre 1973. ADMAE, Série Europe 1970–1976, Sous-série Bulgarie, cote 3170.

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Ambassador Ivan Budinov warned that Sofia can expect Michel Jobert to “pose certain questions firmly bordering the pressure.”²¹ What the Quai did not know was that during the Brezhnev’s visit to Bulgaria (September 1973) Todor Zhivkov managed to acquire the support of the Soviet leader on the Macedonian issue with the argument of the pro-Soviet nationalism of Bulgaria and anti-Soviet nationalism of Yugoslavia.²² This commitment was the reason for the fact that, for the first time, a Bulgarian Foreign Minister spoke out and stood firm against counterfeiting and claims of the Yugoslav propaganda:

“Mr. Jobert: – Can I ask you a question that you could find a little indiscreet, a little strange? Are there any cases in which people of nationality, adjacent to Bulgaria, seek refuge in Bulgaria?”

Mladenov took the hint and talked bluntly about the Macedonian issue: – There was a time when Bulgaria was a great empire. Historians know, one of the largest countries in the world. But now we are satisfied with our borders. So we have no territorial claims. [...] We proposed to all our neighbors to sign an agreement or any document in which we say we have no territorial claims. [...] It seems that some neighbors, however, have claims on our territory. It would be unsuccessful. I have said on another occasion: if we are to defend the national territory, so we will. But we are convinced that we would not come to that.

Mr. Jobert: – [Questions about Greece and Turkey] Why the border is not on the Struma?”²³

²¹ ЦДА, ф. 1477, оп. 29, а.е. 2767, л. 251, 259.

²² Калинова, Е., *Оп. cit.*, 743-744.

²³ In his memoirs Mladenov said that Michel Jobert opened the map of the Balkans, said that the borders in the Balkans seem artificial and asked whether the border between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia was much more logical to go along the river Mesta (since both in the Bulgarian and in the French verbatim report was mentioned the Struma River, probably due to faded memories Mladenov mistakenly quoted the Mesta River – A/N, I.G.), i.e. he implied that the Pirin region had to be part of the Socialist Republic of Macedonia. Младенов, Петър. *Животът – плюсове и минуси*. С., 1992, 60.

*Mr. Mladenov: – [...] The reasons must be numerous. Why not on the Struma, but why not on the Vardar?*²⁴ *The map of Bulgaria was many times remade. We want to retain our country in its current borders. We want nothing from anyone but we will give nothing to anybody. The region you show consists part of the Bulgarian population.*

*We believe we will keep Bulgaria as it is at present. The guarantee of it is our friendship with many countries in the world including our friendship with France.*²⁵

When Peter Mladenov returned in Sofia he prepared a report to the party leadership on the results of his visit to France. On the specific topic he made the following summary: *“Peter Mladenov stated in general outlines the PRB policy in the Balkans. Mr. Jobert's short replies on Balkan issues showed greatly that our position on these issues is not very well known to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs. A separate conversation with Jobert on this topic took place.”*²⁶ In his memoirs Mladenov said that after 2 hours of talks Michel Jobert and he had a coffee break. The French Minister asked about the border between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. Mladenov explained that in the past the border had been deep into the current Yugoslav territory, but Bulgaria didn't claim to change it. He wanted to know what Jobert would say if someone disputed the border between France and Germany and asked for the transfer of Alsace and Lorraine to Germany. According to Peter Mladenov the French Minister of Foreign Affairs asked to forget this conversation and never spoke about this topic.²⁷

Bulgarian and French diplomatic archives as well as historians indicated Yugoslavia's internal problems as a reason for the

²⁴ About 150 km into Macedonian territory from the Bulgarian border, the Vardar River passes through the administrative centre of Skopje.

²⁵ ЦДА, ф. 1477, оп. 29, а.е. 2756, л. 127–130; Entretiens entre M. Jobert et M. Mladenov, 22.11.1973 à 10 h 30. ADMAE, Série Europe 1970–1976, Sous-série Bulgarie, cote 3170.

²⁶ ЦДА, ф. 1477, оп. 29, а.е. 2756, л. 180.

²⁷ Младенов, П., *Op. cit.*, 60.

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campaign against Bulgaria. Analysis of that era assumed that the Yugoslav leadership demonstrated firmness and it attacked because of the strong Soviet support as part of the strategic plans of Moscow.²⁸

A modern interpretation of the period of tension notes that Bulgaria was aimed at in its role of the most loyal satellite of the Soviet Union as an expression of disagreement and protest against the Brezhnev doctrine whose initiator Belgrade did not dare to oppose directly.²⁹ Applying the Cold War means Yugoslavia deployed propaganda activity about its victimization among potential allies. Washington, where federative nationalist movements were known, only contented to quote that “*Belgrade is convinced that Moscow supports the Bulgarians on the Macedonian question, which to the Yugoslavs is tantamount to support of Bulgarian claims on Yugoslav territory (e.g., Socialist Republic of Macedonia and three border enclaves in Serbia)*”.³⁰ Most likely the US administration did not want to be involved in a local conflict that would risk SALT negotiations with the Soviet Union or, worst, a new war. Moreover, the US diplomatic documents disclosed that between the United States and Yugoslavia existed some tension because Belgrade pretended to

²⁸ Bernard, M. Profitant de l'amélioration de ses relations avec Moscou Belgrade durcit sa position dans la querelle sur la Macédoine. – Le Monde, 5.09.1973. – <http://www.lemonde.fr/archives>

²⁹ Баева, И. Източна Европа през XX в. Идеи, конфликти, митове. С., 2010, 341.

³⁰ Telegram From the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) to the Department of State, Belgrade, 18.10.1968. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Vol. XVII – Eastern Europe. Washington DC, 1996, 522; National Intelligence Estimate, Washington, April 13, 1967. Op. cit., 487; Telegram From the Department of State to the Office of the Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Washington, 21.06.1971. FRUS, 1969–1976, Vol. XXIX – Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969–1972. Washington DC, 2007, 562; Airgram A-385 from the Embassy in Yugoslavia to the Department of State, July 23, 1973. FRUS, 1969–1976, Vol. E-15, Part 1 – Documents on Eastern Europe, 1973–1976. Washington DC, 2008, Doc. 62.

be a leader and spokesman of developing countries and Yugoslavia frequently insulted the United States at the UN.

But Tito's leadership did not give up and continued to take advantage of opportunities. The French policy of settlement of influence in the Balkans was accompanied by Belgrade's attempts to establish a strong partnership and – as a consequence – to enlist Paris to the Yugoslav position on the Macedonian issue. And Bulgaria was trapped by the Soviet policy to attract Yugoslavia to the East and had to be delicate in its statements to third parties. Initially, France was unwilling to intervene in the dispute, assessing it as ancient and complex (i.e. insoluble). But gradually the Yugoslav propaganda prevailed and Belgrade's position was evaluated as more convincing and truthful. One can only speculate as to where Paris would come in support of Yugoslavia given the general agreement, at the same time, for a CSCE whose guiding principle was to guarantee the security and territorial integrity of the countries in Europe. However, soon after the change in the French position Bulgaria assured the support and protection of the USSR. Provided with such a strong back, Sofia already stood up firmly for its position and thanks to the proficiency of the Bulgarian Minister of Foreign Affairs Peter Mladenov alleged Macedonian minority in Bulgaria was refuted and Paris distanced itself from the dispute. Of course, Belgrade kept trying and it sought support during the discussions of the CSCE.³¹

³¹ Григорова, И. Аспекти от българската политика на Балканите в контекста на подготовката и провеждането на Съвещанието за сигурност и сътрудничество. – In: Сборник с доклади и съобщения от международна конференция „135 години по-късно: България-Русия-Евразия“, проведена в СУ „Св. Кл. Охридски“, 27 февруари – 1 март 2013 г., under print.

Remembering the Changes in 1989 – a General Approach

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A quarter of century after the collapse of the Communist system is a sufficient time for an evaluation of the changes and the nature of the transition, the lost opportunities and hence – the price, which the Bulgarian society had to pay for alteration of the political paradigm. The positives are visible – Bulgaria today is a member of NATO and the European Union. This determines its position in the new world order and allows finding a support for its needs of modernizing. If only the new elite really wants it. Because the ruling class of today is a product of some *reduplication* patterns, typical of Russia and the Ukraine, and not of the *circulation* practices known in Central Europe. This explains the peculiarities of the Bulgarian transition, which in other times and other places would have different dimensions.

Two hundred years after the French Revolution, which blazed the trail for the real New Time, Europe became again a witness to the collapse of a system that seemed to be unshakable. The active revolutionary period in France took place over one decade – with the end of the *Directoire exécutif* (November, 10th 1799) began the rise of Napoleon, the future Emperor of France. The intensive transition time in post-communist Europe lasted also for ten years – in 1999 the NATO bombing in sovereign Serbia put the end of the bloody fight reshaping the political map of the Balkans after the Yugoslav breakup. It was at that time that Vladimir Putin replaced Yeltsin as president of Russia and started the new course, characterized by return to the Russian old imperial idea. But if

two centuries ago the events in France have played the role of social catalyst that corrected the evolution of the human society, those at the end of the 20th century seemed rather as an attempt to return to one condition, considered by many people as a “normal”. Then what actually was 1989 – the year in which like domino tiles collapsed the Communist regimes in Europe?

The unforced mastering of power in Czechoslovakia through peaceful protests allowed the change of system there to be defined as a *Gentle Revolution*. Later this term was adopted also for the changes in other countries of Eastern Europe. The Czechs are known as a quiet people with a melodious language. But they erupted in the “Prague Spring” 1968, as the attempt to build of socialism “with a human face” was crushed by the Warsaw Pact forces and this postponed the *Perestroika* with two decades. What happened at the end of the 1960s was a part of the chain of events, followed the process of de-Stalinization in the Soviet Bloc – with the “thaw” in the East–West relations and the cultural changes in the Western societies. As if the “loosening” of the system in the East influenced the social movements in the West and proved that all people are related, despite existing differences – an early presentiment of the coming world globalization.

The 1980s were in many respects an antipode of the 1960s. The world became much more pragmatic. Instead of rebels and dreamers the new generation was dominated by the fixed on the practical success young people – success now and at any cost. At that time the balance between the two superpowers was already broken. Although expected, the death of Brezhnev 1982 shook the Soviet society. In the same way like Beria took for a short time after Stalin’s decease the helm of the state apparatus, to be in his turn offset with N. Khrushchev, who carried out “the first Soviet *Perestroika*,” the power now was given to Yuri Andropov – the boss of the Russian KGB, bypassing K. Chernenko. The new “first man” tried to reform the rotting society (by enforcing the labor discipline, struggle against the corruption and imple-

mentation of a kind of “dry mode”), but only to strengthen the “neo-Stalinism”. The atmosphere of insecurity and fear became visible when the the South Korean passenger plane was shot down in the USSR in 1983 that killed 269 people. At this time Andropov was already chronically ill. Three months later, in February 1984, his position was occupied by Konstantin Chernenko, in order to be vacated again “naturally” a year later. This quadrille of the authorities, under which within three years the Soviet Union changed three top leaders, was a sign of the deeper political, economic and moral crisis. It was influenced also by the rise of the conservative powers in the Anglo-American world. The “Strategic Defense Initiative,” announced by Ronald Reagan, together with the increase of defense expenditure, the measures to limit the Russian access to high technologies and the support of anti-Soviet forces in the global scope (the “*Solidarity*” movement in Poland, the Mujahedeen in Afghanistan, etc.) contribute to the economic erosion of the USSR.

The internal weakness of the country and the pressure used by the USA forced the Soviets to seek a younger leader, who could ensure the stabilization of the rule, offering new solutions for the long-lasting problems. The choice of Mikhail Gorbachev was – according to some interpretations – suggested by the KGB, where the project of *perestroika* has started already in Andropov’s time. Gorbachev was one of Andropov’s reliable people. This is evident from his first steps as a new secretary-general, who also attempted to reduce the alcoholism with raised prices and prohibition of spirits in public places. Later the concept of *glasnost* was added that reminds of the Khrushchev’s disclosure of the crimes, committed by the Stalin’s regime. “*Glasnost and perestroika*” [publicity and restructuring] – this was the motto of the Gorbachev’s time or the idea of transparency by managing the reforms in the Communist system. The *glasnost* was however selective – days passed before Kremlin decided to confess the nuclear accident of Chernobyl, and the *perestroika* seemed not to be driven by any clear concept. The impression was rather, as one

gropes after the way on the principle of “trial and error” and then adjusts to the results. However, the *glasnost* created prerequisites for the broader public support to the *perestroika* – a motion of spirit that was stronger and more embracing as that in the post-Stalin’s period. The way taken by the new Soviet leadership reminded the politics of Khrushchev, sharply criticized by Mao Zedong as retreat of the Marxism – “*this is not a Communism, but revisionism, in which the Communist party and its functionaries start to play the role of the bourgeoisie, which has an interest in restoring the capitalist society.*” The subsequent events confirmed his words and support the thesis that the totalitarian Communism was destroyed intentionally by the high nomenclature in the Eastern Bloc countries. The development has been encouraged (if not directed) also by relevant forces in the West. These common efforts from both sides of the “Iron curtain” have led to that moment, in which – according to the Theory of chaos – the accumulated sand cone collapses and gives the start of a new construction.

Its determination is very contradictory. In view of the turn ensuing 1989 in Eastern Europe this was a *revolution* that changed the commanding administrative system to multi-party governance and a market economy. As far as, however, people who took an advantage of the new conditions had had by then some key positions in the society, the turn was more of “*alteration.*” And by taking into consideration the struggle between the two systems that lasted for decades, the end of the Cold War was marked with the *capitulation* of the Communist Bloc that stamped its further development. In this sense, 1989 marks also the beginning of the *recovery* of a system, which in many respects was considered to be overcome.

Then was it agreed the *restoration of the capitalism* that started in Eastern Europe after the Gentle Revolutions? Reliable data allow us to answer this question with more certainty are still missing. But they could help to understand the differences in the way to overcome the totalitarian past. In any case, one gets the impression of the recurrence of used forms, methods and tactics

when the changes occurred in particular countries. As if this overall transition was “directed” by two opposite centers that continued in a new way the struggle for dominance in the already modified conditions. From ideological aspects, this was a fight between the *neo-liberalism* in its conservative type and the *communism* being forced to reforms that through the “socialism with a human face”, the “democratic socialism” and the classical social democracy found asylum in the left wing of liberalism, that allowed the ruling elite to achieve one smoother metamorphosis. Such was the evolution of M. Gorbachev, who at various times defined himself as a Communist–Leninist, as a social democrat or as a liberal. The same path is passed also by his followers, in particular by the head of the Bulgarian opposition at the beginning of the 1990s – the first president of the country, Dr. Zheliu Zhelev.

Probably, in the other countries of the former Eastern Bloc there was also such a rethinking of values in the spirit of the wind from Moscow. But this affected mainly the ex-Communists ruling by then, as the so called reformers renamed the party – instead of “communist” it became, for example, the “socialist” party in Bulgaria, the party of “democratic socialism” in the GDR, etc. In the most Eastern countries, however, there were long traditions of resistance (Hungarian uprising in 1956, the “Prague Spring” in 1968, the Polish *Solidarność* since 1980, etc.), around which united the efforts of the democratic opposition. It was connected in some places with a national[istic] “flavor” – the first mass demonstration against the regime in the Czechoslovakia, for example, took place on 25th March 1988 not in Prague but in Bratislava and this was a harbinger of the future separation of the Federation. On September 11th the same year 300.000 people demonstrated for independence of Estonia, and it made the national Supreme Council to declare on November 16th Estonia for a sovereign state. On 23rd August 1989, on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the Molotov–Ribbentrop pact, two million people formed a human chain of 600 km from Tallinn and Riga

till Vilnius with the request for a full sovereignty of the Baltic States. Already in the early February 1989 in Poland started to sit the so-called Round Table, on which the conditions for the transition period were agreed, and in September was made there the first non-communist government. The requests in Hungary for free elections and a multiparty system in February in the same year led to a policy of opening to the West. On 27th June the foreign ministers of Hungary and Austria removed symbolically the “Iron curtain” by cutting the wire enclosure on the frontier near the city of Sopron. In the early September, the Hungarian authorities allowed citizens of the GDR to leave the country on the path to West Germany, and on 23rd October (the anniversary of the uprising in 1956) Hungary was already declared as an independent democratic Republic. From Poland and Hungary the events were transferred to countries with more conservative regimes. The seeming refusal of Kremlin from interference in the internal Affairs of the satellite states contributed to changes in these countries, which, in turn, put pressure on the slowed down Soviet *perestroika*. A month after the celebration of the 40th jubilee of the GDR, during which Gorbachev warned his German comrades, that the “life penalizes the latecomers”, resigned Erich Honecker. On the 9th September as a result of alleged “lack of co-ordination” or “rashness” fell the Berlin Wall – the most emotional event in this “year of miracles”. It outshined the news about overthrowing one day later of Todor Zhivkov, the doyen of the Communist dictators in Eastern Europe, whose removal was apparently agreed with the Soviet ambassador in Sofia Viktor Sharapov. In the following month a change in power took place in Czechoslovakia, and in the second half of December unrests broke out in Rumania, the result of which was 1104 killed people inclusive the “first family,” Elena and Nicolae Ceaușescu.

So, at the turn of the 1990s Eastern Europe strikes out in a new direction. A period of transformation began. The transition was different in the particular countries. After few attempts at

reforms, the *GDR* ceased to exist, attached to the unified Germany. There, it was not necessary to make experiments, because the powerful German economy supported the integration of the Eastern provinces, although at the price of slowdown in its own growth. Moscow received 13 billion DM for its consent to the reunification of Germany and for the early return of its armed forces while the five “new lands” within the Federal Republic became a part of the territory of NATO and the EU. The other countries of the former Eastern Bloc have had a different development. It was faster or slower, depending on the proximity or remoteness to the “Old Europe” and in unison with the German interests. The states of Central Eastern Europe – *Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic* and *Slovakia* – were able to quickly overcome the initial problems and have built over time a well-functioned market economy, attracting foreign capitals. Similar was the development in the Baltic States – the traditional German influence there prevailed over the Russian neighborhood to such an extent that *Estonia, Latvia* and *Lithuania* separated from the USSR turned out to be more prepared for the EU admission than *Bulgaria* and *Rumania*, which started earlier the transition process. In both countries the “new socialists” succeeded to retain for a longer time their position in the society, adapting elements from the Russian model to the Balkan cultural milieu. The most difficult was the change in *Russia* itself – there one needed to initiate a *coup d’etat*, to achieve the public catharsis, allowed the introduction of such an order, which the “reformer” Gorbachev was not even dared to offer. The collapse of the USSR was a logical consequence of the inability to manage a situation with already exhausted methods and tools. But the problems arisen in some successor states could not endanger the general course of development in the post-Soviet space. Although the democracy remained to a great extend a façade, and the “appropriation” of the national wealth by handful of chosen people created one rather oligarchic type of rule, the transition there has reached also such a stage, in which there is no way back.

What have the people won and what have they lost in the next two decades? The profit is clear – they were released from an imposed system, which under the veil of Marxism served to the imperial goals of a foreign country. They acquired the opportunity to determine their own future. Just as the “glasnost” preceded the “perestroika,” the democratization was *conditio sine qua non* for implementation of economic reforms. But unlike the experience with overcoming totalitarian past in Spain and Germany, the transition from a planned state economy to a market one had no precedent. Hence – the problems of choice. Shall it happen quickly or smoothly, whether on the basis of the neo-liberal economic rules or of experiences with the social state, shall the removing of state property be through “cash” or “mass” privatization – the dispute went over this in the struggle for power between the reformed left- and right-wing political forces, claimed to be a “face of change.”

A certain role was played also by the historical continuity and the political culture in the particular countries. It was because of this that nations, united once in the Austria-Hungary, “drew” faster forward in their development, while those of the European South-East have had major problems. Bulgaria offers a typical example as a country, puzzling between three historically impacts of the oriental Balkan heritage (from South), the Russian cultural penetration (from North-East) and the European impetus for modernization (from West). These influenced its specific development in the whole transitory period. A few strokes:

While the experiments with the introduction of a market economy followed the movement of the “political pendulum,” the national wealth changed its owner – the state enterprises, brought to bankruptcy through a drain of funds, were sold for symbolical prices, and agriculture lands were fragmented to be returned “in real borders” without engaging with their cultivation. This affected the economy (many industry branches collapsed),

whose focus was shifted on the tourist business. The health care reform made the health more expensive but not improved, and in the education the process has led to the closure of schools and kindergartens. Art and culture have been left on self-help; the intentional support of the oriental “pub” folk-music caused changes in the mentality of a whole generation. The development of the science has ceased to be a state priority, despite all words in its support. Fill funds in elite sport has not stopped its decline. Smuggling of drugs and growth of the prostitution – phenomena, patronized by representatives of the executive power – additionally ruined the public morality. With the mimicry of the nomenclature, that transformed its political power into economic one, the success of the transition in Bulgaria is more and more questionable. Although incorporated in the EU, it will be long to overcome some deficits, which root in the way of life and mentality of a people, formed in the struggle for survival and inherited unaltered to the present.

Following blindly foreign models, all forces ruled till now are responsible for the situation, in which the “state” is seen in the grown administration, but not in its effectiveness, the country becomes more and more a territory of corruption and impunity, and the ageing nation continues to melt, also because of the “leaking” abroad of its young potential. The transition in Bulgaria destroyed the old system of values, forming a kind of society, comparable rather with those in Latin America than in Europe. This contradicts to its primary purpose and raises serious questions about the prospects of that country in the new world order.

The Conflicts in Science: The First General Assembly of the Scientists and the Decommunisation of BAS (1991–1992)

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In the late 1980s the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences (BAS) as an academy of socialist type was a combination of a club of the most prominent scientists and scientific research centers, whose structure was connected with the historical tradition and the strong influence of the organization of science in the USSR. It played a leading role in the production of fundamental knowledge, while applied research was left to the branch institutes and universities were engaged with educational functions. The view of the linear development of innovation was reflected in the extensive growth of research institutes and their specialisation, coupled with an increase of scientific personnel. As early as the second half of the 1980s BAS faced the need to transform and adapt to the ever-increasing introduction of market principles in the economy expressed in the program targeted funding of science and in the pressure for economic impact of scientific knowledge, which gave priority to studies of applied nature.

After the radical political change which started with the fall of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989, in Bulgaria as in the other Eastern European countries, the Academy lost its privileged position of a major producer and “legislator” of knowledge. Western experts regarded it as a “Stalinist” academy which had no place in the new conditions. These views were supported by the local scientific and political elites. For that reason the pressure on BAS to undergo radical reform was extremely high.

The Conflicts in Science: The First General Assembly of the Scientists and the Decommunisation of BAS (1991–1992)

The beginning of the reforms was put by the Law on BAS adopted and published on October 15, 1991, which restored the autonomy of the academy that had been abolished by the Law on BAS of 1947. It preserved, but separated its two main components – the Assembly of Academicians and Corresponding Members with a main function to elect people of their academic rank, and the research institutes. The latter appointed their representatives in the new supreme body – the General Assembly of Scientists. But the law stipulated that only an academician or a corresponding member could be elected President of BAS. It introduced the principle of mandates, autonomy, representativeness and deideologisation. The General Assembly of Scientists was formed on these principles, which elected the Presidency of BAS and its executive body – the Executive Council.

After the adoption of the Law on BAS in October 1991 elections were held in the various institutes and the first General Assembly of Scientists was constituted as a new body in the most important scientific institution which was undergoing a process of democratisation. It functioned from November 18, 1991 until the end of 1995 and played a very important role in the recent history of BAS. It was to adopt the new statute of BAS on June 29, 1992, select the new interim and permanent leadership of the Academy and would even act as Board of Directors until the enactment of the new statute. This General Assembly would carry out the decommunisation of BAS and its first optimisation in view of the new conditions by adopting and implementing “*Concept for reorganization and restructuring of BAS*”, which ended up with major changes and layoffs.

The work of the first General Assembly of Scientists may be recovered from the preserved shorthand records that are kept in the Current Archive of BAS.¹ How was decommunisation of the academy carried out, what conflicts it has brought forth and how were they resolved is the subject of this article.

¹ Unfortunately, the shorthand records from the first two sessions of this important General Assembly are not preserved.

The first General Assembly began its work with reduced membership before final elections were being held in all units, as in some institutes the elections were annulled and procedural disputes were running. Only at the fourth meeting was the Assembly constituted of 199 people, whereas the number fixed by the Law was 200.

The composition of the first General Assembly shows that in determining the destiny of BAS scientists in active creative age took part, who were most interested to keep their jobs in the Academy. According to the chairman of the mandate commission almost half of them were associate professors and made equal to senior research associates of second degree. They constituted 48% of all members. 52% were members with a higher degree and title: 41% professors, 7% academicians and 7% corresponding members. The bulk of the delegates were aged between 45–65 years, but 49% of them were under 55 years. These data show some rejuvenation of the BAS management. According to the criterion of administrative–scientific position the majority of the delegates at the General Assembly were representatives of the managing stuff of the institutes and the central leadership elected after 1988. From the 86 units in the General Assembly 59 directors, 24 deputy-directors and 16 scientific secretaries were elected or in total they accounted for 51% of all delegates. From the central leadership of BAS in the General Assembly the President of BAS, three out of the four Vice-Presidents, two out of the four major scientific secretaries and eight of the 28 members of the Presidium were elected. Among the non-elected were Corr. Mem. Alexander Yankov and the former Scientific Secretary General Corr. Mem. Ivan Iliev. In the competition for participation in the first General Assembly 3500 research associates or 70% of the BAS average personnel were involved. The elections were held in several rounds and 139 delegates were elected on first try. However, it was generally considered that the elections were made without clear and

comprehensive rules, which required annullements and re-voting.²

The first General Assembly worked out Provisional Rules of Procedure and elected governing bodies. The Assembly elected as its Chairman (initially as interim, and from the third session as permanent) Assoc. Prof. Yordan Vasilev.

Assoc. Prof. Yordan Vasilev (b. 1935) was at that time a prominent figure in the anti-communist opposition.³ Apparently his big political asset had contributed to his election as Chairman of the General Assembly, although he was a representative of a humanities institute. Not accidentally, the following general assemblies would always be chaired by members of the non-humanitarian sciences, whose institutes were dominant in number and staff at the Academy. For this discrepancy between the two types of institutes and their representation in the General Assembly, which acquired political overtones, spoke also the representative of the Institute of History Prof. Ivan Bozhilov. He was outraged by the article of Prof. Dimitar Nenov from the Institute of Physical Chemistry, a member of the General Assembly and the Democracy Clubs in the newspaper *Vek 21*, which claimed that former State Security had manifested less interest only in scholars from the natural sciences and therefore they had bigger freedom to publish and go abroad, so only

² ТА на БАН, 4 заседание на I OC, 9.12.1991, 9–12.

³ Having hard political destiny, especially in the 1940s and 1950s, after 1966 he was able to find a place in the literary circles and to become a research associate at the Institute of Literature, where he habilitated in 1990. With the perestroika began his active political activity, initially as a member of the Club for Support of Glasnost and Perestroika, then in the UDF. He was the first editor of the newspaper of the UDF – “*Demokraciya*” (Febr.–Aug. 1990). Vassilev was deputy to the 7th Grand National Assembly and was a member of the the group of the 39 deputies, who refused to sign the Constitution. He was elected deputy to the 36th National Assembly (1991–1994), and even headed the National Security Committee, but he resigned when his wife, the famous Bulgarian writer and poet Blaga Dimitrova became Vice-President in 1992. However, from time to time public allegations appear that Vassilev was an agent of the State Security. – See, for example: <http://www.blitz.bg/article/29400>.

their academic ranks were legitimate, as they had received recognition from outside and they were the only ones able to make the reform in BAS.⁴

The first General Assembly had to face a difficult case. The leadership of the Academy had resigned, the new election had been postponed, but it turned out that until a new statute was adopted, a new leadership could be elected only according to the old statute in the format envisaged by it – only by the Assembly of Academicians and Corresponding Members. Meanwhile, the former Chairman Acad. Sendov went on leave in order to participate in the presidential race.⁵ Corr. Mem. Ivan Yuhnovsky was charged with the position. At the same time the Presidium of BAS had not submitted a collective resignation.⁶

The General Assembly resolved the problem radically by considering that the entire leadership, including the Presidium had resigned, as in the new law such authority was non-existent.⁷ Therefore, it assumed the role of Executive Council, a body which under the new law had the functions of the Presidium, and elected interim leadership of the Academy. The only appointed and elected candidate was Acad. Yordan Malinowski. Yordan Malinowski (1923–1996) was a renowned physical chemist, founder and director of the Central Laboratory of Photoprocesses at BAS since its establishment in 1967 until 1992. Corresponding Member of BAS since 1979, and Academician since 1989.⁸ Particularly as a scientist of international reknown and greater organizational experience he was nominated and elected by the delegates at the General Assembly: “*A worthy*

⁴ТА на БАН, 3-то заседание на I OC, 2.12.1991, 6.

⁵ The first direct presidential elections were held on Jan. 12–19, 1992 and were won at the second round by the leader of the UDF the philosopher Dr. Zhelyu Zhelev. Vice-President was the famous poet and writer Blaga Dimitrova, wife of Yordan Vasilev.

⁶ТА на БАН, 3-то заседание на I OC, 2.12.1991, 62, 49.

⁷ Ibid., 45.

⁸ Почина акад. Йордан Малиновски. – Сп. БАН, 1996, № 1, 1.

man, worthy scholar and a good organizer.”⁹ His candidacy was the only one and it was not spontaneous. As he said himself, *“This issue was discussed a lot. For a long time I hesitated whether to take that position and that responsibility, ... but I decided that ... I have no civil right to refuse, if you charge me with it.”*¹⁰

The General Assembly approved also interim Vice-Chairmen of the Academy in the person of Corr. Mem. Ivan Yuhnovsky and Prof. Velizar Velkov,¹¹ as well as the five scientific secretaries proposed by Malinowski to assist his work. These were the very active participants in the General Assembly: the physicist Alexander Vavrek, the biophysicist Boris Tenchov, the historian Ivan Bozhilov, Eng. Stefan Hadjitodorov, Eng. Nadezhda Petrova.¹²

The first General Assembly elected also various committees: for financial and economic check of the status of the Academy, for the statutes, for the archives, for attestation of the scientists and the research units, for ethics and deformations.

In the course of the election of these committees there was an ongoing debate about the future of BAS, what research had to be done, the nature and the means of funding them, which was quite in the spirit of the liberal autonomy of the institution provided by the law.

The drafting of the new Statute was entrusted to a group headed by the Director of the Institute for Legal Studies prof. Veselin Karakashev, who was an active participant in the work on the statutes since 1989.¹³ In this connection, the General Assembly raised the question of *the place and the fate of the*

⁹ ТА на БАН, 4-то заседание на I OC, 9.12.1991, 84.

¹⁰ Ibid., 87.

¹¹ Velizar Velkov (1928–1993) was an eminent Bulgarian archaeologist and historian, from 1989 until his death he was Director of the Institute of Archaeology with Museum at BAS.

¹² ТА на БАН, 6-то заседание на I OC, 23.12.1991, част I, 91.

¹³ Ibid., 113.

corps of academicians and corresponding members as constitutive part of the Academy, regardless of the fact that it was fixed in the newly adopted Law on BAS. At that time the academic corps consisted of 50 academicians, of whom 9 full-time employees in BAS, and out of 84 corresponding members – 28 were full-time employees in BAS.¹⁴

According to Prof. Dimitar Nenov the public regarded BAS as a totalitarian structure that had to be broken down, and the scientists – as a scientific potential which had to be preserved. In order to reconcile these two opposing views on the future of the academy, in Nenov's opinion BAS had to develop as a European scientific center. There was no place in it for the corps of academicians reserved under the new Law, which Nenov called "appendix" and which was anyway excluded from the management of the academy by the Law.¹⁵ That is why BAS was proposed to establish itself only as an academy similar to the Bulgarian Literary Society and the other scholars to be integrated into a national research center.¹⁶

It was also proposed "*the corps of academicians and corresponding members to dissolve itself.*"¹⁷ The academicians and corresponding members themselves were called upon to "resign" if they considered that there was a "political element" in their election.¹⁸ There was also the idea of eliminating the requirement of the law that the chairman of the academy has to be academician or corresponding member.¹⁹ In view of the optimalization and restructuring of the academy, the attestation was suggested to be extended to all scientists, including the academicians and the corresponding

¹⁴ ТА на БАН, 4-то заседание на I OC, 9.12.1991, 9.

¹⁵ Ibid., 107.

¹⁶ ТА на БАН, 4-то заседание на I OC, 16.12.1991, 108–109.

¹⁷ ТА на БАН, 4-то заседание, 23.12.1991, ч. I, 32.

¹⁸ ТА на БАН, 6-то заседание, 23.12.1991, ч. II, 141.

¹⁹ Ibid., 115.

members.²⁰ The most radical delegates proposed to remove that title at all and to return to the naming existent before September 9, 1944 – Member of BAS. Much criticized was the intermediate degree “corresponding member” as unnecessary and without precedent in modern world practice. The highly negative attitude towards academicians and corresponding members in the first General Assembly naturally brought forth the idea to postpone the elections for academicians and corresponding members and to change the method of election of academicians and corresponding members.²¹ Quite expectedly these views were not considered, as under the Law the General Assembly had no such prerogatives.

However, at its meeting on January 20, 1992 what the General Assembly could actually do was to deprive academicians and corresponding members from the privilege to be members of the Scientific Councils of the institutes by rights. This privilege, given to them by the Provisional Rules for the election of scientific councils that was adopted in 1990 before the adoption of the Law on BAS remained valid only for the directors of the units.²²

In the first General Assembly discontent was expressed also with the so called party nomenclature in science. It came to the fore in the conditions of a radical change of the system in Bulgaria. In November 1991 the anti-communist opposition represented by the UDF won the elections and formed the first anti-communist government. On December 12, 1991 at the proposal of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms, which supported the UDF, the 36th National Assembly passed a law for the confiscation of the properties of the Bulgarian Communist Party and the other totalitarian organizations. In the public BAS was also perceived as such. The mentioned fact that in 1990 a number of institutes and departments of the party's ideological academy – the Academy of Social Sciences

²⁰ Ibid., 144.

²¹ Ibid., 123.

²² ТА на БАН, 8-мо заседание, 20.01.1992, 142.

and Social Management (AONSU) – were assigned to BAS, and that a number of their researchers also accepted a job in BAS also contributed to that. In such a situation at the first General Assembly the party secretaries in the institutes and in the BAS headquarters were called upon to voluntarily abstain from elections and participation in the management, in order to clean the image of the academy as a communist institution.²³

As an important step to overcome the poor image of the BAS and as a message that the Academy distinguished itself from the former regime of management of science, Prof. Maxim Mladenov from the Institute of Balkan Studies proposed to establish a Committee on the illegal attitude towards individual researchers in the past, in view of the repressive policy towards the Institute of Bulgarian Language in the 1980s. This proposal was supported, because the members of the General Assembly were dissatisfied with the work of the existing such committee headed by Corr. Mem. Al. Yankov.²⁴

These proposals in the General Assembly were directly related to the critical public attitudes and apparently they would deepen the conflict between the delegates at the Assembly and the corps of academicians and corresponding members as emanation of the “communist academy”. Criticizing the BAS became fashionable in the press and the electronic media. The Academy failed to defend its positions, and to convince the public that it was conducting reform. Yet, attempts at that were made not only in the field of political declarations, as were the cases of BAS statements on the occasion of the overthrow of Nicolae Ceausescu (22.12.1989), and the war in Yugoslavia.

²³ Similarly, in the Hungarian Academy of Sciences were integrated all scientific institutions – also from the former Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Party – the Institute for Political Sciences and from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs – the Institute for Foreign Policy. (ТА на БАН, 4-то заседание на I OC, 9.12.1991, 115–117, 118).

²⁴ Ibid., 119–120.

At its second meeting, the General Assembly adopted a declaration on the events in Yugoslavia, which was read on national television by the Vice-President of BAS Corr. Mem. Ivan Yuhnovsky. This act was highly appreciated by Y. Vasilev: *“I think it had a very good effect on the status of the academy, not only as scientific but also as social factor in our country.”*²⁵

BAS failed to stop the attacks, even though it also conducted scientific expertise. Thus it assisted, according to Eng. Plamen Tsvetanov, longtime head of the Laboratory “Energy Systems Analysis” at the Institute for Nuclear Research and Nuclear Energy of BAS, to develop a complex expertise for a failed round table of BAS, the State Planning Committee and the Ministry of Energy within the Grand National Assembly on the issue of the construction of second nuclear power plant in Bulgaria “Belene”, whose construction began in 1988 and was suspended. But in the words of Tsvetanov: *“After several thematic discussions on model results for economic development, perspective energy demands and energy supply, it became clear that it was possible to do without ‘Belene’ and our partners left the roundtable. It was decided to publish a book with five separate parts and their teams of authors.”*²⁶ All studies and findings of the team were against the construction of NPP “Belene”. The book had particular influence on stopping the construction.²⁷

A major part of the problems related to BAS were in direct relation to the future of science in Bulgaria under the conditions of the neoliberal transition, which called for the rejection of

²⁵ ТА на БАН, 3-то заседание на ОС, 2.12.1991, 5.

²⁶ So, despite the fact that I was the coordinator of the book and responsible for its first part, this is a unique book with more than 50 authors from BAS, Energoproekt and other institutions. The five parts of the book are: 1) Socio-economic development and feasibility of the construction of NPP “Belene”; 2) Technical design of NPP “Belene” and technical level of its facilities; 3) Seismicity of the site, seismic risk and design characteristics; 4) Impact of NPP “Belene” on the environment; 5) Public opinion and reactions on the construction of NPP “Belene”. <http://www.svobodata.com/page.php?pid=5358>.

²⁷ <http://www.svobodata.com/page.php?pid=5358>

active government support of the autonomous structures and gave preference to universities as centers for science. Thus, according to Minister Prof. Nikolay Vassilev, if in BAS 70% cuts were made and 20% in SU, that would solve the problems of science.²⁸ This created tensions between BAS and the Sofia University “St. Kliment Ohridski”. Inside the Academy there was a tension between the humanities and natural sciences, and between ideological and non-ideological institutes.²⁹ The target of criticism were the Institute for Philosophical Research and the Institute for Contemporary Social Theories, and some other institutes, such as the institute of the former president of BAS Acad. Angel Balevski, accused that he became part of Todor Zhivkov’s inner circle and therefore increased its staff unduly. Another institute that caused negative attitude was the Institute of Hydrology and Meteorology. That made its representative in the General Assembly Corr. Mem. Stoicho Panchev read a statement in defense of the right of the institute to be affiliated to the Academy.³⁰

The tightened budget capacity generated debate also about the nature of the scientific activity of BAS and its future. Most of the members of the General Assembly insisted on that the Academy had to remain a center for basic research, which would of course justify its budgetary funding. Along with that the delegates at the General Assembly and the leadership of BAS were aware that attestation was needed to optimize the Academy, the number and the size of the institutes. Various opportunities for the conduction of the attestation were discussed. There were ideas for international expertise,³¹ but because it would be expensive,

²⁸ ТА на БАН, 8-мо заседание на I OC, 20.01.1992, 101.

²⁹ ТА на БАН, 5-то заседание на I OC, 16.12.1991, 109.

³⁰ ТА на БАН, 10-то заседание, 3.02.1992, 12–14.

³¹ The Academies of Sciences in Lithuania and Latvia and later Estonia were subjected to international expertise from Scandinavia, which resulted in the establishment of the academy as a club of academicians and the institutes were put under the authority of the Ministry of Science. Симеонова К. Стратегии в

the attestation was suggested to carry out by the Institute for Science Studies. The representative of the Institute for Science Studies Prof. Kostadinka Simeonova acknowledges that the task was too complex and had many unknowns. So the opinion that the assessment should be done by a committee of representatives of the main research directions who knew best the specifics of the institutes and scientific life in Bulgaria got the upper hand.³² Thus new conflicts emerged – not only within the Academy but also between the Academy and the government.

Attestation meant cuts in institutes and scientific staff. In this connection, on December 23, 1991 CL "Podkrepa", BAS released a statement, which promised full support *"for the realization of all radical proposals and solutions that are socially equitable by declaring that CL 'Podkrepa-BAS' will not protect the inefficient and incompetent staff."*³³ As the Chairman of the General Assembly summarized, this statement had to reassure the members of the General Assembly after its hearing: *"We will not have unnecessary turmoil when specific payroll issues are being decided."*³⁴ There were suggestions of radical members of the General Assembly to make savings by introducing temporary employment contracts. But Malinowski opposed to that. He insisted the cuts to be made in accordance with scientific criteria approved by the General Assembly.³⁵

This led to the election of the 25 member committee headed by the interim President of BAS. It included representatives of all eight scientific fields. The committee had to develop criteria to evaluate the performance of researchers and a strategy for the development of scientific research at BAS. It was clear that most attention would be paid to the so-called ideological

трансформирането на Академиите на науките от социалистически тип. – In: БАН по пътя на реформите 1989-2000, С., 2000, 13, 16.

³² ТА на БАН, 12-то заседание на I OC, 17.02.1992, 11.

³³ ТА на БАН, 6-то заседание на I OC, 23.12.1991, ч. I, 45–46.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Ibid., 122; 6-то заседание на I OC, 23.12.1991, ч. II, 69.

institutions. Therefore it was even suggested a small committee to be formed to examine the activities of these institutions and to prepare a draft decision on the existence of these units. That was assessed as a sign to the public that the Academy was actually reforming and was ready for “*moral cleansing*.”³⁶ The decision of the General Assembly of December 23, 1991 to provide access for any researcher to his personnel file, was taken in view of such cleansing.³⁷ A little later at its 7th Meeting held on January 13, 1992 the General Assembly adopted the addition to the Provisional Rules of Procedure that except for the right of access to any information about the people, the members of the General Assembly had the right of access to information about companies and business organizations, etc.³⁸

The preparation for attestation in BAS ran parallel with the debates about the reforms in science that were carried out in the 36th National Assembly. It was also getting ready to assess and attest the entire scientific potential of the country. The Committee on Science and Education of the 36th National Assembly, headed by the Professor of Medical Statistics Dimitar Sepetliev,³⁹ a deputy from the Movement for Rights and Freedoms, which supported the government, took a decision on that issue on December 18, 1991. It was recommended for the Ministry of Education and Science to

³⁶ ТА на БАН, 6-то заседание на I OC, 23.12.1991, ч. II, 90, 98, 112.

³⁷ Ibid., 136.

³⁸ ТА на БАН, 7-мо заседание на I OC, 13.01.1992, 5.

³⁹ Dimitar Sepetliev is Professor of Medical Statistics and Economics of Medicine at the Medical University in Sofia and the University of National and World Economy, deputy from the Movement for Rights and Freedoms, then independent in the 36th National Assembly in 1991–1994. He was the representative of Bulgaria in the World Health Organization, who flew over Chernobyl and accompanied the Director General of IAEA. He “illegally” took samples from the soil and earth to submit them for objective study to be reported at a symposium in Copenhagen in 1987. <http://www.blitz.bg/article/2015>; http://www.dnevnik.bg/bulgaria/2008/03/24/475214_stanishev_poluchavane_to_na_nauchni_stepeni_i_zvaniia/

prepare a decree for the Council of Ministers, which was to include measures for verification of the scientific potential of Bulgaria, 60% of which was actually concentrated in BAS. According to the Committee's decision, a temporary moratorium for the award of degrees and titles was declared, the retirement age of the habilitated from BAS and the universities was made equal, and the scientists retired in 1991 were reinstated to work without increasing the staff of the Academy. The delegates at the first General Assembly were introduced to the decisions and the bill prepared on their basis at its 8th meeting held on January 20, 1992. Unfortunately, they could not get acquainted with the motives for that bill, as there were not such.⁴⁰

Regarding the motives, the delegates at the General Assembly could judge only the continuing negative attitudes towards the Academy, all in the spirit of the neo-conservative approach to the reform in science. It was expressed in proposals to the National Assembly to close down the institutes which were to be added to the universities. It required 17% staff cuts as early as January 1, 1992, i.e. of 2000 people out of 12742, because instead of the promised 650 million BGN 440 million BGN were given at an average wage of 1650 BGN in BAS. For the sake of comparison, the ministerial salary at that time was 3050 BGN. That was also the salary received by the President of BAS. In this hostile environment for the Academy, it was not accidental that the President of BAS lost his temper when listening to the long debate on the future of the Academy, instead of constructive proposals for reform. He had good reason for that, as he knew that the IMF as a major creditor had estimated that in the next 4–5 years in a country like Bulgaria the number of researchers in the Academy had to be reduced to 5–6 thousand people. The then 12–15 thousand people consumed too large GDP percentage per capita. The IMF made comparison with the former GDR, where there were 25 thousand scientists in a population of 17

⁴⁰ ТА на БАН, 8-мо заседание на I OC, 20.01.1992, 28–30, 97.

million people.⁴¹ For that reason Acad. Malinowski urged the General Assembly to focus on the attestation in order to avoid the verification of the common view among the public, expressed by the former nuclear physicist, monk, presenting himself as an anticommunist Christophor Sabev (at that time very popular person), who had said that in Bulgaria only St. Synod and BAS were not reformed.⁴²

In such a situation the *decommunisation* of BAS became an extremely important signal to the government and society that the Academy was reforming itself. Decommunisation had different dimensions and brought up new conflicts – between scientists and academicians, between humanities and natural sciences specialists. Thus, at the 11th meeting on February 10, 1992 87 people voted “for” the General Assembly to recommend to the management of the Academy to revoke the disciplinary dismissal of Research Associate Yanko Yankov from the Institute of State and Law. He was fired in 1982 for not going to work, but two years later he was subjected to political persecution and after 1989 he was among the popular anti-communist politicians.⁴³

In connection with the decommunisation a *New Committee on Ethics and Deformations* was elected, headed by the mathematician Prof. Nikolay Yanev. He claimed that he had experienced the problems of the old system, being three years Doctor of Science (DSc), without being able to habilitate.⁴⁴ The committee included: Nikolay Yanev, Yordan Yordanov, Al. Popov, Dimitar Velyanov, Alexander Trenev, Radomir Enikov, Nedyalka Mihova, Aglika Edreva, Trifon Tomov, Atanas Danailov, Hristo Nikolov and Yordanka Yurukova.⁴⁵

At the suggestion of this Committee (voted at its 12th meeting of February 17, 1992) the General Assembly voted in every

⁴¹ ТА на БАН, 12-то заседание на I OC, 17.01.1992, 41–42.

⁴² ТА на БАН, 9-то заседание, 27.01.1992, 25.

⁴³ ТА на БАН, 11-то заседание на I OC, 10.02.1992, 6–9.

⁴⁴ ТА на БАН, 10-то заседание на I OC, 3.02.1992, 48.

⁴⁵ ТА на БАН, 11-то заседание, 10.02.1992, 66.

institute the General Assembly of Scientists to assess whether there had been deformations and persecution of scientists for political reasons and respectively to form such committees. The possibility to investigate violations of the scholarly ethics too was discussed, but the voice of reason prevailed. Only the inquiries with regards to political reasons remained.⁴⁶ And that was no accident. Thus Assoc. Prof. Lora Nikolova from the Institute of Nuclear Physics believed that it was unacceptable “while in BAS there were institutes such as the Institute of Balkan Studies established upon a decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee (CC) with the sole objective to carry out the line of the Bulgarian Communist Party (BKP) in science, ...we now have to fight for an increase in our wages, including those people who, to put it mildly, at least some of them have committed crimes against the Bulgarian people”.⁴⁷

At the proposal of the Committee a declaration was adopted that was to be completed by all members of the General Assembly. It was based on the “universal human values and scientific ethics” and aimed “to strengthen the public authority of the members of the General Assembly in the Academy and in the country” without having legal, but only moral value. The declaration included the following points: “1. I am not and have not been assistant to security authorities. 2. I was not involved in any way whatsoever in motivating and carrying out the ‘revival process’. 3. I have not been initiator and participant in the political repression of others.”⁴⁸ This declaration was proposed for signing to the management of the Academy and the directors, deputy directors and secretaries of scientific research units.⁴⁹ The General Assembly did not accept the proposal to be the organizer of a roundtable devoted to the deideologization of science, because the view prevailed that it was the work of

⁴⁶ Ibid., 68–70.

⁴⁷ ТА на БАН, 11-то заседание на I OC, 3.02.1992, 16.

⁴⁸ ТА на БАН, 11-то заседание на I OC, 17.02.1992, 78–79.

⁴⁹ ТА на БАН, 13-то заседание, на I OC, 24.02.1992, 36.

particular institutes and scientists.⁵⁰

The processes of decommunisation started to gain speed. At its 13th meeting held on February 24, 1992 the Committee on Ethics and Deformations proposed steps for further “moral cleansing” of the Academy. It ran under the motto for de-Bolshevisation, de-ideologisation by denying that it was a “witch hunt”, “pursuit of those who think otherwise.”⁵¹ The General Assembly came to the following decision: “The General Assembly recommends the management of BAS and the research units for a period of five years not to allow the holding of high administrative positions of persons who had contributed to the ideologisation of science and the implantation of party style and criteria incompatible with scientific ethics and morality, as the secretaries of party offices, the Politburo of CC of BKP, members and secretaries of party committees of the United Centers, members and secretaries of departmental committees, etc., up the hierarchy, and counselors in the apparatus of the BKP. Under senior administrative positions it was understood heads of sections, scientific secretaries, deputy directors, and chairmen of the Scientific Council.”⁵² These lustration decisions were proposed to be supported by the institutes before the release of a law including similar texts.

These decisions were discussed at a time when at the entrance to the main building of the Academy were glued posters with *portraits and lists of members of the General Assembly* – “red” academicians and quotes from them. The Committee on Ethics and Deformations declared that it had nothing to do with these posters. From the outraged statements of members of the General Assembly, such as Prof. Minko Minkov, Prof. Rosalia Biggs, Assoc. Prof. Vasil Sivov, Acad. Kiril Serafimov it became clear that it was all about scientists

⁵⁰ Ibid., 40.

⁵¹ Ibid., 47.

⁵² Ibid., 36–37.

such as Acad. Evgeni Mateev, Mito Isusov, Todor Iv. Zhivkov, Acad. Kiril Serafimov. These posters were designed as dazibao, typical of the cultural revolution in China and they reminded a Tribunal against the people, not because of the academic qualities, but because of political affiliation.⁵³ The opponents of these posters argued that they were unacceptable in the Academy and referred to scientists with great scientific achievements.⁵⁴ In this connection R. Biggs was discontented that the General Assembly refused to organize a round table on deideologisation and left it to “Podkrepa” to make such dazibao reminiscent of a wall newspaper from the times of the Komsomol.⁵⁵ Prof. Stoyan Nedev from the Institute of Mathematics was the most adamant that *“In my view the morality of a scientist does not go together with what is being suggested, if you like the existence of such a committee. For me it is difficult to imagine reconciliation of these things. Someone who knows the deformations, knows what we have experienced and at the same time has the morals of a scientist, in my view, his*

⁵³ Ibid., 52.

⁵⁴ Thus the famous demographer Prof. Minko Mintchev turned to the Assembly with the question: *“Dear colleagues, I know and I understand that something could be pulled out of anything, but why we are not pointing to the contribution of Evgeni Mateev for developing a methodology which is now at the basis of the planning of the Common Market. He is one of the best experts and interpreters of the ‘method of Leontief’, why is this contribution which is recognized in world literature not emphasized, but we are using things that are actually dishonest.”* (ТА на БАН, 13-то заседание на I OC, 24.02.1992, 3839).

⁵⁵ *“I understand that a desire arises in us to deal with them in a rude manner. But this desire makes us use ways and methods that are degrading... Todor Zhivkov was shrewd enough and invited to himself many people. They will have to pay. But we are offending the institutes themselves. They have come here as delegates of their institutes. To hold them responsible there, to deal with them there. But as we go into the lobby and see next to the announcement about the General Assembly this wall newspaper that we see today, I find that unworthy. Moreover, according to the bill that is being prepared, these people will have to withdraw.”* (ТА на БАН, 13-то заседание на I OC, 24.02.1992, 42–43.)

reaction should be never again! And that's that."⁵⁶

The proponents of the removal of the management of science in BAS upon decision of the institutes themselves before the adoption of the lustration law (which was the majority in the first General Assembly) referred both to arguments from the recent past, and the public opinion. They pointed to the important role of party-political approval for the career of each scholar, especially one with an academic rank, in socialist Bulgaria. Yuliy Toshev recalled that the order of approval of the habilitated persons until November 10, 1989 included a long chain of party units: the party committee of the institute, personnel committee of a United Center, party committee of a United Center, personnel committee of BAS, party committee of BAS, the City Committee of BKP, and for senior first [degree] and the professors – CC of BKP. The direct link between the party and the scientific career was emphasized. *"A party secretary was a future professor, regardless of the scientific qualities"*. It was pointed out that this measure did not affect the ordinary members of BKP, but only 12% of the former communists in science, who would receive the opportunity in their free time from public duties to develop particularly in science.⁵⁷

The need for lustration before the adoption of the law was justified by the fact that in the elections for leadership of the institutes held in 1989 *"We do not notice any change in the administrative and scientific management of BAS. We have chosen only seven new faces – from the President to the scientific secretaries. I intend to ask the party secretaries to try to work with new faces for a certain period of time."*⁵⁸ According to the Chairman of the General Assembly it was *"incompatible with the morality of a scientist if he continues today to be a member of a party for which there is generally a public agreement that has*

⁵⁶ Ibid., 48.

⁵⁷ Ibid., 44–47.

⁵⁸ Ibid., 47.

committed a crime to the entire Bulgarian people."⁵⁹ Y. Vassilev, however, also had in mind that the party secretariatship was a kind of a burden and for that reason it was passed as a duty. Therefore he agreed that the decision of the General Assembly regarding lustration should be recommendatory so that to allow the institutes themselves to decide in each case. But lustration would ensure the termination of the relationship between scientific careers and the Communist Party. ... *"Tell me in which scientific council in the Academy at least 55 percent, if not more, are not members of BKP. Is there such scientific council? It chooses the habilitated and non-habilitated scientists. We could not allow reproduction in this way. This will just not happen. And if we do so, there would be no Academy of Sciences. The society shall just throw us all out. It spends millions – half a billion, and we want to re-produce ourselves not by science, but along family or partisan line. As you can see, here no one from the UDF insists on being elected director. But except for one or two cases, is there a director who is not from BKP? It is not necessary to be a political figure. Just on the contrary."*⁶⁰ In this connection Vassilev insisted on a discussion over the deideologisation and de-Bolshevisation of science.

Decommunisation made some of the people concerned resign. Thus at the meeting of the General Assembly held on June 29, 1992 the Chairman of the mandate commission the physicist Assoc. Prof. Al. Vavrek pointed out that due to resigning Acad. Evgeni Mateev, Corr. Mem. Stoyan Mihaylov, Prof. Al. Fol, Prof. Todor Iv. Zhivkov, Prof. Nikolai Genov, the economist Assoc. Prof. Hristo Pamukchiev, the physicist Prof. Anton Antonov, Assoc. Prof. Ivan Gotchev and others are replaced. Not all replaced were in connection with decommunization. Some resigned also because they went to work abroad. Among them was not Corr. Mem. M. Isusov. However, he completely distanced himself from the work of

⁵⁹ Ibid., 49.

⁶⁰ Ibid., 55–57.

the Assembly, because he did not take part in the next stage of decommunisation which concerned directly historical science.

This stage was the discussion and the accusation of BAS for its participation in the “revival process”. That was made by a specially formed committee by the General Assembly in January 1992, which included: Chairman the historian Prof. Ivan Bozhilov and members: Prof. Maxim Mladenov (Institute of Balkan Studies), Prof. Elena Georgieva (Institute for Bulgarian Language), Prof. Docho Lekov (Institute of Literature), Prof. Yordan Yordanov (Institute of Cell Biology and Morphology), and Assoc. Prof. Georgi Markov (Institute of History).⁶¹ The committee worked seriously, discussing the composition and activities of the Problem Council to the Presidium of BAS and the Academic Council of Sofia University on the revival process.⁶² It examined the documents of that Council, and the publications of scientists included in it and of the BAS institutes on the issue. From the 40 pages report of the committee it is evident that the activities of the scientists basically followed the scientific traditions and were not a motive power for forceful change of the names of Bulgarian Turks in the winter of 1984/85. Moreover, the Problem Council⁶³ created in 1986 after the renaming, included representatives of many other institutions, not just academic institutes. BAS, as the highest scientific organization was supposed to lead this supra-institutional unit.⁶⁴ It had the highest

⁶¹ ТА на БАН, 34-то заседание на I OC, 6.07.1992 след обед, 6.

⁶² This Council included: Strashimir Dimitrov who replaced Ilcho Dimitrov as chairman of the board. Members: Tsvetana Georgieva, Todor Nikov, Doyno Doynov, Dzingiz Hakov, Nikolai Kaufman, Alexander Lilov, Emil Boev, Yordan Peev, Stefan Andreev, Ibrahim Tatarli, Mosko Moskov, Mincho Draganov, Veselin Traikov, Todor Iv. Zhivkov, Veselin Hadjinikolov, Kiril Kiryakov, Vera Mutafchieva, Evgeni Radushev, Petar Petrov, Nikolay Mizov, Paunka Gocheva, Hristo Hristov. (ТА на БАН, 34-то заседание на I OC, 6.07.1992, след обед, 4–6).

⁶³ It was later renamed “Scientific Coordination Council on the Revival Process” and still later it began to be officially named “Scientific Coordination Council on the Problems of Development of the Bulgarian People and Nation”.

⁶⁴ ТА на БАН, 34-то заседание на I OC, 6.07.1992 след обед, 14–15.

number of representatives, 19 out of 36. The emphasis in the work of that Council was on the study of the “Spread of Islam in the Balkans”, rather than the building of Bulgarian identity in the National Revival Period and the more modern and contemporary period throughout the 19th and the 20th centuries.⁶⁵ Corr. Mem. Strashimir Dimitrov became the head of the Council soon after the withdrawal of Acad. Ilcho Dimitrov. It was also noted that strictly scientific research was predominant, and not propaganda activities, and also that in the system of BAS there was not a single associate who had speculated with the topic for the sake of a research career by serving directly to the events of 1984/85 and 1989. However, the Committee denounced the fact that in BAS a Scientific- Coordination Council had been created on similar problems, which had no special status and no additional funding, but because of the very fact of its existence and although it included *“traditional research, caused severe damage on Bulgarian science that would be felt for a long time.”*⁶⁶

These conclusions did not satisfy the General Assembly of the Scientists in BAS in general, as they sounded to them very dry, unemotional, and lacking moral conviction. The Committee and its Chairman were accused of *“slipping on that issue quite academically, which was actually very nice and the report was full of facts that were very good as statistics. But it seemed that it avoided or could not reorganize its thinking in the other direction – the moral one.”*⁶⁷ The President of BAS even acknowledged that the conclusions in the report do *“a disservice to the Academy, no matter how scientifically justified they are. I do not question them, but they will not be understood by the public and that will not be in our interest.”*⁶⁸ A reproach was addressed to the Committee that it did not analyze propaganda articles in the local

⁶⁵ Ibid., 6.

⁶⁶ Ibid., 42.

⁶⁷ Ibid., 74.

⁶⁸ Ibid., 70.

press because, according to Prof. Dimitar Nenov: “*hardly anyone would take it upon himself to defend the assertion that there were no falsifications in science and that they were not conducted following an order... We could defend the Academy by saying the things as they were and saying that this is a different Academy, which has nothing to do with the former one*”.⁶⁹ Thus a decision was adopted that the Committee on Ethics and Deformations and the Committee on the Revival Process should prepare a decision condemning the participation of the Academy that was to be submitted to the General Assembly, indicating especially the participation of particular scientists with materials in the press, i.e. their participation in the propaganda.⁷⁰

The Committee on Ethics and Deformations periodically reported to the General Assembly on the occasion of publications in the organ of the newspaper *Democratsiya* about cases of scientists on which the General Assembly had to take a stand. Thus at a meeting held on July 6, 1992 in connection with the publication in *Democratsiya* that two members of the Academy Acad. Mako Dakov and Corr. Mem. Ivan Popov had participated through their signatures in the decision of the Bulgarian government to send troops into Czechoslovakia in 1968, the General Assembly decided to condemn them morally with only one “against” and 20 “abstentions”.⁷¹

Another important moment in the decommunization of BAS was the adoption and implementation of the law on lustration in science, known as the *Law “Panev”* after the name of his author Assoc. Prof. Georgi Panev from the UDF. It was effective from the end of 1992 to March 30, 1995 and was named “*Act for the temporary introduction of certain additional requirements to the members of the scientific organizations and the Higher Attestation*

⁶⁹ Ibid., 67–68.

⁷⁰ Ibid., 86.

⁷¹ ТА на БАН, 61-во заседание, 6.07.1992, 61.

Commission (HAC).”⁷² This law excluded from the management of science, i.e. membership in the scientific and faculty councils, in the HAC, heads of departments and sections, directors and their deputies for a period of five years of scientists who had occupied positions in the political structures of BKP by employment (party secretaries and members of party committees). Also scientists who were members of the supreme authorities of the former ruling Communist Party, and who were registered at the BKP, or worked in its ideological institutions, including teaching of ideological disciplines, as well as those involved in the “revival process” or who were associates – full-time or voluntary to the State Security and UBO. These conditions had to be certified by a declaration. To implement the law a moratorium was put on the procedures up to four months in which to hold elections and change the managements of the institutes, universities and specialized scientific councils to the HAC.

Although the Law “Pánev” was adopted by the 36th National Assembly on Dec. 24, 1992, it was discussed in the General Assembly of BAS because some scientists opposed to it, others supported it, and a request from the Constitutional Court was submitted to the General Assembly to determine the legitimacy of this law which had already been passed. It was made after 103 MPs from the 36th National Assembly and the President of the State had made a similar request to the Constitutional Court.⁷³ This reminded of an article in the procedure of the General Assembly from the time of the People’s Court in 1945, when the workforces had to show that they supported that Court.⁷⁴ And he expressed the dissatisfaction of a part of the members of the Assembly with this move of the Constitutional Court. Others, such as the Chairman of the General Assembly expressed resentment that the question was raised at all: *“Here in the General Assembly written proposals to BAS are being*

⁷² ДВ, 1992, N 104 (24.12.). Отм. ДВ, 1995, N 29 (30.03.).

⁷³ ТА на БАН, 44-то заседание на ОС, 18.01.1993, 82.

⁷⁴ Ibid., 84.

made to oppose the implementation of the law. I was surprised that a scientist could do that. (Applause). Democracy has its foundations already in Roman law, if I am not mistaken, Prof. Karakashev, 'Dura lex, sed lex'."⁷⁵

Letters against the law were written by Acad. Bl. Sendov who insisted each member of the General Assembly to express in writing his attitude to this law. Another letter, together with a draft to the Constitutional Court regarding this law on decommunisation of science addressed Corr. Mem. Stoicho Panchev. Opponents of the law argued that the law imposed collective guilt on individuals, that their rights were violated for political reasons, and that the Academy would be cleansed of such people without such a law, as there was the Committee on Ethics and Deformations. In their view, the last elections have shown that in fact party careerists were not elected in the leadership of the institutes.

The opponents also called for the need for respect the autonomy of BAS and the universities, and pointed out that this law would deprive of leadership in science eminent scientists, as the academicians Assen Hadzhiolov, Georgi Bliznakov, Rumen Tzanev, Assen Datchev, Lubomir Popivanov, and the corresponding members Gentcho Skordev, Dimitar Mishev, Nikolay Ganchev, Dimitar Elenkov, Constantin Kossev, Petar Kenderov, Stoicho Panchev, Toncho Zhechev.⁷⁶

The proponents of the law (Prof. Y. Yanev, Assoc. Prof. Al. Popov, Assoc. Prof. Enikov, Assoc. Prof. Tomov, Assoc. Prof. Trenev, Prof. Yordanov) on their part were preparing a response to the Constitutional Court. They expressed approval of the law, as it was in line with the public repudiation of the 45 years of totalitarian legacy. The party nomenclature in science has facilitated "imposing totalitarianism". For, as a rule these were "*mediocre people, who used unscientific methods and tools for*

⁷⁵ Ibid., 85.

⁷⁶ Ibid., 73–78.

making a scientific career.”⁷⁷ ... “Conditions were created for a long time control over the development of the personnel and scientific problems from the positions of party norms and generations of leaders were created who had passed through the institution of party secretaries, and who now continue to pursue a policy of support for former political activists. Above all was placed the group of academicians and corresponding members, most of who had gone through all the stages of the party and state leadership and strictly watched for the implementation of party politics at all structural levels. The situation in the universities was even worse ...”⁷⁸ The supporters of the law pointed to the fact that it was softer than the one adopted in the former GDR, where all employees and professors were fired with the right to apply for their places. In the Bulgarian version – though psychologically traumatized, the concerned individuals did not lose their jobs in the institutes, were not deprived of the right to practice their profession, but only could not elect (or be elected as) scientific personnel. It would later turn out that these people were elected, however, as reviewers, which suggests that the law was above all political. Not accidentally, the adoption of such a law, according to its supporters would strengthen the confidence in the Academy of the western partners, and also of the Bulgarian public.

The supporters of the law pointed out that many of the provisions of this Law were applied in the Academy as early as 1992. These initiatives of the General Assembly were envisaged to be adopted and declarations similar to those required under the Law by the management of BAS to be completed also by the members of the General Assembly. They reminded also for the above mentioned address to the party nomenclature to refrain from participation in the management of science. The supporters also paid attention to the fact that the underlying principle of lustration had already

⁷⁷ Ibid., 78.

⁷⁸ Ibid., 79.

been applied in the election of new leadership of BAS.

All these arguments had to justify the position of the General Assembly to send an affirmative answer to the request of the Constitutional a Court. Eventually, at the meeting of the General Assembly held on January 25 a declaration was adopted in defense of the Law, with 94 “for”, 28 – “against” and 9 “abstentions”.⁷⁹ In addition to it and to the President Dr. Zh. Zhelev’s approval of the Law, at a meeting of the General Assembly held on February 1, 1993 an “Open Letter” was read to the Constitutional Court with additional arguments in support of the Law “Panev”.⁸⁰ This shows that the law found the support of BAS for the lustration of leading members of BKP in science. It was confirmed by a decision №1 of the Constitutional Court of February 11, 1993. This Lustration Law, however, appears to be the only of its kind in Bulgaria. Lustration provisions are found only in the Law on Banks and Credit Activity of March 27, 1992.

The actions of the first General Assembly on the decommunisation of BAS, despite its conflicting decisions, are clear signals to the government and society that the Academy was ready to part with its past in the hope of a better future. Unfortunately, these signals did not prove to be convincing enough, because the future of the Academy is filled with continuous efforts for survival in the conditions of the neoliberal transition.

⁷⁹ ТА на БАН, 45-то заседание, 25.01.1993, 102. It was published in the BAS Magazine 1993, 1, 37–38.

⁸⁰ ТА на БАН, 46-то заседание, 1.02.1993, 81–85.

Territorial Aspects of Population Decline in Bulgaria

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INTRODUCTION

According to the censuses of post-socialist era the Bulgarian population is continuously decreasing. Bulgaria is only one of the post-communist countries where the number of inhabitants has been declining for decades, but the degree and intensity of this process is prominent. The political, economic and social processes of transition from state directed economy to market oriented capitalism, the emerging social tensions after the fall of dictatorships, the ethnic conflicts and changes of state boundaries, the EU accession and changing opportunities of international migration had great influence on demographic processes in the Eastern part of Europe.

The social problem of population decline is a multidisciplinary research area; even geographers investigate its territorial aspects beside sociologists, psychologists, anthropologists, biologists and historians. This work analyzes the demographic trends of the last decades in Europe, especially in post-communist states, and the background of population decline in this region and in Bulgaria. After this overview the study explores the spatial patterns of population decrease with the help of published census results and methods of data analysis and GIS technics.

Threatening is not among the aims of this paper, the increasing of social tensions with the vision of national death is false and unnecessary. Exploring the territorial aspects of decline is an opportunity to understand the reactions of people and society

to the changing social, economic and political conditions.

DATABASE AND METHODS

The population number is in connection with the fertility and migration processes. These factors can be measured by demographic indicators. The informational revolution provides more opportunities to data analysis and makes the collection of comparable statistical data possible. Census results of countries in the world give the basis of demographic researches and construction of large databases makes the exploration of global, continental or regional demographic patterns and trends possible.

This geographical study uses the methods of data analysis and technics of GIS for introducing the differences of population decline in post-socialist countries and mapping the spatial pattern of negative trends in Bulgaria. The census data of the states are available in the websites of national statistical institutes, but there are differences among countries in the time of censuses during the 20th century. All states in our region held censuses in almost every decade after the Second World War; therefore it is possible to carry out time series researches. Lacks of data are replaceable with population estimates.

Bulgarian territorial data were published after censuses of 1992, 2001 and 2011; they are available in the website of the National Statistical Institute of Bulgaria (www.nsi.bg). The GIS database of this research includes demographic data of municipalities (EU level LAU 1, called *obshtina* in Bulgaria).

POPULATION GROWTH IN EUROPE

After the political and social changes of the 1990s many scientific works investigated the demographic patterns of Europe. Population processes in Europe generate some social problems to the new millennium. The fertility rate of Europe was the lowest in the world in the 1990s, and fertility differences among European

countries continued to diminish.¹ These tendencies promise further population ageing and falling population growth, which cannot be compensated by the migration to Europe.

Fertility trends show similarities in European countries after the Second World War, but the political and cultural background generated divergences among different regions of Europe. In Western and Northern Europe after the decline in fertility in the second half of the 1960s, countries enjoyed the period of relative stability for decades.² The 'Catholic fertility' of Southern Europe has disappeared in the last decades of the 20th century; the Southern states had the lowest fertility in Europe in the 1990s.³

Countries of the Eastern Block showed divergences in fertility in the second half of the 20th century. The years of 1950s and 1960s were the period of declining fertility; the 'baby boom' of Western states is missing, but they started the post-war era with higher fertility rates because of their rural and less developed economic background. The pro-natalist policies of Communist governments caused short-term effects on birth rates and generated the differences in fertility trends.⁴ Divergences disappeared after the fall of communism. The period of transition, the economic disruption, the rising unemployment and falling living standards resulted in declining fertility in every country.

In the 21st century Europe had to face with the challenges of population aging and population decline. Population growth is the lowest in Europe in comparison with the other regions of the World and the estimated turning point to decline is the year 2025.⁵ Because of the low fertility rates the international

¹ Coleman, D. New Patterns and Trends in European Fertility: International and Sub-National Comparisons. – In: Coleman, David (Ed.). *Europe's Population in the 1990s*. New York, 1996, 2.

² Ibid. 11.

³ Ibid. 47.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Van Nimwegen, N., R. van der Erf. Europe at the Crossroads: Demographic Challenges and International Migration. – *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 36, 2010, N 9, 1360.

migration has become the main engine of European population growth and it may delay population decline but could not reverse the trends.⁶ Differences in fertility rates and migration processes provide Western, Northern and Southern Europe slow population growth, but countries of Central and Eastern Europe are already experiencing population decline.

POPULATION DECLINE IN THE POST-SOCIALIST COUNTRIES

At the moment of regime change nearly 130.5 million people lived in the European satellite states of the USSR (this article classes also the Baltic States among satellite states besides Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Yugoslavia). After the first decade of the new millennium the number of inhabitants in the seventeen countries of this region is less than 123 million. In the last two decades the demographic loss of the Post-Socialist countries was nearly 7 million people (*Fig. 1*).

Despite similarities in population processes, the political, historical, cultural and economic disparities resulted in different demographic reactions within this region to the changing conditions. Natural population decline has already appeared in Bulgaria, the Baltic States, Hungary, Romania and Germany. The negative migration balance is observed in Romania, Bulgaria, Poland and Baltic States. The population decline in the Eastern part of Europe is the result of not only the low fertility levels and emigration, but high levels of mortality too.⁷


Vassilev explained the negative demographic trends of post-communist countries with the lowest fertility level, declining average life expectancy at birth, high morbidity and

⁶ Ibid., 1360.

⁷ Coleman, D., R. Rowthorn. Who's Afraid of Population Decline? A Critical Examination of Its Consequences. – Population and Development Review, 37, 2011, 220.

mortality rates and population losses due to emigration.⁸ He related these processes with such economic and social problems like unemployment, increasing social inequalities, healthcare crisis, environmental pollution, high poverty rates, low real incomes and stagnating living standards.⁹

Figure 1. The change of population number (%) in the region of Post-Socialist States in the second half of the 20th C.



Sources: Censuses of States.

Population decline in the Baltic States is the most conspicuous, which is the effect of not only the emigration of inhabitants of Russian origin, but also of the low birth rates too, as it mentioned above (*Fig. 2*). The rates of negative changes were the worst in Estonia in the 1990s (–12.5%), but in the 21st century the trends showed improvement in this country (–5.5%). In Latvia and Lithuania the trends of declining strengthened in the new millennium (under –12%).


Countries of East-Central Europe (the Visegrad Group) show divergences in population trends (*Fig. 3*). Besides the higher fertility of ‘Catholic Poland’ the young, Slovakia

⁸ Vassilev, R. Bulgaria’s Population Implosion. – *East European Quarterly*, 40, 2006, N 1, 71.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 71.

entered later to the phase of demographic transition, therefore higher fertility rates provide delayed decrease to the country. Slovakia produced minimal population growth even in the first decade of 21st century (0.33%). Poland produced decrease in population number in the 1990s (–1%), but these trends changed to minimal growth after the millennium.


Figure 2. Changes in population number (%) in the Baltic States after the Second World War.



Sources: Censuses of States

The same tendencies can be seen in the Czech Republic. This country produced modest and decreasing population growth in the second half of the 20th century, which turned to decline in the 1990s (–0.7%), but the demographic trend reversed in the new millennium (3.25%). In Hungary falling in population growth is continuous after the Second World War; population decline is appeared before the fall of communism in the 1980s (under 3%). Improvement can be seen in decreasing tendencies in the 1990s (–1.7%), but it reversed in the 21st century (–2.56%).

Figure 3. Changes in population number in countries of the Visegrad group after the Second World War.




Sources: Censuses of States

Balkan States are the less homogenous in demographic trends and processes (*Fig. 4*). Population growth in Albania, the poorest country of Europe was above 20% in the years of Socialism, but after the fall of communism this trend is immediately turned to decline (−3.6%), which continued in the 21st century (−7.7%). The same tendencies can be seen in the other Albanian state, Kosovo, where population decline appeared only after the turn of the millennium (−13%). Decrease in population number appeared after the fall of communism in Romania (−5%), and this tendency remained stable in the next decade (−7.2%).

The elimination of population growth is continuous in Bosnia and Herzegovina after the Second World War, but mainly the war events reversed it to decline in the 1990s (−13.2%); the intensity of decrease slowed in the 21st century (the rate of decline is only 0.7%). The decreasing rates of population growth in Croatia (6.4–4%) and in Serbia (8.4–1.2%) during the Socialist era turned to decline (−7.25% in Croatia, −4.15% in Serbia) in the war years of the 1990s, which persisted in the next decade too. War events avoided the former Yugoslav states of Macedonia,

Montenegro and Slovenia, therefore falling tendencies did not appear in these countries in the last decade of the 20th century. Slow population growth prevailed in Slovenia (4.4%) and Macedonia (2%) after the millennium, but migration processes have caused decline in population number (−7.9%) for the independent Montenegro.

Figure 4. Changes in Number of Population in Balkan States after the Second World War.



Sources: Censuses of the States

DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS IN BULGARIA

After the fall of communism, Bulgarian scientists proclaimed the population decline. Donkov introduced the demographic processes of the 20th century with demographic indicators.¹⁰ He confirmed the declining fertility in the country after the Second World War and emphasized the negative effects of internal migration to towns and cities, which resulted population aging and population decline in the rural areas. The demographic policies

¹⁰ Donkov, K. Bulgaria. – In: Rallu, Jean Louis and Blum, Alain: European Population. Paris, 1991, 257–275.

of the Bulgarian communist regime provoked fluctuation in fertility rates, but after 1980 the stable tendency of fertility decline was observable.¹¹

Vassilev depicted the vision of a demographic catastrophe with serious political, economic and social consequences.¹² He introduced the statistical indicators of this “implosion”: the lowest level of fertility in the world, the lowest birth rate in Europe, one of the highest mortality rates of Europe, replacement rate far below the fertility replacement level, decreasing marriage rates and rising divorce rates.¹³ The general decline of population in the end of the 20th century is mainly the result of the highest negative birth rates in Europe and the emigrations of the 1980s and early 1990s.¹⁴ While in the 1980s it was the Bulgarian Turks emigrating from Bulgaria to Turkey, after the fall of Communism the emigrants were mainly highly skilled Bulgarians.¹⁵ In addition the mortality increased too in the 1990s.¹⁶

The reduction in fertility levels relates to the postponement or refusal of child bearing and marriage. The mode age group of reproduction was 20–24 years in the era of communism, but in the post-socialist period it shifted towards to 25–29 years.¹⁷ The decline of marriages is accompanied with the increase of divorces.¹⁸ Another change in the 1990s the extraordinary

¹¹ Ibid., 262.

¹² Vassilev, R., Op. cit., 71–87.

¹³ Ibid., 72–74.

¹⁴ Rangelova, R. Bio-demographic Change and Socio-economic Trends in Bulgaria. – *Economics and Human Biology*, 1, 2003, 417.

¹⁵ Georgieva, P. Bulgaria: The Double Edge of Economy and Demography. – *Higher Education in Europe*. 29, 2004, N 3, 364.

¹⁶ Christov, Vl. et al., A Report on the Demographic Characteristics and the State of Men's Health in Bulgaria. – *JMHG*, 1, 2004, N 2–3, 92.

¹⁷ Pamporov, Al. Patterns of Family Formation: Marriage and Fertility Timing in Bulgaria at the Turn of the Twenty-first Century – A Case Study of Sofia. – *History of the Family*, 13, 2008, 211.

¹⁸ Taaffe, R. N. Population Structure. – In: Grothusen, Kl., D. (Ed.).

increase in extra-marital births.¹⁹ Child bearing is a personal choice, which is in relation with the changes in traditional attitudes towards life-course events. Persons would like stable positions in society and to maintain own household. In the first part of the 20th century this independency meant a separate room. In the post-war era it changed to an apartment, but in the post-socialist period a separate house meant this security, which is suitable to the size of the family.²⁰ According to Vassilev the norm of one-child families is the result of income losses and pessimistic expectations of future.²¹

Most of the scientific works blame the transition processes, especially the painful economic transition for the high level of population decline, but some other social aspects must be mentioned, which are the features of the modern (and postmodern) European societies. The trends of falling fertility rates appeared earlier during the 20th century, not only around the turn of the millennium. Taaffe collected the reasons of decreasing birth rates, like the increasing level of education, the lack of ability to care for children (both parent works and grandparents live far away from the city), the careers of women, the lack of domestic help and inadequate governmental stipends.²²

Besides the negative consequences to the economy, population decline burdens the future with another social problem, the situations of ethnic minorities in Bulgaria. The false minority politics of the Bulgarian communist regime resulted strained relations between Muslim minorities and ethnic Bulgarians in the 1980s. The excessive news about higher fertility rates of Roma and Turkish minorities, and the visions of national death indicate threatening in the majority and strengthen the ethnic conflicts in the 21st century.

Handbook on South Eastern Europe. Vol. 6. Göttingen, 1990, 438.

¹⁹ Pamporov, Al., Op. cit., 211.

²⁰ Ibid., 215.

²¹ Vassilev, R., Op. cit., 40, 2006, 1, 74.

²² Taaffe, R. N., Op. cit., 440.

SPATIAL PATTERN OF POPULATION DECLINE IN BULGARIA AFTER THE FALL OF COMMUNISM


According to the 1992 census 8.487.332 people lived in Bulgaria. This number was 7.928.091 in 2001 and 7.364.570 in 2011. In the last two decades the population decline was 13%, more than 1 million persons (1.122.752). In the transition era of the 1990s the rate of decrease was 6.58% (558.421 persons). After the fall of communism the economic and social crisis of the country influenced natural increase and migration processes. After the turn of the new millennium the trends and the intensity of demographic processes have not changed. In the first decade of the 21st century the rate of decline was 7.12% (564.331 persons). The challenges of EU accession and the new employment opportunities maintained the emigration process and the low birth rates.

The spatial pattern of population decline after the fall of communism shows the presence of the processes that had appeared in the socialist era (*Fig. 5*). The rural areas produced the highest rates of decrease, but the cities show positive tendencies. The worst trends can be observed in the north-western region of the country. The fall in population number is more than 50% in three obshtinas of oblast Vidin (Bojnica –59.72%, Makresh –55.02%, Gramada –51.35%). The decline is more than 30 per cent in the whole oblast of Vidin (except in the town of Vidin, –26.42%). The trends are the same in the neighbouring Montana and Pleven oblast, where only the obshtinas of the greatest settlements, Kozloduj (–11.52%) and Pleven (–18.27%) show lower decrease.

The western border region had great losses in the last decades too. The losses are more than 30% in the vast majority of the obshtinas in oblast Pernik and Kjustendil. Next to the Serbian border in obshtina Trekljano the population decline is 62%, and 52% in obshtina Nevestino (Macedonian border). The pulling effects of the capital city can be recognised in the

higher rates of population decline within these municipalities.

Figure 5. Changes in population number in the municipalities (obshtinas) of Bulgaria (1992-2011).



Source: NSI of Bulgaria

The population decrease is also higher in the southern and south-eastern areas of Bulgaria. The fall in number of inhabitants is more than 30% in every obshtinas of oblast Jambol (except in municipality of Jambol). The situation is the same in the southern obshtinas of oblast Kardjali and Haskovo (e.g. Madzharovo –59%). In the north-eastern region the population decline is more than 30% in the border obshtinas of Dobrich. Higher rates of decrease appear also in municipalities between Ruse, Razgrad and Veliko Tarnovo.


The counterpoints of declining are the cities of Bulgaria.

The capital city of Sofia (8%) and the cities of the Black Sea coast, Varna (9.39%) and Burgas (1.14%) could increase their population number. The coastal settlements with their developing tourism are the most attractive places to the inhabitants (Nesebar 18.4%, Aksakovo 13%). The population decline in Plovdiv (−0.8%) and in its neighbouring obshtinas is lower (under 10%), as in the cities of Veliko Tarnovo (−5.5%), Haskovo (−7.7%) and Stara Zagora (−8.7%). The rates of decrease are lower also in the obshtinas of the south-western region.

Ethnic Turks and Pomaks live in the obshtinas of Rodope Mountains. Their fertility indicators are better than that of ethnic Bulgarians. In the western obshtinas, the decline is smaller, but in the Eastern Rodope the migration processes strengthen the decrease. The economic features are also different in the two parts of the mountain. Western Rodope preserved its rural feature in the era of socialism, but the area of Kardjali was the scene of the hardest economic crisis in Bulgaria after the fall of communism. In the obshtinas of the North-Eastern region, where the number and rate of ethnic Turks is also higher, the rate of decline is under 10%.

The spatial patterns of declining trends show differences before and after the millennium (*Fig. 6*). In most obshtinas the rates of decrease were higher, but in some areas the 21st century has brought positive changes. Deteriorating tendencies became stronger mainly in the northern parts of the country, in the obshtinas near Ruse and in oblast Vidin, Montana and Pleven. Positive changes have appeared in trends after the millennium in Sofia and in coastal settlements. In the obshtinas where the number and rate of ethnic Turks are higher, the negative tendencies have decreased, especially in the southern obshtinas of Kardjali oblast. These trends refer to the changing features of migration processes. The rural Turkish inhabitants choose migration mainly before the millennium; they are probably less interested in the emigration towards EU countries.

Figure 6. Changes in population decline before and after the millennium in municipalities (obshtinas) of Bulgaria.



Source: NSI of Bulgaria

CONCLUSIONS

Negative demographic trends and slowing population growth are common features not only in Europe, but also in the whole world. Decrease raises some serious social and economic questions, but the vision of national death is unnecessary and only increases the social tensions.

The recent demographic decline of population in Bulgaria

is the result of the negative economic and social situation and the European cultural background. Low birth rates are typical in European countries and population decline can be measured in post-socialist states.

The changing living conditions, the internal migration from rural areas to urban settlements, the collapsing larger families and the employment of women resulted lower population growth after the Second World War. The low fertility rates and the false minority policy caused population decline in Bulgaria in the 1980s. The tendency continued in the years of hard economic crisis after the fall of communism. The changing economic, social and living conditions and the EU accession influenced demographic processes in the new millennium; the decrease remained round 7%.

The loss of population is higher in the rural areas, especially in the north-western region. The capital city of Bulgaria and cities of the Black Sea coast could maintain their population number, which indicates the internal migration directions and the reaction of the society to the challenges of the new millennium.

SOURCES OF DATA

Albania: <http://www.instat.gov.al/en/census.aspx>

Bosnia and Herzegovina: <http://www.popis2013.ba/index.php/en/>

Bulgaria: <http://www.nsi.bg/census2011/indexen.php>

Croatia: http://www.dzs.hr/default_e.htm

Czech Republic: <http://www.czso.cz/csu/2008edicniplan.nsf/engp/4032-08>

Estonia: <http://www.stat.ee/phc2011>

Hungary: http://www.ksh.hu/nepszamlalas/tablak_demografia

Latvia: <http://www.csb.gov.lv/en/statistikas-temas/population-census-30761.html>

Lithuania: <http://www.stat.gov.lt/en/>

Macedonia: http://www.stat.gov.mk/OblastOpsto_en.aspx?id=31

Montenegro: <http://www.monstat.org/cg/page.php?id=56&pageid=56>

Poland: <http://stat.gov.pl/en/topics/national-census-of-population-and-housing/>

Romania: <http://www.recensamantromania.ro/rezultate-2/>

Serbia: http://popis2011.stat.rs/?page_id=2162

Slovakia: <http://datacube.statistics.sk/SODB/>

Slovenia: http://www.stat.si/eng/tema_demografsko_prebivalstvo.asp

The International Labour Organization, Its Development in Hungary and the Current Situation in Bulgaria

Alex Ember

University of Szeged

I. THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF LABOUR LEGISLATION

Alongside with the establishment of the Second International in 1900 in Paris, the International Association for Labour Legislation (IALL) can be considered the immediate forerunner of the International Labour Organization. The first directors of the Organization were Léon Bourgeois (in office: 1895–1896)¹ and Ernest Manheim². The Legislation was established to serve as a link among those industrialized countries which deemed the legal protection of their workers important; also to initiate the establishment the ILO, to secure the regular publishing of legislations in French, German, and English, to aid the revision of laws of different countries, and to supply these countries with adequate information on laws in force and their application. The IALL also gave a helping hand for contracting countries preparing their memorandums, the statistics dealing with laws protecting workers, international statistics, and to organize international congresses on international workers' legislations.

The first session of the IALL was held in Bern, in 1906, where immediately two drafts were accepted, namely the ban

¹ Léon Victor Auguste Bourgeois (1851–1925) - the 64th Prime Minister of France.

² Ernest Aimé Joseph Manheim (1900–2002) - Belgian liberal politician.

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of use of white phosphorus³ in match factories and regulation of working conditions. In 1913, also in Bern, another two drafts were submitted: child labor under fourteen was completely, yet over sixteen and in connection with women was generally prohibited. Unfortunately, owing to the First World War the latter draft could not be realized.

But even the Legislation itself was not flawless. Employers, employees, and government delegates did not represent themselves in the IALL at all, only general practitioners, teachers, and lawyers were present, and owing to this, most of the times they were not always at disposal, therefore the Legislation was not able to function properly. Though great benefit of the IALL was that it paved the way for the ILO and three very important motives were preserved after the First World War: the practice of annual conferences, the institute of a central organization and the supervision of the implementation of conventions. During the twenty-five years of operation of the IALL, it seated in Basel. It was dissolved in 1925.⁴

1.1. THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

In January, 1918, Woodrow Wilson (in office: 1913–1921)⁵, the twenty-eight President of the United States of America submitted the final part of his 14 points, in which the last point reflected the need of an international organization for labor maters. The contracting parties of this organization granted the political freedom and the territorial integrity for each other, promoted international cooperation, offered security for its members, secured long lasting peace, and helped to settle

³ White phosphorus is a material produced from allotrope and used for for example the illumination of ammunition. The substance is flammable and therefore it is extremely dangerous to human health and life.

⁴ International Association for Labour Legislation (IALL). City University, London. <http://www.staff.city.ac.uk/tom.davies/IALL.html>; Johnston, G. A. The International Labour Organization. Its Work for Socail and Economical Progress. London, 1970.

⁵ Woodrow Wilson (1856–1924) – 28th President of the United States of America.

international disputes. Wilson's idea of the League of Nations (Société des Nations) found widespread support, though faced with many unexpected obstacles; therefore, during his term Wilson was not able to see the United States among the contracting countries of the League.

The horrors of the First World War provided a sound reason for establishing such an organization, which later on could even prevent a similar international catastrophe. Seeing the scale of the support, Wilson had taken the matters into his hands and travelled to Europe to the peace conferences which were to secure the end of the War. Here in Paris he propagated his ideas among the countries present and used all of his might to see the establishment of the League as a part of the Peace Treaty of Versailles (1919). Finally, alongside Wilson, great men, such as Georges Clemenceau (in office: 1917–1921)⁶ and David Lloyd George (in office: 1916–1922)⁷ helped drafting the first section of the contract.

The League had two main organs: the assembly, where five members seated, and the council, which consisted of five constant and four temporary members. This was further completed by the Permanent Court of International Justice.⁸ The Court was established in 1922, and was specified by the Covenant of the League of Nations. It had become the first such institute with a perpetual, international, and general jurisdiction. During its twenty-four years of operation, the Court had dealt with twenty-nine international litigious cases, out of which twenty-seven ended with consensus. Undoubtedly the Court also helped to clarify and to improve numerous international legislative questions. The functioning of the Court ceased in 1946; from that year on the primary judicial organization of the latter United Nations (UN), the International Court of Justice took its place.⁹

⁶ Georges Benjamin Clemenceau (1841–1929) - the 72nd Prime Minister of France.

⁷ George Lloyd George (1863–1945) - the 52nd Prime Minister of Great-Britain.

⁸ The League of Nations, 1920. Milestones: 1914–1920. U.S. Department of State. Office of the Historian. <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1914-1920/league>.

⁹ International Court of Justice. Permanent Court of Justice. Publications of

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According to the contracting nations, one of the most important roles of the League was to respect one another's territorial sovereignty while they endowed the organization with every possible asset to protect peace. The League could carry this out by using economic sanctions or even military force.

Beside the overwhelming support, the opposition had also raised its voice. Already in 1919, during the Paris peace conference they criticized Wilson's participation in the establishment of such organization, which at the end resulted that the United States did not join the League.

The United States has never joined the League and due to this fact the League proved less effective. In spite of this, Wilson had always agreed with its goals; from time to time the United States even helped the League. Finally, Wilson's dream had come true, though the Paris Peace Conference had not realized its aims. By time the Conference had lost its credibility and had become too extreme in its instructions.

The surfacing peril of another world war had furthermore strengthened the legitimacy of an organization similar to the League to settle international disputes. In accordance the American public and the Roosevelt (in office: 1933–1945)¹⁰ cabinet supported the 1945 establishment the United Nations (les Nations unies) as the heir of the League of Nations.¹¹

1.2. THE AFTERMATH OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR

In 1918 the Germans launched the so called spring offensive (Kaiserschlacht) owing to which they awaited the turn of the table, but the failure of the offensive had sealed the fate of the German Empire for good. In this very year Bulgaria also

the Permanent Court of International Justice (1922–1946).

<http://www.icj-cij.org/pcij/?p1=9>

¹⁰ Franklin Delano Roosevelt (1882–1945) - the 32nd President of the United States of America.

¹¹ The League of Nations..., Op. cit.

surrendered¹² and this was the time when Great-Britain found timely to organize a peace conference during which several questions in relation with the working class had to be considered.

The establishment of an international labor committee could not be hindered any more for several reasons. Many nations, including the German Empire, would have liked to protect its workers, and so the German Emperor, Max von Baden (reign: 1918)¹³ had pulled all strings for such a committee that would further strengthen the stability of the individual states. Another barely disguised aim of the committee was that it could provide ground for nations to settle their disputed political matters.

The first memorandum (Joint Memorandum by the Home Office and Ministry of Labour) on the post-war situation of the working class was born in 1918. According to this, the task of the developed countries ought to have been to help the establishment of a committee. This should have been carried out before the restoration of the free market since afterwards it would have been hard to settle wages and labor circumstances; also the failure of all this would have sent the message that the peace conference would have only supported the trade interests of the capitalists.¹⁴

In 1919 the war had already past and the preparations of the Paris peace conference had commenced. A second memorandum also came to light which is related to Edward J. Phelan.¹⁵ According to his memorandum the future organization must have to have to main organs: the office and an annual conference. Phelan supported an organization which would be above all nations, but would only be as effective as the contracting

¹² The surrender of Bulgaria was sealed by the Treaty of Neuilly in Nov., 1919.

¹³ Maximilian von Baden (1867–1926) - prince and politician, 8th Chancellor of Germany (1918).

¹⁴ Alcock, A. History of the International Labour Organization. London, 1971, 18–19.

¹⁵ The first international office-holder and the 4th Director-General of the ILO (1941–1948).

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nations were willing to carry out the collective agreements. The idea faced many obstacles. The first was to determine the circle of non-governmental members. Although, according to the convention the given country should make the choice, to become aware of the full picture the participation of the employers and employees was required as well. Maintaining a healthy balance, as Phelan suggested, the governmental delegates should have two, the employer and employee delegates should have one-one votes. The second problem lied in the difference of levels of economic power among nations. This would mean that the economically more advanced countries might accept such conventions that the less advanced countries could not execute; consequently to accept a proposal, the two-third of all votes were required. The third problem was how to enforce nations to employ the accepted conventions. The solution to this would be if the nations provided supervision over each other, but even in this case the matter of penalties would have remained an open question. The fourth and final question was that the economically more advanced countries could have had more votes or not. According to Phelan this would be against the spirituality of the future organization and the less advanced countries would only see the downside of the collaboration.

Despite all the progressive approach, Phelan's suggestion had one great fault, though finally his proposal served the base for the latter International Labour Organization it did not have the disposal of an executive organ; now, only his memorandum had to be divided into articles.

Phelan's faults were amended by Harold Butler¹⁶, who, in his memorandum did think of an executive organ, the Governing Body in which the great five, Great-Britain, France, the United States of America, Italy, and Japan took a seat. Besides the governmental delegates, non-governmental representatives,

¹⁶ Harold Butler (1883–1951) - the Secretary-General of the first ILO Conference and the Director-General of the Organization between 1932 and 1938.

delegates of employers and employees were also deputed. Butler's aims are detailed in the Preamble.¹⁷

Phelan and Butler's memorandums together constituted the so-called Phelan-Butler Draft, which basically provides the composition of the governing body and deals with the avoidance of putting conventions into effect. Altogether twenty-four people had place in the governing body: twelve people from the great five, seven from other nations and six from the employer side and six from the employee side. The contracting nations had to make a report annually about the ratified conventions, and about those conventions they did not ratify with the addition of why it could not be done. The existing office is supplemented by the Permanent Court of International Justice, and most importantly it had to be an integrated part of the League of Nations.

The Labour Council consisted of fifteen members: two from each of the great five and five from other countries; two from Belgium, and one from Poland, one from Cuba, and one from Czechoslovakia. Respect for the United States Samuel Gompers (1850-1924)¹⁸ was elected as the chairman of the conference.¹⁹

1.3. THE LABOR LEGISLATIONS OF THE PEACE CONFERENCES

After the First World War it became obvious that that the capitalists had to give in to the working class and finally come up with some practical measures. By the 1920s the situation had become untenable and the governments had to intervene into economic freedom. At the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries the thought had become fit for to entrust the legal

¹⁷ Alcock, A., Op. cit., 21–24.

¹⁸ American cigar manufacturer, the founder of the American Federation of Labor.

¹⁹ Alcock, A., Op. cit., 24–26.

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regulation of labor to an international organization.

In the last years of the 19th century, the discussion had commenced which prepared the 1919 founding conference. The initial congresses were held under the aegis of the Second International. The first important congress was held in 1889 in Paris, and later in Brussels (1891), in Zürich (1893), in London (1896), again in Paris (1900), in Amsterdam (1904), in Stuttgart (1907), in Copenhagen (1910), and as an exceptional conference, in Basel (1912). During these conferences, the participants listed all those points, which were deemed crucial by the working class. The four years of the war had shed light upon the fact that the everyday worker owed his country not just with his labor, but with his blood, therefore cardinal question of the conferences were the military service of the working class. Further points were the eight hour working day, the regulation and banning of the night, the women's and children's work, the protection of labor, the voting rights of women, education, the rights of labor, the regulation of the strike-rights and the role of trade unions.

In 1919, based on the statements, memorandums, and suggestions of the different nations a declaration was set for the Versailles Peace Conference to be ratified, which finally practically became the Constitution of the ILO. The Constitution has two parts: the first consists of the suggestions and measures for the perpetual organization; the second explains the labor clauses.

The first important conference after the War was the Bern Conference of 1919, which practically framed and prepared the program of the international charta of labor. Still, in the very same year, in Paris another conference took place, which further strengthened that the peace conferences after the War must deal with the labor legislations and the establishment of an institution dealing with such matters. During this the national key concepts should have conciliated with the national legislations, the supervision of all this ought to have been organized, and, among the frames of the organization, the proportion of the employers and employees must have been set.

The Peace Treaty also should have contained all of those points which were spoken of before the War; the regulation of working hours, the setup of a social security system, establishing the minimum level of wages, raising the national social regulations on international level, setting up a pension system, the reorganization of a labor supervision system and the regulations regarding women and children.

The basis of the above outlined new, permanent and autonomous international organization is in part XIII of the Versailles Peace Treaty ratified on July 28, 1919. In accordance with this many general principles were drafted in the peace treaties bound with Austria in Saint-Germain, with Hungary in Versailles, and with Bulgaria in Neuilly. By these treaties every contracting country, which were also the members of the League of Nations, kept their pledge to the establishment of equitable criteria within the frames of the institute, and for the support of the institution they also contribute to it financially.²⁰

II. HUNGARY

After the downfall of the Hungarian Soviet Republic (Magyar Tanácsköztársaság), the first phase of joining the International Labour Organization for Hungary had begun. In 1921 when Governor Miklós Horthy (in office: 1920–1944)²¹ appointed István Bethlen (in office: 1921–1931)²² as the Prime Minister of the Hungarian Kingdom. Still in 1921, Bethlen's conservative party and Károly Peyer's²³ socialist party agreed, and together they worked out the so-called Bethlen-Peyer Pact. The Pact had a significant importance for both parties; neither of them desired another coup similar of the previous years.

²⁰ Tatomin, N. A Munka Nemzetközi Szervezete. Bp., 1964, 5–7.

²¹ Miklós Horthy (1868–1957) - the Governor of the Hungarian Kingdom.

²² István Bethlen (1874–1946) - the 27th Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Hungary.

²³ Károly Peyer (1881–1956) - the Home Secretary of Hungary (1919) and one of the leading figures of the socialist movement between the two world wars.

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This political compromise turned out to be favorable for both the conservatives and the socialists as well and the pressure on the socialists seemed to ease somewhat. The Hungarian Social-Democratic Party (Magyar Szociáldemokrata Párt – MSZDP) could freely run in the elections and could represent itself at the parliament. For all this, they had to cease the organization of public servants, postmen, and railroad workers, the agitation of peasantry, and the organization of political strikes; they had to finish the association with the emigrant socialist politicians, and had to support Bethlen in every way in his foreign relations. In return, the MSZDP demanded that the workers' organizations could continue working freely, that Bethlen should grant the right of freedom, and restore the institution of workers' insurance. Thank to the pact, the MSZDP became one of the leading parties of the political palette until the 1930s. They supported the rights of workers, but had not yet given up class struggle and the organization of rural workers. With this Bethlen's party officially acknowledged the MSZDP as a political factor, although it is also true that they did not desire to share political leadership with them.

Hungary had stabilized and it was also pleasing for the West that the advance of Bolsheviks was halted. In 1922 the Bethlen administration asked for admission to the League of Nations which at the same time meant the admission to the International Labour Organization. Hungary now could again ask for Western loan, what happened in 1924, therefore the country was able to start rebuilding.²⁴

Although the organization had not yet voted Hungary into the Governing Body, but already in 1925 Hungarian officials were working for the Organization. At this time separate office had not been working in the country, but a local correspondent had been informing the Governing Body about the actual

²⁴ Vass, V. A magyar demokratikus munkásmozgalom rövid története, 1919-1944. Bp., 1999, 25–30.

happenings and also Hungary had appeared in the publications of the Organization several times. The aim of the Bethlen administration was safely allocate Hungarian delegates into most committees and with help of the Organization elevate the Hungarian labor to the levels of the age. For this end, until its resignation, the Bethlen administration had ratified numerous conventions.

Hungary lost the Second World War. In the wartime years battles in the territory of Hungary, the leaving German forces, and the occupying Soviet Red Army practically devastated the country. The hardest hit sectors were the transportation, the agriculture and the manufacturing industry.

Between 1945 and 1948 much of the country's revenues were turned to the payment of indemnities. The economy was devastated which resulted in one of the greatest inflation of currency in the history of the world. The stabilization of economy could not be solved without Western help.

After the War the structure of economy was characterized by the private property, but the systematical socialization had soon changed this situation. In 1946 the mines, which might even seem a logical step, were socialized but the following moves only served the consolidation of the communist authority. Consequently the biggest industrial firms (1946), in the banks (1947), the firms employing more than one hundred workers (1948) became socialized. By this time four of every five workers became a government employee. But the socialization did not ceased; the companies employing more than ten workers (1949), the crafts employing more than three employees (1950) got into communist hands. By the 1950s the socialization was almost complete in Hungary, the idea of compensation had not even surfaced and company leaders were systematically removed by series of tresspasses.²⁵

²⁵ A magyar gazdaság átalakulása. Országos Széchenyi Könyvtár. 1956-os Intézet és Oral History Archívum. 2001.

http://www.rev.hu/sulinet45/tanulm_gazd/gazd.htm

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The forced change of regime and the complete control of communism over Hungary was born. The main figure behind this was Mátyás Rákosi (in office: 1945–1953)²⁶. Under his control his party the Hungarian Communist Party (Magyar Kommunista Párt – MKP)²⁷ defeated all of its political enemies and even assimilated the MSZDP. The political cleanup continued within his own party too; as a consequence he was able to realize a Soviet-style dictatorial socialism. Under his reign the politics criminalized and exploitation overshadowed the economy.²⁸

The relationship between the ILO and Hungary had suffered the greatest during the Rákosi era. In 1945 with the surrender of Japan the second Chinese–Japan war (1937–1945) was over, but right afterwards a devastating civil war had broke out. The communists had over the nationalists who had to flee to the island of Taiwan. The communists did not recognize this newly formed. Seeing the advancement of the communist the United States of America desired to protect the nationalists and it even used its naval fleet to confirm its standpoint in the matter. The scale of American intervention enraged the communists and as a guarantee of loyalty, the Hungarian delegation left the International Labour Conference in 1949 and kept aloof from the collaboration with the Organization until 1954.²⁹

In 1989–1990 Europe could witness Hungary's second change of regime during which the governmental property and the single party system gave its way to the private property and the system of multiple party parliamentary representation. The influence of the government had significantly lessened

²⁶ Mátyás Rákosi (1892–1971) - the leader of the Hungarian Communist Party (1945–1953) and the Secretary-General of the Hungarian People's Republic (1952–1953).

²⁷ The leading political force after the occupation of the Red Army of Hungary (1944–1948).

²⁸ Bihari, M. Magyar politika. A magyar politikai rendszer történetének főbb szakaszai a második világháború után. 1945–1995. Bp., 1996, 12–13.

²⁹ A Tajvan-kérdés. – Biztonságpolitikai Szemle, 2010.

http://biztpol.corvinusembassy.com/?module=corvinak&module_id=4&cid=88#C

and the role of private property had strengthened, though the change did not completely meant breaking away from socialism; the system of traditions had been still haunting the country for several decades. At this time did Hungary become part of the European economy and government of laws. From 1996 Hungary again became an ordinary member of the ILO. In the following twenty years the current political parties had managed to realize yet another twenty-one conventions.³⁰

Since 2000 Hungary serves as a donor country to the ILO which means that with the foundation of the IPEC (International Programme on the Elimination of Child Labour) program, the country financially contributes to the technical running of the Organization. The Nemzetgazdasági Minisztérium (Ministry for National Economy) has strong relationship with other ministries and the employer and employee organizations.³¹ The participants are the following: From governmental side: a) Nemzetgazdasági Minisztérium (Ministry for National Economy), b) Központi Statisztikai Hivatal (Hungarian Central Statistical Office), c) Emberi Erőforrások Minisztériuma (Ministry of Human Resources), d) Külgazdasági és Külügyminisztérium (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade); from employer side: a) Munkaadók és Gyáriparosok Országos Szövetsége – MGYOSZ (Confederation of Hungarian Employers and Industrialists), b) Vállalkozók és Munkáltatók Országos Szövetsége – VOSZ (National Association of Employers and Entrepreneurs); From employee side: a) Magyar Szakszervezetek Országos Szövetsége – MSZOSZ (National Confederation of Hungarian Trade Unions), b) Autonóm Szakszervezetek Szövetsége – AszSz (Autonomous Trade Union Confederation), c) Szakszervezetek Együttműködési Fóruma – SZEZ (The Forum for the Co-operation of Trade

³⁰ Bihari, M., *Op. cit.*, 16–17.

³¹ Magyarország és az ILO kapcsolata. Nemzetgazdasági Minisztérium. Szakmai Területek.

<http://ngmszakmaiteruletek.kormany.hu/akadalymentes/magyarorszag-es-az-ilo-kapcsolata>.

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Unions), d) A Független Szakszervezetek Demokratikus Ligája – LIGA (Democratic League of Free Trade Unions), e) Munkástanácsok Országos Szövetsége – MOSZ (National Federation of Workers' Councils), f) Értelmiségi Szakszervezeti Tömörülés – ÉSZT (Confederation of Unions of Professionals)³².

III. BULGARIA

Bulgaria is a member state of the International Labour Organization since 6.12.1920 and a member of the United Nations since 14.12.1955. Bulgaria was among one of the first ten states that ratified the most Conventions of ILO. Bulgaria is represented by the Labour and Social Policy Minister at the ILO and its governing bodies, respectively. Since its admission to the ILO it has ratified 84 Conventions out of the 184 existing Conventions, which also include the 8 core Conventions: 1) Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29). Ratified: 22.09.1932. Convention is still in force, 2) Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize Convention, 1948 (No. 87). Ratified: 8.06.1959. Convention is still in force, 3) Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98). Ratified: 8.06.1959. Convention is still in force, 4) Equal Remuneration Convention, 1951 (No. 100). Ratified: 7.11.1955. Convention is still in force, 5) Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, 1957 (No. 105). Ratified: 23.03.1999. Convention is still in force, 6) Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention, 1958 (No. 111). Ratified: 22.07.1960. Convention is still in force, 7) Minimum Age Convention, 1973 (No. 138). Ratified: 23.04.1980. Convention is still in force, 8) Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, 1999 (No. 182). Ratified: 28.07.2000. Convention is still in force.

The above mentioned 84 Conventions had been ratified by the end 2002. It may be interesting to mention that the year of

³² Hungary, ILO.

<http://www.ilo.org/budapest/countries-covered/hungary/lang--en/index.htm>

2002, which was of great importance, as in June of that year Bulgaria became honorary member of the Administrative Committee. Previously Bulgaria was only a substitute member of the Administrative Committee. The ILO has long-lasting relationship with the Bulgarian government and the Bulgarian organizations of employers and employees, namely: from governmental side – with the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy, the National Statistical Institute, the Ministry of Education and Science, as well as the National Employment Agency; from employer side – with the Bulgarian Industrial Association, the Balkans Investment Consulting Agency; from employee side – with the Confederation of Independent Trade Unions of Bulgaria, the Confederation of Labour “Podkrepa”. Bulgaria’s connection is outstanding as, she does everything that she can to keep and preserve this good communication and connection with the International Labour Organization. It is worth mentioning that Bulgaria kept this good, frank and open relationship with the ILO, despite all troubles and problems that arise from the field of everyday labour.

Tracing Bulgarian–Hungarian Language Contact

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1. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

Interdisciplinary approaches offer solutions to various fields of research and such “multi-sources” are undoubtedly assisting linguistic analyses as well. It is namely the rediscovering of the already existing data that can sometimes shed light on certain linguistic issues.

The present paper aims at revealing specific manifestations of Bulgarian–Hungarian language contact which differ largely in their parameters. It focuses on two realizations taking place at different periods of the development of the languages in question. The purpose is to highlight the linguistic outcome of certain geopolitical historic events in the contact of two non-neighbouring, genealogically and typologically distant languages, Bulgarian and Hungarian.

1.1. The Area of Language Contact

Undoubtedly, the phenomenon of language contact, and the way it affects the structure of languages, has been of great interest to linguists in recent years. This may be contributed also to the fact that in the early 21st century we find linguistic “minorities” in virtually every country of the world. In modernity, having one mother tongue and residing in a country with another (different from the mother tongue) language is more of a regularly

encountered linguistic situation, rather than of a surprising one.

The general opinion of the researchers – despite the differences which exist in regards to the degree of influence various language structures demonstrate as result of language contact – is that the *bilingualist* (a generalized term denoting also trilinguists etc.), as well as the so-called *intercultural identification* are the main factors triggering language change on the level of contact. *Intercultural identification* is a sociolinguistic term with a rather elastic definition when applied to linguistic analyses. It is well-known that there exist two basic types of language contact definitions: the so-called psycholinguistic, where the individual is in the center of research and treats cases of bilingualism, for example, and the sociolinguistic, where a given group of individuals exposed to more than one language is in the center of research. More specifically, a group where the mother tongue is different from the language of their residence, or are part of a multicultural society (as in Switzerland, Algeria, or Belgium, for example). Bilingualistics – a rather disputable interdisciplinary field – manages to integrate these two main approaches, departing from the individual and generalizing the systematically occurring idiosyncratic realizations. The research in this particular direction advances rather slowly, unfortunately, and it is modest in gaining more popularity among linguists¹.

1.2. On the Parameters of Language Contact Analysis

When aiming at tracing and systemizing the linguistic results of a given language contact we are bound to enter a rather rough terrain. The phenomenon of language contact itself manifests in such large boundaries that it makes it a challenge to post common frames for analyses. As a result, the attempts to construct a common apparatus for language contact analyses are quite numerous. In this

¹ Pöppel, E., Y. Bao. Temporal Windows as Bridge from Objective Time to Subjective Time. – In: Arstila, V., D. Lloyd (Eds). Subjective Time: the Philosophy, Psychology and Neuroscience of Temporality. Cambridge, 2014, 241–261.

respect, coming quite handy is the work of Thomason,² where she presents a synthesis of the main parameters appearing in this research filed. This rather interesting and elaborated generalization is given in an adapted form in the appendix below, since the main purpose here is to pinpoint a realization of a language contact and not to enter the theoretical discussions.

A number of authors also argue for a so-called *borrowing scale*, which would allow to foresee what kind of elements are expected to be borrowed during a more intensive language contact. The scale could be presented as in the table below:

sporadic contact ↑↓	→ light intensity of contact ↑↓	→ medium intensity of contact ↑↓	→ very intensive contact ↑↓
- more peripheral words, incl. verbs; - no transfer of language structure	- non-basic vocabulary; functional words; minimal borrowing of structure; - phonological characteristics of the donor language	- functional words; various vocabulary, incl. words from closed classes, e.g. pronouns; - borrowing of structure (without serious typological switch in the recipient language) on phonological level (e.g. prosodic characteristics, changes in the syllable structure etc.), on morphological level (e.g. suffixes) and on syntactic level (e.g. changes in word order).	- unlimited vocabulary borrowing; - massive borrowing of language structures which lead to serious typological changes in the recipient language

² Thomason, S. G. Language Contact. Edinburgh, 2001.

In a nutshell, the main parameters give the following aspect of language contact „pre-planning”: firstly, vocabulary is borrowed before language structure, i.e. the lexical elements are the first ones to „cross” the language borders. Further on, the words in peripheral stratum of the lexicon could be borrowed even in a non-intensive language contact. The increasing of the intensity of the language contact leads to the including of more/additional characteristics of the language donor in the borrowing process.

The concept of *intensity of contact*, employed by a large number of linguists, is in fact quite vague. For example, how could this concept *specify* the level of intensity which is found in the language contact between English and Hungarian on the level of nation-state, i.e. in Hungarian language minorities in English language environment? Also, what is the level of intensity of language contact between Dutch and French in Belgium (potentially large number of bilinguals)? Although this concept is very appropriate and adequate in regards to language contact situations in general, it still remains rather subjective when applied to a linguistic-orientated analysis.

2. BULGARIAN-HUNGARIAN LANGUAGE CONTACT: MANIFESTATIONS

The two main moments of language contact between Bulgarian and Hungarian language are defined by the periods when substantial/compact groups of people – native speakers of each of the languages – had direct contact (and subsequently the need of intensive language exchange).

2.1. Bulgarian (Donor Language) - Hungarian (Recipient Language)

It is not surprising, therefore, that the language contact which led to Slavic and more specifically, Bulgarian lexical mark on the Hungarian language, took place namely during the first

encounter of Bulgarian and Hungarian speaking people, most probably in the Carpathian basin, during 9th–10th century (as argued by Tóth³). The result of this language contact did not remain temporary, on the contrary, the Hungarian lexicon hosted permanently a substantial number of Slavic (incl. Bulgarian) lexical elements. Extensive and rich data lie in the works of Hungarian Slavists who have devoted much of their research namely to collect and identify lexical elements with Slavic origin.⁴ Here however we do not enter the large discussion regarding the exact Slavic donor language (which is occupying predominantly the publications in that field), since this is far from the focus of the current work. Rather, it should be noted that the presence of the Slavic loans in various lexicon layers (kinship terms, everyday life, church/state, calendar etc.) clearly reveals the fact that there has been a language contact, where language material from Bulgarian shifted into Hungarian. One quite interesting aspect is that it took place roughly a century ago, which leaves us with two main tools for the analysis: historical information and linguistic data (both from the perspective of the history of the language and present day state of the system), and minimizes the socio-pragmatic factor.

2.2. Hungarian (Donor Language) – Bulgarian (Recipient Language)

Approximately ten centuries after the first language contact between Bulgarian and Hungarian we witness another language transfer. This time the direction is from Hungarian to Bulgarian and it is manifested in the language of the Bulgarian minority which finds itself in Hungarian language environment during the first decades of the 20th century. This particular language

³ Tóth, I. A magyar és szláv együttélés kérdései a Kárpát medencében. - In: *Bibliotheca Slavica Savariensis* III. Szombathely, 1996, 213–218; Тот, И. По въпроса за славянските заеми в угарски език. – БЗ, 2006, N 1, 91–98.

⁴ Zoltán, A. Szavak, szólások, szövegek. Nyelvészeti és filológiai tanulmányok. Bp., 2005.

contact can easily find its place among the many other typical of the modernity language minorities all around the world. Bulgarian-speaking (as well as Hungarian-speaking, by the way) groups are found in quite some places, most often in the so-called traditional emigrant destinations such as Australia, Canada, USA, South Africa, and also the more recent ones – Greece, Spain, United Kingdom, Germany. The previously mentioned destinations are the ones chosen by migrants nowadays (due to political and economic reasons). Bulgarian-speaking minorities are present in Rumania, Ukraine, Serbia, Greece, Turkey etc and they are the result of an earlier wave when large compact masses got “transferred” into non-Bulgarian language environment (due to migration or re-mapping of state borders).

The presence of Bulgarian-Hungarian language contact on the territory of Hungary clearly predefines the influence of the Hungarian language structures over the Bulgarian language. The mother tongue of the so-called “Bulgarian gardeners” (here we use this familiar for all who work with any Bulgarian-related issue term) has been the object of investigation and there exist some linguistic works (e.g. Menyhárt and her interesting observations on the language of the children in that minority)⁵. The impression is that the interest of the linguists who work with that language material is directed namely towards the Bulgarian of the gardeners in Hungary. The changes and metamorphoses which have occurred as a result of the language contact are traced in the recipient language. From the point of view of Hungarian language research it would be undoubtedly quite interesting to trace which Hungarian language structures have entered the “Bulgarian of the gardeners” the earliest and with least obstacles. Also, it is intriguing to follow the ways in which the phonological system reacts under the constant pressure of Hungarian.

⁵ Менхарт, К. Резултати в проучването на някои аспекти на двуезичието при българо-унгарски двуезични деца. – ЕЛ, 2011/2012, N 3-4, 51–65.

3. FINAL NOTES

Undoubtedly, it is of prime interest to trace whether there exists a preference towards a given pattern in the borrowing of language material that appears universally, i.e. which is found in various languages. The way to give an overall picture of the universality in the language contact mechanisms is – naturally – by taking into account the language specific investigations. The present work is yet another small note which has marked two rather different but at the same time very rich language contacts between Bulgarian and Hungarian.

Appendix

Table 1. Typologies of language contact: linguistic results and processes.

1. Language change as a result of contact
→ Typology of defining types and degrees of language change: <ul style="list-style-type: none">- social factors;- intensity of contact;- presence or lack of partial language acquisition;- speakers' attitude;- linguistic factors;- universal markedness.
→ Degree of integration of "imported" linguistic characteristics <ul style="list-style-type: none">- typological distance between the recipient language and the donor language;- typology of the effects on the structure of the recipient language;- loss of characteristics;- adding characteristics;- shifting characteristic.
→ Typology of the mechanisms of language changes <ul style="list-style-type: none">- code-switching;- language code shifting;- passive knowledge;- 'negotiation'.
→ Strategies in foreign language acquisition <ul style="list-style-type: none">- conscious decision;

- effects on native language acquisition.
2. Extreme language interaction: typology of languages which have occurred as a result of contact, i.e. contact languages <ul style="list-style-type: none">- pidgin languages;- Creole languages;- mixing on bilingual level.
3. Typology of the 'routes' of the dying languages <ul style="list-style-type: none">- loss of language material;- changing/substituting grammar categories;- no structure loss, minimal borrowing.

Source: Thomason, S. G., Op. cit., 2001, 60–77.

Petar Miyatev (1906–1991) and Bulgarian–Hungarian Language Relations

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Petar Dimitrov Miyatev was a prominent Bulgarian scientist who contributed to the development of the Bulgarian-Hungarian linguistic relations. He was born on July 20, 1906 in the town of Peshtera. He completed his primary education in Dolni Dubnik, a village in the Pleven district, and his secondary education in the town of Plovdiv. Petar Miyatev studied law at the Sofia University of “St Kliment Ohridski” and then transferred to history and archeology major. In 1927 he left “St Kliment Ohridski” University. In 1929 he obtained a scholarship from the Ministry of Education and in 1931 he graduated in Turkish and Slavic studies in Budapest. After completing his higher education, he defended his doctoral dissertation in philosophy titled “Contribution to the explanation of the Bashkir tribes and names” at the Budapest University. In 1940 his dissertation was published in Japanese. In 1931–1932 he completed specialization studies in Berlin and Istanbul.¹

In 1932 he became manager at the National Museum of Plovdiv. Since 1935 he began his research as a manager at the Oriental Department of the National Library. In 1942 P. Miyatev was sent to Hungary as a teacher of Bulgarian language at the Budapest University and a manager of the Bulgarian Cultural Institute. The Bulgarian language was included in the Slavic

¹ НА-БАН, ф. 156.

Studies major at the Budapest University of “Péter Pázmány” in 1875-1876.² Then Aurel Meyer, a professor in Indo-European studies, taught the subject of Old Bulgarian grammar.³

After his return to Bulgaria in 1945 he became a part-time professor at the Sofia University of “St Kliment Ohridski” in comparative grammar of Turkic languages and lectured on Introduction to Turkic Studies. Since 1947 he worked at the BAS.⁴

At the beginning he worked as a manager of the Archives Department at the BAS, and later he became a senior fellow and worked at the Institute of History (BAS). In 1957 Miyatev became a candidate of historical sciences, and since 1964 he worked at the Institute for Balkan Studies (BAS). In 1971 he was appointed a professor at the Institute for Balkan Studies-BAS. For his 60-year anniversary P. Miyatev was awarded the “St Cyril and Methodius” medal.⁵

Petar Miyatev published over 300 scientific papers and analyses in Bulgarian and foreign magazines and newspapers. His scientific interests were history and linguistics for many years. He compiled three volumes of documents from the archive of K. Ireček, one volume containing documents on the history of the Bulgarian Literary Society, and one volume documents from the Bulgarian and Serbian history, derived from the Hungarian archives. P. Miyatev was a Hungarian graduate and was among the founders of the Bulgarian archives⁶.

A significant and valuable contribution of Miyatev was his work on compiling the first Hungarian-Bulgarian dictionary, released in 1956 by the BAS.

² Ibid.

³ Пейковска, П. Българистиката в Унгария. – В: Българистиката по света. С., 2009, 69.

⁴ НА-БАН, ф. 156.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Пейковска, П. Творческото общуване между унгарски и български езиковеди от втората половина на XIX в. и първите десетилетия на XX век. – ЕЛ, 2011/2012, № 3-4, 156.

P. Miyatev worked also on the ethnic origin of the ancient Bulgarians and their relationship with other Turkic tribes and peoples. His works clarified important problems from the Bulgarian history related to the origin of the Bulgarians. He sought and published documents on the life of the Bulgarians during the Ottoman slavery, on the Bulgarian revolutionary movement, on the library science in Bulgaria, on the cultural and linguistic relations between Bulgaria and Hungary in the twentieth century etc.

The interest in literary language was completely natural and logical, since it realized all spiritual culture of human society and all forms of social consciousness, social-political and administrative-legal ideas and concepts.

The dynamic public life strongly influenced the rapid development of language links between the Bulgarian and Hungarian languages. This affected mostly the lexical layer of the language, which quickly reacted to public changes. The development trends in the vocabulary of the language were expressed with the rapid influx of new words that enabled the scholars to more accurately express the nuances of their thoughts and feelings.⁷

The main driving forces of social development were the driving forces of the language's dynamics too.

The creation of the Hungarian-Bulgarian dictionary was according to the agreement on cultural cooperation between Bulgaria and Hungary. It was made under the leadership of Acad. Stoyan Romanski working at the Institute for Bulgarian Language-BAS, and the compilers were P. Miyatev and his wife Ireyn Oppelts-Miyatev.

Undoubtedly, the vocabulary wealth helped establish closer ties between the two peoples through their mutual understanding by learning in both languages (Bulgarian and Hungarian). Thus, to people from one nationality would be easier to learn the language of other nationalities, to benefit from foreign

⁷ Виденов, М. Норма и реч. С., 1986, 79.

literature, and to gradually use and understand it.⁸

In view of the tasks set for the creation of the Hungarian-Bulgarian dictionary all possible words from the contemporary Magyar language were included, even some old or obsolete were also compiled, as they were still alive in use. Completeness required also to include some colloquial and slang-words well known in literary language. Particular attention was paid to the use of phraseological entities, which was often explained with relevant phrases from the Bulgarian language. Proverbs and sayings were applied as examples because they best reflected the spirit of the language.⁹ Technical terms, geographical names, botanical and zoological names were presented in the dictionary because they were an essential part of the composition of the literary language. The dictionary was printed in parts and therefore, the desired unity was not possible to achieve, as it was the case with dictionaries compiled and printed entirely. For this reason a part of the material, the first ten volumes was printed in the old spelling, and as a result from the changes in the spelling of the Magyar language, the rest was written in the new orthography.¹⁰

The dictionary was made with a view to its practical use to facilitate students of both languages in the use of the word wealth.

In the preface of the “Magyar grammar” by Boris Paunov Petar Miyatev stated that Bulgarians lived in the Magyar country and worked mainly as gardeners who were had to learn the local language at great effort.¹¹ The grammar of the spoken Magyar language was too simplistic, because this guide was mainly adapted to the spoken language. Miyatev noted: “The Magyar language is rich, sonorous and flexible. Its long, closed and open vowels give special musicality, which the student will understand only when advance a little

⁸ Миятев, П., И. Опелц-Мятева, И. Унгарско-български речник. С., 1956, 5.

⁹ Ibid., 5.

¹⁰ Ibid., 6.

¹¹ Миятев, П. Предговор. – В: Паунов, Б. Маджарска граматика. С., 1940, 1.

more in it. The accent is always on the first syllable and this even facilitates the correct pronunciation and makes it easily absorbed in this respect”.¹²

In the paper “On the spoken Magyar language” Petar Miyatev detailed touches on the affiliation of the Magyar language, indicating its origin and noting some typical grammatical peculiarities. The author drew conclusions and stated that “The good relations existing between the Bulgarian and Hungarian people require more studies of the Magyar language in Bulgaria. In Hungary, in Budapest, Hungarians have already started studying the Bulgarian language in a few educational institutions. The mutual knowledge of the languages will further strengthen relations between the two peoples”.¹³

Being a supporter of the Bulgarian language in his paper “Bulgarian nicknames of Turkish origin” Petar Miyatev stated the following: “Apart the Turkish nicknames, nicknames of Greek origin or only Greek nicknames are used in Bulgaria. It would be useful that they would be replaced with Bulgarian also. To cleanse and bulgarise our language, especially there, where it will not cause any distortion, is a noble cause, which everyone loving the native Bulgarian language must contribute to. We do not create new words, we do not clutter the language with heavy and funny to use words, we want only our Bulgarian language, so we recommend discarding the other words, that is, in this case we recommend discarding the Turkish nicknames”.¹⁴ He concluded that, “We must bulgarize the nicknames of the Bulgarians too as the names of their villages were bulgarized”.¹⁵

P. Miyatev closely examined language issues in his paper “On the Pronunciation and Transcription of the Magyar Names

¹² Ibid., 1.

¹³ Миятев, П. За говоримия маджарски език. – PP, 1940, № 2, 72.

¹⁴ Миятев, П. Български прякорни имена от турски произход. – PP, 1937, № 1, 20.

¹⁵ Ibid., 21.

in Bulgarian Language”. “Like almost all other languages, the Magyar language also contains the above-mentioned loan-words from the Ural-Altaic languages, as well as loan-words from Latin, Greek, French, German and of other origin”, he stated¹⁶. Petar Miyatev noted that the sound system of Magyar language was differed too much from the Bulgarian one and this naturally caused difficulties with speech and transcription of the Magyar names. Two key points in the Magyar language were important: the Magyar language used long and short vowels, which was alien to the modern Bulgarian language and the accent always stood on the first syllable.¹⁷

In the paper “Wrongly translated Magyar names to Bulgarian ones” Petar Miyatev paid serious attention to the mistakes that occurred in the periodicals such as newspapers and magazines. The paper was a call to the translators not to make mistakes in the translation of texts from the Hungarian language¹⁸.

The dynamics of the bilateral scientific exchange marked an ascending line that characterized certain unevenness in the pace of development. Bilateral scientific relations, although affected by the economic and political relationships, had also independent development, which was conditioned by the cultural needs of the two nations in various fields of science and by the spiritual attitude and the creative interests of the scientists themselves. P. Miyatev contributed greatly to the spiritual achievements in the Bulgarian-Hungarian linguistic relations. His linguistic studies helped the process of mutual cultural understanding and enrichment between the Bulgarians and Hungarians as a part of European culture.

¹⁶ Миятев, П. За изговора и транскрипцията на маджарските имена в българския език. – БЕ, 1953, № 3, 252.

¹⁷ Ibid., 252.

¹⁸ Миятев, П. Неправилно предадени на български маджарски имена – РР, 1938, № 6, 68-70.

A nemzeti színszimbolikáról másképpen: a nemzeti színek a magyar és a bolgár nyelvi világképben

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Közismert, hogy a nyelv nem csupán a kommunikáció és a megismerés eszköze, egyben a nemzet kulturális kódja is, amely „meghatározott világképet is tartalmaz”.¹ Benne tükröződnek a nyelvhasználók élettapasztalatai és hagyományai.

A jelen írás a nemzeti színek nyelvi realizációiról szól. Mind a magyar, mint a bolgár nemzeti zászló színei a piros, a fehér és a zöld, csak más sorrendben következik a három egyenlő szélességű vízszintes színsáv. Céлом, hogy ismertessem, milyen helyet foglalnak el ezek a színjelnevezések a két nyelv szó-készletében, milyen beszédfordulatokban szerepelnek, mi indokolja használatukat, hogyan fejezik ki a nép eszmevilágát, milyen fogalmak kapcsolódnak hozzájuk, milyen asszociációkat ébresztenek. A három színnévnek mind konkrét, mind átvitt, szimbolikus jelentéseit vizsgálom (a teljesség igénye nélkül), nyomon követve azt a színes világképet, amely a rájuk vonatkozó frazeologizmusokból kibontakozik. Szem előtt tartom a nem lexikalizálódott, de gyakran együtt előforduló, több szóból álló szemantikai egységeket, az ún. kollokációkat is, valamint a vizsgált színlexémákkal alkotott összetett szavakat, amelyeknek egy részéhez a frazémákhoz hasonló képszerűség, érzelmi és/vagy jelentésbeli többlet fűződik hozzá. Ez a megközelítés

¹ Bańcerowski, J. A világ nyelvi képe mint a szemantikai kutatások tárgya. - MNy, 1999, N 95/2, 190.

lehetővé teszi, hogy összehasonlítsuk saját valóságképünket az idegennel és így a másik ország kulturális reáliáinak világában találhassuk magunkat.

A színek olyan nyelvi jelek, amelyeknek szemantikai struktúrája denotatív és szimbolikus jelentésekből áll. Hogy a színnevek mennyire tükrözik egy nyelvközösség gondolkodásmódját, a világhoz fűződő viszonyát, azt mi sem bizonyítja jobban, mint az a sok színnevet tartalmazó nyelvi alakzat, amely minden nyelvnek a sajátja. A hasonló értelemmel bíró, de más képi világú bolgár és magyar frazeológiai kifejezések közötti összehasonlítás feltárja a két kultúra képi és gondolati világában megmutatkozó hasonlóságokat és különbségeket.

Felmerülhet a kérdés miért érdemes egyáltalán a szín-szimbolika nyelvi megközelítésével foglalkozni? Azért, mert ily módon a nyelvvel kapcsolatos fontos háttérismereteket szerezhethetünk, és érdekes információkat kaphatunk a vizsgált nyelvekben rögzített világról is. Gyakran nem is sejtjük, hogy amikor idegen nyelven beszélünk, vagy egy másik nyelvre fordítunk, mennyire körültekintőnek kell lenni a színlexémák használatával, mert nem mindig elég azok referenciális jelentését ismerni. A szín szemantikai mezője azért is érdemel különös figyelmet, mert nagyon jól szemlélteti az egyes nyelvek szóhasználatbeli eltéréseit. Habár a szivárvány színeit mindenki ugyanolyannak látja, a különböző nyelvek beszélői nem egyformán tagolják a színspektrumot, így az általuk használt színelnevezések száma sem azonos. Gyakorlatilag ugyanannak a színnek lehet más neve attól függően, hogy mit akarunk jellemezni vele. A magyar zászló felső sávja piros, de ugyanaz a szín a volt Szovjetunió zászlajában már vörös. Ezen kívül a színneveket tartalmazó szókapcsolatok nem mindig tükrözik a valóságot, sokszor nem színt, hanem valamilyen más ismertetőjegyet fejeznek ki. A *fehérbor* valójában nem *fehér*, hanem a *vörösbor*hoz képest *világos*. A *vörös* melléknév a vér színével azonos, mégis előfordul olyan szókapcsolatban, amelyben a *világossal* ellentétes *sötét* változatot jelenti: a *vörös káposzta* a

valóságban sötétlila, a vöröshere színe is lila. A zöldbabnak és a zöldpaprikának is van olyan fajtája, amely színét tekintve sárga, a zöldhagymának is csupán a szára zöld. Amikor a zöld melléknévvel utalunk növényekre, zöldségekre, gyümölcsökre, elsősorban nem a színt vesszük figyelembe, hanem azt, hogy a növény új, friss, vitaminokban gazdag vagy még nem teljesen érett.² A színnevek gyakran szerepelnek olyan szókapcsolatokban, amelyek referenciája egyáltalán nem vonatkozik színre: *Vörös-tenger, fehér könyv, zöld asztal, Червен Петко* ('a bor tréfás elnevezése'), *Бяла Пада* ('a pálinka tréfás elnevezése'), *Червено море, Бяло море*. Az olyan kifejezések is, mint *vörös brigád, fehér vics, бял кахър, червени барети, червено щастие* stb. csak metaforikusan értelmezendők.

Nézzük sorra a három választott színnév alkalmazásait a magyar és a bolgár nyelvben.

A piros szín két prototípushoz kötődik: a vérhez és a lángoló tűzhöz, így szimbolikájába ellentétes dolgok vegyülnek. A vér az élet, az erő és az egészség jelképe, az elfolyó vér azonban a halálé. A tűzhöz nem csak a szerelem kapcsolódik, hanem a veszély jelzése, a pusztítás is.³

Brent Berlin és Paul Kay amerikai antropológus 98 nyelvre kiterjedő összevető kutatásai szerint szinte egyedül- állónak számít, hogy a magyar két önálló színnevet használ a vörös színtartományra: piros és vörös.⁴ A színnevek kapcsán a piros–vörös probléma az egyik legvitatottabb kérdés a magyar szakirodalomban. Feltűnő, hogy a kutatók eltérő, néha egymásnak ellentmondó következtetéseket vonnak le.⁵ A Színszótár szerint a

² Ibid., 34.

³ Koutny I. Mennyiben magyar színek a piros-fehér-zöld? Kontrasztív frazeológiai vizsgálat. – In: Maticsák S. (Ed.). *Nyelv, nemzet, identitás II.* Bp.–Debrecen, 2007, 232.

⁴ Berlin, B., P. Kay. *Basic Color Terms: Their Universality and Evolution.* Berkeley–Los Angeles, 1969, 36.

⁵ Erről részletesen lásd: Bálizs B. A huszadik század magyar színkutatói – nyelvészek. – In: Bene K., Sarlós I., Vitári Zs. (Eds.). *Kutatási Füzetek 17.* A Pécsi Tudományegyetem Interdiszciplináris Doktori Iskolájának kiadvány-

két elnevezés között némi árnyalatbeli különbség észlelhető: a piros világosabb, élénkebb, míg a vörös a vérrel való összefüggés következtében inkább mély árnyalatú, erősebb. Az *elpirul*-hoz képest az *elvörösödik* igét valamivel erősebbnek érzik, de több jelzős szerkezetben (*vörös haj, vörös téglá, vöröshagyma* stb.) a feltételezett szabály nem áll. A piros számóca például lehet sötétebb, mint a vörös szikla, a nemzeti lobogók pirosa is mélyebb lehet, mint a munkásmozgalmi vörös zászló. Bogatkin Mari vizsgálatai sem bizonyítják a fenti feltételezést. A szerő szerint a *vörös* a mai magyarban néhány kivételtől eltekintve „már csak az idiómákban és szólásokban fordul elő. Viszont a *piros* szóval napjainkban majdnem minden piros szín leírható”.⁶

A piros és vörös közötti különbség inkább csak használatbeli és alig függ a színárnyalattól. A bohóc orra piros, a hóban-fagyban didergő vagy részeg emberé viszont vörös. Ha valaki nem mond igazat, a füle pirosra színeződik, ha nagyon fázik vörösre. A nyuszinak, valamint a fényképezőgépbe néző embernek piros a szeme, a kialvatlan és síró emberé vörös. Az alma, a cseresznye, a meggy piros, de az áfonya, a ribizli, a som vörös. A kicsattanó egészség jele a *kipirosodott* vagy a *pirospozsgás* arc. A *vörös arcszín* betegséget jelezhet, de erős haragot is, bár heves indulat következtében az *arc pirosra* is gyűlhat. Az egészséges, nem sápadt arc tehát piros színű, de melegtől, erőfeszítéstől, felháborodástól vörös. Annak ellenére, hogy Krisztus vérével hozható kapcsolatba a húsvéti tojás csak piros lehet, még ha színe mélyvörös is. A vöröset főleg harcias vagy erotikus vonásokkal ruházzák fel. A szovjet hadsereg, az ötágú csillag vörös. „*Vörös csütörtök*”-ként vált emlékezetessé

sorozata. Pécsi Tudományegyetem, 2011, 13–34.

⁶ Bogatkin, M. Värvinimed ungari keeles. Põhinimed, nende struktuur ja kujunemine (Színelvezések a magyar nyelvben: alapszínnevek, szerkezetük és keletkezésük). Tartu Ülikool, 2005, 129.

<http://dspace.utlib.ee/dspace/bitstream/handle/10062/1188/bogatkin.pdf>
(2015.05.08.)

a budapesti munkásság 1907. október 10.-i tömegstrájkja az általános választójogért. A fenyegető-rémisztő pokol is vörös. A *vörös haj* sokáig a boszorkányok „ismertetőjele” volt, ma (a vörös körmökkel együtt), inkább az erotika körébe tartozik, mint ahogy a vörös lámpás negyed is. Ha vki dühös, az arca *pulykavörös* vagy *céklavörös*.

Egyes esetekben mindkét színelnevezés használatos: *piros, mint a paprika*, ~vörös, *mint a paprika; tűzvörös~tűzpiros*. Ezzel szemben a csak nyelvben létező színnevekben, mint a *tulipiros* és a *jajvörös*, amelyeknek nincs vizuális színjelentésük, a piros-vörös nem cserélhető fel egymással. Szégyenében vagy zavarában az ember *elpirul* vagy *elvörösödik*, de ha hőtől, erőfeszítéstől vagy indulattól elváltozik az arcszíne, csak az *elvörösödik* ige használható.

A piros szín árnyalatainak érzékeltetésére mind a magyar, mind a bolgár különböző nyelvi kifejezésekkel él. Az esetek többségében összetett szót képez a színnévvvel: *cseresznyepiros, kakaspiros, lázpiros, pipacspiros, skarlátpiros, gránátvörös, rákvörös, rozsdavörös, vérvörös, ill. малиновочервено, винено-червено, огненочервено, кървавочервено, рубинено-червено, керемиденочервено, вишневочервено*. Egyes megnevezésekből hiányzik a színnév, és csak a hasonlító elem önmagában vagy a -színű utótaggal együtt szolgál a szín kifejezésére: *bordó, karmazsin, krapp, rőt, vörhenyes, hússzínű, csipkebogyószínű, eperszínű; пужаво, бордо, коралово* stb. Fontos megemlíteni, hogy a bolgár nyelvben a piros szín szinonim elnevezéseit (*пурпурно, алено, румено*) stilisztikai differenciálás jellemzi a bennük foglalt konnotációktól függően, ezért a funkcionális megterheltségük sem egyforma. A *пурпурно* ‘bíborszínű’ például a hatalommal, a nemes származással, a királyi uralkodással társul.

Az árnyalat kifejezésének másik formája az összehasonlítás. A szóláshasonlatok a két nép asszociatív gondolkodását tárják fel, és kapcsolatban vannak gyakorlati tapasztalatukkal és kultúrtörténeti hagyományaikkal. A hasonlati tárgy kiválasztását

az embernek a környező világgal való kölcsönhatása határozza meg. Ezzel magyarázható, hogy a két nyelv eltéréseket mutat a hasonlított elemre vonatkozóan, amelek a tárgyak és a jelenségek közös jegyeinek és sajátosságainak különböző verbalizálására vezethetők vissza.

A szóláshasonlatokban a jellemző referenseket találjuk: *piros, mint a pipacs, ~a rózsza, ~az alma; vörös, mint a cékla, ~a pulyka, ~a róka, ~a Júdás haja, ~a skarlátposztó; червен като рак, ~кръв, ~мак, ~ябълка, ~домат, ~паяк, ~пламък, ~огън, ~панджар, ~битолски просяк; червен~ален като божур; червен, ~румен като трендафил.*

A különböző referenciatárgyak a színintenzitás különböző fokait, a piros szín erősségét, eltérő árnyalatait jelzik. A több frazeológiai variáns meglete lehetővé teszi kicserélhetőségüket, és gazdagítja a két nyelv stilisztikai lehetőségeit.

A szóláshasonlatok szemantikája azonos alakúságot mutat az összetett melléknévvel, amelyek a megfelelő analitikus hasonlító szerkezetekre vezethetők vissza. Vö.: *rákvörös ~ vörös, mint a rák.*

A piros~vörös színnévnek több szimbolikus jelentés tulajdonítható.⁷ Ez a szín a nagy intenzitású érzelmek mutatója, a *szeretet, a szerelem, a vágy, a szenvedély* színének tartják; gyakran valamilyen *erotikus* tartalomra is utal: *piros rózsza, piros szív, piros körmök, vérvörös ajkak, червена роза, червено сърце, кървавочервени~яркочервени~аленочервени устни.*

A piros a *tűzet, az aggodalmat* jeleníti meg. Azt is jelzi, hogy veszély leselkedik ránk. Ez az asszociációs kapcsolat olyan kollokációkban nyilvánul meg, mint: *vörös kakas, vörös lista, червена книга, червен бутон, червена лампичка, червена линия.*

A *figyelmeztetésre, tiltásra* is utalhat: *piros lap, piros fény, piros tiltó táblák; piros lámpa, belehajt a pirosba, червен картон (във футбола), червена светлина, червен светофар, минавам на червено, червена точка по време на телевизионно предаване.*

⁷ Ld. Koutny I., Op. cit., 233.

A piros hagyományosan a szocializmus és a kommunizmus színe. A *politikai baloldallal, a harccal, a forradalommal* hozzák összefüggésbe. Erről tanúskodnak az olyan nyelvi kifejezések is, mint például *Vörös Gárda, Vörös Hadsereg, Vörös Brigádok, Vörös Khmerek, vöröskatona, vörösingesek, a vörösök, vörös csillag, vörös nyakkendő* (úttörők jelvénye), *vörös október, vörös diktatúra, Червена армия, червеноармеец, червена роза, червена звезда, пионерска червена връзка, червена диктатура, червени кхмери, червени бабички-боклучи* ‘vörös vénasszonykák/ vörös szemét’ (a kommunista/szocialista párt hívei), *червени бапети* (a terrorizmus ellen harcoló osztagok).

A *vér, az egészség, az életerő, az energikus élet fogalmakhoz* is kapcsolódik: ez olyan kifejezésekben tükröződik, mint *pirospozsgás arc, piros száj, piros nyelv, piros tojás, Vöröskereszt, Vörös Félhold, Vörös Kristály* mint a nemzetközi humanitárius szervezet jelképei, amelynek célja az emberi élet és egészség védelme, ill. *червендалест, бял и червен, румено лице, румени бузи, алени устни, червено яйце, Червен кръст, червен полумесец, червен кристал*.

A vértolulás olyan fiziológiai reakció, amelyet ellenétes érzelmek válthatnak ki. Ezért nem véletlen, hogy a piros-vörös kétértelmű szín, amellyel mind *pozitív, mind negatív dolgok* fejezhetőek ki. Pozitív töltésűek a *piros pont, piros betűs ünnep, piros pünkösöd, червена точка, червения, румения, червение ми се гребенът, зачервил съм гребена*. Negatív konnotációjú jelentései a *haraghoz, a bűnbeeséshez, a testi szenvedélyek megbélyegzéséhez* kapcsolódnak: *vörös lett vkinek a feje, előnti a vörös kód~vörös kód ereszkedik a szeme elé; vörös, mint a pulyka; vörös posztó vkinek a szemében, почервениява от яд като догат~божур~чушка, червя се, изчервявам се; a piros ajkak, a piroslámpás ház, a vöröslámpás negyed, a skarlát-vörös a “nagy babiloni parázna” színe. A bolgár nyelvben a piros szín ‘veszély’ konceptuális jelentése gazdasági kontextusban veszteségre, pénzügyi nehézségekre is utalhat: на червено съм,*

azaz rosszul megy neki, veszteséggel dolgozik.

A *fehér* szín a fénnel, a tisztasággal, a jósággal, az ártatlansággal, az egyszerűséggel, a békeszeretettel asszociálható.⁸ Leginkább a tökételesség színéhez társítják. Prototípusa a fény és a hó.

A fehér színnevet tartalmazó szóláshasonlatok között vannak olyanok, amelyek megegyeznek a két nyelvben: *fehér, mint a fal, ~a hó, ~a gyolcs, ~a tej, ~a galamb, ~a hattyú, ~a lilium, ~az alabástrom, ~a kréta, ~a mész* – бял като сняг, ~платно, ~стена, ~мяко, ~гълъб, ~лебед, ~лилия, ~алабастър, ~тебешир, ~вар. Olyanokat is találunk, amelyekben a hasonlatok csak az adott nyelvre jellemzők: *fehér, mint a patyolat, ~mint Svatopluk lova, ~mint a bíbor, ~a tyúktojás*, – бял като клавиши на роял, ~като смин, ~като сирене, ~като възлен, ~като катран, ~като на тенджерата дъното. ~като на тиган дъното.

A jeltárgy megnevezésében megmutatkozó eltérések a két nyelv között a következő kifejezésekben figyelhetők meg: *бял кахър* ‘jelentéktelen, múló, csekélyke gond’, *бяла чума* ‘fehér pestis’ (= kábítószer-élvezés metaforikus jelölése).

A fehér szín a *fény*, a *világosság* színe, amely szemben áll a sötétséget jelképező feketével. E szimbolikus jelentés olyan szókapcsolatokban jut kifejezésre, mint *fehér éjszakák* ‘бели нощи’, *дохождам на бял свят* ‘világra jön’; *виждам бял свят* ‘napvilágot lát’, *посред бял ден* ‘világos/fényes nappal’, *ясно като бял ден* ‘világos, mint a nap’. Az utóbbi két bolgár szókapcsolat magyar megfelelőiben nem a fehér, hanem a világos szó szerepel, ami szintén a fehér és a világos jelentésbeli viszonyára utal. Ugyanez a kapcsolat a húsvét utáni vasárnap magyar és bolgár elnevezésében is fellelhető: *vö. Fehérvasárnap*, ill. *Светла неделя*.

A fehér szín hagyományosan az élethez, a naphoz, a világhoz társul. Aki nehéz életet él, akinek rosszul megy a

⁸ Алмалех, М. Слово и цвят: психолингвистични и прагматични аспекти. – In: Год. на СУ - ФСФ, Т. 91, 2006, 80.

szénája, arról azt mondják a bolgárok, *не вижда бял свят/бял ден* ‘nem lát fehér napot/világot’.

A fehér pozitív töltéssel bír. A *béke* és a *jóakarát* kifejezője: erre utalnak olyan kifejezések, mint *fehér galamb* ‘бял гълъб’, *kitűzi~lengeti a fehér zászlót, развявам~вдигам бяло знаме, не ми дава бял ден* ‘vki nem hagy békén vkit’.

A fehéret a tisztaság színének tartják: fehér mágia, бяла магия, оставям бяло поле. Az ártatlanságra is utalhat: fehér lilium, fehér lelkű, fehér vicc, fehérre mos vkit.

A fehér *politikával* kapcsolatos kifejezésekben is előfordul: fehérterror, fehérgárdista, fehérgalléros bűnözés; бял терор, белогвардеец, бяла бюлетина ‘üres, érvénytelen szavazólap’; бели якички (a hatalom, parlament, rendőrség bűnözői).

A fehér az *öröm* hordozója. *А роден на бял покрив* ‘fehér leplen született’, azaz burokokban született szólásban a fehér színnév a boldogsággal, a szerencsével, a gondtalansággal társul. A fehér lepel elválaszthatatlan egységbe fonja össze az életet és a halált, így annak a jó sorsnak a jelképévé válik, amellyel az újszülött “áldott”.

A fehér színt tartalmazó átkokban viszont, mint például *Да не видиш бял ден!* ‘Ne láss fehér napot’, *Под бяло да легнеш!* ‘Feküdj fehér lepel alá’, *Да те забулят в бяло!* ‘Fehérben fátyolózzanak le’ (‘halj meg/pukkadj meg’ jelentésben), *Бяла коса да не видиш!* (‘ne őszüljön a hajad’ = halj meg fiatalon) fordított szimbolikát találunk – itt a fehér az életből a halálba való átmenetet jelképezi. E szimbolikus jelentés a keleti kultúrákkal való analógiával magyarázható meg, ahol a fehér a gyászhoz, a bánathoz, a halálhoz társul. A holttestet mindenütt fehér lepellel borítják, így az adott frazeologizmusok által felidézett kép a színszimbolika univerzális voltára utal.

A fehér szerencsét hoz, a hosszú élettartamhoz, a sikerhez fűződik. Ez olyan frazémákban fejeződik ki, mint *вижда бяла бога* ‘látja a fehér Istent’ (sikeres az életben, boldogul), *идвам на бял кон* ‘fehér lovon jön’, azaz sikert ér el vmiben, *Да те видя на бял кон* ‘hadd lássanak fehér lovon’, azaz legyen sikered,

szerencséd, *Вятър го вее на бял кон/бяла кобила* ‘Szél fújja fehér lovon/fehér kancán’, azaz gondtalanul él, *връстник с белите орли* ‘egykorú a fehér sasokkal’, vagyis élemedett korú.

A bolgárban a fehér szín a jóságot is jelölheti. A jóságos, szelíd emberről azt mondják, hogy: “*сърце и бял дроб*” (‘szív és a tüdő’).

A fehér valami ritka, kivételes dolgot is jelenthet, a váratlan boldogságot és a meglepetést: *fehér holló, бяла врана, бяла лястовица*, ellentétben a fekete macskával például, amelyet a népi hiedelemben baljós előjelnek tekintenek.

Az ellentét olyan frazeologizmusokban nyilvánul meg legélénkebben, amelyek mind a két színt tartalmazzák: *ha akarom fehér, ha akarom fekete; ha nem fehér, fekete; не казва ни черно, ни бяло* ‘nem mond se fehéret, se feketét’, vagyis se jót, se rosszat; *на черното казва бяло* ‘a feketét fehérnek mondja’; *не съм видял бял ли е, чер ли е* ‘nem láttam fehér-e vagy fekete’ vagyis én sem értettem, hogy ez jó vagy rossz; *бели пари за черни дни* ‘fehér pénz szűk napokra’ (félre teszi a megtakarított pénzt, hogy meglegyen szükség esetén).

Az olyan okszimoron hasonlatokra, mint *бял като въглен. ~като на тенджерата дъното, ~ като кюмюрджия, ~циганин, ~егюптин, ~арапин* ‘fehér, mint a szén, ~a lábas feneke, ~a szénégető, ~a cigány, ~a néger’ jellemző, hogy az ellenkezőjét kell érteni annak, ami meg van nevezve. Éppen az egymást kizáró ellentétes fogalmak összekapcsolásából, a forma és a tartalom ellentmondásából ered e frazémák jelentésének ironikus színezete.

A zöld szín a természet színe, az élet szimbóluma. A megújulást, a növekedést, a harmóniát, a termékenységet, a reményt jelenti, és egyúttal az éretlenség, a fiatalság, a változás jelképe is.⁹

A zöld szimbolikus jelentései megegyeznek a két nyelvben, de szembetűnik, hogy egyes frazeológiai kifejezések magyar, ill. bolgár megfelelőjéből hiányzik a színnév. Pl.: *zöldasztal*

⁹ Koutny, I., Op. cit., 235.

mellett – официално, по пътя на преговори; *zöld ágra vergődik* – успешно се справям с нщ, провървява ми, преуспявам, излиза ми късметът; *a szomszéd rétje mindig zöldebb* – комшийската кокошка все по-големи яйца снася ‘a szomszéd tyúkjá nagyobb tojásokat rak’; *kékre-zöldre ver* – насинявам от бои; *праицам за зелен хайвер* ‘elküld vkit zöld káviárra’ – lóvá tesz; *трай, коньо, за зелена трева* “túrj/várj, ló, zöld füért” – várhatsz, babám, míg csak bele nem fáradsz.

Több magyar összetett szó és kifejezés bolgár megfelelője sem tartalmazza a színnevet: *zöldpetrezselyem* – маджаноз, *zöldfőzelék* – яхния от пресни зеленчуци, *zöldvendéglő* – ресторант градина stb.

A zöld közvetlenül kapcsolódik a természethez, ill. a környezetvédelemhez: *zöld párt/klub/hírek/oldal*, *zöldhatár*, *a zöldek*, *zöld főváros*, *zöld könyv*; ill. *Партия на зелените*~Зелена партия, *клуб на зелените*, *зелени новини*, *зелена страница*, *зелена столица*, *зелена книга*. A környezetvédelmi kérdések, a környezetbarát gondolkodásmód előtérbe kerülésével manapság egyre több szókapcsolatban található a zöld színszó a bio/öko melléknév szinonimájaként: *zöld projekt*, *zöld energia*. A *зелено училище* ‘zöld iskola’ kifejezésnek magyar megfelelője ‘iskolai kirándulás a természetbe’ nem tartalmazza a színnevet, de hasonló jelentéssel bírnak olyan kifejezések, mint *a zöldbe kirándul*, *a zöldben tölti a hétvégét*.

A zöldnek az éretlenség, tapasztalatlanság, fiatalság, naivitás fogalmához köthető jelentése is van: *zöld gyümölcs* ‘éretlen’, *zöldbőr* ‘frissen lefejtett állati bőr’, *zöldfülű*, *még zöld a szakmában*, ill. *млад и зелен*, *зелена глава* ‘zöldfejű’, azaz a bolgárok számára, a magyaroktól eltérően, a tapasztalatlan embernek a feje és nem a füle zöld. Az utóbbi szinonim szólásában más színnév és más testrész is szerepelhet a bolgár nyelvben: *има още жълто по устата* ‘van még sárga a szája körül’, vagyis *tejjföllösszájú*, *rajta van még a tojáshéj*.

A jelzőlámpánál a zöld a piros szín ellentéte: piros – tilos, zöld – szabad. A szabadság, engedély szimbolikus jelentése olyan kifejezésekben is tükröződik, mint pl. *zöld lámpa*, *zöldvonal* (ingyenes telefon), *zöld szám*, *zöldkártya* (autósoknak), *zöldhullám* (a közlekedésben), *zöldfolyosó* (a repülőtéren), *zöld utat ad/biztosít/kap*, ill. *зелен светофар*, *зелена светлина*, *зелена телефонна линия*, *зелен телефонен номер*, *зелена карта на автомобил*, *давам зелена улица*, *давам зелена светлина*.

A zöld színnév negatív felhangú is lehet: *a méreg*, *a féltékenység*, *az ostobaság* fogalmakhoz köthető. Gondoljunk csak a *zöldhályog* (glaukóma) betegségre – *зелена звезда* (глаукома), a féltékenységnak Shakespeare Othello című művéből származó elnevezésére (*a zöld szemű szörny* – *зеленооко чудовище*); a harag, a felindulás, a betegség okozta sápadtságra: *szép zöld vki*, *zöld lesz mérgében*, *az arca zöld a félelemtől*, *kékre-zöldre válik* (dühében vagy ijedtében), ill. *позеленява от яд/зняв*. A *zöldek/zöldségeket beszél*, *sok zöldet összehord* kifejezések bolgár megfelelői nem tartalmazzak színnevet: *говоря врели-некипели*, *измишльотини*, *бабини деветини*, *небивалици*, de magát a szimbolikus jelentést megtaláljuk a *зелена кратуна* ‘tökfilkó, tökfejű’ frazémában.

Összefoglalásul elmondhatjuk, hogy a nemzeti színlexémák jelentős szerephez jutnak a népek hétköznapi életében, történetében és hitvilágában, ezért fontos kategóriái a vizsgált nyelvek fogalmi rendszerének is. A piros, fehér, zöld színnevek produktívak mind a magyar, mint a bolgár nyelvben, számtalan összetett szó, ige és főnév képezhető belőlük, több frazeológiai egységben szerepelnek, színjelölő funkciói és szimbolikus jelentései erőteljesen áthatják mindennapi nyelvhasználatunkat.¹⁰ Az átvitt értelmű kifejezésekben a jelentésátvitel nemcsak metaforán, hanem metonímián is alapulhat: *vörösingesek*, *zöldbenzin*, *zöldövezet*, *zöldkártya*, *zöldmezős beruházás*, *червеноризци*, *зелен бензин*, *зелена*

¹⁰ Koutny, I., Op. cit., 237.

зона, зелена карта.

A színárnyalatok különböző denotátumokról kapják a nevüket: a tapasztalati valóság, a környező világ, a mindennapi élet, a kultúrtörténeti hagyományok, „*az adott ország (vagy nagyobb térség) klímájának, növényzetének, tágabb értelemben kultúrájának jellegzetességei nyomják rá bélyegüket,*” így sok hasonlóság található az elnevezésekben, de némi különbség is.¹¹ Vannak földrajzi eredetű színnevezések (pl. *burgundi vörös, írzöld, Himalája-fehér, буржундско червено, бордо, ирландско зелено*), személy- vagy tulajdonnevekből képzett (pl. *Mikulás-piros, Ferrari-piros, Rubens-vörös, Amazonas-zöld, Benetton-zöld*) és kémiai vonatkozású színnevek is (pl. *rézvörös, bronzvörös, ólomfehér, kadmiumzöld, медено/бакъреночервено*). Egyes konkrét elnevezésekben a magyar, másokban a bolgár használja több helyen a színt a név részeként és hasonló fajták megkülönböztetésére. A szólásokban és szóláshasonlatokban a színek sajátos gondolkodásmódot jeleznek. Bizonyos dolgokat a két nép más színben lát: itt főleg közel álló, ill. kevert színekre kell gondolni, amelyet az egyik kultúra az egyik színként, a másik a másikként értelmez. A frazeológiában is tükröződik, hogy a piros, fehér, zöld szimbolikája a prototipikus képviselőkhöz, illetve az ezekből levezethető fogalmakhoz kötődik. A magyar és a bolgár nyelv e három színnevet tartalmazó kifejezéseinek összevetése során a következő csoportok különíthetők el:

Azonos szín – azonos vonatkozás: olyan szókapcsolatok kerülnek ide, amelyeknek azonos a denotatív és konnotatív jelentésük, és egybeesik a lexikális összetételük. Pl.: *vörös, mint a rák/vér/láng/pulyka/ – червен като рак/кръв/пламък/пуйка; majd ha piros hó esik – като завали червен сняг; vmi vörös fonálként vonul végig – нещо преминавам като червена*

¹¹ Ibid., 231; Недкова, Е. Съпоставителен лингвокултурологичен анализ на фраземи с компоненти названия на цветове в български, сръбски и руски език. – В: Сборник Матице српске за славистику, т. 76, Нови Сад, 2009, 109–118.

нишка; *vörös szőnyeget terít (valaki elé) – разгъвам червения килим/червената пътека пред някого, fehér, mint a hó/fal/gyolcs – бял като сняг/стена/платно; zöld, mint a fű – зелен като трева; zöld utat ad – давам зелена улица.*

E csoporton belül olyan hasonló alakú frazeológiai egységeket is találunk, amelyek között szemantikai különbségek figyelhetők meg a két nyelvben. A *fehéren feketén* szólás pl. a magyar nyelvben két jelentésű, a bolgárban csak a ‘dokumentálva van, írásban is létezik’ jelentésben használatos, míg a ‘félreérthetetlenül, világosan’ szinonimájaként való értelmezése nem ismert.

Eltérő vonatkozás: A frazeologizmusok egy részében csak az adott nyelvre jellemző képeket találjuk, amelyeket a másik nyelv használói teljesen elfogadhatatlanoknak tartanak. Az esetek többségében az eltérések a frazeológiai kapcsolatok kultúrspecifikus összetevőire vezethetők vissza: *vörös, mint a skarlatposztó, ~a Júdás haja – червен като божур ‘pünkösdi rózsza’, ~като битолски просяк ‘bitoli koldus’, ~ като калинка ‘katicabogár’; felszáll/leszáll a vörös kakas vnova – пускам червената кобила ‘eleresztí a vörös kancát’, бял като клавиши на роял, ~сирене, ~въглен, ~камран, ~на тиган дъното ‘fehér, mint a brinza sajt, ~a zongora billentyűi, ~a szén, ~a kátrány, ~a serpenyő feneke’.*

Eltérő színhasználat: a két nyelv eltérő módon vonatkoztat egy-egy színt a valóságra. Például a *vöröshagymát* bolgárul vagy csak hagymának nevezik (*кромид/кромид лук*), vagy ritkábban *жълт лук*, azaz sárga hagymának, a *lilahagyma* pedig a bolgárok számára vörös (*червен лук*). A sárgászöld epéhez kapcsolódó irigység a magyarban sárgaként jelenik meg: *sárga irigység, sárga vki az irigységtől, előnti/elfogja/megeeszí a sárga irigység, belesárgul az irigységbe*. A bolgár nép *черна и бяла завист* ‘fekete és fehér’ irigységről beszél, az irigységtől az ember elzöldül (*позеленява от завист*).

Színhiány: *червен вятър* (betegség) – orbánc; *червенокож* – rézbőrű; *червено щастие* – havibaj; *червена мухоморка* – légyölő galóca; *vörösfenyő* – ливтеница; *vörösgyűрű* –

кучешки дрян; на червен Гергьовден~на червен понеделник ‘piros Györgynapon/piros hétfőn’, vagyis majd, ha fagy; хванала ме е червената болест ‘elkapta a vörös betegséget’, azaz vki betegnek tettei magát; по бели гащи – ingben-gatyában, teljesen készületlenül; червен бан/мангър не се губи, ~ червена аспра не загива – rossz pénz nemvész el; червенеет ми се гребена, зачервил съм гребена – jól megy a szénája; kimutatja a foga fehérét – показва си зъбите/porata; зашит с бели конци – kilóg belőle a lóláb, látszik rajta a csalás; zöld disznóról mesét mond – говоря приказки от 1001 нощ.

Minden szín sokrétű tapasztalattal köthető össze. A példaanyagból láthatóvá válik, hogy a piros, fehér, zöld színszavak nem szín értelemben is funkcionálhatnak, vagyis metaforizálhatók. Mindhárom aktívan vesz részt archetipikus és kulturális jelentések közvetítésében is. Az archetipikus jelentés az emberiség őstapasztalataihoz, évszázados hagyományaihoz nyúlik vissza, és hozzájárul a szín által kiváltott érzelmi és asszociatív reakciókhoz. Ilyen pl. a vörös és az izgatottság, a veszély kapcsolata. A piros kulturális jelentése a szeretet, a szerelem, a forradalom színe, a fehér a tisztaságé, a zöld – a remény színe, a közlekedésben pozitív tartalmú, a természetben az egészséges, friss növények színe.

A vizsgálat alapján megállapítható, hogy a három tárgyalt színnév prizmáján keresztül bemutatott magyar és bolgár nyelvi világkép sok közös tulajdonságot mutat. A magyarok és a bolgárok hasonló dolgokat tekintenek piros-, fehér-, ill. zöld színűnek, ami a közös kulturális térséghez való hovatartozásukra vezethető vissza. Az asszociációs kapcsolatokban az univerzális dominál az etnospecifikus felett. A két nyelvben a színlexémáknak általánosan ismert szimbolikáját találjuk, amely egyúttal némi helyi színezettel jelenik meg a frazeológiában. A színek felfogásában és használatában fellelhető különbségek abból adódnak, hogy a valóság hasonló elemeinek nyelvi megnevezéseiben más és más szempontok jutnak kifejezésre.

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